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Abstract
A broad transformation occurred in the scale and scope of professional architectural practice in the
United States in the decades after World War II. My dissertation explores this shift, in particular the
rise of the body of collaborative and team-based methods of production that would come to be
labeled as corporate architectural practice. An exploration of these practices reveals a climate of
speculation in the postwar period on the corporation as a social and institutional form, and a
widespread interest in the potentials of anonymous and collective methods to reshape the nature and
objects of architectural production. Tracing the history of these collaborative approaches from
progressive project to the critique of the corporate, the dissertation challenges the historiographic
methods premised on singular authorship that have governed existing interpretations of postwar
modernism.
While there exists a growing body of work on architecture produced for corporations in the
postwar period, far less critical attention has been paid to its corollary: the corporate production of
architecture itself. Despite the dominant role of large firms within mainstream architectural practice
in the United States, a comprehensive account has yet to be written of the motivations for and
growth of such practices after 1945, the shifting economic and political conditions which underlay
their production, and the problematic reception of their work by architectural critics after the 1970s,
predicated on notions of signature and authorship which remained essentially unchanged despite
these radical shifts in the nature of production.
The dissertation proposes a cultural and discursive history of corporate architectural practice,
from its origins and international extension to its built products and their reception within the
architectural field. I explore these transformations in architecture through the history of The
Architects Collaborative (TAC), founded in 1945 as an experiment in team-based design methods by
seven young practitioners together with German emigrd Walter Gropius. Despite the extensive
historiography of Gropius and his work prior to 1945, there is as yet no detailed history of TAC
itself, the largest architectural firm in the U.S. by the 1970s and the collective body through which
Gropius practiced for the last twenty-five years of his career. An exploration of the firm's origins and
expansion, its sustained legacy of work in the Middle East and Europe in the decades after World
War II, and its eventual demise in 1995 reveals the contested stakes around questions of anonymity,
authorship, and expertise at the heart of the U.S. architectural corporation and its continuing global
impact up to the present.
Thesis Supervisor: Mark Jarzombek
Tide: Professor of the History and Theory of Architecture
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Introduction
I believe that an architectural historian should, from time to time, look over the shoulders and under the
feet of the conventionally accepted heroes and try to see what went on around them and on what they
stood; and, furthermore, to see whether that hinterland may not contain some very adequate heroes of its
own.
-John Summersoni
Despite the increasing presence of large, team-based offices within U.S. architectural practice over
the last century, a history of how architects and critics have understood these offices has yet to be
written. In the past century, the nature of group practice transformed from the big businesses and
large organizations that accompanied the merger movement at the turn of the twentieth century to
the factory producers of the industrial expansion in the 1910s and 1920s, the bureaucratic firms of
the postwar boom, and the multinational conglomerates of the neoliberal present. Throughout these
shifts in the scope of "corporate" architectural organization, architects and historians have speculated
on the implications of the large-scale office for the status of architecture as a business, a profession,
and a field of cultural production. 2
In this dissertation, I explore the unaccounted presence of collective, collaborative, and team-
based methods of production within architecture's modernity. Despite the diversity of these practices
and the intensity of debates regarding their efficacy and meaning for the nature of architectural
production, all would eventually come to be grouped, and increasingly criticized, under the broad
rubric of "corporate" architectural practice in the decades after World War II. An exploration of these
practices reveals a widespread interest in the potentials of collective methods to reshape the nature
and objects of architectural production, as well as the contested stakes around questions of creativity
I John Summerson, "Charting the Victorian Building World," in 7he Unromantic Castle and Other Essays (London:
Thames and Hudson, 1990).
2 I borrow this term from Pierre Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production (New York: Columbia University Press,
1993).
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and authorship within the architectural corporation after 1945. Despite the dominant role of large
firms within mainstream architectural practice in the United States, a comprehensive account has yet
to be written of the motivations for and growth of such practices after 1945, the shifting economic
and political conditions which underlay their production, and the problematic reception of their
work by architectural critics after the 1970s, predicated on notions of signature and authorship
which remained essentially unchanged despite these radical shifts in the nature of production. In
exploring this history, I propose that architects throughout the twentieth century have regarded the
structure of professional practice itself as the terrain on which the relation between architectural
creation and the broader economic and cultural conditions of practice can be negotiated and
contested.
This investigation began with a basic question: what do we mean when we talk about
corporate architecture? Within the design professions, the term "corporate" has commonly been used
to bracket a certain domain of generic or formulaic work, in contrast to practices that are seen to be
more unique, original, or inventive. Yet it is often unclear precisely what the abstraction of the
"corporate" is meant to signify.3 Does it designate a certain scale of office, or particular legal or
creative structures of practice? Does it refer to the production of architecture serving corporate
clients or programs, for example the office tower?4 Or does it ultimately describe the perceived
character-or lack thereof-of the work that is produced? 'The dissertation explores the challenges of
language that have accompanied attempts to think the concept of the architectural corporation,
focusing on key terms within this discourse, including questions of bureaucracy, teamwork,
3 See John Harwood, "Corporate Abstraction," in Perspecta 46 Error (2013): 218-243. In his assessment of the
theoretical difficulties of historicizing team-based or corporate entities in architecture, Harwood points to the "sophistry
of inter-war avant garde theory," such as that of Hitchcock, in its attempts to finesse "the historiographical attitude
produced by simultaneously viewing the history of architecture as the product of individuals and of groups." Instead, he
calls us to address "the question of what is excluded from a historical account that treats neither collective action, nor the
behavior of individuals as motivated by corporate identity."
4 On the nature of corporate architectural space in the postwar period, see in particular Reinhold Martin, The
Organizational Complex: Architecture, Media, Corporate Space (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003) and John Harwood,
The Interface: IBM and the Transformation of Corporate Design, 1945-1976 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
2011).
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collaboration, incorporation, influence, signature, and anonymity. I argue that the basic narratives of
architectural modernism have been overburdened by a language that remains centered on the notion
of singular architectural authorship, despite the fundamental impact of team-based architectural
practices over the last century.
I study these transformations in modern architecture through the history of The Architects
Collaborative (TAC), founded in 1945 as an experiment in team-based design methods by seven
young practitioners together with German emigre Walter Gropius. Despite the extensive
historiography of Gropius and his work prior to 1945, there is as yet no detailed history of TAC
itself, the collective body through which Gropius practiced for the last twenty-five years of his career.
An exploration of the firm's origins and expansion, its sustained legacy of work in the Middle East
and Europe in the decades after World War II, and its eventual demise in 1995 reveals the contested
stakes around questions of anonymity, authorship, and expertise at the heart of the U.S. architectural
corporation and its continuing global impact up to the present. In exploring this history, I argue that
TAC is worthy of study as both a symptomatic example of broader transformations in the nature of
professional practice after World War II and as a specific case that reveals the limits of existing
categories for understanding the range of collective and corporate practices that took shape in this
period.
A central aspect of the history of collaborative practices has been their challenge to modernist
discourses of the singular creative figure. My dissertation investigates the historiography surrounding
just such an anointed figure within architectural modernism, Walter Gropius, and the difficulties
faced by historians in accounting for his work as it came to engage with the team-based models of
practice for which he and his contemporaries advocated. Though it was the largest dedicated
architecture firm in the U.S. by the 1970s, the firm has been conventionally historicized almost
exclusively in relation to Gropius, the architect singularly identified with the migration of the
Bauhaus and its legacy after World War II. Received accounts of TAC's origins have perpetuated the
13
idea that Gropius established the firm as an application of his ideas on collaboration and teamwork
among holistically-trained designers, achieved through a group of willing disciples who would realize
this collective ideal in practice. 5 Such accounts distort the true story of TAC's founding, described in
Chapter Two, by seven younger architects who came together through a dense network of personal
and professional connections in a shared climate of utopian social ideals at the start of the postwar
building boom. A reassessment of this history against the historiography of TAC, the focus of
Chapter Three, reveals persistent questions concerning the architectural corporation and its global
extensions after World War II that parallel recent explorations of the modes of embodiment,
personhood, signature, and influence in architectural history.6
Among the team-based practices that have served as exemplars of late modernism for
architectural historians, TAC was unique in being both a postwar collective of young practitioners
and the medium through which the singular image of Gropius continued to be propagated during
the last twenty-five years of his work. This double construction has continued to pose a crisis for
historians, many of whom have preferred to collapse the firm's history back onto the conventional
5 TAC's work has appeared primarily through histories of Gropius that presume he was the primary author of the firm
and its projects. These include Winfried Nerdinger, The Architect Walter Gropius (Berlin: Bauhaus-Archiv; Cambridge,
MA: Busch-Reisinger Museum, 198 5); John C. Harkness, ed., Walter Gropius Archive, Vol 4: 1945-1969, The Work of The
Architects Collaborative (New York and London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1991); Reginald R. Isaacs, Walter Gropius: An
Illustrated Biography ofthe Creator ofthe Bauhaus (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1991). The major monographic
treatments of TAC's work are Walter Gropius and Sarah P. Harkness, ed., The Architects Collaborative 1945-1965 (Teufen:
Verlag Arthur Niggli, 1966) and "TAC: The Heritage of Walter Gropius," PROCESS: Architecture No. 19 (October
1980).
6 See in particular Ana Miljacki, ed., Under the Influence (Cambridge, MA: MIT SA+P Press, 2014); Timothy Hyde,
"Notes on Architectural Persons," The Aggregate website (Transparent Peer Reviewed), accessed October 15, 2013, http://
we-aggregate.org/piece/notes-on-architectural-persons; Amanda Lawrence and Miljka&i, ed., Terms ofAppropriation:
Essays on Architectural Influence (London: Routledge, 2017).
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narrative of other supposedly singular creative practices before and after World War II.7 This
biographical emphasis has served to distort the histories of both TAC and Gropius, marginalizing the
firm and its work while condemning Gropius to stand as a synecdoche for the perceived failures of
the modernist avant garde at large. 8 The problematics of reception and legacy within this history
have been further complicated by the presence of artists and architects throughout the twentieth
century who consciously sought to efface the role of signature in their work, significantly including
Laiszl6 Moholy-Nagy and Gropius among the Bauhaus 6migres. 9 This abdication of authorship was
frequently portrayed negatively by historians and critics, as a pretext for their dismissal of postwar
modernism as a submission to the demands of mainstream market practice in the U.S. Yet others,
like the architectural historian Henry-Russell Hitchcock, recognized that the postwar emergence of
large-scale, bureaucratic firms would require the critic to develop fundamentally different tools in
order to distinguish the built products of such practices from those of more singular modes of self-
fashioning.10 Despite Hitchcock's warning that "conceptually the two types of work are distinct and
should not be subjected to the same type of analysis and criticism," I argue, subsequent historians
7 The titles and chapters of the major surveys on twentieth-century modernism in this period attest to the historiographic
emphasis on the legacy of prewar avant garde figures as singular authors, variously referred to as masters, pioneers,
founding fathers, etc. To note only some of the most prominent examples, see Nikolaus Pevsner, Pioneers ofthe Modern
Movementfrom William Morris to Walter Gropius (London, Faber & Faber 1936); Peter Blake, The Master Builders: Le
Corbusier, Mies van der Rohe, Frank Lloyd Wright (New York: Norton, 1976); Charles Jencks, "Gropius, Wright and the
Collapse into Formalism," in Modern Movements in Architecture (Garden City, N.Y., Anchor Press, 1973); Manfredo
Tafuri and Francesco Dal Co, "The Activity of the Masters After World War II," in Modern Architecture (Milan: Electa,
1976); William H. Jordy, "The Aftermath of the Bauhaus in America: Gropius, Mies, and Breuer" (1968), reprinted in
Jordy, "Symbolic Essence" and Other Writings on Modern Architecture andAmerican Culture, ed. Mardges Bacon (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2005): 187-224.
8 George Kubler, in particular, has pointed to the limits of art and architectural history as biography. As he notes, "The
life of an artist is rightly a unit of study in any biographical series. But to make it the main unit of study in the history of
art is like discussing the railroads of a country in terms of the experiences of a single traveler on some of them." Kubler,
The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things (New York and New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962): 6.
9 On anonymity and the effacement of signature by artists and architects in the twentieth century, see in particular Louis
Kaplan, Ldszld Moholy-Nagy: Biographical Writings (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1995); Caroline Jones,
"Frank Stella: Executive Artist," in Machine in the Studio: Constructing the Postwar American Artist (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1996): 114-188; David Joselit, "The Artist Readymade: Marcel Duchamp and the Societd Anonyme,"
in Jennifer R. Gross, ed., The Societ/ Anonyme: Modernism for America (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
2006): 33-44, and Joselit, Infinite Regress: Marcel Duchamp 1910-1941 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).
10 Henry-Russell Hitchcock, "The Architecture of Bureaucracy and the Architecture of Genius," Architectural Review, No.
101 (January 1947): 3-6.
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proved largely unwilling or unable to meet this call for new methods to assess the work of corporate
architects after 1945 as distinct from their prewar predecessors.11
Challenging this framework has required an engagement with the body of critical and theoretical
literature on questions of authorship and cultural production, drawn from diverse fields including
sociology, literary criticism, business and institutional history, and histories of collective spaces of
artistic and architectural work. In seeking to broaden the framework for understanding these creative
practices, my research engages methodological approaches drawn in particular from the history of
science, especially those concerning the social construction of technological systems. 12 Mis
dissertation has also been informed by attempts to introduce sociological methods to the study of
art, particularly Howard S. Becker's seminal Art Worlds. 3 In contrast, sociological analyses of
architecture-particularly those produced in the 1980s and 1990s, at a time when the economic and
legal structures of mainstream professional practice were increasingly under threat-have focused on
professional issues internal to the discipline, ignoring broader cultural questions concerning the
meaning and interpretation of architecture in its social context.' 4 Conversely, histories focused on
evaluating the visible products of architectural production have often obscured the questions of
bureaucracy, organization, competition, expertise, and ethics in relation to practice which the
dissertation seeks to illuminate. Between these two approaches, I am interested in what historian of
technology Donald Mackenzie has described as the "historical sociology" of cultural fields and their
practices, in which historical questions about the definition of concepts and objects within a field are
11 Ibid., 6.
12 See in particular Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, Trevor J. Pinch, ed., The Social Construction of Technological
Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987).
13 Howard S. Becker, Art Worlds (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).
14 Sociological analyses of the design professions in this period include Judith R. Blau, Mark La Gory and John S. Pipkin,
ed., Professionas and Urban Form (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983); Blau, Architects and Firms: A
Sociological Perspective on Architectural Practice (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984); Robert Gutman, Architectural
Practice: A Critical View (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1988); Paul L. Knox, ed., The Design Professions and
the Built Environment (London and Sydney: Croom Helm; New York: Nichols Publishing Company, 1988); Dana Cuff,
Architecture: The Story ofPractice (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991); Magali Sarfatti Larson, Behind the Postmodern
Facade: Architectural Change in Late Twentieth-Century America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
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informed by the social processes through which the "knowledge-generating and knowledge-assessing
activities" of the field take shape.15
The historiographic elision of TAC has been exacerbated by the problematic status of the archive
itself in relation to the firm's work. The research draws on a body of accessible but largely
unprocessed material, all salvaged during TAC's sudden demise in 1995 and scattered among various
institutions including the MIT Museum and the Harvard Graduate School of Design. The bulk of
this fragmented body of material has remained ignored by scholars of postwar modernism, in
contrast to archives focused on Walter Gropius as a singular author and teacher, including the
Bauhaus-Archiv in Berlin and the Harvard University Art Museums. These archives have served to
reinforce the identification of Gropius with the Bauhaus and Harvard, the major sites of his
pedagogy and practice before and after World War II, while largely separating his history from that
of the office with which he practiced for nearly half of his professional career.16 Such archives have
institutionalized the narrative of emigration and influence from Europe to the United States which
continues to structure the history of architects like Gropius, ultimately reinforcing the devaluation of
their postwar work as a collapse of avant garde idealism under the demands of professional practice
in the U.S.
Correcting the historiographic division between Gropius and TAC has required an expansion of
the archive itself beyond the study of existing documentary material. The chapters that follow have
15 Donald Mackenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology ofNuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1993). Mackenzie's term refers to a double sense in which historical narratives of a given field and its products would
benefit by being more attention to the sociological, while conversely, the sociological study of such a field would benefit
from a focus on historical questions and narratives. In contrast to sociologies of architectural practice that have focused
on the career patterns and reward systems internal to the field, Mackenzie offers a reminder that within any field of
production, change "is simultaneously economic, political, organizational, cultural, and legal change, to enumerate just
some of the aspects of 'the social."'
16 The distortions induced by the historiographic and interpretive split between Gropius and TAC can be seen readily in
The Walter Gropius Archive (New York and London: Garland Publishing Inc. and Harvard University Art Museums,
1990-9 1), the definitive four-volume publication of materials in collection of the Busch-Reisinger Museum concerning
Gropius and his practice. Three volumes focus on his work in Germany and in the United States with other German
emigres including Marcel Breuer and Konrad Wachsmannn, while the fourth volume, ostensibly dedicated to the work of
The Architects Collaborative after 1945, in fact contains only a small number of the firm's projects in which its authors
claim "Gropius Had a Major Part."
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benefited from interviews with numerous ex-principals, collaborators, and other alumni of the TAC
office, many of whom have not previously been included in historical accounts of projects often
attributed solely to Gropius or otherwise ignored. This research has included other protagonists in
TAC's international work beyond the firm itself, including engineers, local consultants, and other
bureaucratic agents involved with these projects. These interviews comprise an oral history of the
firm that includes a broader array of voices of those inside and outside the firm, seeking to paint a
more complex portrait of the social and professional cultures in which architectural practices take
place. While the voices of these team members and collaborators are crucial in describing the
formation and growth of TAC in the first half of the dissertation, they reappear throughout the study
in relation to specific projects and problems faced by the firm as it negotiated the shifting landscape
of architectural practice during its fifty years of existence. In this way, narrating the history of a
collectivity like TAC demands a multivalent approach that avoids the distortions of biographical
history on the one hand, and on the other, the problematic constructs of "anonymous history" or an
essentializing "architecture without architects."17
A persistent elision enabled by the reliance on narratives of singular authorship, addressed in the
second half of the dissertation, is the history of involvement of U.S. architecture firms in the
transnational, oil-based economies of the Arab and Persian Gulf states after World War II. These
exchanges reached their peak during the boom in crude oil prices from 1973 to 1983 as a direct
corollary to the economic collapse of practice in the West, a period in which TAC built heavily in
Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The dissertation addresses this discursive
ellipsis between the conventional histories of such U.S. firms and their deep reliance on commissions
in the Arab and Persian Gulf among an expanding international map of commissions. I trace how,
paradoxically, post-colonial critiques of such work as Orientalist have often served to preclude a more
detailed account of the sustained, reciprocal influence between corporate practices and the
17 Sigfried Giedion, Mechanization Takes Command: A Contribution to Anonymous History (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1948); Bernard Rudofsky, Architecture Without Architects (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1964).
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speculative oil economies of the Gulf states. In studying the implication of TAC and other U.S.
architects in Iraq and Kuwait after 1945, I argue that it is precisely in the relationship between the
changing economy of architectural practice in the U.S. and the problematic discourses of
"modernization" in the Middle East that the evolutions of both the abstract language of late-modern
architecture and and the increasingly anonymous modalities of corporate architectural practice can
be traced.
Constructing a fuller global understanding of these exchanges requires connecting regional,
national, and disciplinary histories of architecture which have often remained separate. Tracing the
implication of postwar practices within transnational exchanges also poses a challenge to the
interpretive framework of critical regionalism, in which a supposedly universalizing and uncritical
modernism was seen to demand forms of resistance only possible from local architects rooted in
more "authentic" regional cultures. 18 In failing to account for the role of such multinational practices
within the history of postwar architectural modernism, I argue, these accounts have served to
obscure the political and structural forces that undergirded the trajectory of modernist architectural
production in the twentieth century. In particular, I argue that the suppression of this history in
critiques of corporate architectural production after the 1970s erased precisely those social and
political questions of bureaucracy, organization, competition, expertise, and ethics in relation to
global practice which the dissertation seeks to illuminate.
The six chapters of the dissertation provide a series of related episodes in the trajectory of collective
and corporate architectural practice in the twentieth century, overlapping in time and geography.
Following an introductory chapter, the remaining sections extend from the founding of TAC in
18 See in particular Kenneth Frampton, "Towards a Critical Regionalism: Six Points for an Architecture of Resistance,"
Hal Foster, ed., The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture (Port Townsend:, WA Bay Press, 1983): 16-30.
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1945 to its growth and international extension in the 1950s, the incorporation and transformation
of the office in the 1960s and 1970s, and its gradual decline from the end of the oil boom in 1983 to
the firm's eventual bankruptcy in 1995. Each chapter of the dissertation centers on the
instrumentality of one or more operative terms within postwar architectural discourse and practice,
and concentrates on one or more projects through which the changing contexts and conditions of
practice, the stakes of architectural authorship, and the reception of modernism in these decades can
be measured.
Chapter 1, "The Concept of the Architectural Corporation," provides a brief history of team-
based architectural practice in the United States from the turn of the twentieth century to the 1990s
I examine this evolution in the context of the broader development of the modern corporation as an
organizational and social form, as distinct from the collective and collaborative models of
architecture practice that would mark the decades after World War II. I focus on the evolution of
these collaborative ideals under the changing legal and economic constraints of market practice in
the United States after the 1950s, as corporate business models became increasingly prevalent among
architecture firms and the field was reshaped by professional debates over competition,
compensation, and ethics through the 1970s. The chapter concludes with the emerging critique of
the architectural corporation by a self-styled neo-avant garde after the 1960s, and the subsequent
nostalgia for signature forms of authorship that left architects, historians, and critics with few tools to
account for the meaning of collaborative and corporate models for architectural production on the
cusp of the postmodern turn.
Chapter 2, "The Idea of the Architects Collaborative," traces the origins and founding of TAC
in the years during and after World War II. Collaboration became the watchword for a generation of
architects committed to challenging the paradigm of the singular genius-the primary model for
interpreting the work of the so-called modernist masters- as inadequate to address the large-scale
building problems of their time. For adherents to the collaborative ethos, a perceived consensus on
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the principles of the modern movement was accompanied by the belief that such unity might enable
newly collective forms of work that would bring the building disciplines together to address the
complex tasks of postwar construction. I explore the formation of TAC in relation to this emerging
discourse and its attendant questions of anonymity, equality, and democracy, and the call for new
methods of practice that were opposed to the specialization and hierarchy associated with large
prewar businesses. I situate these broader structural transformations against the office history of TAC
as it grew to become one of the largest and most successful architecture firms in the U.S. and as the
firm attempted to adapt, ultimately unsuccessfully, to these shifts in practice in its later years, leading
ultimately to the firm's demise.
Chapter 3, "Collective Practice and the Limits of Historiography," explores the origins of TAC
in 1945 and the early years of the office against the existing historiography of the firm, which has
attributed the intentions behind its founding primarily to Gropius. This conventional assessment
relies on Gropius's body of writing on collaboration and teamwork and his pedagogical emphasis on
team-based work among holistically-trained designers first at the Bauhaus and later at the Harvard
University Graduate School of Design. In drawing on this legacy of pronouncements by the prewar
European "master," historians have assumed TAC to be merely the translation of Gropius's ideas on
teamwork into practice, largely ignoring the role played by his collaborators. In reassessing the
history of TAC, I pay particular attention to how the firm's model was received and interpreted by
architectural critics, many of whom took TAC's work as evidence for the decline of the modernist
masters (exemplified by Gropius) in the U.S. after World War II. I argue that the uneasy status of
authorship beyond the firm's rhetoric of collaboration led critics to conflate TAC's architecture with
the personae of its presumed authors, cementing the firm's reputation as a producer of buildings
whose aesthetics embodied the anonymous, corporate character of their architects.
The final three chapters of the dissertation develop the themes of this broader history of
twentieth-century professional practice episodically, focusing on the reinterpretation of major
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projects or sites of work by TAC: the Pan American Airways building in New York City (1958-63),
the University of Baghdad in Iraq (1957-83), and the firm's numerous projects built in Kuwait from
the 196 0s to the 1980s, ranging in type from major institutional commissions to anonymous souks.
In Chapter 4, "Real Estate, Ethics, and the Problem of Pan Am," I revisit the circumstances
surrounding the history of the Grand Central City project, which became the Pan American Airways
building, and the differing stakes among its consortium of architects, including Emery Roth & Sons,
TAC, and Pietro Belluschi. A reassessment of this history reveals a set of public debates on questions
of authorship, ethics and social responsibility, public versus private development, and the role of
both corporate clients and corporate architects in the transformation of New York City after the
1950s. Crucial in these debates, I argue, was the tendency of critics to search for evidence of
authorial signatures that might distinguish the roles of the building's various architectural
protagonists, most significantly Walter Gropius. In this way, debates over Pan Am's design came to
serve as a referendum on the fate of the modernist masters after World War II and a benchmark for
critics and the public alike to assess the state of mainstream postwar architectural practice in the
United States.
Chapter 5, "Bureaucracy and Genius at the University of Baghdad," describes the international
expansion of TAC's work to the developmental context of Iraq after 1957, among the earliest
examples of involvement by U.S. firms in the Arab and Persian Gulf states after World War II. TAC's
commission to design the University campus formed part of a national modernization program
under the Iraq Development Board, created in 1950 to expend oil revenue on national development,
first through infrastructure and later through iconic cultural projects by foreign architects including
Le Corbusier, Alvar Aalto, Frank Lloyd Wright, and Gio Ponti. In particular, I explore how TAC's
increasingly bureaucratic organization allowed it to continue working through changing political
currents in Iraq, particularly after the coup d'etat of July 14, 1958, which spelled the end of the
U.S.-allied Hashemite monarchy, along with most of the projects by international architects it had
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commissioned for Baghdad. A crucial factor in TAC's continuity across political regimes was their
success in self-positioning as an expert practice, in contrast to other modes of address that sought to
navigate this new landscape through the rhetoric of cultural synthesis and artistic genius. A
comparison of these competing forms of engagement reveals the reemergence of the discursive
dialectic of bureaucracy and genius in the post-colonial context of Iraq, as a means of competition
among foreign architects to participate in national modernization programs in the Arab and Persian
Gulf states after World War II.
Chapter 6, "Architecture and Oil in the Gulf States," explores the involvement of TAC and
other U.S. firms with the Kuwaiti oil boom and the speculative finance economy to which it gave
rise. The demolition and planning of Kuwait City after 1952 constituted one of the earliest and most
extreme examples of large-scale urban transformation in the Gulf states after World War II, creating
a vast, empty urban canvas for governmental and commercial architectures through which the state
sought to project the spatial and economic bases of a "modern" Kuwait onto the world stage. The
role of foreign architects, and TAC in particular, was crucial in creating these images of modernity.
The chapter explores the unintended consequences of the firm's heavy involvement in Kuwait after
1965, and the factors that led to the firm's eventual bankruptcy as a consequence of related events
including the end of the boom in crude oil prices and the collapse of the Souq Al Manakh stock
bubble in Kuwait in 1982. In exploring these processes, I devote particular attention to the cultural
constructions of foreign and local and the complex economies of material, labor, and expertise
through which the work of TAC and other U.S. firms in took shape in the Arab and Persian Gulf
states after the 1950s.
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Chapter 1
The Concept of the Architectural Corporation 1890-1990
The ideology ofthe past century has taught us to see in the individual genius the only embodiment oftrue
and pure art.
-Walter Gropius1
When architecture becomes an anonymous art, like engineering, the Modern Movement will have come to
an end.
-Joseph Hudnut2
Professionalization, Big Business, and U.S. Firms Before 1945
The nature and meaning of group architectural production in the United States have shifted
continuously from the end of the nineteenth century to the present. As the structures of professional
practice took shape through this period, both the framework and the nomenclature of team-based
architecture have changed, from the "big businesses" and large organizations that accompanied the
merger movement at the turn of the twentieth century to the "plan factories" of the industrial
expansion in the 191 Os and 1920s, the bureaucratic firms and "package builders" of the post-World
War II boom, the incorporated entities of the 1960s and 1970s, and the multinational
conglomerates that reshaped the field after the 1980s. Despite the expanding role of large offices
within U.S. architectural practice since the end of the nineteenth century, it was only after World
War II that the term "corporate" came to constitute a topos of architectural discourse, one that
referred at once to a specific mode of production, the mentality of its producers, and the perceived
qualities of the work produced. Throughout these changes in the scope of architectural organization,
Walter Gropius, Scope of TotalArchitecture (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955): 86.
2 Joseph Hudnut, "Architecture and the Individual," Architectural Record (October 1958): 170.
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architects and historians have speculated on the implications of the large-scale office for the status of
architecture as a business, a profession, and a field of cultural production.
From its origins in the second half of the nineteenth century, the interpretation of team-
based production in the U.S. has been marked by persistent tensions between competing definitions
of architecture as a benevolent profession of socially concerned professionals, an economically-driven
market service, or an artistic endeavor. The inherited British notion of the professional as an elite,
gentlemanly practitioner, entrusted to mediate the interests of clients with the needs of society in a
financially disinterested manner on the model of medicine or law, encountered an established
tradition of carpenters and craftsmen in the U.S., hostile to the definition of architecture as a
discipline distinct from such craft trades. The first expatriates who sought to gain an economically
and culturally elevated status for the architect, like Benjamin Latrobe, encountered resistance as the
idea of the professional became increasingly democratized during the nineteenth century, coming to
refer to any member of a learned trade.3
The increasing organization of dedicated architectural practices and the conscious
introduction of European models of team-based professional practice in the U.S. was initiated by the
first Americans to study at the Pcole des Beaux-Arts in Paris, beginning with Richard Morris Hunt in
1846. Upon their return to the U.S., architects like Hunt and H.H. Richardson sought to raise the
professional and cultural status of the architect by replicating both the structure and the discursive
formations of their academic training. Their studios combined the domain of the Beaux-Arts atelier
(the collegial space in which students worked under the guidance of a master) with the working
3 On the professionalization of architectural practice in the United States from the nineteenth century to the present, see
Mary N. Woods, From Craft to Profession: The Practice ofArchitecture in Nineteenth-Century America (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1999); Bernard Michael Boyle, "Architectural Practice in America, 1865-1965--Ideal and Reality,"
in Spiro Kostof, ed., The Architect: Chapters in the History of the Profession (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977):
309-344; Paul Louis Bentel, "Modernism and Professionalism in American Architecture, 1919-1933," Ph.D.
Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1993).
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space of a professional office, at once business practice and learning environment. 4 Along with the
German polytechnic, the Ecole provided a formative pedagogical model for the first schools of
architecture in the U.S., including programs at the Polytechnic College of Pennsylvania (1861), the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1865), the University of Illinois (1868), and Cornell
University (1871).5
Such attempts to establish a firm pedagogical foundation for architectural practice were
paralleled by the consolidation of new learned societies and professional associations. Chief among
these was the establishment of the American Institute of Architects (AIA) in New York in 1857. For
the AIA, questions concerning the ethics and economics of architectural practice were paramount,
including the establishment of standards for architectural fee structures, the registration and licensing
of practitioners, and bans on advertising and other competitive practices which were seen to lower
the professional stature of the field.6 These disciplinary concerns were circulated in parallel through
the first architectural journals in the U.S., particularly the American Architect and Building News,
established in 1876.2 Such economic protections, which formed the core of the AIA's charter to
defend the interests of architects, later emerged at the center of legal battles over the conditions of
professional practice a century later, as part of renewed debates over the definition of architecture as a
market service or a professional practice that would have repercussions for the integrated, diversified
firms that reshaped the field after the 1970s.
4 On the structure of Beaux-Arts pedagogy, see Richard Chafee, "The Teaching of Architecture at the Ecole des Beaux-
Arts" and David van Zanten, "Architectural Composition at the tcole des Beaux-Arts From Charles Percier to Charles
Garnier," in Arthur Drexler, ed., The Architecture ofthe acole des Beaux-Arts (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1975):
61-110, 111-324.
5 Michael J. Lewis, "1860-1920, The Battle between Polytechnic and Beaux-Arts in the American University," in Joan
Ockman and Rebecca Williamson, ed. Architecture School: Three Centuries of Educating Architects in North America
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Washington, D.C.: Association of Collegiate Schools of Architecture, 2012): 66-89.
6 On the AIA's prohibition of architects from advertising prior to World War II, see Andrew M. Shanken, "Breaking the
Taboo: Architects and Advertising in Depression and War," Journal ofthe Society ofArchitectural Historians, Vol. 69, No. 3
(September 2010): 406-429.
7 See Mary N. Woods, "The 'American Architect and Building News' 1876-1907," Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia
University (1983).
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The first recognition of the coming impact of corporate models of business practice for
architectural production came with the industrial revolution and the "great merger movement" in
U.S. manufacturing that saw the consolidation of large-scale industrial corporations at the turn of
the twentieth century.8 These firms soon found their parallel in the rise of architectural firms in
Chicago and New York City that were equally organized to meet the needs of a corporatizing class of
investment concerns, including the formation of joint-stock companies, as well as the demands of an
increasingly complex array of commercial and industrial building types, including the speculative
office tower and the daylight factory.9
Contemporary debates over the importance of these transformations in the business world
marked an early instance of the discursive dichotomy between genius and bureaucracy that would
mark later attempts to understand the meaning of team-based practice for the architectural
profession. Chicago architect Louis Sullivan, who joined into group practice with engineer Dankmar
Adler in 1880, later claimed that his self-described rival Daniel H. Burnham, then a principal of
Burnham & Root, had espoused a particular interest among his peers in the benefits of large scale-
practice. "My idea is to work up a big business, deal with big business men, and to build up a big
organization," Sullivan recounted Burnham telling him as early as 1874, "for you can't handle big
things unless you have an organization."10 Sullivan noted that during the intense commercial boom
8 On the rise of the large industrial corporation in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, see Alfred D. Chandler Jr.,
7he Visible Hand: 7he Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, MA and London: Belknap Press, 1977);
Thomas K. McCraw, ed., The Essential Alfred Chandler: Essays Toward a Historical Theory of Big Business (Boston: Harvard
Business School Press, 1988); David Noble, America By Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism
(New York: Knopf, 1977); Alan Trachtenberg, The Incorporation ofAmerica: Culture and Society in the GildedAge (New
York: Hill and Wang, 1982), and Olivier Zunz, Making America Corporate, 1870-1920 (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1990). Sociologies of the corporation in this period include William G. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise ofthe
Large Industrial Corporation in America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999) and Charles Perrow,
Organizing America: Wealth, Power, and the Origins of Corporate Capitalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2002). On the merger movement, see Naomi R. Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement in American Business, 1895-
1904 (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
9 On the impact of joint-stock companies on the economics of speculative real estate in Chicago and New York City in
the early twentieth century, see Daniel Abramson, "Inventing Obsolescence," in Obsolescence: An Architectural History
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016): 12-37.
10 Louis H. Sullivan, Autobiography ofAn Idea (New York: Press of the American Institute of Architects, Inc., 1926):
285-286.
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of 1890-92-the economic bubble that he saw as giving rise to both the impasse and the solution of
the skyscraper as a type-and its subsequent collapse in the Panic of 1893, "there was well under the
way the formation of mergers, combinations and trusts in the industrial world.",1 Burnham, he
claimed, was "The only architect in Chicago to catch the significance of this movement" for his own
practice, "for in its tendency toward bigness, organization, delegation, and intense commercialism,
he sensed the reciprocal workings of his own mind."1 2 Yet within Sullivan's conception of
architecture as an artistic vocation, such an interest could ultimately only be negative. He was careful
to contrast his own creative practice-even though conducted within a joint partnership of architect
and engineer-as a mode of signature production opposed to the business-oriented ambitions of
Burnham, a model of authorial self-fashioning that would soon be emulated by Sullivan's legatee,
Frank Lloyd Wright.
The body of increasingly large architectural firms that accompanied the merger movement at
the turn of the century were concentrated in Chicago and New York City, the cities that increasingly
constituted the dominant poles of industrial, commercial, and architectural production in the U.S.
in these years. Burnham's interest in the benefits of large-scale organization for the expanding tasks of
architectural practice was paralleled in New York City by architects like George B. Post, whose office
had 60 employees by the end of the nineteenth century.1 3 By the first decade of the twentieth
century, the largest practices were those of McKim, Mead & White in New York City, with 110
employees around the time of the firm's design of the World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago in
1893, and D.H. Burnham & Company (the successor firm to Burnham & Root after engineer John
11 Ibid., 314.
12 Ibid.
13 Diana Balmori, "George B. Post: The Process of Design and the New American Architectural Office (1868-1913),"
Journal of the Society ofArchitectural Historians, Vol. 46, No. 4 (December 1987): 351. See also Winston Weisman, "The
Commercial Architecture of George B. Post," Journal ofthe Society ofArchitectural Historians, Vol. 31, No. 3 (October
1972): 176-203; D. Everett Waid, "The Office of George B. Post & Sons," The Brickbuilder (February 1914): 47-49.
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Wellborn Root's death in 1891), which boasted of having 180 employees by 1912.14 (Fig. 1.1) As
their names indicated, these firms often relied on a structure of partners specialized as architects and
engineers (as with Adler & Sullivan or Burnham & Root), or a division of their tasks between design,
construction, and business management (as with McKim, Mead & White or the later partnership of
Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, established in Chicago in 1936).
New office settings for group practice accompanied the increasing size and organization of
these firms. The floor plans of the largest offices, like Burnham & Root, typically combined large,
undifferentiated rooms for draftsmen with private offices and consultation rooms through which
partners could communicate directly with each other, as well as with clients.1 5 (Fig. 1.2) Frank Lloyd
Wright later described his relationship with Sullivan during his time working for Adler & Sullivan in
just such terms, occupying the rare position of a separate room as chief draftsman adjacent to
Sullivan's office, through which he could work directly with the architect he later declared to have
been his "Lieber Meister."16 (Fig. 1.3) These firms were often concentrated in large buildings designed
14 Robert Gutman, Architectural Practice: A Critical View (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1988): 5; Jay
Wickersham, "Learning From Burnham: The Origins of Modern Architectural Practice," Harvard Design Magazine 32
(Spring/Summer 2000): 22. On D. H. Burnham & Company in this period, see "The Organization of An Architect's
Office No. 1.," The Engineering & Building Record (January 11, 1890): 84-85. On McKim, Mead & White in this
period, see D. Everett Waid, "The Business Side of an Architect's Office. The Office of Messrs. McKim, Mead & White.,"
The Brickbuilder (December 1913): 267-270.
15 Primary resources for understanding the structure and organization of group firms in this period are "The Business
Side of an Architect's Office," a series of articles by D. Everett Waid in The Brickbuilder from 1902-4 on business aspects
of architectural practice and reappearing as a series of firm profiles in 1913-14, and "How Architects Work," a second
series of firm profiles by Waid in The Brickbuilder from 1911-12. See Waid, "The Business Side of an Architect's Office,"
The Brickbuilder, I. (April 1902): 69-70; II. (May 1902): 91-93; III. (August 1902): 157-160; IV (September 1902):
191-195; V. (February 1903): 37-39; VI. (November 1903): 232-233; VII. (December 1903): 254-256; VIII. (January
1904): 13-15; VII. [sic] (August 1904): 168; Waid, "How Architects Work," The Brickbuilder, I.-Offices of Noted
Architects [H. J. Hardenbergh, Cass Gilbert, La Farge & Morris, Maynicke & Franke, Donn Barber] (December 1911):
249-252; II.-Offices of Noted Architects [York & Sawyer, Charles A. Platt, Carrere & Hastings, Grosvenor Atterbury]
(January 1912): 7-10; III.-Offices of Noted Architects [J. H. Freedlander, H. Van Burn Magonigle, Delano & Aldrich,
Trowbridge & Livingston] (February 1912): 35-38; Waid, "The Business Side of an Architect's Office," The Brickbuilder,
"With A Description of the Architects' Building, New York" (August 1913): 179-181; "The Office of Mr. Donn
Barber" (September 1913): 197-200; "Description of the Offices of Messrs. Henry Bacon; Ford, Butler & Oliver;
Ludlow & Peabody; H. Van Buren Magonigle and Kenneth Murchison" (November 1913): 251-254; "The Office of
Messrs. McKim, Mead & White" (December 1913): 267-270; "The Office of George B. Post & Sons" (February 1914):
47-49; "The Offices of Mr. Howard Greenley and Messrs. Taylor & Levi" (March 1914): 62-64; "The Office of Messrs.
Mann & MacNeille" (May 1914): 103-105.
16 Frank Lloyd Wright, Genius and the Mobocracy (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949).
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by the architects to house their own offices as well as those of their clients, such as Burnham &
Root's offices in its Rookery Building (1888) and Adler & Sullivan's offices in its Auditorium
Building (1889). Steinway Hall (1895) in Chicago, designed by Dwight Heald Perkins, quickly
became home to the "Steinway Group" of architects including those of Wright (who formed his own
practice in 1893 after being fired for accepting private commissions while with Adler & Sullivan), R.
C. Spenser, and Myron Hunt.1 7 The Architects' Building in New York City (1913), designed by
Ewing & Chappell and built by a stock-holding cooperative of fifteen architects and seven engineers,
was "home to a large group of T square and triangle men" including McKim, Mead & White, the
largest U.S. firm at the end of the 19th century.1 8 (Fig. 1.4) Yet outside of professional trade journals
in which the organization of such firms was detailed, architects like Wright continued to promote
images of themselves as singular authors. In Wright's case, this construct was emblematized by his
home and studio in the Chicago suburb of Oak Park (1889), publicized in the popular press as the
true locus of his creative practice, in contrast to his "business office" in Steinway Hall. (Fig. 1.5-1.6)
The Artistic Proletariat and the Bauhaus Collective
The rise of efficient group production in the U.S. sparked the interest of European architects in the
first decades of the twentieth century, many of whom later became emigres in the years immediately
prior to World War II. Mutual exchanges between young European, Soviet, and U.S. architects in
the interwar period paved the way for modernist movements on both sides of the Atlantic.
Fascinated by architectural "Americanism," German architects traveled to the U.S. to study its urban
and industrial landscapes, inspired particularly by Frederick Taylor's theories of scientific
17 On Steinway Hall as a center for architects' offices in Chicago in this period, see William R. Hasbrouck, The Chicago
Architectural Club: Prelude to the Modern (New York: Monacelli Press, 2005): 210-216.
18 D. Everett Waid, "The Business Side of an Architect's Office, With A Description of the Architects' Building, New
York," The Brickbuilder, Vol. 22 (August 1913): 179-181. Subsequent profiles of firms in the Architects' Building appear
in the September, November, and December 1913 issues of The Brickbuilder.
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management and the factory models of Henry Ford.1 9 Press photographs of U.S. industrial
buildings, like those compiled by Walter Gropius in the Jahrbuch des Deutscher Werkbund in 1913,
were superseded by the reportage of Erich Mendelsohn's Amerika, Bilderbuch eines Architekten (1926)
and detailed insider accounts of U.S. design and construction practices like Wie Baut America?
(1927) and Amerika (1930), written by Austrian emigre Richard Neutra after working for Holabird
& Roche and Frank Lloyd Wright in Chicago before moving to Los Angeles. 20 (Fig. 1.7-1.8)
Gropius visited the U.S. in 1928, traveling among other cities to Detroit to photograph Albert
Kahn's Ford River Rouge Plant (1917-27), and thereafter to Los Angeles, where he visited Neutra
and photographed his buildings, including the Jardinette Apartments completed in the same year.21
(Fig. 1.9) The ground was prepared in turn for European modernism in the U.S. by proselytizing
critics and curators, chief among them Alfred H. Barr Jr., Henry-Russell Hitchcock, and Philip
19 See Jean-Louis Cohen, Scenes of the World to Come: European Architecture and the American Challenge, 1893-1960
(Paris: Flammarion, 1995); Ivan Rupnik, "Exporting Space-Time: American Industrial Engineering Tools and European
Modernism," in Eva Franch i Gilabert, Amanda Lawrence, Ana Miljacki, Ashley Schafer, ed., OfficeUS: Agenda (Zurich:
Lars Muller, 2014): 105-116.
20 On the circulation of the photographs collected by Gropius before and after 1913, see Reyner Banham, A Concrete
Atlantis: U.S. Industrial Building and European Modern Architecture (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986); Mark
Jarzombek, "The Discourses of a Bourgeois Utopia, 1904-1908, and the Founding of the Werkbund," in Imagining
Modern German Culture 1889-1910, ed. Fran~ois Forster-Hahn (Washington, D.C.: National Gallery of Art, 1996):
127-145. Images of these factory commissions were among those circulated most heavily after 1914 by European
architects who sought to emulate the efficiency of U.S. building practices as well as the forms of U.S. industrial
buildings. The extensive republication of these images by European architects thereafter included, most famously, their
copying and alteration by Le Corbusier in Vers une Architecture (1923).
21 Gropius's trip to the U.S. is chronicled in Gerda Breuer, Annemarie Jaeggi, ed., Walter Gropius: Amerikareise 1928 =
American Journey 1928 (Berlin: Bauhaus Archiv, 2008).
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Johnson at the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) in New York.22 The International Style, the
publication that resulted from their "Modern Architecture: International Exhibition" at MoMA in
1932, quickly became what Sibyl Moholy-Nagy called the "passport that secured the entry of the
'Makers of Modern Architecture' into this country." 23 (Fig. 1.10)
While the dramatic successes of big businesses in the U.S. offered compelling alternatives to
the stultifying methods of older European models, a rising generation of younger architects in
Europe and the U.S. viewed both professional traditions skeptically. They criticized the inequalities
inherent in the European academic models that underlay both modes of practice, particularly the
Ecole des Beaux-Arts and its emphasis on the identification and elevation of architectural genius.
This emphasis was embodied by the pyramidal system of drawing competitions among students
(concours) that structured the school's pedagogy, culminating in the singular annual winner of the
Prix de Rome. 24 For Walter Gropius, the founding director of the Bauhaus in Weimar in 1919, in
practice this cultivation of signature produced not the flowering of creative genius but merely the
"artistic proletariat," a class of architectural laborers "foredoomed to semi-starvation" by its inability
22 On the impact of the "Modern Architecture" exhibition, The International Style, and the legacies of Barr Jr. and
Johnson, see Terence Riley, The International Style: Exhibition 15 and The Museum ofModern Art (New York: Rizzoli,
1992); John Elderfield and Kirk Varnedoe, Philip Johnson and The Museum ofModern Art (New York: Rizzoli, 1998);
Sybil Gordon Kantor, Alfred H. Barr, Jr. and the Intellectual Origins ofthe Museum of Modern Art (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2002); David A. Hanks, ed., Partners in Design: Alfred H. BarrJr. and Philip Johnson (New York: The Monacelli
Press, 2015). On the exile, arrival, and acceptance of the Bauhaus and the Bauhailsler in the U.S., see Margret Kentgens-
Craig, The Bauhaus in America: First Contacts 1919-1936 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999); Kathleen James-
Chakraborty, "From Isolationism to Internationalism: American Acceptance of the Bauhaus," in James-Chakraborty, ed.,
Bauhaus Culture From Weimar to the Cold War (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006): 153-170; Peter
Hahn, "Bauhaus Architects and Designers Between the Old World and the New," Franz Schulze, "The Bauhaus
Architects and the Rise of Modernism in the United States," and James-Chakraborty, "Changing the Agenda: From
German Bauhaus Modernism to U.S. Internationalism," in Stephanie Barron with Sabine Eckmann, Exiles + Emigres:
The Flight ofEuropean Artists From Hitler (Los Angeles and New York: Los Angeles County Museum of Art and Harry N.
Abrams, 1997): 211-252; William H. Jordy, "The Aftermath of the Bauhaus in America: Gropius, Mies, and Breuer," in
Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn, ed., The Intellectual Migration: Europe andAmerica, 1930-1960 (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1969): 485-526.
23 Sibyl Moholy-Nagy, "The Diaspora," Journal ofthe Society ofArchitectural Historians (March 1965): 25.
24 For much of its history, the majority of Beaux-Arts students did not formally graduate as such, ascending only to the
status of deves-those who had been admitted to the upper levels of the concours-while the Prix de Rome signified the
only true credential for a Beaux-Arts alumnus. See Chafee,"The Teaching of Architecture at the tcole des Beaux-Arts," in
Arthur Drexler, ed., The Architecture of the &cole des Beaux-Arts: 61-110.
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to do more than slavishly copy.25 Born out of the "widespread heresy that art is just a useless luxury"
and the enervated mentality of "I'artpour l'arti propagated by the academy, Gropius argued in The
New Architecture and the Bauhaus (1934) that this labor class, "lulled by false hopes of the rewards of
genius," was in fact "brought up to the 'professions' of architect, painter, sculptor, etc., without the
requisite training to give it an independent artistic volition," possessing only "amateurish studio-bred
order which is innocent of realities like technical progress and commercial demand."26 (Fig. 1.1)
Furthermore, in their obsession with identifying "that rare 'biological' sport, the commanding
genius," such academic models produced fundamentally undemocratic structures of architectural
practice. Recognizing the group nature of architectural practice, Gropius argued that these schools
had abdicated their mission, forgetting
that their business was to teach drawing and painting to hundreds and hundreds of minor
talents, barely one in a thousand of whom could be expected to have the makings of a real
architect or painter. In the vast majority of cases this hopelessly condemned its pupils to the
lifelong practice of a purely sterile art. Had these hapless drones been given a proper practical
training they could have become useful members of society.27
Unable to produce original creative works and ignorant of the realities of professional practice,
Gropius's "artistic proletariat" symbolized the perceived failure of the European academy to create
true forms of community among designers in either education or practice. Such conventional
structures of group work were thus inadequate settings for designing the forms of community
Gropius and his contemporaries sought to build in their roles as architects and urban planners. 28
Instead, both state agencies and private firms in Europe and the U.S. were staffed primarily by
25 Walter Gropius, The New Architecture and the Bauhaus (London: Faber and Faber, 1935): 58.
26 Ibid. This text is a variation of "Idee und Aufbau des Staatlichen Bauhauses Weimar," published in Staatliches
Bauhauses Weimar 1919-1923 (Weimar-Miinchen: Bauhausverlag, 1923) and abridged and translated into English as
"The Theory and Organization of the Bauhaus," published in Herbert Bayer, Walter Gropius, Ise Gropius, ed., Bauhaus
1919-1928 (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1938): 22-31.
27 Gropius, The New Architecture and the Bauhaus: 61.
28 See Jeannette Redensek, "Manufacturing Gemeinschaft: Architecture, Tradition, and the Sociology of Community in
Germany, 1890-1920," Ph.D. Dissertation, The City University of New York (2007).
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architects capable only of working as low-level producers of drawings or technical specifications.
Such conditions typified many of the largest U.S. offices, where pools of anonymous draftsmen
executed tasks under job captains or passed projects between specialized departments in sequence.
These included both the technologically advanced firms that fascinated European architects like
Gropius and more stylistically retrograde examples like John Russell Pope, an academically trained
classicist whose firm, organized hierarchically from construction managers to chief draftsman to an
undifferentiated "drafting force," faithfully reproduced a federal classical style in monumental
commissions like the Jefferson Memorial (1935-1943) and the National Gallery of Art (1936-41) in
Washington, D.C.2 9 (Fig. 1.12-1.13)
In contrast to such examples of practice, Gropius's propagation of the Bauhaus model sought
to reflect the recognition, in his words, that "The art of building is contingent on the coordinated
team-work of a band of active collaborators whose orchestral cooperation symbolizes the cooperative
organism we call society."30 In contrast to the competitive structure of the tcole des Beaux-Arts,
Bauhaus pedagogy was organized as a progression from shared elementary formal training (in the
famous preliminary course, or Vorlehre) to specific material technologies and craft techniques, and
finally to the building arts (Bau) as the highest unification of these separate disciplines. (Fig. 1.14-
1.15) The goal of this method was to produce holistically trained artists, some of whom went on to
teach the next generation of Bauhaus apprentices as workshop "masters" in tandem with
craftspersons. Yet "the Bauhaus student was no professional," in the words of architect and designer
Marcel Breuer, who was among the primary products of the Bauhaus method, joining the first
generation of workshop masters after his graduation as a student. 31 In practice, Gropius maintained a
clear distinction between bauatelier, the design studio within the Bauhaus curriculum, and baubairo,
29 See Parker Morse Hooper, "Office Procedure, I: Office Manual of John Russell Pope, Architect," Architectural Record
(January 1931): 177-182 and "Office Procedure, 2: Office Manual of John Russell Pope, Architect," Architectural Record
(June 1931): 261-272.
30 Gropius, 7he New Architecture and the Bauhaus: 57.
31 William H. Jordy, "The Aftermath of the Bauhaus in America: Gropius, Mies, and Breuer": 506.
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his professional office, housed in the administrative wing of the building adjacent to his director's
office. (Fig. 1.16) Paradoxically, this split mirrored the professional differentiation between the
Beaux-Arts atelier as teaching environment and bureau as the setting for private practice, often led by
the same practitioner.
Though Gropius later disavowed the idea that the name "Bauhaus" was a reference to the
medieval bauhutte, an evident nostalgia for the image of the guild informed the school's models of
collectivity. Such invocations of an imagined harmony of teamwork placed Gropius's program within
an artistic lineage that extended from William Morris and the Arts & Crafts school in England to the
interwar Germany of the design reform movement, or Kunstgewerbe.32 The contested stakes of
Bauhaus-produced goods-often singularly designed but intended to signify the standards and
aesthetics of mass-production-reflected broader debates about the creation of signature artistic
works versus anonymous objects for the market, in parallel with discussions of individual versus
team-based production. Such dichotomies were tied to earlier legal and economic arguments within
the Deutscher Werkbund, like the debate between Hermann Muthesius and Van de Velde in 1914,
over the valuation of artistic labor in the marketplace through the apparatus of copyright (proper to
artistic signature) versus patents (proper to reproducible objects). 33
32 Gropius invoked John Ruskin and Morris explicitly as predecessors who "strove to find a means of reuniting the world
of art with the world of work." The New Architecture and the Bauhaus: 62. The intellectual genealogy from the Arts &
Crafts movement to the Bauhaus was codified in particular by Nikolaus Pevsner in his Pioneers ofthe Modern Movement
From William Morris to Walter Gropius (London: Faber & Faber, 1936), published by the same press in the year following
Gropius's book. On the image of the medieval guild as a model for the modernist conception of the master builder, see
Andrew Saint, The Image of the Architect (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).
33 The debate initiated by Muthesius's lecture at the Werkbund Congress of 1914 was first published as Die
Werkbundarbeit der Zukunft undAussprache darliber [The Future Work of the Werkbund and Discussion Thereof], edited
by Muthesius and appearing in the same year. For a translation of this publication, see "Appendix B: Werkbund Theses/
Counter-Theses," in John C. Maciuika, Before the Bauhaus: Architecture, Politics, and the German State, 1890-1920
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 300-311. For a reading of this debate as concerning copyrights
and patents as opposed legal valuations of artistic production, see Frederick J. Schwartz, "Commodity Signs: Peter
Behrens, the AEG, and the Trademark," Journal ofDesign History, Vol. 9, No. 3 (1996): 153-184 and "Magical Signs:
Copyright, Trademarks and "Individuality," in Schwartz, The Werkbund: Design Theory and Mass Culture Before the First
World War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996): 147-212. On authorship, reproducibility, and intellectual property
within the Bauhaus collective, see Robin Schuldenfrei, "The Irreproducibility of the Bauhaus Object," Magdalena Droste,
"The Bauhaus Object between Authorship and Anonymity" and T'ai Smith, "The Identity of Design as Intellectual
Property," in Jeffrey Saletnik and Robin Schuldenfrei, ed., Bauhaus Construct: Fashioning Identity, Discourse and
Modernism (London and New York: Routledge, 2009): 37-60, 205-225, 226-244.
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The closure of the Bauhaus by the Nazi government in 1933 formed the first major impetus
for the mass departure of European architects through the decade-and the dissemination of the
architectural ideals that accompanied this migration-which Sibyl Moholy-Nagy termed "The
Diaspora." 34 Gropius and Breuer left for England in 1934 and from there to Cambridge in 1937,
practicing together until a contentious split in 1941. Ludwig Mies van der Rohe left last among the
Bauhansler, arriving in 1937 in Chicago, a city he saw as both open to German immigrants and
possessing favorable regulations for licensing foreign architects. 35 Josep Lluis Sert escaped the Spanish
Civil War to Paris in 1937, departing for the U.S. in exile following Franco's victory in 1939. Victor
Gruen (nee Gruenbaum) fled Austria in 1938 on the eve of World War II, practicing first in New
York before moving to Los Angeles. As immigrants, these architects were aware that only university
posts would allow them to obtain permanent residence in the U.S. Joseph Hudnut, dean of the
architecture school at Harvard University, sought a European modernist as chair of the program,
choosing Gropius after Mies declined to compete for the position.36 Mies instead went to the
Armour (later Illinois) Institute of Technology, joined by Ludwig Hilberseimer, while Liszl6
Moholy-Nagy founded the short-lived New Bauhaus School of Design in Chicago in 1937. The
opening of the retrospective exhibition "Bauhaus: 1919-1928" at the Museum of Modern Art in
1938, curated by Barr Jr., placed a definitive stamp on the arrival of the Bauhansler en masse and
presaged their impact on the guiding ethos of architectural practice in the U.S. (Fig. 1.17)
The absorption of the emigres into the U.S. professional context proceeded rapidly. Mies,
Breuer, and Gropius were received as the major figures among the emigres after World War II,
though the later interpretation of the work of such "masters" within the context of their U.S. offices
proved to be problematic, as will be discussed in Chapter 3. Breuer, for his part, saw the two
34 Sibyl Moholy-Nagy, "The Diaspora," Journal ofthe Society ofArchitectural Historians (March 1965): 24-26.
35 Cammie McAtee, "Alien #5044325: Mies's First Trip to America," in Phyllis Lambert, ed., Mies in America (Montreal
and New York: Canadian Centre for Architecture and Whitney Museum of American Art, 2001): 133-185.
36 Jill Pearlman, Inventing American Modernism: Joseph Hudnut, Walter Gropius, and the Bauhaus Legacy at Harvard
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2007).
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professional cultures as complementary: "Americans are efficient," he said, while "Germans are
systematic," a combination he felt to be ideal in adapting to the new context.37 Significantly, the
postwar work of these architects often included commissions in their countries of origin, many of
them identified publicly with the persona of the emigre and their conceptual return. By 1957, a
special issue of the Architectural Review on "Machine Made America" reflected the integration of
these architects into the mainstream of U.S. practice, including Mies, Gruen, Neutra, and Gropius
equally with their colleagues and students among the postwar "Personal Contributions to American
Architecture."38 (Fig. 1.18)
The Architecture of Bureaucracy and The Architecture of Genius
In the years immediately after 1945, architects and critics looked to the largest firms of the early
twentieth century to comprehend the implications of team-based practices for postwar architectural
production. Among the earliest attempts was Henry-Russell Hitchcock's 1947 article in the
Architectural Review, "The Architecture of Bureaucracy and the Architecture of Genius," in which he
predicted that the major categories of postwar architecture would be distinguished not by style, but
by economy of production. (Fig. 1.19) Hitchcock noted that the prewar terms of architectural debate
had centered on avant-garde themes of advance or regression. "The early twentieth century,"
Hitchcock noted, "in considering its own cultural phenomena, was much obsessed with time, or
more precisely, with pace of development.... criticism of architecture down almost to the war was
frequently and tediously concerned with whether buildings were 'advanced' enough or too
'advanced."' 39 In the aftermath of World War II, Hitchcock argued, both the exigencies of wartime
construction and the immediate needs of the postwar building boom had given way to a
37 William H. Jordy, "The Aftermath of the Bauhaus in America: Gropius, Mies, and Breuer": 491.
38 "Genetrix: Personal Contributions to American Architecture," Architectural Review (May 1957): 336-386.
39 Henry-Russell Hitchcock, "The Architecture of Bureaucracy and the Architecture of Genius," Architectural Review, No.
101 (January 1947): 3.
37
"clarification of the architectural picture" in which "it came about that there was at last only one
contemporary way of building." Like the Allies, modernism had definitively won its own battle at
mid-century. Clearly satisfied with this state of affairs, Hitchcock ventured that in the wake of
modernism's victory, older revolutionary terms of debate would be replaced by newer questions
concerning the structure and interpretation of architectural practice. "It is not too optimistic," he
wrote, "on the basis of the building done during the war in America-and I believe also in England
-to say that the particular situation which justified a primary critical approach to new buildings in
terms of their degree of modernity came to an end with the present decade."40
The new social, political, and economic context of the postwar period thus placed new
demands on the architectural profession, to be resolved within the dominant language of
modernism. Given this stylistic consensus, "the major problem of architecture in the middle of the
twentieth century," Hitchcock wrote, would "be a problem not of up-to-dateness but of quality." In
providing the competence required to meet this new criterion of quality, he predicted that a new
type of professional entity would evolve to meet the increasing scale and scope of design tasks in a
postwar society: the bureaucratic design office. Within this framework, Hitchcock speculated,
The major division of architecture into categories is, I believe, going to be between what may be
called the architecture of bureaucracy and the architecture of genius, and of the latter we may
presume that very little will be built for some years to come. By the architecture of bureaucracy I
do not mean merely such building as is designed by civil servants, nor even the building which is
closely controlled by the regulations of one or more ministries.... By bureaucratic architecture I
mean all building that is the product of large-scale architectural organizations, from which
personal expression is absent. 41
While the speed and competence of bureaucratic architecture would ideally be suited to large-scale
projects-the article identified town planning, hospitals, and schools as examples-Hitchcock
counterposed "an entirely different world" of design practice for those monumental or special
40 Ibid., 4.
41 Ibid.
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cultural commissions requiring artistic or creative synthesis, "the world of the architecture of
genius." 42 The genius was defined as the anti-bureaucrat, "the sort of architect who functions as a
creative individual rather than as an anonymous member of a team"; his or her method would be "a
particular psychological approach and way of working at architecture which may or may not produce
masterpieces." In contrast to the principles of quality and consistency that would govern the needs of
bureaucratic work, the synthetic capacity of the genius would constitute the criterion for judging the
success or failure of these symbolic commissions: "only complex individual structures of generalized
symbolic meaning"-that is, those produced by the genius-"actually fail architecturally when there
has been no individual imaginative formulation."
Hitchcock's distinction between bureaucracy and genius constituted a first call, at the outset
of the Cold War, for new methods of history and criticism capable of describing the new systems of
architectural production that would mark the decades to come. Such methods were compelled, in
Hitchcock's view, by a condition in which these two modes of practice and their resulting forms of
expression-the competent prose of the bureaucrat and the imaginative poetry of the genius-would
each have their exclusive domain of professional application. Significantly, Hitchcock already warned
that this dichotomy, at once productive and discursive, would require the architectural critic to
develop different tools to evaluate the built results of such practices. "Conceptually the two types of
work are distinct and should not be subjected to the same type of analysis and criticism," he
insisted. 43 Henceforth, it would no longer be possible to judge bureaucratic production on the same
artistic criteria that had applied to the prewar avant-garde, whether the interpretive framework of
signature and authorial intention or the expressive attributes of imagination, creativity, or synthesis.
Frank Lloyd Wright provided the inevitable model of Hitchcock's architectural genius,
reinforcing an image maintained through the atelier-like atmosphere Wright cultivated at his Taliesin
studios in Arizona and Wisconsin. (Fig. 1.20) Expressing this image in Genius and the Mobocracy
42 Ibid., 6.
43 Ibid.
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(1949), Wright praised his mentor, Louis Sullivan, in much the same terms that reappeared within
his own self-fashioning.44 In hailing Sullivan as "our great native genius," Wright offered an example
of singular creativity that paralleled Hitchcock's description, a figure opposed to the structures, and
strictures, of conventional architectural production. 45 (Fig. 1.21) In this way, Wright rejected both
the conventional notion of professional practice and its increasing reliance on large-scale organization
among teams of architects. "Professionalism," he wrote, "is parasitic-a body of men unable to do
more than band together to protect themselves."46 For Wright, such group structures ultimately
produced not equality but "mobocracy," a mentality that "swarms, and swamps what genuine
democracy we have built into our commonplace," which thus threatened to become merely "a
battlefield for divided interests."47
In contrast to the authorial model emblematized by Wright, "the type of bureaucratic
architecture par excellence" in Hitchcock's account was represented by the office of Albert Kahn &
Associates, known primarily for factories and offices for Ford Motor Company and other Detroit
manufacturers. 48 Hitchcock praised "The strength of a firm such as Kahn... [that] depends not on the
architectural genius of one man... but in the organizational genius which can establish a fool-proof
system of rapid and complete plan production."49 Such a system, organized in technical divisions
44 Frank Lloyd Wright, Genius and the Mobocracy (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949). Hitchcock had earlier
reinforced this self-fashioning through his monograph on Wright, In 7he Nature ofMaterials: The Buildings of Frank Lloyd
Wright 1887-1941 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1942).
45 Ibid., 3. In his account, Wright was aware of the conceptual problems inherent in claiming the status of genius for
both himself and Sullivan, his mentor and former employer, a fact that might otherwise condemn him to the status of
disciple or legatee. In Wright's construction, it was his own genius that enabled him to recognize the same characteristics
in Sullivan, thus making their connection one of sympathy between geniuses rather than that of genius and emulator.
"For genius is but an expression ofprinciple," he wrote, and so "Therefore in no way does genius ever run counter to
genius nor ever could." Genius and the Mobocracy: 80. In this sense, Wright claimed, "I am not writing this belated book
as a discipline and I am not willingly a professional. A lineal descent from seed-perhaps." Ibid., 4.
46 Ibid., 4.
47 Ibid.
48 On Albert Kahn & Associates, see George C. Baldwin, "The Offices of Albert Kahn, Architect, Detroit, Michigan,"
Architectural Forum (October 1918): 125-130; "Industrial Buildings: Albert Kahn Inc," Architectural Forum (August
1938): 87-96; "Producer of Production Lines," Architectural Record (une 1942): 39-42.
49 Hitchcock, "The Architecture of Bureaucracy and the Architecture of Genius": 4.
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from design to engineering to construction, enabled different sets of design information to "meet on
the site with as perfect mutual co-ordination as machine parts come from the various sections of a
factory to be joined first into sub-assemblies and then into the finished product on the final assembly
line." 50 (Fig. 1.22) Achieving extreme speed and quantity through coordinated divisions of specialists
working simultaneously across architecture, engineering, and construction rather than in successive
phases, the firm's production methods embodied the same Taylorist principles of scientific
management that regulated Ford's production of automobiles-a factory producer of factories. 51
Indeed, contemporary articles lauded Kahn's firm as such, marveling at the prodigious output of this
"Producer of Production Lines." 52 (Fig. 1.23) As proof of Hitchcock's association of bureaucracy with
quantity, by 1938 the work of Albert Kahn & Associates accounted for nearly twenty percent of all
industrial buildings in the U.S. designed by architectural firms. 53 The office grew to over 600
employees by 1942 to support a massive expansion of plant construction for the production of tanks,
aircraft, and other military equipment during World War II.54 (Fig. 1.24) Kahn & Associates'
wartime industrial building program in the U.S. was anticipated by Kahn's involvement as
consulting architect for all industrial construction in the Soviet Union under Stalin's First Five-Year
Plan from 1929 to 1932, a vast program of national building that included the formation of a design
50 Ibid.
51 Frederick Winslow Taylor's Principles ofScientific Management was first published in 1911, the year after Kahn &
Associates's Highland Park plant for Ford Motor Company (1908-1910) was completed. On the relation between
scientific management and the organization of the Kahn office, see Federico Bucci, "Scientific Management of Design
Work" and "Fordism and Architecture Firms," in Albert Kahn: Architect ofFord (New York: Princeton Architectural Press,
1993): 123-140.
52 "Producer of Production Lines," Architectural Record (June 1942): 39-42.
53 "Industrial Buildings: Albert Kahn Inc:" 87.
54 On Kahn & Associates's involvement with wartime construction, see Jean-Louis Cohen, "The Case of Kahn," in
Architecture in Uniform: Designing and Buildingfor the Second World War (Montreal: Canadian Centre for Architecture,
2010): 86-99.
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bureau in Moscow with over 2,000 Soviet workers, trained by architects and engineers from the
Kahn office. 55
While Albert Kahn & Associates undertook an extensive range of public and private
commissions throughout its history, including hospitals, schools, office buildings, libraries, houses,
temples, and academic buildings, both Kahn and his office remained associated primarily with
factory buildings in the architectural press, coming to epitomize (as the firm did for Hitchcock) the
image of the "bureaucratic" or industrial architect. 56 In this way, the respective images of genius and
bureaucracy were reinforced on both sides of the discursive divide, with the self-fashioning of both
group producers like Albert Kahn & Associates and singular personae like Frank Lloyd Wright
mirrored in their classification within the field by architects, historians, and critics.
The Corporate Architect at Mid-Century
Despite Hitchcock's invocation of Albert Kahn & Associates as the "bureaucratic architect par
excellence," by 1947 Fordist factory production was already an anachronistic model for large-scale
organizations in the postwar period. A year before Hitchcock's article, sociologist Peter F. Drucker
defined the corporation as the representative American social institution, predicting its emergence as
the dominant form for business and other postwar institutions. In contrast to the assembly-line
production embodied by Ford Motor Company, Drucker argued in The Concept ofthe Corporation
55 On Kahn's involvement in the U.S.S.R. between 1929 and 1932, see Sonia Melnikova-Raich, "The Soviet Problem
with Two 'Unknowns': How an American Architect and a Soviet Negotiator Jump-Started the Industrialization of
Russia," IA, Issue 2 (2010): 57-80; Anatole Senkevitch, "Albert Kahn's Great Soviet Venture as Architect of the First
Five- Year Plan, 1929-1932," Dimensions 10 (1996): 35-49. On the relationship between Kahn's U.S. and Soviet works,
see Claire Zimmerman, "Albert Kahn's Territories," in Franch i Gilabert, Lawrence, Miljacki, Schafer, ed., OfficeUS
Agenda: 117-128.
56 Claire Zimmerman, "The Labor of Albert Kahn," The Aggregate website (Not Peer Reviewed), accessed December 14,
2014, http://we-aggregate.org/piece/the-labor-of-albert-kahn. The series of factories with which Albert Kahn Associates
became synonymous began in 1903, when the firm designed the first of nine buildings for the Packard Automotive Plant
in Detroit. Subsequent designs for Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Company and Ford Motor Company followed, culminating
in the massive River Rouge complex of factory buildings for Ford (1917-27).
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that the managerial principles that would typify the coming economic boom would emulate the
flexible, distributed model of General Motors, the largest corporation in the world by the 1950s. 57
(Fig. 1.25) In contrast to the assembly-line production embodied by Ford Motor Company and
identified by Hitchcock with the bureaucratic structure of Albert Kahn & Associates, Drucker wrote,
"The essence of this large-scale organization of the late twentieth century is that within it people of
very diverse skills and knowledges work together."58 General Motors' structure consisted of
independent automobile divisions combined with coordinated decision making and control between
divisions to ensure consistency across the company's product lines. A mix of specialists at different
levels within the hierarchy allowed information to travel both upwards and downwards through the
production chain, creating feedback loops-or what Drucker called "a Two-way Flow"-that would
increase efficiency from the factory floor to the management office and allow the company to make
rapid design changes within and across divisions in response to technical issues or consumer
demands.59 Looking back in 1972, Drucker still held that "the attempt by General Motors to find
the principles, the constitution, the concept of order and organization for a very big institution, is
still essentially without parallel." 60 Decentralization, teamwork, and flexibility were, for Drucker, the
characteristics that marked the progressive application of corporate models across both business and
institutional domains in the postwar context.
In 1949, an extensive survey of the architectural field conducted by the AIA, titled The
Architect at Mid-Century, chronicled the changes in the scope and scale of design practice that
mirrored the broader rise of the corporation suggested by Drucker. "The new society," its authors
reported, "has satisfied its larger purposes more and more by cooperating in associations,
57 Peter E Drucker, The Concept of the Corporation (New York: The John Day Company, 1946).
58 Ibid., xvi.
59 Ibid., 59. The concept of feedback loops was developed in Norbert Wiener's Cybernetics: or Control and
Communication in the Animal and the Machine, which appeared two years later in 1948.
60 Ibid., xx.
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corporations, and institutions." 61 The survey described the range of professional responses to this
new class of entities, noting that
The building needs of such groups have become a major phenomenon in modern practice, and
architects soon adjusted their methods to the special necessities of these group clients. The
expanded scale of corporate projects, their investment character, and the accelerated pace of
completion imposed by relentless carrying charges, have increased the scope, type, and speed of
architectural services to such an extent as to foster the growth of large architectural firms and the
refinement of many phases of their work.62
In changing to address the needs of its new clients, the AIA argued, the corporate architectural firm
thus formed the natural counterpart to the rise of the corporation as a broader phenomenon of
postwar society. Such offices were still a relative anomaly among all architectural practices, despite
their increasing proportion of control over the building field. The survey noted that a mere two
percent of architectural firms in the U.S. could be classified as large, with between 40 and 99
employees, while an even smaller number of "very large" firms, 0.9 percent, had more than 100
employees. 63 (Fig. 1.26) Yet the authors of the report suggested the increasingly disproportionate
share of the construction field that was controlled by this relative handful of firms, a phenomenon
that increased steadily over the next decade.64 They also noted the national and international
extension of the largest firms, as "the gradual increase in size and complexity of projects, together
with vastly improved facilities for travel and communication, has encouraged a growing proportion
of large firms whose practice extends not only throughout the nation, but often to distant lands as
61 Turpin C. Bannister, ed., The Architect at Mid-Century: Evolution andAchievement, Volume One ofthe Report ofthe
Commission for the Survey of Education and Registration of the American Institute ofArchitects (New York: Reinhold
Publishing Corporation, 1949): 16.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., 32.
64 On the relative sizes of offices in the 1950s and 1960s, see Architectural Forum's annual survey of the hundred largest
architectural firms in the U.S., published annually from 1958 to 1964. The initial article in the series described the
survey as one "which confirms that while architecture is primarily an art, it is also a business that is stamped indelibly
with the American cachet of bigness." This article noted that the hundred largest firms in the U.S. controlled ten percent
of all building construction as of 1958. "Architecture's Biggest Firms," Architectural Forum (September 1958): 112-114.
See "100 Largest Architectural Firms in the U.S.," Architectural Forum, April 1963: 110-112 and April 1964: 14-16.
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well." 6 5 This expanding map of involvement often required the expansion of the firms in turn; as the
report noted, "the tendency of very large firms to establish branches or coequal offices in various
metropolitan centers and even abroad" offered "another method by which large-scale technical
resources can be brought to bear on local projects." 66
The Architect at Mid-Century outlined two basic types of organization through which this
new class of large architectural firms sought to meet the increasingly complex demands of its clients.
A first type, embodied in the assembly-line organization of Albert Kahn & Associates, was organized
into specialized departments, "each of which performs its assigned duties for each project in
appropriate sequence." (Fig. 1.27) The result of this structure was "a kind of horizontal stratification
through which the project manager guides and coordinates the job," presenting advantages of
efficiency and speed in its "standardization of each stage of the work and the rapid pace this permits."
The report warned, however, of the potential dangers inherent in such a "fragmentation of the
architectural process and the difficulty of ensuring that continuous personal concentration which is
so necessary for creative work." 67 Perhaps in response to this creative fragmentation, a second type of
large firm was organized into project teams, each headed by a single project architect responsible for
developing a given commission in its entirety from schematic design through to construction
administration. (Fig. 1.28) Ihe AIA survey noted that "In effect, the firm thus creates within itself a
series of small offices," thus benefiting from "the continuity and close integration of personnel and
project it provides." 68 Yet the authors of the report also reiterated the creative need for individuality
within large organizations, echoing the dichotomy outlined by Hitchcock two years earlier. While
"subdivision of duties is a necessary and legitimate principle" in such firms, the report warned, "final
accountability for the quality of service and result cannot be delegated... the conception of a project
65 Bannister, ed., The Architect at Mid-Century: Evolution and Achievement: 3 5.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., 41.
68 Ibid., 41-42.
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must evolve in the mind of one individual, and, unless the architect is to become a mere
administrative figurehead, he [sic] cannot avoid its major decisions whether he works alone or
employs an army of assistants."69 Despite these authorial difficulties, the AIA survey praised the
increasing corporatization of architectural practice as beneficial for the status of the architectural field
as a whole, by enabling large firms to meet the growing demands of practice "now conceived as
requiring a degree of comprehensiveness never before envisioned."70 These innovations had led in
particular to a more sophisticated delivery of architectural services, as "The new ideal of integration
and the desire for precise control of all phases of the project... have brought not only extraordinary
completeness to architects' Instruments of Service, but have also expanded and refined to an amazing
degree their administrative and managerial techniques." 71 Over the next decade-plus, the steady
proliferation of such "Organizations for Efficient Practice" offered proof of the AIA's prediction that
large-scale firms would increasingly constitute the rule, rather than the exception, within mainstream
architectural practice. 72 (Fig. 1.29-1.31)
A General Motors of the Architectural World
The managerial methods outlined by Drucker and praised by the AIA found perhaps their closest
parallel in architectural practice in the offices of Skidmore, Owings & Merrill (SOM), the firm that
became uniquely synonymous with the term "corporate" during this period. (Fig. 1.32) SOM's
69 Ibid., 44.
70 Ibid., 17.
71 Ibid.
72 The term refers to "Organization for Efficient Practice," a series of profiles of large-scale firms that appeared in
Architectural Record from 1960 to 1963. The firm profiles were "1. Eggers and Higgins Architects" (April 1960): 207-
212; "2. Daniel, Mann, Johnson, & Mendenhall, Architects & Engineers" (June 1960): 187-194; "3. Smith, Hinchman
and Grylls Associates, Inc. Architects & Engineers" (August 1960): 165-170; "4. Caudill, Rowlett and Scott, Architects-
Planners-Engineers" (November 1960): 179-184; "5. Hellmuth, Obata and Kassabaum, Inc., Architects" (February
1961): 137-144; "6. Gruen Associates" (October 1961): 133-134; "7. Nolen-Swinburne & Associates" (February 1963):
155-158; "8. Eliot Noyes & Associates" (March 1963): 163-170.
46
success was based on its development of the "package deal," in which large teams of architects and
engineers delivered complex projects from site planning and structural engineering to detailed
design, facade systems, interiors, budgeting, and administration. 73 Diagrams of the firm's
organization published in architectural journals precisely represented Drucker's efficient yet flexible
corporation. (Fig. 1.33) In practice, however, the image of SOM as a firm characterized by consistent
products rather than by signature architects-one supposedly so anonymous that a partner claimed
"it could even be called the ABC Company"-conflicted with public celebrations of Gordon
Bunshaft above all as the firm's lead designer. 74 This individual status, often effected at the expense of
other partners' credits-particularly female partners, like Natalie de Blois-was reaffirmed
unproblematically by contemporary descriptions of Bunshaft's role as office "dictator," often in the
same publications that lauded SOM's teamwork.75 (Fig. 1.34) Yet the overall impression of a
smoothly functioning team was successful enough that Fortune magazine extolled SOM's "group
design," while Business Week marveled at the firm's $2 billion dollars of "design by conference." 76 (Fig.
1.35-1.36) Newsweek made explicit the firm's affinity with Drucker's managerial paradigm, praising
SOM for its "enormous and assiduous activity and production-something like a General Motors of
the architectural world."7 7 A 1950 exhibition of SOM's work at the Museum of Modern Art-
described by the Museum as its first on a group architectural practice-had already affirmed the
73 William Hartmann, "S.O.M. Organization," Bauen + Wohnen Vol. 11, No. 4 (April 1957): 116.
74 "Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, Architects, U.S.A.," Museum ofModern Art Bulletin, Volume XVIII, No. 1 (Fall 1950):
7. The singular status of Bunshaft within representations of the firm's work was made evident in monographic treatments
like Carol Herselle Krinsky, Gordon Bunshaft ofSkidmore, Owings & Merrill (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), as well
as in his receipt of the Pritzker Prize in 1988, awarded to Bunshaft as an individual rather than to SOM as a firm. On
Bunshaft's persona, see Nicholas Adams, "Gordon Bunshaft: What Convinces is Conviction," SOMJournal 9 (Berlin:
Hatje Cantz: 2016).
75 "Designers For a Busy World: Mood For Working," Newsweek (May 4, 1959): 100. On Natalie de Blois, see Chicago
Architects Oral History Project, Oral History of Natalie de Blois, Interviewed by BettyJ Blum (Chicago: T he Ernest R.
Graham Study Center for Architectural Drawings, Department of Architecture and The Art Institute of Chicago, 2004);
"Interview with Natalie de Blois by Detlef Mertins," SOMJournal4 (Berlin: Hatje Cantz: 2004); Hilary Sample,
"Natalie De Blois," in Franch i Gilabert, Lawrence, Miljacki, Schafer, ed., OfficeUSAgenda: 65-81.
76 "The Architects From Skid's Row," Fortune (January 1958): 137-40, 210, 212, 215; "2-Billion Worth of Design by
Conference," Business Week (December 4, 1954): 96-104.
77 "Designers For a Busy World: Mood For Working": 97.
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perceived compatibility between the repetitive, reproducible character of modernism and the
efficiencies of bureaucratic production, characterizing the firm as one in which designers "work
together, animated by two disciplines which they all share-the discipline of modern architecture
and the discipline of American organizational methods."78 (Fig. 1.37)
However, the model of General Motors was not always a positive one for architects. Joseph
Hudnut, for example, lamented the rise of the "corporation-architect," the type of producer "whose
esthetic is pre-harmonized to that of big business."79 Invoking an unnamed firm reminiscent of
SOM as an example of such corporation-architecture, Hudnut wrote of "at least one architect who
has, among his two hundred employees, a dozen or more who, segregated in a 'style department' not
unlike that of General Motors, develop their designs in a collaborative manner." 80 For Hudnut, the
end results of this corporate turn could only be the demise of architecture as art: "I can imagine no
method more subtly corrosive of individuality," he wrote, maintaining that "The art in architecture,
however elaborate may be the processes of getting things done, must be individual in origin and
control."81
Just as Hitchcock had situated the emerging architecture of bureaucracy in terms of the
prewar model of Albert Kahn's office, so contemporary critics looked to earlier examples of large-
scale practice in order to understand this new scale of production. In a special issue of Bauen +
Wohnen dedicated to SOM in 1957, Sigfried Giedion situated the offices's work within the lineage of
Chicago firms like Burnham & Root that had been among the pioneers of the large-scale
architectural business at the turn of the twentieth century.82 (Fig. 1.38) Responding to Hitchcock
78 "Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, Architects, U.S.A.": 5.
79 Joseph Hudnut, "Architecture and the Individual," Architectural Record (October 1958): 170.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Sigfried Giedion, "The Experiment of SOM," Bauen + Wohnen Vol. 11, No. 4 (April 1957): 113. In his introduction
to the first monograph of SOM's work in 1962, Henry-Russell Hitchcock placed the firm's heritage in the lineage of
Daniel Burnham, whom he credited as "the inventor and developer of the large architectural office-the 'plan factory', if
you will." Hitchcock, "Introduction," in Ernst Danz, Architecture ofSkidmore, Owings & Merrill 1950-1962 (New York:
Praeger and London: The Architectural Press, 1962): 9.
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and Giedion with a view from outside the United States, Peter Smithson placed SOM's genealogy
not with the commercial architects of the Chicago School but rather with the New York office of
McKim, Mead & White, among the largest architectural firms at the end of the nineteenth
century.83 For Smithson, both firms embodied a lineage of luxurious materials and careful execution
inaccessible to foreigners, "that special tradition of concentration on detail which Americans enjoy."
The results of this technocratic emphasis, he wrote, became manifest in the other-worldly impression
created by "machine-absolute" buildings like SOM's Chase Manhattan Bank in New York City,
among the exquisitely detailed products of U.S. corporate firms that could serve as "truly hints of une
architecture autre" for foreign architects like Smithson. (Fig. 1.39) Hitchcock also linked the fetish
character of such products with the professionalization of the firms that produced them, suggesting
that "the acceptance of the skyscraper outside of North America has certainly already led in some
cases to the development of architectural offices comparable in scale and organization to the
American ones. Thus it is not only the American skyscraper that has come to be adopted abroad but,
up to a point at least, the methods of its design and production." 84
Evident in these descriptions was the need to reconcile the prewar notion of modernism as a
cultural avant-garde with the mainstream, corporate organization by which such products were
achieved. Giedion's essay had characterized SOM as an "experiment" in merging management and
progressive design, by using this scale of organization to convince clients of the value of modernist
aesthetics. Yet Nathaniel Owings, one of the founders of SOM, argued that the partners' initial
interest in team-based practice lay not just in leveraging big business toward aesthetic ends, but in
how such large-scale involvement could be channeled toward broader cultural goals. In The Spaces in
Between, his autobiography as well as a personal chronicle of SOM's early years and growth after
World War II, Owings alluded to the partners' conviction that "We would have to take responsibility
83 Peter Smithson, "The fine and the folk: An essay on McKim, Mead and White and the American tradition,"
Architectural Design (August 1965): 394-397.
84 Henry-Russell Hitchcock,"The Rise to World Prominence of American Architecture," Zodiac 8: America, ed. Bruno
Alfieri (Milan: 1961): 2.
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to gain authority." 85 The means to achieve this professional and cultural authority, they resolved, was
"to build a modern 'Gothic Builders Guild' practice and to apply the synergism of power thus
created."86 The key to this synergism was scale. As Owings insisted,
We were not after jobs as such. We were after leverage to influence social and environmental
conditions. To work, we must have volume. An efficient set of master builders can eat up a lot of
work. Volume meant power. We would try to change men's minds.87
Later statements by the firm that described its large-scale organization continued to defend the need
for creative synthesis as the key to achieving these cultural impacts. In "Big Buildings from Big
Offices," published by Voice ofAmerica in 1961 as part of a series of essays by prominent architects
and historians on the state of U.S. architecture, SOM partner William Hartmann reminded readers
that "The 'Big Office' has to be more than a technical monolith to make an outstanding 'Big
Building."'88 Even while outlining the step-by-step procedures through which the firm executed
large, complex commissions for its corporate clients, Hartmann suggested that "Beauty and order are
special contributions manifestly needed in work of this scale," and that such attributes were
ultimately "the results of special qualities which distinguish one large firm from another." 89 The firm
thus continued to argue that its true ambitions were ultimately social and aesthetic, enabled by the
power of efficient delivery methods and large-scale organization.
85 Nathaniel Alexander Owings, The Spaces in Between: An Architect' Journey (Boston: Houghton Miffin Company,
1973), 66. On the writing and narrative voice of Owings's book, see Nicholas Adams, "Belonging as a Corporate Ideal:
Nathaniel A. Owings of Skidmore, Owings & Merrill writes The Spaces in Between (1973)," Histories ofPostWar
Architecture, No. 0 (2017): 1-14.
86 Owings, The Spaces in Between: An Architect Journey: 66.
87 Ibid.
88 William Hartmann, "Big Buildings from Big Offices," The Voice ofAmerica: Forum Lectures, Vol. 6, No. 7 (1961): 6.
89 Ibid., 7. An earlier description of the firm's structure by Hartmann is "S.O.M. Organization," Bauen + Wohnen Vol.
11, No. 4 (April 1957): 116.
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TAC and the Scope of "Total" Architecture
The firm that perhaps most genuinely adopted the postwar belief in team-based practice as a social
ethos was The Architects Collaborative (TAC), established in Cambridge, Massachusetts in 1945.
The firm was comprised of seven young architects along with Walter Gropius, chairman of the
Harvard Graduate School of Design after his emigration from Germany via England in 1937.
Founded as an experiment in collective production, TAC eventually became the largest dedicated
architectural practice in the U.S., with $12.4 million in billings and over 300 employees by 1978.90
(Fig. 1.40) In the postwar decades the firm's headquarters formed the nucleus of a vibrant
professional culture of designers gathered around Harvard Square, numbering into the hundreds-
many of them working in offices indebted to the collective atmosphere first established by TAC. For
members of this scene, sometimes referred to by its legatees as the "Cambridge School," it was within
the structure of practice itself, beyond its visible products, that the postwar evolution of modernism
would take place.
As will be described in detail in Chapters 2 and 3, TAC represented a model of practice that
was distinct from other prominent team-based architecture firms of the postwar period like SOM,
though all would eventually come to be grouped together by critics under the rubric of the corporate
office. In particular, the collaborative ideal at TAC was radically opposed to the hierarchy represented
by SOM's work. 91 Key to the TAC approach was the idea that teams should consist of generalists
able to criticize each other as equals, rather than parceling tasks among specialized practitioners
90 Oliver W. Witte, "Learn from the Public Giants," Building Design & Construction (July 1978): 59.
91 It is interesting in this regard that Henry-Russell Hitchcock claimed an affinity between both the organizational
models of SOM and TAC and the character of their design work in their early years. In his introduction to SOM's 1962
monograph, Hitchcock contested the conventional notion that the firm's work, particularly early buildings like Lever
House, was "generically Miesian," instead claiming that "before 1950 their approach to design was closer, perhaps, to that
of Gropius. Their type of organization, with its emphasis on anonymous production by teams of co-workers, is certainly
so although it was not derived from the pattern of practice Gropius had long called for and finally achieved with TAC."
Hitchcock, "Introduction," in Ernst Danz, Architecture ofSkidmore, Owings & Merrill 1950-1962 (New York: Praeger
and London: The Architectural Press, 1962): 9.
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according to the managerial principles of efficiency and division of labor. This structure was
formalized through a weekly meeting in which all the partners gave shared criticism of each others'
projects, Gropius among them as a declared collaborator among equals-a far cry from descriptions
of Gordon Bunshaft's "dictatorial" position at SOM. Working at other team-based firms meant suits
and ties, a time clock, and a rigid chain of command; TAC meant corduroy and jeans, wild
(occasionally scandalous) office parties, and a messy environment of shared investigation closer to an
atelier than a corporate office. Embedded in this environment was Gropius himself, at once simply
one among the partners and the singular figure identified with the outsized legacy of the Bauhaus.92
(Fig. 1.41-1.42)
Given Gropius's identification with the Bauhaus pedagogy of team-based work among
holistically-trained designers and its postwar translation into schools of architecture in the United
States, critics chose to see TAC's organizational model as the application of these same principles in
the context of Americanized professional practice. As the chosen voice of TAC's work in the
architectural press (though significantly not the primary author of the firm's architectural output),
Gropius wrote extensively about the positive impact that collaborative models of management could
have on architectural practice. In 1952, on the verge of his retirement from Harvard to focus on the
practice, Gropius fought against the AIAs prohibition of designers from engaging in building
contracting, a separation he regarded as preventing architects from maintaining their status as
"masters" of the building industry in the face of competition with integrated "package-builders" and
92 Chief among these revels was the unfortunately named-but presumably tongue-in-cheek-Gropefest, an annual
celebration of Gropius' birthday. While TAC celebrated the date prior to 1969, particular on his 80th (1963) and 85th
(1968) birthdays-the latter in conjunction with events at the Harvard Graduate School of Design and in Harvard Yard
-it appears the term "Gropefest" originated with the first celebration of Gropius's birthday a year after his death,
scheduled for May 8, 1970 (later delayed until Gropius's actual birthdate of May 18). See Marjorie Sherman, "Gropius
Party Postponed," The Boston Globe, May 24, 1970: 12; Robert Reinhold,"'Grope Fest' Honors Gropius," The New York
Times, May 20, 1970: 43; Robert Taylor, "Gropefest: A Memorial in Living Metal," The Boston Globe, May 24, 1970: 26,
and Gropefest, May 8, 1970, pamphlet (TAC and Harvard Graduate School of Design, 1970), Canadian Centre for
Architecture Collections.
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other large-scale construction entities. 93 (Fig. 1.43) Elaborating on these concerns three years later in
his book The Scope of TotalArchitecture, Gropius reiterated the urgent need for "a closely co-operating
team together with the engineer, the scientist and the builder," in which "design, construction and
economy may again become an entity-a fusion of art, science and business." 94 (Fig. 1.44) Only
such a holistic, team-based management structure would allow the profession to combat its
increasing divorce from building production, a development that threatened to reduce the the
architect's role within the new spectrum of design tasks that demanded comprehensive solutions.
In advocating for teamwork, Gropius sought to articulate a specifically democratic notion of
collaboration, a persistent feature of his writing in the Cold War context of U.S. postwar practice.
He insisted that "it is one thing to condition an individual for cooperation by making him conform;
it is another, altogether, to make him keep his identity within a group of equals." 95 Achieving this
balance would guarantee "the protection of the individual against becoming a mere number," as he
had perceived the products of the cole des Beaux Arts to be, and so ensure "the development of
related expression rather than of pretentious individualism."96 As a German emigre, Gropius was
particularly sensitive to avoid any association of collective labor with the specter of communism,
accusations that had also plagued large-scale federal programs like the Tennessee Valley Authority
93 Walter Gropius, "Gropius Appraises Today's Architect," Architectural Forum (May 1952): 111-112, 166, 170, 174,
178, 182. On the ethical and service issues of architects competing with package-builders, see "Those Worrisome Package
Builders," Architectural Forum (April 1958): 120-123, 190 ff. The article describes Gropius as "certainly no partisan of
the engineer-constructor but who does hold to the idea of the master builder," quoting him on the dilemmas faced by
architects in advertising their value: "when a client is in a building mood, he wants to buy the complete package for a
fixed price and at a definite time of delivery. He is not at all interested in the question of the division of labor between
architect, engineer, and contractor. Since he senses subconsciously that it is rather artificial to keep design and building so
wide apart, he usually concludes that the architect is the unknown 'X' in his calculations, in terms of money as well as
time." Ibid., 123. A 1955 article in Architectural Forum characterized Gropius's argument as a more direct emulation of
package-firms, and described architects' motivations to follow his ideas as more cynically derived: "They agree with
Gropius that only so can they seem really integral in the building effort, only so can their planning costs get paid without
question, only so can they seem businesslike in a country that highly respects-and pays-men of business." Louise
Cooper et al., "The Architect Today," Architectural Forum (October 1955): 123.
94 Walter Gropius, "The Architect Within Our Industrial Society," in Scope of TotalArchitecture (New York: Harper &
Brothers, 1955): 80.
95 Walter Gropius, "TAC's Teamwork," in Gropius and Sarah P. Harkness, ed., The Architects Collaborative 1945-1965
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before the war.97 In this context, Gropius maintained, a collective method like that of TAC, self-
consciously balancing individual decision-making with collective criticism, offered a middle path
between the anti-democratic extremes of groupthink on the one hand and the autocratic cult of the
genius on the other.
Gropius's concepts of the "total" architect and of "total architecture" thus reflected his
attempts to effect a delicate rhetorical balance across the domains of politics, architecture, and
business in arguing for collectivity in the postwar context. In this sense, the circulation of these terms
within the field over the next two decades betrayed their shifting interpretation. In the same year
Gropius's book appeared, an article in Architectural Forum offered a more blunt set of analogies
within the postwar complex of military technology, consumer culture, and architectural production.
"Democracy and the immense productivity of industry have for the first time in history produced
something like a 'total' market," its authors wrote, arguing that in the construction field, "This
revolution has led to an idea as radical as the idea of 'total' war: the concept of 'total' construction
and with it the possibility of 'total' architecture." 98 Photographer and architect Robert Damora, an
avowed acolyte of Gropius and the chosen photographer for his and TAC's earliest buildings in the
U.S., used the term philosophically, defining Total Architecture as "architecture that is human, that is
useful, that goes beyond form alone to the beauty of the spirit; architecture that encompasses all
building types and all people."99 Like Gropius, he stressed the democratic character of this concept in
the postwar context, allied to the conviction that modern architecture so conceived would be "an
architecture for everyone; just as our democratic government is a government for everyone with no
97 See Karen Koehler, "The Bauhaus Manifesto Postwar to Postwar: From the Street to the Wall to the Radio to the
Memoir," in Jeffrey Saletnik and Robin Schuldenfrei, ed., Bauhaus Construct: Fashioning Identity, Discourse and
Modernism (London and New York: Routledge, 2009): 13-36.
98 Louise Cooper et al., "The Architect Today," Architectural Forum (October 1955): 116-123.
99 Robert Damora with Sirkka Damora, "Robert Damora," in Nina Rappaport, ed., Robert Damora: 70 Years of Total
Architecture (New Haven: Yale School of Architecture, 2003), n.p. Damora photographed both Gropius and his house in
Lincoln, Massachusetts in 1948, and TAC's Harvard Graduate Center in 1950. On Damora's relationship with Gropius,
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exclusions."1 00 By the 1970s, however, architects and critics employed the term without political
content, invoking the notion of "total" architecture more pragmatically to describe the increasing
range of services offered by larger and more diversified design firms. In Total Design (1972), a
monograph on the comprehensive practice of Welton Becket & Associates, editor William Dudley
Hunt described the firm's concept as encompassing "almost anything that could remotely be called
professional architecture," including an extensive array of services ranging from engineering to
programming, space studies, survey and analysis, site selection, master planning, zoning assistance,
industrial design, furnishing and decorating, graphics, plan checking, and cost control. 101
In developing his argument from a text on the AIA's prohibitions in 1952 to its expanded
form in The Scope of TotalArchitecture three years later, Gropius's position was both ideological and
pragmatic. He insisted that collaboration across disciplines would allow the architect to recover the
ideal of integration represented by the pre-industrial figure of the master builder in the context of
postwar industrial society. These issues of production also directly concerned questions of authorship
and the self-image of the producer, issues with which Gropius was intimately familiar through his
long engagement with design pedagogy. Students of architecture would have "to learn to collaborate
without losing their identity," an approach he had worked to promote through collaborative
workshops at the Bauhaus and later at Harvard.1 02 "The younger generation of architects," he
warned, "[is] beginning to lose confidence in the trusteeship character of our professional setup and
in its logical result: the self-appointed prima donna architect."1 03 'he historical task of the next
generation of architects, inheritors of the legacy of modernism, would thus be to overcome "the
100 Interview with Robert Damora by Dean Sakamoto, in Robert Damora: 70 Years of TotalArchitecture, n.p.
101 William Dudley Hunt, Total Design: Architecture of Welton Becket & Associates (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 1972).
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ideology of the past century" that "has taught us to see in the individual genius the only embodiment
of true and pure art." 104
Significantly, Gropius understood that this change in pedagogy would enable new attitudes
towards individual self-consciousness for architects in practice, no longer taught to think in terms of
singular authorship. He warned that these new team-based production would entail an inevitable
confrontation with inherited expectations about the autonomy and importance of the architect,
predicting that "Architects in the future will refuse to be restrained from a natural urge to take actual
part in a team effort with the industry to produce buildings and their parts. The emphasis, I believe,
will be more and more on the team."1 05 By the 1960s, however, this "natural urge" to teamwork
received a more compelling impetus from legal and economic challenges that required firms to grow
larger in order to meet the demands of an increasingly competitive marketplace.
Incorporation, Ethics, and the American Institute of Architects
In 1968, an editorial in the Architectural & Engineering News lamented the "Decay of the Old
Ethics," predicting that "the huge public-private client of the future will know little, and care less,
about many of the ins and outs of architects' professional ethics."1 06 Over the next decade, the
profession underwent a series of fundamental shifts in the conditions of practice that saw the
dismantling of over a century of anti-competitive regulations based on the definition of architecture
as a disinterested, liberal profession. These changes had profound impacts on the competitive terrain
of the architectural field, leading to the consolidation and expansion of ever-larger and more
diversified firms.
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A crucial event in this shift was the consent decree signed by the American Institute of
Architects (AIA) with the U.S. Department of Justice in 1972 to remove mandatory fee schedules
from its standards of professional practice, a major stake in its charter to protect the interests of U.S.
architects as a community of expert practitioners.1 07 The consequences of allowing architects to
compete for services on the basis of price were immediately clear to critics, who warned that
"agreeing to the consent decree reduces the concept of professionalism to the level of a
commodity."1 08 Caught between consumer advocates who sought to democratize access to
professional services and laissez-faire economists in favor of deregulating markets, by the end of the
decade most of the AIAs ethical protections against competitive practice had been dismantled,
including its long-standing ban on advertising and rules to prevent any architect from attempting to
supplant another with potential clients.1 09 Studying the impact of these changes, sociologist Robert
Gutman held that architects' self-conception as a liberal (rather than entrepreneurial) profession was
anachronistic, a sign that "the theoretical underpinnings which have held the field together no longer
appear valid."' 1 0 (Fig. 1.45)
Other market forces further exacerbated the need for firms to grow bigger in order to meet
the demands of open market competition. The effects of prolonged recession, the reduction of
architects' authority over building construction, the increased specialization of building types, and
expanded litigation and the resulting liability protection which firms were obliged to carry, all
107 "Convention Delegates Vote 2-1 to Accept Justice Department Consent Decree," Architectural Record (June 1972):
47.
108 Walter E Wagner Jr., "The AIA and the Justice Dept: Do you know you're almost slightly pregnant?" Architectural
Record (May 1972): 9. The AIA's legal disputes with the Department of Justice over price competition was not fully
resolved until 1990. See Daniel P. Moskowitz and Peter Hoffmann, "Architects and Engineers Getting Part of What They
Want on Antitrust Laws," Architectural Record (January 1983): 35; David Johnston, "Justice Department Files Antitrust
Suit Against Architects," The New York Times, July 6, 1990; Sharon Walsh, "American Institute of Architects Settles U.S.
Suit on Pricing Policy," The Washington Post, July 6, 1990.
109 Jay Wickersham, "From Disinterested Expert to Marketplace Competitor: How Anti-Monopoly Law Transformed the
Ethics and Economics of American Architecture in the 1970s," Architectural Theory Review, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2015): 138-
158. I am grateful to Wickersham for providing me with an early version of this paper, delivered at the annual conference
of the Society of Architectural Historians in April 2011, in the early stages of my writing.
10 Robert Gutman, "Architecture: The entrepreneurial profession," Progressive Architecture (May 1977): 55.
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resulted in a steady decline in the net profitability of U.S. architecture firms after the 1950s.II The
result was the consolidation of a smaller number of large firms with an increasing proportion of the
architectural market, split from a sea of smaller practices with an ever-more marginal share of the
field.
Firms responded in different ways to these shifts in the economics of architectural practice.
The largest offices were pushed both to diversify and specialize their services, often in highly
technical building categories, or to look for commissions abroad, particularly the expanding markets
of Southeast Asia and the Middle Eastern Gulf States. A 1971 article in Fortune outlined the ways in
which "Architects' collective acceptance of the team idea" had become increasingly necessary to
compete with contractors and developers in navigating the intensifying legal and economic pressures
of the construction field.11 2 "Building projects are growing larger and much more complex," the
article noted, "requiring an ever expanding list of specialists, from sociologists to market analysts, for
their planning."113 Such demands threatened the viability of medium-sized firms in particular (those
listed in Fortune as having ten to thirty employees), necessitating expansion and diversification as a
condition of survival on the open market. In response,
Many firms have abandoned the traditional partnership setup and have incorporated. At least
two companies have floated public stock issues, and many more are considering the possibility.
An increasing number of architects have become entrepreneurs.... Large firms are spreading out
from architecture and engineering into such related activities as city and regional planning,
economic and transportation studies, graphics, and interior design." 4
Among the firms pursuing such structural changes in their practice, John Portman Associates chose
the path of entrepreneurship, with Portman offering the persona of a combined developer, part
11 See Anne Filson, "Net Profits," in Eva Franch i Gilabert, Michael Kubo, Ana Miljacki, Ashley Schafer, ed., OfficeUS
Atlas (Zurich: Lars MUller, 2015): 700-701, based on Filson's research on the separation of architects from building
construction after 1949. I am grateful to Filson for providing this research for OfficeUS as well as for this dissertation.
112 Gurney Breckenfeld, "The Architects Want a Voice in Redesigning America," Fortune (November 1971): 206.
113 Ibid., 198.
114 Ibid., 146.
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owner, and designer for large-scale commercial complexes like the Peachtree Center in Atlanta,
Georgia (1965), a real estate model he soon applied to projects in San Francisco, Detroit, Los
Angeles, and thereafter internationally in Singapore, China, India, and South Korea.1 15 Charles
Luckman, previously a partner in large-scale practice with William L. Pereira in Los Angeles (and the
client for SOM's Lever House in New York City prior to the start of his architectural career), agreed
in 1968 to the acquisition of his firm, Charles Luckman Associates, by Ogden Corp., a conglomerate
with interests in shipbuilding, scrap-metal, and savings and loans, among other industries.11 6 RTKL
Inc., based in Baltimore, merged with research, engineering, and computation conglomerate URS
Systems in 1971, opening the firm to both the development market and the access to capital
provided by a publicly held firm.11 7 A public issue of $1.4 million in stock provided Los Angeles
building designer Barry A. Berkus with the funds to establish Environmental Systems International,
Inc. (ESI) in June 1970, a competitor to architecture firms in selling designs for up to 13,000 houses
and apartments by the end of 1971.118 Perhaps the most significant of these changes was the decision
of CRS Design Associates, the firm established as Caudill, Rowlett Scott (CRS) in 1945, not to
merge with a larger company but to become the first publicly traded architecture practice in 1971,
initiating a series of acquisitions that transformed the company into a vast global engineering and
15 On the development model of John Portman Associates, see Charles Rice, Interior Urbanism: Architecture, John
Portman and Downtown America (London: Bloomsbury, 2016); "John Portman: Atlanta's One-Man Urban Renewal
Program," Architectural Record (January 1966): 133-140; Maeve Slavin, "Portmania," Interiors (October 1984): 118-
127. On the firm's international expansion after 1979, see Robert Guenther, "U.S. Developers Sign Contracts To Put Up
Projects in China," 7he Wall StreetJournal (November 12, 1984): ii; John C. Portman, "An Architecture for
Contemporary China," Building in China (December 1990): 34-38; Mitchell Pacelle, "U.S. Architects in Asia: Only
Way to Go Is Up," The Wall StreetJournal (March 21, 1996): B 1; Aric Chen, "The Kubla Khan of Hotels," The New York
Times (June 25, 2006): 5; Charlie Qiuli Xue, Yingchun Li, "Importing American Architecture to
China: the Practice of John Portman & Associates in Shanghai," The Journal ofArchitecture (March 2008): 317-333.
116 Breckenfeld, "The Architects Want a Voice in Redesigning America": 203.
117 Ibid.
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construction conglomerate over the next two decades.11 9 (Fig. 1.46-1.47) While journalists noted
that "Not every firm is willing to share ownership and control with a large number of mostly
anonymous stockholders and to bare its financial soul to them and to the world," by 1978 at least 33
other large design and construction firms in the U.S. had chosen to issue public stock and so become
subject to the forms of expansion and diversification demanded by shareholders on the open
market. 120
By the 1970s, the economies of production represented by team-based offices had become
the norm within architectural practice. A scale of operation that before World War II had been
reserved for a handful of firms-including those of D. H. Burnham & Company, McKim, Mead &
White, and Albert Kahn & Associates-formed the typical structure of mainstream architectural
production.121 This expansion of corporate practice was intimately related to the expanding oil
economies of the Arab and Persian Gulf States in the decades after World War II. As will be discussed
in Chapter 5, TAC's University of Baghdad (1957-83) was an early example of what quickly became
a heavy involvement in the region by U.S. firms, in parallel with U.S. geopolitical and economic
interests during the Cold War. This presence included corporate practices in particular, with SOM,
CRS, Hellmuth, Obata + Kassabaum (HOK), Leo A Daly, and Daniel, Mann, Johnson &
Mendenhall (DMJM) among the firms whose expansion in these years was indebted to large-scale
commissions in the Middle East.1 22 (Fig. 1.48) The invitation of Houston-based CRS (later CRS-
Sirrine Inc.) to assist with site selection for the University of Petroleum and Minerals (1964-82) in
119 Paolo Tombesi, "Capital gains and architectural losses: the transformative journey of Caudill Rowlett Scott (1948-
1994)," Journal ofArchitectural Education, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2006): 145-168. See also Avigail Sachs, "Marketing Through
Research: William Caudill and Caudill, Rowlett, Scott (CRS)," The Journal ofArchitecture, Vol. 13, No. 6 (2008): 737-
752; Peggy Deamer, "Office Management," in Franch i Gilabert, Lawrence, Miljacki, Schafer, ed., OfficeUSAgenda: 52-
64.
120 Oliver W Witte, "Learn from the Public Giants": 48.
121 Robert Gutman, Architectural Practice: A Critical View (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1988): 5.
122 See Tony Morris, "American Designers in Arabia," Middle East Construction (August 1985): 37-43. The article
includes profiles of HOK, DMJM Phillips Reister Haley Inc., Leo A Daly, TAC, CRS-Sirrine Inc. as firms that were
particularly invested in work in the region.
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Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, for example, marked the beginning of three decades of large-scale
commissions for governmental, industrial, and military clients in Saudi Arabia, including workers'
housing for the Arabian-American Oil Company, or Aramco (1975-80) in Dhahran, King Abdul
Aziz Military City (1976) for the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, housing for the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (1978) in Riyadh, and office buildings for National Methanol and Saudi Petrochemical
Company (1981) in Jubail. 123 (Fig. 1.49) As described in Chapter 6, exchanges between U.S. firms
and Gulf clients reached their peak during the boom in crude oil prices from 1973 to 1983, a shift in
clientele that formed a direct corollary to the corresponding decline in building practice in the
United States.
The Critique of the Corporate
In retracing the steps that led to his decision to pursue a Ph.D. at the University of Cambridge in the
spring of 1960, later published as The Formal Basis ofModern Architecture (1963), Peter Eisenman
conspicuously located his decision to return to the academy in having become "disillusioned with
practice after working with Walter Gropius's [sic] Architects Collaborative" in the summer of
1959.124 At the same time, a younger generation of architects and educators who had studied under
Gropius at Harvard were publicly critical of the collaborative ethos. Victor Lundy insisted in 1961
that "creative architecture comes out of the individual, not group design." 125 Paul Rudolph, then
chair of the architecture department at Yale, laid the blame for the team method squarely at his
123 On the origins of CRS's involvement in Saudi Arabia and its subsequent practice there, see Jonathan King and Peter
Langdon, ed., The CRS Team and the Business ofArchitecture (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002);
Charles E. Lawrence, Saudi Search (Houston: CRSS Research, 1986). On the University of Petroleum and Minerals (later
King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals), see "A Jewel of a University on the Arabian Sands," Fortune
(November 1975): 126-133; Charles K. Hoyt, "Caudill Rowlett Scott's Ongoing Work For a Saudi Arabian University,"
Architectural Record (April 1976): 95-100.
124 Peter Eisenman, postscript to The Formal Basis ofModern Architecture (PhD Dissertation, Cambridge, 1963),
published in 2008 (Basel: Lars Muller).
125 Cranston Jones, Architecture Today and Tomorrow (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961): 175.
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teacher's feet. "Gropius may be wrong in believing that architecture is a cooperative art," he declared.
"Architects were not meant to design together; it's either all his work, or mine." 126 In the same
period, Robert Venturi reacted negatively to his experiences working for the office of Eero Saarinen
& Associates in the 1950s, by then a firm of hundreds responsible for delivering an eclectic range of
corporate images for a variety of clients.127 Venturi denied the influence of other architects for whom
he had worked, including Louis I. Kahn, in much the same manner that Frank Lloyd Wright had
earlier resisted the label of disciple to his acknowledged master, Louis Sullivan. 128 In his own
practice, Venturi's writing stressed the individual nature of his architectural interests-famously
beginning his 1966 book, Complexity & Contradiction in Architecture, with a statement of personal
taste, "I like complexity and contradiction in architecture"-even though he worked in partnership
throughout his career, first with Paul Cope and H. Mather Lippincott (1958) and subsequently with
William Short (1961), John Rauch (1964), and finally with his lifetime collaborator, Denise Scott
Brown.1 29 Latent in Eisenman's and Venturi's writings was a shared nostalgia for the ideal of the
genius, with an emphasis on difficult, complex, and resistant forms of production as a deliberate
counter to the smooth efficiencies represented by the distributed postwar office.
By the early 1960s, then, corporate architectural practice had come to stand as the other
against which a younger generation of architects opposed itself in seeking more authorial modes of
practice outside the strictures of the traditional office. For this self-styled neo-avant garde and its
theoretical mentors, like Colin Rowe, the discursive rejection of mainstream professional practice in
126 Ibid.
127 On Saarinen's firm in this period, see Walter McQuade, "The New Saarinen Office," Architectural Forum (April 1962),
113-19. A critique of Saarinen's office in this period as providing "a style for the job," tailored to the needs of the firm's
corporate clients, is Reyner Banham, "The Style for the Job," New Statesman (February 14, 1964): 261.
128 On Kahn's discussion of influences in the writing of Complexity 6- Contradiction in Architecture, see Mary McLeod,
"Venturi's Acknowledgements: The Complexities of Influence," Lee Ann Custer, "Teaching Complexity and
Contradiction: Robert Venturi's Lecture Course 'Theories of Architecture,' 1961-1965," and Christine Gorby,
"Manuscripts into Manifesto: The Evolution of Robert Venturi's 1966 Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture,"
papers delivered at the Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture at 50 conference, Museum of Modern Art and
Philadelphia Museum of Art, November 11-12, 2016.
129 Robert Venturi, Complexity & Contradiction in Architecture (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1966).
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the U.S. after the 1960s centered on two parallel myths: the loss of the utopian social project of
European modern architecture in its migration to the U.S. after the 1930s, and the figure of Walter
Gropius as a synecdoche for this subjection to the market forces of postwar capitalism. In Rowe's
introduction to Five Architects (1972), key among the documents that codified the neo-avant garde
project of Eisenman and his peers, he summarized the generational feeling that postwar architectural
production offered no more than a laundered, aestheticized version of a more radical prewar
European modernism, "largely purged of its ideological or societal content." 130 In this
transformation, Rowe argued, modern architecture in the U.S. had come to function as merely "a
suitable veneer for the corporate activities of 'enlightened' capitalism."1 31 As such, its aesthetic
content was "made safe for capitalism and, with its dissemination thereby assisted... became
agreeably available to be catalogued-on either side of the Atlantic-among the cultural trophies of
the affluent society."1 32 The consolidation of this critical discourse around the periodizing category of
"late" modernism, framed in negative terms, further reinforced the narrative of a revolutionary
European avant garde and its perceived collapse into formalism in the U.S. after World War 11.133
At the same time, the abstract, reflective language of corporate headquarters designed by U.S.
architects in the 1970s and 1980s often further obscured the economic processes that lay behind
their production. In his description of the rhetoric of late modernism, architectural critic Charles
Jencks classified the shimmering mirror facades of such office buildings as "Slick-Tech" or "wet-look"
architecture, a phrase that could well have been applied, for example, to TAC's headquarters for
130 Colin Rowe, "Introduction," in Five Architects (New York: Wittenborn, 1972): 4.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
133 On "late modernism" as a periodization, see in particular Charles Jencks, Late-Modern Architecture and Other Essays
(New York: Rizzoli, 1980). The majority of literature on the periodization of modernism has focused on the category of
"postmodernism," leaving the notion of a "late" modernism relatively underdiscussed (even when this appears within
broader discussions of late capitalism and postmodernity). See Jencks, The Language ofPost-Modern Architecture (New
York: Rizzoli, 1977); Andreas Huyssen, "Mapping the Postmodern," New German Critique, No. 33 (Autumn 1984): 5-
52; Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic ofLate Capitalism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
199 1); Jameson, "Theories of the Postmodern," in The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the Postmodern, 1983-1998
(London: Verso, 1998): 22-31.
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Johns-Manville outside of Denver, Colorado (1973-77).134 (Fig. 1.50) For philosopher Fredric
Jameson, it was precisely this category of buildings, with their immersive interiors and hermetically
enclosed exteriors, that offered the most powerful illustration of "the formal overtones proper to a
late finance capitalism."1 35 Not least within these processes of mystification was the growing fissure
between discussions of U.S. architects and the oil-based economies of the Arab & Persian Gulf states
in which their work was increasingly implicated after World War II. Historian Reinhold Martin has
recently pointed to the ways in which corporate buildings for U.S. oil companies, like Johnson/
Burgee's Pennzoil Place in Houston (1973-76), transubstantiated the "phantasm" of the petroleum
economy into the shimmering effects of mirror-glass and steel, simultaneously concealing and
mystifying both the processes of capital and the transnational sites, materials, and actors through
which these processes flowed in these decades.1 36 (Fig. 1.51)
Faced with such entanglements within the politics and economics of architectural practice,
contemporary architects and critics struggled to engage with the impact of the architectural
corporation on mainstream practice by the 1970s. A new wave of Marxist theoretical approaches,
particularly embodied by the group of critics at the University of Venice centered around the
historian Manfredo Tafuri, seemed to offer a means out of this growing impasse in critical
assessment. In advocating for engagement with the structural conditions of U.S. architectural
production, the group argued that "Academic disdain for the banal in this culture and a critical
134 Charles Jencks, "The Rhetoric of Late-Modernism-A Pictorial Essay," in Late-Modern Architecture and Other Essays
(New York: Rizzoli, 1980): 35, 66. Jencks alluded to the processes of mystification inherent in such facades, describing an
office tower designed by Anthony Lumsden of DMJM for the Indonesian bank Bumi Daya as having an "oil-slick
surface" whose ripples "suggest a series of meanings without naming them." Jencks, Late-Modern Architecture and Other
Essays: 66.
1 3 5 Jameson, "The Brick and the Balloon: Architecture, Idealism, and Land Speculation," in 7he Cultural Turn: Selected
Writings on the Postmodern, 1983-1998 (London: Verso, 1998): 186. While Jameson praised Jencks's "wonderful"
descriptions of the glass-and-steel semiotics of late modernity in Late-Modern Architecture and Other Essays, he rejected
the Jencksian tendency to make such literal links of "thematic self-reference," as in his description of the Bumi Daya
bank, from the economies of land speculation and finance capital to the formal aesthetics of late-modern architecture.
Ibid.
136 Reinhold Martin, "Materiality: Mirrors", in Utopias Ghost: Architecture and Postmodernism, Again (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2010): 93-122.
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disparagement of its products are both positions to be rejected, not because they are wrong but
because they are useless in explaining trends over time; they do not help us to understand, because
they tend to eliminate phenomena and problems the forms of which may leave us indifferent but the
mechanisms of which must be continually recognized." 137 Yet in accounting for the legacy of the
avant-garde "masters" and their postwar followers in their 1976 survey Modern Architecture, Tafuri
and Francesco Dal Co took up the dichotomy laid out by Hitchcock in 1947 merely to lament a
condition in which "a true and proper 'architecture of bureaucracy' settled in everywhere," while the
field "came to be dominated not by individual architects intent on communicating their opinions of
the world but by large studios in which the tasks were parceled out with virtual assembly-line
standards." 138 Ceasing to distinguish among the varieties of collaborative, bureaucratic, and
corporate practices that had shifted the landscape of practice over the preceding quarter-century,
Tafuri and Dal Co dismissed such modes of practice as capable only of producing buildings "as
anonymous as the architectural concerns that build them."139
Historical narratives like that of Tafuri and Dal Co constituted an effective abandonment of
Hitchcock's call to develop a critical framework through which such practices could be evaluated, in
contradistinction to traditional models of singular architectural authorship, on the cusp of the
postmodern turn. By the time of MoMA's "Transformations in Modern Architecture" in 1979, a
survey of the previous two decades of architectural production, curator Arthur Drexler could only
point (following the historian Peter Collins) to the "archaeologically unclassifiable" variations of late-
and post-modern production on display-a selection dominated by the work of corporate firms-
declaring the result to be "bewildering, profuse, overloaded, contradictory, inconsistent, largely
mediocre." 14 0 (Fig. 1.52) Paramount within this proliferation was the dominant role of large-scale,
137 Giorgio Cucci, Francesco Dal Co, Mario Manieri-Elia, Manfredo Tafuri, introduction to The American City: From the
Civil War to the New Deal (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1979): xi.
138 Manfredo Tafuri and Francesco Dal Co, Modern Architecture/2 (Milan: Electa, 1976): 339.
139 Ibid.
140 "Response: Arthur Drexler on 'Transformations'," interview with Andrew McNair, Skyline (Summer 1979): 6.
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corporate firms over the spectrum of architectural production in the United States by the 1970s, the
producers par excellence of an endlessly pliable range of styles within an increasingly fragmented and
competitive marketplace for architectural services.1 41 Drexler succinctly encapsulated the
consequences of this shift in the economy of architectural practice a few years later in his
introduction to Three Skyscrapers (1983), a MoMA exhibition on recent commercial towers by SOM,
Norman Foster, and Johnson/Burgee (among the corporate firms whose work had featured most
prominently in Transformations), where he lamented that "In a free society capitalism gives us what
we want, including our own demise." 142
Exhibitions like Drexler's exposed the critical ellipsis that had come by this time to obscure
corporate practices in architecture, exacerbated by a neo-avant garde that fashioned itself as the
rejection of a professionalized field lacking criticality toward its own conditions of production.1 43 Far
from producing resistance to the economic dominance of the profession by large-scale offices,
however, the critique of the corporate only reinforced the widening disparity between such firms'
increasing hegemony over the conditions of the built environment and the relative inattention given
to their work in contrast to smaller, boutique practices. Indeed, this lack of attention had much the
opposite effect, leaving few models by which to assess the next wave of multinational conglomerates
that took over an even greater portion of the construction field after the 1990s, led by ultra-large
entities like AECOM144. It remains for critics to take up the task of recognizing and reading the
141 On the role of this exhibition in manifesting the dominant role of corporate firms over the spectrum of architectural
production in the U.S. by the 1970s, See Michael Kubo, "'I Decline To Be A Missionary:' Late-Modern Mirrors and
Transformations in Modern Architecture," in Lea-Catherine Szacka, Veronique Patteeuw, ed., Exhibitions, Periodicals and
the Shaping of Postmodern Architecture-Mediating Messages (London: Bloomsbury, 2018).
142 Arthur Drexler, Three New Skyscrapers (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1983): 6. The three skyscrapers were
by Norman Foster Associates (Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Headquarters in Hong Kong), Skidmore,
Owings & Merrill (National Commercial Bank in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia) and Johnson/Burgee (International Place in
Boston, Massachusetts).
143 Drexler acknowledged the difficulties in presenting such mainstream work for public consumption: "The merely
good, which may not be in dispute, is least eligible for public scrutiny. It is difficult to imagine a newspaper article that
says: here are some good buildings-none of them has won a prize and they are in no way peculiar." Arthur Drexler,
Transformations in Modern Architecture (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1979): 7.
144 AECOM Technology Corp. has led the annual ranking by Engineering News-Record of the world's "Top 500 Design
Firms" by size every year since 2010.
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work of such collective, collaborative, and corporate bodies in the twenty-first century, by effectively
renewing the call made by Hitchcock seventy years ago to develop critical tools commensurate with
the reality of this production.
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Chapter 2
The Idea of The Architects Collaborative 1945-1995
When, in order to be an architect, one must be a genius, the profession, as such, is obsolete.
-An Opinion on Architecture, 19411
There are two ways to go-towards competition or towards collaboration.
-Sarah Pillsbury Harkness 2
In the years during and after World War II, "collaboration" became the watchword for a generation
of architects committed to challenging the legacy of the genius, inherited from the first generation of
modernist "masters," as inadequate to address the building problems of their time. For adherents to
this ethos, faith in a perceived consensus around the principles of the modern movement was
accompanied by the belief that such unity in the postwar period might, for the first time, enable
newly collective forms of work that would unite the building disciplines in addressing the complex
tasks of postwar construction. These efforts were inspired by models of collectivity including the
large-scale infrastructural projects of the Tennessee Valley Authority and other federal entities under
the New Deal, the housing and social development projects of the Farm Security Administration and
the Federal Public Housing Authority during World War II, the coordinated planning efforts of the
Telesis group of architects and planners on the West Coast, and the cooperative pedagogy of the
German Bauhaus and its progressive U.S. analogues, from the Harvard Graduate School of Design
in Cambridge to Black Mountain College in North Carolina. Young architects trained in these
settings combined common interests in issues of community design, large-scale regional planning,
I John B. Bayley, Robert Hays Rosenberg, Bruno Zevi, John Taylor Moore, Jr., Warren H. Radford, Frank C. Treseder,
Arthur Koon Hing Cheang, Win. Joseph, Dahong Wang and T. J. Willo, An Opinion on Architecture (Boston: The
Century Press, 1941): 8.
2 Sarah P. Harknesss, "Collaboration," in Walter Gropius and Harkness, ed., The Architects Collaborative 1945-1965
(Tuefen: Arthur Niggli, 1966): 26.
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and progressive models of democratic action with a faith in the integrated, unifying character of
modern architecture and design. Such concerns led members of this generation of designers to seek
new models of collective work that would join the fields of architecture, planning, landscape
architecture, and engineering into a new whole. 3
It was in this context of debate on the intersections between democracy, collaboration, and
modernism that the seven young founders of The Architects Collaborative-Jean Bodman, Norman
Fletcher, John Harkness, Sarah Pillsbury, Benjamin Thompson, Louis McMillen, and Robert
McMillan-came together. The architects who joined to form TAC were linked through a network
of overlapping personal and professional connections, formed in this shared climate of social and
architectural optimism in the prelude to the postwar building boom. Committed to forming a
practice together after the war, these friends and colleagues decided that adding an experienced
senior practitioner would help them find their way in the field and lend stature to the young firm.
Coincidence and good timing intervened to bring Gropius, the very figure of Bauhaus pedagogy, on
board. In Gropius, the group found both the eminent practitioner they sought and more
fundamentally a highly sympathetic collaborator, one whose attitude toward the value of teamwork
closely matched their own. Christened The Architects Collaborative, the goal of its founders was, in
Sarah Harkness's words, nothing less than "to remake the world."4
As TAC grew to become the largest dedicated architectural practice in the U.S., however, the
fate of these ideals and the legacy of the partners' collaborative optimism were increasingly contested.
As the firm navigated fundamental changes in professional practice and management that defined
the character of the office and its products by the 1980s, both the remaining founders and later
principals struggled to reconcile the reality of the large-scale organization and its corporate structure
3 on the disciplinary turn to planning, see Andrew Shanken, 194X: Architecture, Planning, and Consumer Culture on the
American Home Front (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011); Anna Vallye, Design and the Politics of
Knowledge in America, 1937-1967: Walter Gropius, Gyorgy Kepes, Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University (2011).
4 Transcript of interview with Sarah Harkness conducted by Perry Neubauer, November 3, 2006: 4. I am grateful to
Neubauer for providing transcripts of this and other interviews with then-surviving founders of TAC.
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with the image of collectivity that had governed its birth at the start of the postwar period. The
nature of these conceptual and economic battles over TAC's course revealed both the force of the
partners' original faith in the collaborative ethos and the radical redefinition of architectural
production that had taken place over the fifty years of the firm's existence.
Collective Tasks
The pursuit of coordinated and collective planning models in the U.S. after the 1930s was marked by
a central imperative to distance such efforts from the more authoritarian forms of social organization
that loomed over geopolitical debates in the years preceding World War II. The large-scale federal
initiatives of the New Deal era were characterized by public advocacy not just for their social and
economic benefits but for their fundamental compatibility with concepts of individual self-
realization within an equal, collaborative democratic society. The successes of these programs offered
inspiration to a generation of designers seeking more collaborative forms of creative work, in line
with the desire to reform architectural pedagogy and practice along modernist lines.
For young architects of the era, above all these New Deal initiatives stood the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA), which provided a fundamental model in these years both for the heroic scale of its
concrete dams and large-scale infrastructural works and for its demonstration of the rapid planning
and execution at a regional scale made possible by its coordinated team of architects and engineers. 5
(Fig. 2.1) Students from around the country, including some of TAC's future partners, traveled to
study the fruits of TVA's integrated infrastructural program for flood control, land and soil
reclamation, rural electrification, and agricultural and economic development along the Tennessee
River watershed. As teachers, many of these architects offered design studio problems at Harvard and
5 On the TVA's design methods, see Christine Macy, "The Architect's Office of the Tennessee Valley Authority," in Tim
Culvahouse, ed., The Tennessee Valley Authority: Design and Persuasion (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2007):
26-51. On non-infrastructural buildings by the Architect's Office in these years, Roland Wank, "Architecture in Rural
Areas: A Report on TVA Experience, by Roland A. Wank, Head Architect," New Pencil Points (December 1942): 47-53.
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other schools of architecture modeled on the TVA's efforts as well as those of other federal planning
authorities. 6 Publications on the TVA stressed the democratic character of its work as an agent of
national, social, and physical progress. A special issue of Architectural Review in 1943 devoted to the
TVA, edited by Julian Huxley, hailed the program as a paradigmatic "achievement of democratic
planning." 7 (Fig. 2.2) The following year, David Lilienthal, the former chairman of the program,
published TVA: Democracy on the March (1944) as an argument against persistent claims that the
government program constituted a form of socialism in the United States.8 (Fig. 2.3)
At the southeastern end of the Tennessee Valley watershed lay Asheville, North Carolina, where
a group of faculty, artists, and students established Black Mountain College in 1933 as a radical
effort to realize the progressive educational ideals of democratic participation and collective self-
determination. The College's creative model was heavily inspired by the educational philosophy of
John Dewey, an interlocutor for the school's founders and a supporter of Black Mountain's efforts in
these years. 9 As reflected in the theoretical models offered by books like Dewey's Democracy and
Education (1916) and Art as Experience (1934), the school's founders envisaged an intellectual
framework that would bridge artistic creation and democratic action through collaborative social
6 Design topics related to the TVA and other federal programs later taught Harvard included studios to design a rental
housing development in Newton, MA for the Federal Housing Authority (taught by John Harkness, 1947), mobile
shelters and sectional housing for the TVA (taught by Norman Fletcher and Leonard Currie, 1951), and a construction
camp and workers' community at Fontana Dam (taught by Josep Lluis Sert and Ronald Gourley, 1956). Harvard
Graduate School of Design, The GSD History Collection, Student Affairs-Student Work, Subseries CA: Graduate
School of Design, Architecture Student Problems, folders CA107, CC023, CAI 10, CC024, CAOO1.
7 "TVA: An Achievement of Democratic Planning," special issue of The Architectural Review on the TVA, ed. Julian
Huxley (June 1943).
8 David Lilienthal, TVA: Democracy on the March (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944).
9 Following his first visit to Black Mountain College in 1935, Dewey wrote to John Rice, the school's founder, that "No
matter how the present crisis comes out, the need for the kind of work the College does is imperative in the long-run
interests of democracy. The College exists at the very 'grass roots' of a democratic way of life." John Dewey, quoted in
Harl-Heinz Filssl, "Pestalozzi in Dewey's Realm? Bauhaus Master Josef Albers among the German-speaking Emigres'
Colony at Black Mountain College (1933-1949)," Paedagogica Historica, Vol. 42, Nos. 1-2 (February 2006): 81.
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participation.1 0 Contemporary school brochures advertised to potential students that "Black
Mountain College is a small cosmopolitan community of students and teachers living together, an
education stressing democratic cooperation."11 In line with these aims, Black Mountain provided a
receptive home for a number of Bauhaus emigres, including Josef and Anni Albers, Lyonel Feininger,
and Xanti Schawinsky, who played fundamental roles in shaping the school's experimental
curriculum in art and architecture in these years.1 2 In this sense, it was Black Mountain College that
perhaps best represented the attempt to enact the cooperative ideals of the Bauhaus in the U.S.-not
(as many critics assumed) Gropius's program at Harvard, a professional graduate school within a
major U.S. university, or the more formalist program of the New Bauhaus, later renamed the
Chicago School of Design and then the Institute of Design, led first by LMszl6-Moholy Nagy and
after his death by Serge Chermayeff in Chicago.13
The faculty and students of Black Mountain College and the Harvard Graduate School of
Design were intimately connected during the war years. Walter Gropius taught in the summer art
institutes at Black Mountain each year between 1944 to 1946 and served on the advisory council to
the College from 1940 to 1949, a group that included Dewey, Carl Jung, and Albert Einstein. (Fig.
2.4) In turn, Josef Albers, the Bauhaus emigre entrusted to develop the foundational art curriculum
(or Werklehre) at Black Mountain College, served as a visiting professor at Harvard in these years,
10 John Dewey, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1916) and Art as Experience (New York: Minton, Balch & Company, 1934). On the influence of Dewey and
progressive educational models at Black Mountain College, see Mary Emma Harris, "A New Deal in American
Education" and "Progressivism, Modernism, and the Higher Learning," in The Arts at Black Mountain College
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987): 2-15 and Ruth Erickson, "A Progressive Education," in Helen Molesworth and
Erickson, Leap Before You Look: Black Mountain College, 1933-1957 (Boston: Institute of Contemporary Art; New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2015): 76-80.
11 Black Mountain College brochure, box 1, folder 3, Mary Caroline Richards Papers, 1898-2007, Getty Research
Institute, Los Angeles, cited in Helen Molesworth, "Imaginary Landscape," in Molesworth and Ruth Erickson, Leap
Before You Look: 47.
12 See Jeffrey Saletnik, "Bauhaus in America," in Leap Before You Look: 102-105.
13 As evident in its title, the New Bauhaus was much more self-conscious in claiming inheritance of the pedagogy of the
German Bauhaus in the U.S. compared to Black Mountain College or even to Harvard. See for example Serge
Chermayeff, "l'architecture au 'bauhaus' de Chicago" and "Architecture at the Institute of Design," in Gropius et son &cole,
special issue of lArchitecture d'Aujourd'hui (February 1950): 48-68.
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teaching biannual fall seminars after 1936 as well as in spring and summer 1940.14 Under Gropius's
direction, Harvard students also traveled to North Carolina in the summer months to gain hands-on
experience by participating in Black Mountain's work programs, an integral part of both the College's
operations and its collaborative pedagogy that included community farming and building projects.15
(Fig. 2.5) The democratic aspirations of these work programs found their most powerful expression
in the collaborative construction of the Studies Building on Black Mountain's Lake Eden campus
from 1940 to 1941 under the coordination of architect A. Lawrence Kocher, a member of the faculty
and the director of the school's design-build program. 16 (Fig. 2.6) The project followed Gropius and
Marcel Breuer's failed attempts to build an ambitious but cost-prohibitive complex of campus
buildings at Black Mountain College in 1939, plans for which were abandoned due to an inability to
raise sufficient funds. (Fig. 2.7). Such misalignments between the professional efforts of external
architects and the College's own culture of experimental, community-driven work among students
and faculty presaged later conflicts after World War II, when TAC attempted to design a long-range
plan for Black Mountain to ultimately failed ends.
A more proximate model of interdisciplinary collaboration among professionals in these years
was offered by Telesis, an "environmental research group" of urban and regional planners, landscape
architects, architects, and industrial designers established in San Francisco in 1939. The group's name
derived from the concept of "telesis," derived from the Greek [zang] by sociologist Lester Frank
Ward to describe his theories of a planned or "telic" society based on coordinated social
14 Harris, The Arts at Black Mountain College: 12. Harris describes Gropius's unsuccessful efforts to bring Albers to
Harvard permanently, writing to Albers that his work was "too good for a small college." Ibid. Vincent Katz has argued
that Albers' ideas on art, particularly his belief that "l'art pour l'art' can be justified," diverged from Gropius's belief in
the social function of art and architecture following his departure from the Bauhaus. Katz, "Black Mountain College:
Experiment in Art," in Katz, ed., Black Mountain College: Experiment in Art (Madrid: Museo Nacional Centro de Arte
Reina Sofia, 2002): 52.
15 The pedagogical importance of the work programs are detailed in David Silver, "Building Autonomy, Creating
Community: The Farm and Work Program at Black Mountain College," in Leap Before You Look: 120-129.
16 On Kocher and the Studies Building project, see Lauren Belliard, "The Design-Build Program at Lake Eden," in Leap
Before You Look: 132-141.
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advancement, or "planned progress," through nationally directed education.' 7 The cover of the
catalogue to Spacefor Living, a Telesis exhibition at the San Francisco Museum of Art in the summer
of 1940, defined the term (via Webster Dictionary) as "progress intelligently planned and directed;
the attainment of desired ends by the application of intelligent human effort to the means."18 (Fig.
2.8) The group's interests in coordinated planning as a tool for social development was reflected in
the service of two of its most prominent members, Burton Cairns and Vernon DeMars, as successive
directors for the western division of the Farm Security Administration (FSA) from 1937 to 1943.
Other Telesis members, like landscape architect Garrett Eckbo, developed their understanding of
collective action through their work for the FSA in these years. Eckbo's involvement with the design
of migrant workers' camps with the FSA and later cooperative housing projects, for example, led
him, in the words of historian Caroline Constant, "to view the process of collaboration-like the
governing process of the housing cooperative-as an instance in miniature of participatory
democracy in action."19
The intersection of these disparate impulses toward collective action during the war years at
Harvard was centered around the establishment of the student journal TASK, published irregularly in
six issues from 1941 to 1944-45 and followed by a one-off double issue in 1948. The rotating group
of editors and contributors to the journal during the war issues included two of TAC's subsequent
founders-Louis A. McMillen as an editor of the second issue in the fall of 1941 and Walter Gropius
among the contributors to the first issue that summer-and future collaborators, including I. M. Pei,
Ezra Stoller, and Edward Larrabee Barnes. The Cambridge discussion group from which the journal
17 See Frank Lester Ward, "Individual Telesis: Contributions to Social Philosophy. XI.," American Journal ofSociology,
Vol. 2, No. 5 (1897): 699-717 and "Collective Telesis: Contributions to Social Philosophy. XII.," American Journal of
Sociology, Vol. 2, No. 6 (1897): 801-822. Ward developed the concepts of "social telesis" and social planning in Applied
Sociology (Boston, New York, Chicago, London: Ginn & Company, 1906).
18 Telesis Environmental Research Group, Spacefor Living, San Francisco Museum of Art, July-August 1940. I am
grateful to Caroline Constant for bringing this exhibition catalogue to my attention.
19 Caroline Constant, "Collaborative Fruits: Garrett Eckbo's Communal Landscapes," in The Modern Architectural
Landscape (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012). On Eckbo's work for the FSA, see also Dorothee Imbert,
"The Art of Social Landscape Design," in Marc Treib and Imbert, Garrett Eckbo: Modern Landscapesfor Living (Berkeley,
Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1997): 106-178.
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emerged brought together men and women from Harvard, MIT, and the Cambridge School of
Architecture and Landscape architecture, a reflection of their shared commitment to the principles of
equality and joint effort in cooperative work.
The topics covered by the journal and the group structure of its editors and contributors
reflected these students' faith in collaboration as the means to achieve democratic forms of
participation and planning for both the war effort and the tasks of physical and social reconstruction
that would follow.20 An editorial in TASK 1 explained its founders' hope that "This magazine is to be
the expression of students who realize that architects today are either unaware of the rapidly
changing needs of society or are unable to answer them."21 In defining their objectives, the editors
argued that
The magnitude and nature of contemporary planning requires the closest collaboration of the
engineer, landscape architect, regional planner, architect, and the people for whom they build.
We believe that the architectural schools and the profession do not sufficiently reflect society's
needs; nor train the student and the young architect in the principle of collective work.22
The fourth issue similarly reminded readers that " TASKs purpose... is to give the profession
direction-a social and cooperative one."23 This need for direction, the editors claimed, required
overcoming the "traditional isolation" of the architectural profession and its replacement "with a
cooperative planning effort comprising all allied fields, technical, social, and economic."24 An
editorial in the fifth issue, on the verge of Allied victory, warned that students who had been trained
in such technics for the war effort would be required to accommodate themselves to the new realities
of team-based practice during peacetime. Its authors insisted that "the technician must be able to
20 On the paradigm of planning as a model for reconstruction during and after World War II, see Andrew Shanken,
194X: Architecture, Planning, and Consumer Culture on the American Home Front (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 2009).
21 "Editorial: TASK," TASK 1 (Summer 1941): 5.
22 Ibid.
23 "The Architectural Front," TASK4 (1943): 1.
24 Ibid.
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adapt himself to the large office in the interests of efficiency and prompt expedition of post-war
work," a change requiring that the prewar "contempt for 'bureaucracy' which marked so many
designers in New Deal government agencies must also be recognized as a hang-over from the
comfortable days of private patronage, which ended a decade and a half ago." 25
Walter Gropius contributed to the efforts of the young TASKeditors with an essay in the
inaugural issue titled "Education Should Aim at Combining Individual Independence With the
Spirit of Cooperation," lending the journal both his imprimatur as chair of the Harvard architecture
department and the banner of his advocacy for joining the principles of collaborative pedagogy to
the democratic, anti-fascist language of a U.S. at war.26 To these ends, he argued that "the
development of our period seems to move away from a competitive attitude to a cooperative
conception of thought and action," reiterating his belief that strengthening each individual's
"independence of mind by stirring up his [sic] courage and initiative and adventures of his own
serves better to develop cooperative qualities than the obsolete method of forcing the individual into
given channels of thought and action." 27 In this sense, Gropius's statements echoed the Deweyan
principles of progressive, democratic education with which he was simultaneously engaged as a
member of the advisory board at Black Mountain College in these years.
Further evidence of TASK's intrinsic connection to cooperative and collaborative initiatives
taking place beyond Cambridge lay in the frequent appearance of representatives from Telesis and
other national groups across the journal's wartime issues. Landscape architect Garrett Eckbo was
listed as the "Telesis Representative" to TASKin its fourth issue, having already provided the cover
image for TASK2 (1942), depicting a planting plan for a group of multi-family houses in Firebaugh,
California designed for the FSA. In the same issue the group expressed its conviction that, "by
collaboration, we may develop the comprehensive viewpoint necessary to produce and encourage the
25 "Unity for Planning," TASK5 (Spring 1944): 3.
26 Walter Gropius, ""Education Should Aim at Combining Individual Independence With the Spirit of Cooperation,"
TASK I (Summer 1941): 34-35.
27 Ibid., 34.
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study of the disorganized environment in which we find ourselves, make the average person aware of
the rich possibilities of his home and his community, and point out the techniques by which this can
be achieved."28 The issue also featured an article by Vernon DeMars, among the Telesis founders and
then district manager for the FSA in San Francisco, on social planning and agricultural development
in California. (Fig. 2.9-2.10) The Telesis group contributed another article on nursery schools on the
west coast to the journal's fourth issue, prior to the "West Coast Issue" of TASK6 (1944-45), edited
by Eckbo for Telesis among others and featuring an article on the planning of California's Central
Valley in the same year that Jean Bodman Fletcher, soon to be a founder of TAC, explored the same
subject in her master's thesis at Harvard. (Fig. 2.11-2.12)
An Opinion on Architecture
The collaborative roots of TASKlay in an even more polemical precursor, An Opinion on Architecture
(1941), a manifesto published by an overlapping group of Harvard students, including Bruno Zevi,
as a critique of the perceived formalist tendencies of the school under Joseph Hudnut. (Fig. 2.13)
Published in the same summer that TASK 1 appeared, the pamphlet constituted both a defense of
modern architecture as a social project, rather than a style, and an advocacy for the fundamental
necessity of collective work in achieving truly democratic structures of pedagogy and practice.29
Echoing Gropius's own criticisms of the academies and their production of the "artistic proletariat,"
the authors of Opinion argued that the pedagogy at Harvard as of 1941 had not yet progressed
significantly beyond these outmoded structures, despite four years of Gropius's presence. Laying the
28 "Telesis," TASK2 (1942): 27.
29 The editors of TASK I explained that both An Opinion on Architecture and the journal originated from student
discussion groups in Cambridge, begun at Harvard after 1938 to discuss issues of concern in architectural pedagogy.
They wrote that "In May [1941], several members of the discussion group attempted an analysis and clarification of the
state of 'Modern' architecture with some criticisms of the Harvard Architectural School, and published three hundred
copies under the title An Opinion on Architecture. This paper aroused considerable controversy among the students and
though it produced diverse opinion among members of the faculty interested them sufficiently to provoke consideration
of some concrete improvements at the school." "Editorial," TASK 1: 8.
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blame at Hudnut's feet instead, the authors lamented the continued presence of a formalist "art for
art's sake"-now transferred to the abstract model rather than the wash rendering-protesting that
"our life in the school is not fundamentally different from that of any Beaux Art school."30 For these
students, the consequences in practice remained those identified by Gropius in The New Architecture
and the Bauhaus: "As far as the profession is concerned," they wrote, "the result has been, and still is,
the division of engineers, practical architects, and architects of facades." 31
The ideology of the genius, they argued, was the cause of this persistent anachronism. In
pushing strongly against the reduction of the modern movement to a style, they held that the
pedagogical residues of individualism were philosophically incompatible with the modernist project,
claiming that "modern architecture proclaims the end of the architects's exploitation of his own
originality." 32 As such, true unity in design was inseparable from collaboration in process. As the
authors declared, "We hold that modern architecture is a synthesis of plan, structure, and their
expression; and that its complex realization can only be achieved on a COLLECTIVE basis."33
Elsewhere they framed this conviction in more explicitly socialist terms, insisting that "We see only
one solution for the future of architecture as an expressive and social activity: COLLECTIVE
WORK among architects, engineers, contractors, and the working class." 34 The manifesto concluded
with the polemical statement, above a joint listing of its authors' names, that
30 An Opinion on Architecture: 3.
31 Ibid., 5. The fourth issue of TASK repeated this complaint two years later, arguing that "For years the public has had a
definite and not incorrect picture of the architect. It is a familiar one: the architect is either a picture-maker, or a drafting
arm of the real estate operator, or an aesthete, or a 'facadist."' The editors pointed to young architects' unpreparedness for
participation in the large-scale planning efforts of the war as proof that the academic emphasis on genius and the
resulting production of the "artistic proletariat" had continued: the majority of trained architects, unable to find
placement in war departments, "forgot about private practice and went to work for large architect-engineer
combinations, government agencies and industrial construction firms often as structural mechanical and piping
draftsmen. They were scattered and demoralized." "The Architectural Front," TASK4 (1943): 1.
32 An Opinion on Architecture: 4.
33 Ibid., 10.
34 Ibid., 8. Among the differences between the more polemical Opinion and TASK, it is perhaps significant that this
language has been rendered less explicitly Marxist in tone: while in Opinion, the ideal of collective work is described as
joining building professionals to "the working class," in the first issue of TASK this appears as a less politicized call for
"collaboration of the engineer, landscape architect, regional planner, architect, and the people for whom they build."
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The main aim of this movement and of this review should be COLLABORATION: its
possibility, its experiments.
COLLABORATION IS THE CREDO AND THE FAITH OFARCHITECTURE TODAY35
In calling to redefine the social project of modernism in radically collectivist terms, the authors of An
Opinion on Architecture offered a pointed assessment of the "pioneers" of the modern movement and
their relevance for a younger generation of architects committed to the collaborative ethos. Neither
Le Corbusier nor J. J. P. Oud, they noted, had worked during the five years of the war.3 6 'hey
rejected the example of Ludwig Mies van der Rohe entirely as "a man with absolute disregard for the
conception of the architect as a social entity," concerned mainly with "buildings dependent upon a
particular financial and intellectual elite."37 Architects working in creative teams offered more
valuable models of collaboration, including the Tecton group in London, which the authors praised
"from the point of view of coherence of conception," and Albert Kahn & Associates and the
consortium of architects that designed the multi-block Rockefeller Center, which provided beneficial
examples "from the point of view of work organization." 38
A more telling assessment of the modernist masters appeared in the students' contrasting
descriptions of Frank Lloyd Wright and Gropius, as diametrically opposed figures of architectural
authorship. For the manifesto's authors, Wright's heroic self-fashioning offered a paradigmatic case of
"The Problem of Personality." "This obscure genius," they wrote,
35 Ibid., 16.
36 The claim was erroneous at least in the case of Le Corbusier, as evidenced by his attempts to build for the Vichy
administration in France during the war. The authors of Opinion further compounded the inaccuracy of this claim by
suggesting that "During the architectural reaction in France, he preferred to renounce work rather than compromise."
Ibid., 11. On Le Corbusier's politics in this period and his relation to fascism, see Mary McLeod, "Architecture or
Revolution: Taylorism, Technocracy, and Social Change," ArtJournal, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Summer 1983): 132-147 and
Urbanism and Utopia: Le Corbusier from Regional Syndicalism to Vichy, Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University (1985);
Simone Brott, "Architecture et Revolution: Le Corbusier and the Fascist Revolution," Thresholds 41 (Spring 2013): 146-
157; Xavier de Jarcy, Le Corbusier, unfascismefranfais (Editions Albin Michel: 2015).
37 Ibid., 11.
38 Ibid., 10.
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has a deep interest in social problems, but, in their solution, he is overshadowed by his own
personality. We regard him, as he probably will be regarded by history, as a genius able to free
himself from the conventions of the outside world, but never able to free himself from himself.39
By comparison, the authors upheld Gropius as an architect whose work, particularly in collaboration
with Marcel Breuer after 1937, remained "of basic importance in the present stage of architecture in
the Unites States." 40 Though they commended the high quality of Gropius and Breuer's projects
together, including Gropius's own house in Lincoln, MA, the authors noted their "only complaint is
that is done on a strictly individual basis, and not in the light of a school or a movement." 41
Furthermore, as a key voice for teamwork as the key to reuniting the disciplines of architecture and
engineering, the authors wrote that "the ideas and work of Walter Gropius are of basic importance
for any concrete collective movement in the field of building organization." 42
Despite their strident advocacy for the democratic necessity of collective work, the student
authors of An Opinion on Architecture revealed a telling ambivalence toward the social consequences
of true anonymity. They were careful to qualify their assessment of Wright, noting that "we
advocated the principle of collective work as the only one which can solve the architectural problem,
but of course, we do not mean to deny the value of personality." As with Gropius and the later TAC
founders, they stressed that true cooperation ultimately relied on a balance between individual self-
identity and group consensus: "Collaboration and collective work does not mean anonymity, but a
meeting of personalities in mutual understanding." 43 At the level of creative practice, the authors also
acknowledged the higher forms of artistic unity embodied by the notion of the genius. In holding
39 Ibid., 12.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., 11.
43 Ibid., 13.
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out hope that such a transcendent personality might still emerge in their own time, they were
compelled to admit that
We must recognize the existence of the genius as a philosophical necessity. Outside and above
collective work, and group movements, there has been in the past, and there will be in the future
the man of self-sufficiency in analytical and comprehensive work: the man of synthesis and
creation. We call for collaboration but a Leonardo could work alone.44
True to the difficulties of personality outlined in its text, the questions of individual agency and
politics within the group authorship of An Opinion ofArchitecture remained problematic. Bruno Zevi
later claimed primacy over its production, and further insinuated that he had initially written an
even more radical text with a more "violent critical title" that was ultimately censored by the other
students.45 More direct evidence of individual agency within the group can perhaps be found in the
fact that three of its authors, John B. Bayley, Warren H. Radford, and Robert Hays Rosenberg, were
also among the editors of the first and second issues of TASK, both of which appeared in the same
year that An Opinion ofArchitecture was published. The differing political stakes within the editorial
team behind these early issues of the journal, however, were equally difficult to discern. Critic Peter
Blake-with whom Norman Fletcher collaborated in 1943 on the design of park apartments for the
Serge Chermayeff Group in the "1 94X" issue of Architectural Forum-later claimed that behind the
comparatively more "apolitical facade" of TASK, "there raged a fierce battle" over control of the
journal between liberal promoters of modernism on the one hand and more openly communist
partisans on the other, a proxy for broader struggles over the nature of the Allied resistance that
would soon have more serious consequences during the Cold War.46 A staunch anti-Communist,
44 Ibid., 15.
4 5 Jill Pearlman, Inventing American Modernism: Joseph Hudnut, Walter Gropius, and the Bauhaus Legacy at Harvard
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2007): 176. Zevi characterized the final text of An Opinion on Architecture
as more "generic and weak" than he desired, claiming that he "accepted [the changes] because I wanted the signatures of
students who were afraid of everything." Ibid.
46 Peter Blake, No Place Like Utopia: Modern Architecture and the Company We Kept (New York and London: WW
Norton, 1993): 60.
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Blake characterized the battle as between politically naive "left/liberal students on the one hand, who
wanted to produce an idealistic publication dedicated to such traditionally 'modern' issues as decent
housing, good planning, neat and clean modern buildings, and all the rest; and a small group of
Stalinist or Stalinoid students who wanted to turn the little magazine into a propaganda organ first
for peace and, after June 1941, for war." 47 Among those "friends of those early 1940s" whom he
regarded as having been blindsided by these more radical political partisans at the time, Blake
included "the Fletchers, the McMillens, the Harknesses, and other liberal or left/liberal architects"
who would soon form TAC.48
Above any such incipient political disagreements, however, the first issue of TASKavdertised
the editors' sympathy with the anti-fascist polemic of An Opinion on Architecture from the outset.
The first issue of the journal in 1941 included a cartoon, identified in the caption as "inspired" by
the earlier manifesto, depicting "A Group of Students Fighting Fascism With Out-of-Date
Equipment." 49 (Fig. 2.14-2.15) It showed a young architect defending an imperiled "flower of
democracy" against a looming, Hitler-like caterpillar, as well as from the various "domestic pests"
that threatened to devour it from below. Among the out-of-date tools in the architects' bug spray
were various well-worn aesthetic tropes of modernism: form follows function, the flat roof, the
cantilever. Prominently placed among them was "the genius," appearing as the last among the
outmoded concepts that had failed to reach their target. In paying homage to the earlier manifesto,
the authors of TASK made clear that the aesthetic and political battles over both modernism and
democracy were very much undecided as of 1941, a far cry from later authors like Henry-Russell
Hitchcock who confidently proclaimed that modern architecture had emerged victorious in the
immediate aftermath of World War II.
47 Ibid. Blake further claimed the latter group "also followed the Stalinist line in the visual arts-which meant Socialist
Realism in painting and sculpture, and neoclassical Revivalism in architecture."
48 Ibid., 63.
49 The cartoon was possibly drawn by Christopher Tunnard, a contributor to the first issue and a lecturer at the Harvard
Graduate School of Design at the time, as indicated by the initials "C. T." appearing to the right of the architect depicted
in the lower left corner of the drawing.
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The Architects (Collaborative)
The backgrounds of the seven TAC partners reflected the diversity of their origins and social
commitments, ranging from the wealthy and the well-to-do to those raised in more modest
circumstances. Jean Bodman was born in 1915 in Boston, Massachusetts, to Maud Hayden Rogers
and Fenimore Lewis Bodman, then a representative for the Powers-Weightman-Rosengarten
Company, a chemical manufacturer based in Philadelphia. By 1933, Fenimore ran his own company,
F. L. Bodman Inc., and the family had moved to the upper middle class suburb of Wayne,
Pennsylvania. The youngest of three children, Jean attended the Baldwin School in Bryn Mawr,
Pennsylvania, and then studied at Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts, where she
graduated in 1937. She then entered the Cambridge School of Architecture and Landscape
Architecture for Women, then affiliated with Smith and perhaps the first degree-granting graduate
programs in the U.S. to offer graduate training in architecture and landscape architecture exclusively
to women under one faculty.50 In 1942, following declining enrollment at the School during World
War II, Harvard University began admitting women to its Graduate School of Design, including
students attending the Cambridge School, who now received Harvard degrees. 51 Bodman began
studying there in the same year.
Norman Collins ("Fletch") Fletcher was born on December 8, 1917 in Providence, Rhode
Island, the child of immigrant parents from Lancashire, England. Raised in Willimantic,
Connecticut, where he later proposed a community library as one of TAC's first projects, Fletcher
50 At the time the school was known as the Smith College Graduate School of Architecture and Landscape Architecture
in Cambridge, having entered into a cooperative agreement with Smith in 1932. On the Cambridge School, see Doris
Cole, "The Education of Women Architects: A History of the Cambridge School," Architecture plus (December 1973):
30-35, 78-79; Kevin D. Murphy, "The Vernacular Moment: Eleanor Raymond, Walter Gropius, and New England
Modernism between the Wars," Journal ofthe Society ofArchitectural Historians Vol. 70, No. 3 (September 2011): 308-
329.
51 Smithipedia, "Cambridge School of Architecture and Landscape Architecture," http://sophia.smith.edu/blog/
smithipedia/academic-life/cambridge-school-of-architecture-and-landscape-architecture/, last accessed September 20,
2015.
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grew up under what were later described as "modest" family finances. 52 Despite these limited means,
Fletcher earned a full scholarship to Yale, earning his degree from the school of architecture in 1940.
While in college, Fletcher became a committed pacifist and self-declared Fabian socialist, later
crediting this conversion to his exposure to writing by authors including George Bernard Shaw and
Aldous Huxley, particularly the latter's Ends and Means (1937).53 After earning a traveling
scholarship in the year of his graduation, Fletcher eschewed the more traditional opportunity to
travel to Europe, choosing instead to tour the U.S. to visit examples of large-scale infrastructural and
master planning, including the TVA dam projects and FSA migrant labor camps in Arizona and
California. 54
John Cheesman ("Chip") Harkness was born on November 30, 1916 to Sara Arden Cheesman
and Albert Harkness in New York City, moving shortly thereafter to Providence where his father, an
architect, established his own office. 55 After attending the Gordon School and Providence Country
Day School-the latter in a building designed by his father-Harkness finished high school at
Milton Academy before attending Harvard in 1934, where he became a national champion in
wrestling. After completing his undergraduate studies in 1938, he continued on to the Graduate
School of Design, where he earned both his B.Arch (after completing the required design thesis
project), and an M.Arch in 1941.56 At the time he had already been accepted into the Master's class
to study with Walter Gropius, the only one of the future TAC partners to do so.
Sarah ("Sally") Pillsbury was born on July 8, 1914 in Swampscott, Massachusetts, the daughter
of Helen Farrington Watters and Samuel Hale Pillsbury, a lawyer. She attended the Winsor School,
52 The library project is described in "Program for the Proposed Willimantic Public Library on a Theoretical Site," Arts d
Architecture (August 1946): 28-29. The description of Fletcher's upbringing as "modest" appears in Bryan Marquard,
"Norman Fletcher, 89; Cofounded Influential Architects Group," The Boston Globe, June 6, 2007.
53 Transcript of interview with Norman Fletcher conducted by Perry Neubauer, November 6, 2006: 3.
54 Ibid.
55 John C. Harkness, John Cheesman Harkness (self-published autobiography, n.d.): 1. I am grateful to Sarah Harkness for
providing me with a copy of this autobiography.
56 Ibid., 9.
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where her friends included Molly Duncan Weed (later married to the designer Eliot Noyes), before
both entered the Cambridge School of Architecture and Landscape Architecture, where Bodman had
also studied, in 1940.57 After her family purchased a plot of land in Duxbury, Massachusetts,
Pillsbury designed a house on the site by through working through the office of Eleanor Raymond,
an early graduate of the Cambridge School and the architect of the school's modern drafting wing,
added in 1928.58 (Fig. 2.16) The house, completed in 1941, was subsequently published in
Architectural Forum under Raymond's name, with Pillsbury listed as an associate. 59 In 1940,
Harkness and Louisa Loring Vaughan, a fellow graduate of the Cambridge School, established
Pillsbury and Vaughan, possibly the first showroom for modern furnishings and interiors in
Boston.60 (Fig. 2.17) The partners soon became the exclusive distributors for the Artek-Pascoe
company in Boston, changing the name of the store to Artek in Boston in 1942 before it closed the
following year due to the privations of the war years. 61
Benjamin C. Thompson was born on July 3, 1918 in St. Paul, Minnesota to Lynne Mudge and
Benjamin Casper, a prosperous owner of farmland made valuable by the expansion of the railroads in
the nineteenth century. Casper in turn had come from Maine, where his family previously owned a
large timber concern. 62 Thompson attended prep school in New England before enrolling as an
undergraduate at the University of Virginia. 63 Inspired by travels in Europe with his mother, an artist
and collector, Thompson enrolled at the Yale school of architecture in 1938, receiving a Bachelor of
57 Transcript of interview with Sarah Harkness conducted by Perry Neubauer, November 3, 2006: 3.
58 Ibid., 3. On Eleanor Raymond and the Cambridge School, see Murphy, "The Vernacular Moment: Eleanor Raymond,
Walter Gropius, and New England Modernism between the Wars."
59 "House in Duxbury, Mass: Eleanor Raymond, Architect, Sarah Pillsbury, Associate," Architectural Forum (December
1941): 402-403.
60 A later store for modern furnishings prior to the establishment of Design Research in 1953 was Rapson-Inc.,
established in 1950 at 282 Dartmouth Street by Mary and Ralph Rapson while Ralph was a professor at MIT.
61 Materials on Pillsbury and Vaughan are held in The Louisa Vaughan Conrad Collection, 1913-2003, Special
Collections, Frances Loeb Library, Graduate School of Design, Harvard University. I am grateful to Caroline Constant
for sharing her research on the store, including the photographs reproduced here.
62 Interview with Jane Thompson by the author, March 2016.
63 Mildred F. Schmertz, "A Life in Architecture," ArchitectureBoston: Ben (Spring 2011): 23.
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Fine Arts in 1941. He subsequently served as a lieutenant on a destroyer escort for the U.S. Navy
before returning to the U.S. in 1944.64
Louis Albert McMillen was born on October 24, 1916 in St. Louis, Missouri to Eleanor
Strockstrom and Drury McMillen, an engineer. The family's wealth was derived from his maternal
grandfather Louis Strockstrom, one of two brothers who established the the American Stove
Company in St. Louis in 1901 as merger of eight smaller stove companies in St. Louis, Chicago and
Cleveland.65 While still married to Drury McMillen, Eleanor (later married to the architect
Archibald K. Brown) moved to New York City in 1924 to establish McMillen, Inc., a major design
concern credited as the first full-service interior decorating firm in the U.S., specializing in
traditional styles. Louis McMillen attended St. George's School in Newport, Rhode Island before
enrolling at Yale, where he received his Bachelor of Fine Arts in 1940. Norman Fletcher, his friend
from Yale, later described McMillen's apartment in New York City during the war years as "a hotbed
of socialism," visited by political activists such as Bayard Rustin, David Dellinger, and A. J. Muste.66
McMillen studied at the Harvard Graduate School of Design in 1941-42-the only one of the
future TAC partners to come from both Yale and Harvard social circles-before serving as a
lieutenant in the U.S. Navy during World War II. Following his return to the U.S. in 1945, he
completed his B.Arch. at Harvard in 1947 during the first two years of TAC's practice. 67
64 Ibid.
65 The company's headquarters in St. Louis, a modernist building designed by Harris Armstrong and completed in 1948,
featured a ground-floor ceiling designed by Isamu Noguchi. See "Progress in St. Louis: The American Stove Company
Puts Up An Enlightened Administrative Headquarters and Sales Display Building, Architectural Forum (October 1948):
70-79. and "Building a St-Louis (U.S.A.)," lArchitecture dAujourd'hui (December 1949): 60-63. In 1951 the company
officially changed its name to match the name of its most successful oven and stove brand, Magic Chef.
66 Norman Fletcher, quoted in Robert Campbell, "Utopia Revisited," The Boston Globe, April 7, 1994: Al. I am grateful
to Campbell for bringing this article to my attention.
67 The first publication of TAC's aims in August 1946 did not list McMillen among the partners, suggesting the
possibility that he was not officially one of the founders as of the firm's establishment in January 1945. See "Program for
the Proposed Willimantic Public Library on a Theoretical Site," Arts & Architecture (August 1946): 28. The letter from
the Fletchers to Gropius in November 1945 suggesting the formation of the office does mention McMillen and his wife
Peggy, also an architecture student at Harvard, expressing hope "that after he completes his course at Harvard, Louis
McMillen and Peggy will join the cooperative."
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Robert S. McMillan, the last of the partners to join the group, was born in 1917 in Hibbing,
Minnesota. He studied at Yale with Fletcher, McMillen, and Thompson, graduating in 1943 before
serving in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in World War II. The first appearance of his name
among the TAC partners dates to January 1947, when he appeared in an article in the Christian
Science Monitor on the idealistic "Modern Architects' Collaborative" comprised by a group "whose
friendships all date back to those prewar college days when their respective enrollments as students of
architecture were scattered between Yale, Harvard and Smith School in Cambridge." 68
This heterogenous group of architects came together during the war years through a sequence
of overlapping relationships developed through schools and architectural offices around the country.
Fletcher, McMillen, and Thompson had been classmates at Yale, where they had already talked about
forming what Fletcher called the "World Collaborative," an "ideal office" that would combine
painting, sculpture, and architecture. 69 Fletcher and Harkness met while working together during
the war at Skidmore, Owings & Merrill (SOM) in New York City after 1941, where both were
conscientious objectors. Harkness remained in New York working for Kahn and Jacobs and then
under Morris Ketchum at Harrison, Fouilhoux & Abramovitz before being drafted in the fall of
1942, serving first as an ambulance driver for the American Field Service and later in Isernia, Italy,
where he developed a plan for the reconstruction of the town after Allied bombing in September
1943.70 (Fig. 2.18) Fletcher, a declared pacifist, was arrested while at SOM for failing to register for
the draft, and was placed on probation in order to work on wartime housing for the Office of
Strategic Services (OSS) under Eero Saarinen. 71 Harkness and Pillsbury, then students at Harvard
68 Helen Henley, "Two Girls Share as Equal Partners in Modern Architects' Collaborative," The Christian Science Monitor,
January 13, 1947: 10.
69 Transcript of interview with Norman Fletcher conducted by Perry Neubauer, November 6, 2006: 2.
70 Harkness's plan for Isernia is detailed in "Planning With You," Architectural Forum (March 1945): 107-111.
71 Fletcher's work for the FSA is described in Vernon Armand DeMars, "A Life in Architecture: Indian Dancing, Migrant
Housing, Telesis, Design for Urban Living, Theater, Teaching," an oral history conducted in 1988-1989 by Suzanne B.
Riess, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1992, http://
www.oac.cdlib.org/view?docld=kt938nb53j&brand=oac 4 &doc.view=entiretext.
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and the Cambridge School respectively, were married in 1941. By 1943 Bodman, then a student at
Harvard, had met Fletcher, who moved to Washington, D.C. in 1944 to complete his work for the
OSS. Following Bodman's graduation the couple moved to Bloomfield Hills, Michigan to work
together for Saarinen, Swanson & Associates, marrying in 1945.
The independent work of the future partners as students reflected their common interests in
issues of coordinated regional planning, federal infrastructure and housing initiatives, and collective
work, just those concerns that An Opinion on Architecture and TASKwere raising in the same years.
Fletcher worked in 1942 for Telesis member Vernon DeMars, then head of the western division of
the Farm Security Administration (FSA), while on a traveling fellowship from Yale to study regional
planning and infrastructural projects in the United States. He worked as a draftsman on the design
of wartime "duration" dormitories and a cafeteria and recreation center for defense workers in
Vallejo, California. (Fig. 2.19) A year later, Jean Bodman spent a summer working for the Federal
Public Housing Authority (FPHA) in 1943. Even more emblematic of this attitude was Bodman's
thesis project at Harvard, published in Arts &Architecture magazine in May 1945. (Fig. 2.20)
Conducted in the same year as TASK's "West Coast" issue on regional planning in California,
Bodman proposed a migrant workers' community and factory in the context of a regional plan for
California's Central Valley, integrating flood control, electric power development, and water
conservation and use. 72 (Fig. 2.21-2.22) She wrote that the project "might become a laboratory
where basic relationship Is] will be created which may serve as a guide for action in other regional
developments," with the ultimate goal of "raising the living standards of the worker [through] a new
pattern of agricultural-industrial communities operated on a cooperative basis."73 The thesis was
72 Jean Bodman Fletcher, "There Should Be Regional Integration in Central Valley," Arts &Architecture (May 1945), n.p.
Drawings for Fletcher's thesis are preserved in "Thesis: Community for Migratory Labor, Central Valley, California,"
1943-1944, Harvard Graduate School of Design, The GSD History Collection, Student Affairs-Student Work,
Subseries CA: Graduate School of Design, Architecture Student Problems, folder CB033.
73 Fletcher, "There Should Be Regional Integration in Central Valley," n.p.
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conducted under Walter Gropius, whom Bodman and Fletcher would soon solicit to join together in
collaborative practice.
Prior to the formation of TAC, both the Harknesses and the Fletchers initially sought to
develop their independent practices as married couples, publishing speculative designs and entering
national architectural competitions during the building hiatus of the war years. In May 1943 the
Harknesses gained an invitation (through the recommendation of Ketchum, who was too busy to
participate) to contribute to the issue of Architectural Forum dedicated to "New Buildings for 1 94X"
that also featured speculative projects by such luminaries as Ludwig Mies van der Rohe and Charles
Eames. (Fig. 2.23) The couple contributed a design for a two-story bank as part of the recent
tendency of financial institutions "to become more human," writing of their hope "to accentuate this
trend by the openness of the design and the generally informal treatment." 74 For the same issue,
Norman Fletcher collaborated with a group led by Serge Chermayeff to design a prototype for slabs
of split-level park apartments, contrasting the "cramped, rugged individualism" of the traditional
house with the "free, cooperative individualism" offered by modern, vertical living.75 (Fig. 2.24) The
Fletchers soon gained recognition through their first-prize entry for the design of "A House for
Cheerful Living," sponsored by Pencil Points and the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company in 1945. The
couple proposed a single-story house for Salinas, California, with separate bedroom and living wings
connected by a prefabricated mechanical core in an H-shaped plan. (Fig. 2.25) The competition jury
commended the project upon its publication in Pencil Points in May 1945, remarking that "the
design is sympathetically done; it is simple, direct, and has a definite American flavor that is
refreshing." 76 Commenting on the project in the New York Times, the Fletchers declared, "We
subscribe fully to the tendency in modern architecture of eliminating stylist ornaments in favor of
74 John C. Harkness and Sarah Harkness, "Bank," Architectural Forum (May 1943): 86.
75 Serge Chermayeff Group (Peter Blach, Serge Chermayeff, Abel Sorenson; Collaborators: Norman Fletcher, Henry
Hebbeln), "Park Apartments," Architectural Forum (May 1943): 138-145. Peter Blach later changed his name to Peter
Blake.
76 "Report of the Jury,"' Pencil Points (May 1945): 54-55.
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practicality." 7 7 Together with Charles D. Wiley the couple designed a hypothetical "Motor Traveler's
Hotel" for Architectural Record in July 1945, organized as a raised ring of parking spaces from which
visitors would ascend or descend a half-level into two-story hotel units, suspended within U-shaped
structural frames. (Fig. 2.26) An adjacent community center was attached to a ground floor
containing shops, meeting rooms, and exhibition spaces. As the Fletchers explained, "A hotel is the
visitor's contact with the community and a focal point of local activities," and it was thus natural that
it should form "part of a community group which includes shops, offices, local municipal
headquarters, theater and junior high school."78
It was the last in this string of winning competition entries, a project to design dormitories for
Bodman's alma mater, Smith College, that overlapped with the formation of The Architects
Collaborative at the end of 1945. Conducted by the Museum of Modern Art in New York (which
exhibited the winning entries in early 1946) together with Pencil Points-Progressive Architecture, the
Fletchers teamed with Benjamin Thompson, Norman's classmate at Yale. Their submission won first
prize among the ninety-one entries submitted. Second prize went to the Harknesses, with whom the
Fletchers had remained friends since working together at SOM. 79 (Fig. 2.27) The coincidence of five
of the imminent founders of TAC gaining the first two prizes, a fact announced just after the
establishment of the office at the beginning of 1946, offered a powerful confirmation that the
idealism of their ambitions for collective practice was well founded. Both the program of the Smith
competition and the social makeup of its winning teams-two women and three men from three
different schools, working in independent collaboratives to design dormitories for a women's college
-reflected the group members' shared desire to escape the hierarchical, and gendered, office
structures that had continued through the war years. (Fig. 2.28) Norman Fletcher recalled his and
77 "Homes Design By New York Architects in Prize Competition: Prize Plans in National Contest Stress 'Livability' of
New Homes," The New York Times, May 13, 1945: R1.
78 "Motor Traveler's Hotel, By Charles D. Wiley, Norman Fletcher and Jean Bodman Fletcher, Architects," Architectural
Record (July 1945): 75.
79 Ibid., 6.
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Jean's strong interest in these years in developing a shared practice that would be "pretty much equal,
no bosses... working as a team together in a collaborative way." 80
Acting on these ambitions immediately after the conclusion of the war, in November 1945 the
Fletchers wrote to John Harkness (who had returned in May from serving in Europe) from
Bloomfield Hills, Michigan to propose the formation of an office together, one month before
competition entries for the Smith dormitories were submitted in December. The couple followed this
entreaty with a letter a week later dated November 11, 1945 to Walter Gropius, who had asked John
to join him as a teaching assistant in the master's classes at Harvard. (Fig. 2.29) Norman Fletcher
later suggested that Louis Kahn and George Howe had been considered as possible collaborators,
prior to the fortuitous timing of Gropius's invitation to Harkness and the group decision to approach
the Harvard chair instead. 8 1
In soliciting Gropius's involvement in the collaborative office they envisioned, the Fletchers
sought to give "some background on the cooperative idea" as they saw it. They wrote to Gropius that
"we feel that we can learn more and give more as productive citizens if we achieve more responsibility
and independence than is possible in the traditional office organization."8 2 They had already enlisted
the Harknesses along with Benjamin Thompson and Louis McMillen, another colleague of Norman's
at Yale who was then finishing his master's degree at Harvard. Echoing Gropius's calls for integration
between architecture and industry, the Fletchers describe their collective feeling that, "by working on
projects, even very small ones, in which we had a very responsible part, we might gain greater contact
with materials, building methods, and people," expressing the ultimate intention "to supplement and
finally integrate with planning research and execution." 83 "Closely allied to the architectural aims,"
they continued, were "the social aims" the partners shared for the organization of their group
80 Transcript of interview with Norman C. Fletcher conducted by Perry Neubauer, November 6, 2006: 5.
81 Ibid., 6.
82 Letter from Jean Bodman Fletcher and Norman Fletcher to Walter Gropius, November 11, 1945: 1. Reginald R. Isaacs
papers, circa 1842-1991, Smithsonian Archives of American Art.
83 Ibid.
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practice. To these ends, the Fletchers ventured the idea of starting a cooperative nursery as part of the
new collective, along with the even more idyllic hope-perhaps in reference to the work programs at
Black Mountain College-that "establishing some sort of design center in the country together with
an experimental farm, may be possible." 84 In pursuing this collective approach to living and working,
they wrote to Gropius, "our aims become, not architecture for architecture's sake, but architecture for
the sake of a healthy society." 85 The Fletchers traveled to Cambridge at the end of November to meet
with Gropius and the other partners, and the new office was officially inaugurated on January 1,
1946.86
The Cooperative Idea
By the time the results of the Smith dormitory competition were announced in February of 1946,
the five architects of the winning and runner-up entries had already decided to form TAC, a fact that
was noted when the winning entries were published in Progressive Architecture in April. 87 Combining
the first- and second-prize winnings from the competition ($2000 and $1000, respectively) provided
seed money for the new firm, along with its first possible commission. In choosing five of the
founding members of the new office for the top two projects, Lucia Norton Valentine, a trustee of
the College and a member of the jury, commented that "Style was the least consideration," indicating
that "the jury was searching for fundamentals as an indication of talent." 88 Ironically the
84 Ibid., 2.
85 Ibid., 1.
86 The December 25th meeting date is given by Reginald Isaacs in his Walter Gropius: An Illustrated Biography (Boston,
Toronto, London: Bulfinch Press, 1991): 256.
87
88 Lucia Norton Valentine, "First Step Toward New Dormitory," Smith Alumnae Quarterly (May 1946): 126. The Smith
jury commended the Fletchers' project in particular for its simplicity and appropriateness, citing their feeling that "the
designers had developed their forms out of the requirements instead of forcing their rooms into any arbitrarily imposed
shape." "A Competition To Select an Architect for a Proposed Dormitory Group for Smith College," Progressive
Architecture, Vol. 27 (April 1946): 52-53.
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commission, which was to have been TAC's first building, soon foundered due to the stylistic
objections of an advisor to the competition jury then practicing for a traditional firm in New York.89
Nine months after the official establishment of the office, the founders described their
intentions in a "Statement of Aims," published in Arts &Architecture in August 1946 and signed by
all of the partners. In it, they reiterated the polemical language of their Harvard contemporaries,
framing the problem of teamwork as necessary for the democratic project of rebuilding after World
War II. "The whole post-war reconstruction problem, so vast and so complex," they wrote, "hangs
upon our ability to cooperate."90 In addressing these tasks, the group argued,
The architect as a coordinator by vocation should lead the way-first in his [sic] own office-to
develop a new "technique of collaboration" in teams. The essence of such technique will be to
emphasize individual freedom of initiative instead of authoritative direction by a boss.
Synchronizing all individual efforts by a continuous give and take of its members, a team can
raise its integrated work to higher potentials than the sum of the work of just so many
individuals. 91
The firm's earliest projects reflected this commitment to developing the "technique of collaboration"
in practice. Primary among these was the commission to develop a postwar construction program for
Black Mountain College, both the major example of collaborative pedagogy in the U.S. for young
architects like the TAC founders and the site where Gropius and Breuer's earlier projects for the
College of 1939-40 had fallen through. At the time of TAC's founding in November 1945, Gropius
had apparently already recommended the Fletchers to the College's director, Ted Dreier, either for
teaching or to undertake design work for the College's Lake Eden campus-a gesture for which the
89Transcript of interview with Norman C. Fletcher conducted by Perry Neubauer, November 6, 2006: 7. Richard Marsh
Bennett, a professional advisor to the competition jury, was then practicing in New York together with Caleb
Hornbostel. It is unclear if Bennett was the "traditional" architect to whom Fletcher was referring, given the modernist
projects designed by Bennett and Hornbostel, such as their winning design for a proposed Art Center at Wheaton
College in 1938. Modernist dormitories for Smith College were ultimately built on a different site by Skidmore, Owings
& Merrill (1957).
90 "Statement of Aims," published in "Program for the Proposed Willimantic Public Library on a Theoretical Site," Arts
&Architecture (August 1946): 28.
91 Ibid.
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Fletchers thanked Gropius in the same letter in which they proposed the creation of a shared office.92
In February 1946, the young architects-now part of TAC-were commissioned to develop a long-
range plan for the College, along with the design for a women's dormitory, with Norman Fletcher as
principal architect within the team.93 Yet the development of the project laid bare significant
differences in the conception of the collaborative creative process between the College and its
architects. After Fletcher spent three weeks at Black Mountain in March 1946, TAC delivered
preliminary building and site plans for a women's dormitory for sixty students, received in May.94
The College expected a TAC member to be in residence during construction, however, while a group
of students responded independently to the firm's plans by developing an alternative proposal for
smaller six-unit spaces for sleeping and study, "to the astonishment of the faculty." 95 Both the
architects' and the students' plans were ultimately rejected after delays and lengthy debates in which
a central question posed within the community-"when is a decision a decision at Black
Mountain"-remained unanswered.96 A second campus plan by TAC, submitted in October, elicited
similar debate, with small groups of ten to twelve students convening to record criticisms that were
then submitted to the architects. 97 (Fig. 2.30) While some funding was eventually raised for a first
92 Letter from Jean Bodman Fletcher and Norman Fletcher to Walter Gropius, November 11, 1945, Reginald R. Isaacs
papers. In thanking Gropius, the Fletchers do not specify the nature of the recommendation: "We have been wanting to
thank you for referring us to Ted Dreier of Black Mountain College. We were very enthusiastic after visiting the college,
but have not yet given Ted an answer yet. The work down there bears a close relationship to our ideas for group effort,
but we have hesitated to commit ourselves because, with the ending of the war, our long realized plans seem possible of
being carried out."
93 Mary Emma Harris, The Arts at Black Mountain College Project (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987): 114.
94 Mary Emma Harris has suggested that the Fletchers were invited to teach at the College, but chose to join TAC
instead. See Harris, "TAC Plans," The Black Mountain College Project, http://blackmountaincollegeproject.org/
architecture/campuses/lake%20eden/unrealized%20plans//o20collaborative%20text.htm. The text of the Fletchers' letter
to Gropius bears out this interpretation to some extent, particularly in the Fletchers' hesitation "to commit ourselves" in
favor of pursuing their "long realized plans."
95 Mary Emma Harris, The Arts at Black Mountain College Project: 114.
96 Ibid.
97 The Architects Collaborative, "BMC Site Plan Study," October 22, 1946, Harvard University Art Museums. Although
this drawing is clearly dated and labeled as by TAC in the upper left corner, it is misattributed in both the Harvard
University Art Museums collection and the Marcel Breuer Archive, where in both cases the drawing is classified as
belonging to the Gropius and Breuer project of 1939-40.
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dormitory building to be constructed, TAC remained unable to send a supervising architect for
construction, and the project officially ended with the resignation of Dreier as the College
underwent a faculty crisis in 1948-49.98
Looking back a decade later, Sarah Harkness recalled that with the eventual losses of both the
Smith and Black Mountain College commissions, "The first year consisted of very few jobs, but a
great deal of discussion." 99 However, she credited this year with the invention of the central
mechanisms through which the partners structured the firm's collaborative method across the
decades to come: the system of job captains and the weekly partners' meeting, originally held every
Thursday at noon. As Harkness outlined in 1957,
Every job has to go through a meeting before the design is frozen. The job captain, together with
those who have been assisting him, brings drawings, models, and pertinent facts and figures to
the conference room. A really "hot" design meeting often produces the best architecture. In the
end, the changes are those of the job captain himself, because he [sic] has final authority. 100
The relationship between job captains (or project managers, as they were later known) and the
weekly meeting was thus meant to effect the balance between individual and collective authority that
all the partners saw as essential to a democratic, rather than bureaucratic, form of collectivity. As
Harkness explained years later, "the concept was not to establish design by committee but to have an
active exchange of ideas on work at various stages of development." 101 Furthermore, by dedicating
the weekly meetings to both design and business (including a system whereby partners served as
rotating "mailmen" to sort through each week's correspondence), the group ensured that there was no
98 Mary Emma Harris, The Arts at Black Mountain College Project: 114.
99 Sarah Harkness, text on TAC's working methods quoted in "Genetrix: Personal Contributions to American
Architecture," Architectural Review (May 1957): 370. A portion of this text, unattributed to Harkness and listed only as
"written by a member of the Collaborative," appears in Ian McCallum, "Walter Gropius and TAC," in Architecture USA
(New York: Reinhold Publishing Corporation, 1959): 175-179. McCallum was the editor of the issue of Architectural
Review, on "Machine-Made America," in which the "Genetrix" article appears. The same text also appears, unattributed,
in a special issue of Baukunst und Werkform on TAC (December 1957): 683.
100 Ibid.
101 Sarah Harkness, "The Architects Collaborative," Encyclopedia ofArchitecture, Design, Engineering & Construction: 46.
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split between creative and managerial decision-making within the office. As the office grew beyond
the original partnership and design work increasingly took place within separate project teams, the
partners' meeting came to serve as a secondary means of ensuring coordination across projects. In
later year, office portfolios, prepared for clients, continued to describe the weekly gathering as "the
principal cohesive factor of the firm," the key instrument for guaranteeing that "collaboration first
occurs within the team working together on the project and later within the design meetings." 0 2
Despite TAC'S insistence that this structure of group meetings and individual decision-making
was the key to ensuring equality within the firm, the anomalous status of Gropius remained a
persistent issue within this framework. The partners repeatedly addressed the question of how to
account for his voice within the collective, as both a self-described equal among the partners and an
elder figure whose stature placed him, perhaps inevitably, as primus interpares within this young
group of architects. (Fig. 2.31) The other founding members maintained long after his death that
Gropius had insisted on a co-equal role in the process of evaluation that was enacted during the
weekly meetings, receiving criticism for his ideas in addition to critiquing the work of others. Rather
than operating through any authorial signature, they held, Gropius functioned as a broadly
intellectual figure among the group of architects, yet one fully embedded within the partners'
collaborative model. 103 Sarah Harkness portrayed Gropius' importance to the team less in terms of
architectural authority than in his voice as a thinker, collaborator, and critic at the heart of the firm.
"Everybody wants to think of him as one of the world's great designers, but he wasn't," she argued
-"he was one of the world's great philosophers." 104 Other partners acknowledged that Gropius was
accorded an elevated status in this respect, but claimed that this manifested itself primarily in his
102 "The Architects Collaborative," TAC office portfolio c. 1967, n.p. Canadian Centre for Architecture Collections.
103 In the year after Gropius's death, principal Alex Cvijanovic reiterated his sense that Gropius's true hope for the
partner's meetings was that "the principals should have a communication of views regarding the world and not just
regarding architecture." Cvijanovic, quoted in "Long-Range Planning Meeting-30 October 1970," in Long-Range
Planning Meeting-1970, Re-distributedfor Long-Range Planning Meeting ofjune 25-27, 1981 (1981): 8. MIT Museum
Archives.
104 Transcript of interview with Sarah Harkness conducted by Perry Neubauer, November 3, 2006: 7.
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ability to mediate disputes, not to impose his will. John Harkness later recalled, "when Gropius was
with us he was so generally recognized as the senior person in the firm that he tended to pull us all
together and override personal controversies."105 In this sense, he described the effect of Gropius's
absence on TAC's practice after his death in 1969 in terms of a loss not of his signature as an
architect, but of his value in enabling the social cohesion of the partnership as a whole. Harkness
wrote to the firm's members in 1984, fifteen years after Gropius's death, of his continued conviction
that
architectural offices fall into two categories: (1) Those that are built around a strong
personality, and (2) those that are built around an idea or ideas. The first category tends to live
and die or make a total transition with that person. Its work is largely monolithic. The second
is more apt to be made up of a group of individuals working together, bound by their ideas
but inevitably more varied in their design product. And most important, it has the structure
to evolve, to continue past the original partners, to grow and change with time.10 6
Gropius's outsized voice, he argued, had in fact allowed TAC at its best to function as an example of
the latter category-the firm built on ideas-even if historians and critics tended to relegate it to the
status of the personality-driven office. "In spite of the fact that Gropius was such a strong
personality," Harkness wrote, "what he purposely gave to us was not hero worship but ideas, and that
is why we have been able to continue." In the absence of this guiding voice, he reminded the firm's
members that "When a leader such as Grope is no longer with us, it is easy to drift into a bickering
over who will pick up the reins.... I think it is a credit to all of us that we have not done this."1 0 7
105 John C. Harkness, "President's Report," TA CAnnual Report (1981): 5. MIT Museum Archives.
106 John C. Harkness, "President's Report," TA CAnnual Report (1984): 5. MIT Museum Archives. In the 1981 Annual
Report, Harkness made similar statements about the need to retain the collaborative spirit, without ceding control to a
"strong personality," for TAC's continued success: "There is always a danger, particularly under pressure circumstances
that we start to bicker with each other and complain that someone else is not doing his or her job. I believe collaboration
requires realizing that we are not all identical. Each of us has strengths and weaknesses. We must learn to work together
to support each other with respect for the contribution of the other person. This does not mean that we will decide who
the best one or two designers are and have them do all of the design. Nor does it mean that production will be handed
over to a production team. But it does mean forming teams with an eye to balancing these abilities, and it does require
the respect for all members of the team. If we can do this, I think we will be continuing and strengthening TAC in the
true collaborative spirit in which it was formed." TACAnnual Report (1981): 5-6.
107 Ibid.
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The partners thus evidently felt the need to answer insistent questions about Gropius's role
within the office as well as without, before and after his death. In her account of TAC's method just
over a decade after its founding, Sarah Harkness made clear that the issue had already become
predominant for the firm's reception, posing the question of an imagined reader along with a testy
response: "Is it, in reality, 'Gropius's Architects' Collaborative'? No one is more annoyed by this
misconception than Gropius himself."1 08 She further reminded this hypothetical interlocutor that
"The idea of a Master surrounded by his disciples is absolutely contrary to Gropius's own precepts."
Yet Harkness was quick to note that the younger partners were not monolithic in their own right,
portraying the group as a collection of disparate characters joined more by their belief in
collaboration than by any particular creative type or method:
Is it then a remarkable coincidence of personalities that happen to click? Actually, the
personalities could not be more different. It is such a "bunch of individualists" that one might
wonder how they ever happened to come together. They even have different ways of working and
different ways of running a job. To some, a pencil is their sword-if they lost their hold on it
they would lose control of the design. Others feel they can guide the design by remote control. I
do not think that the success of a collaborative office is dependent on a remarkable combination
of particular people. It is a practical system-on the way to becoming more usual. 109
In the final analysis, Harkness framed the success of TAC's model as a question not of personality but
of scale. "If there is anything magic in the whole set-up," she offered, "I believe a good deal of it may
simply be a matter of numbers." In this view, the size of the original group fortuitously offered just
the right balance between individual ego and collective consensus, achieved through face-to-face
conversation rather than via a larger, more abstract entity. "The partnership," Harkness explained, "is
large enough so that it would be almost impossible for one person to dominate it.... However, the
group is small enough so that the partnership can meet round the conference table for informal
discussion; small enough so that decisions do not have to be made by vote, but only by the "sense of
108 Sarah Harkness, "The Architects Collaborative," Encyclopedia ofArchitecture, Design, Engineering & Construction: 46.
109 Ibid.
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the meeting." Given these characteristics, she added, "Our meetings have been likened to Quaker
meetings in this respect."' 10
However ideal the scale of TAC's original practice for the founding partners, it was quickly
superseded by the expanding size of the office. Within two years of group practice, there was already
a debate within the firm about how best to maintain the collaborative model as its staff grew larger.
In a discussion in November 1947 held at Gropius's suggestion, the partners "discussed the problem
of methods for handling future work coming into the office which was in excess of that which could
be handled by the present group.", I The options discussed included hiring new members, on either
a salary basis or according to a profit sharing system, but without the possibility of their becoming
partners; or to open up the possibility of adding new members as partners after a year's trial period.
According to the meeting notes, Norman Fletcher was opposed to expansion in general, "afraid of
increasing the number of people in the office very considerably by any method whatsoever because of
the difficulty of maintaining design control and coordination," while McMillen, in contrast, "felt
that the office could expand a very considerable amount before such a point would be reached." 1 2
Significantly for TAC's collaborative ethos, Chip Harkness already warned that the "obvious
disadvantage" of hiring salaried but subordinate members, without the possibility of becoming
partners, "was that it reduced our method of operation to that of any other office."" 3 Opening up
the office to a profit-sharing system (among non-partners) or adding new partners, however, would
entail other concerns for the firm and its future employees. The former option risked exposing new
members to "bearing the possible gambles or losses of the office without promise of a future
partnership," while the latter, Harkness presciently noted, might lead to a situation where "with an
increasing number of partners it might become difficult at a time when work slacked off to reduce
10 Ibid.
II "Meeting on November 20, 1947," TAC meeting notes, transcribed by John C. Harkness, n.p. MIT Museum
Archives.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
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our personnel."" 4 Indeed, the problems of eliminating staff became a paramount concern decades
later when TAC, by then a large organization of over 300 employees, was confronted with the
economic volatility of the 1970s and early 1980s.
No Woman Should Stay Home
Of no small importance within TAC's "technique of collaboration" and its emphasis on "individual
freedom of initiative" was the presence of two women among the founding partners, a feature that
was well-noted in the popular press of the time. While the TAC partners may have regarded this
simply as a natural way of pursuing their "long realized goals" of a practice that would be "pretty
much equal"-with two married couples forming fully half of the partnership, all four trained as
architects and anxious to practice-it also constituted one of the major stakes of collaboration at the
outset of the postwar period. In 1951, the Dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Design, Joseph
Hudnut, described the available means of collaboration for female architects in just such terms. In a
two-part article titled "The Architectress," he sought to outline the "amendments, or diversifications,
of the accepted pattern of marriage" through which his students had been able to enter and sustain
architectural practices despite the strictures of postwar family life, based on his experiences as a
professor at Harvard and previously at the Columbia School of Architecture. Hudnut noted that
under five percent of female graduates of professional schools of architecture remained in the
profession for longer than five years, while even fewer, only two percent, began independent
practices. The vast majority of women trained in architecture-ninety-five percent, he claimed-
became housewives." 5 Yet for women who wanted to practice, Hudnut argued, the vicissitudes of
family obligations were largely incompatible with the continuity required for architectural creation.
114 Ibid. The partners decision among these three options, according to Harkness, was that "It seemed to be the general
census [sic] that for a particular rush job where an old line draftsman might be needed to push a job through, he would
be hired under method #1."
115 Joseph Hudnut, "The Architectress," Part I, Journal oftheA.I.A. (March 1951): 115.
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"Architecture is a vocation which cannot be practiced successfully unless practiced continuously," he
wrote; "It will not admit of interludes for the education of children or the promotion of
husbands."116
In describing the ways in which his female students had overcome these challenges, Hudnut
placed significant weight on two working methods that were both already typified by the TAC
founders: marriage and collaboration. Aside from marrying a wealthy husband-a practice he wryly
noted had enabled some of his students to work independently-Hudnut described a more earnest
"variation in the pattern of marriage, also put into practice by our graduates" as a means of
practicing: namely, that of "a husband-and-wife partnership in architecture."1 7 More significantly
among the devices through which "women-architects have escaped some of the oppressions unjustly
laid upon their sex," however, was "the 'collaborative' mode of practice," in which "a number of
architects may agree to pool their talents and some, or all, of them may be women."11 8 In describing
the benefits of collectivity, Hudnut noted the flexibility such a setup offered for structuring the
relationship between family and work: "A collaborator, in such an event, may reserve the right, at
certain times and under specified conditions, to be absent from the office; and since such absences
would be anticipated and provided for, they might be of little consequence in the welfare of the
partnership as a whole."119
Despite his later criticisms of collaborative and corporate models of practice, as described in
Chapters 1 and 4, Hudnut praised them here as a significant means by which women could enter
116 Ibid. Hudnut further detailed the barriers to women both within the structures of the offices in which they worked
and in their dealing with outside contractors and builders: "Perhaps the greatest barrier to woman's progress in
architecture is neither our patterns of marriage, but those less mutable prejudices... concerned with employment,
promotion, opportunity, salesmanship. Architects do not like to employ women in their offices; contractors do not like
to build from their plans; people with money to spend do not like to entrust its expenditure to a woman. The real
bottleneck here is the architect's office in which the beginner in architecture must serve his apprenticeship after
graduation. Following their very ancient tradition, architects who are established in practice take newly fledged architects
under their wings and help them to grow wings of their own. Women, I am sorry to say, often receive a somewhat cold
welcome in such offices." Hudnut, "The Architectress," Part II, Journal ofthe A.I.A. (April 1951): 182.
117 Hudnut, "The Architectress," Part II: 181.
118 Ibid., 182.
119 Ibid.
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and remain in the workplace. However, in writing on the gender gap in architectural practice,
Hudnut ventured an assessment of the merits of collective work that anticipated his later views.
While he noted positively that "such a scheme seems to be at this moment the most promising of
any yet proposed against the ironies of marriage," he also cautioned that
since the ability to collaborate is here taken for granted, it would seem to be somewhat perilously
founded. Collaboration is a beautiful word; but there are still in human nature impulses towards
power and selfish promotion, basic stupidities and jealousies, and even honest, inevitable
misunderstandings. Collaboration will succeed best, I think, where only one of the collaborators
is gifted with a truly creative imagination. I can conceive several musicians taking their parts in
an orchestra, each with his special command of harmony; but I find distinctly discouraging the
thought of seven sculptors at work on a Venus. 120
Though the anecdotes he offered in "The Architectress" were clearly not those of the TAC founders
-the article noted a "Miss P." of Columbia, who won a student competition for "A Norman Castle
of the Tenth Century," and a "Miss B." of Harvard, who, noticing a parking garage was to be built in
downtown Boston, walked unannounced into the manager's office and gained the commission by
expounding on the virtues of module construction-he might well have included Jean Fletcher (a
student at Harvard during his tenure) or Sarah Harkness (who studied at the Cambridge School and
was married to a Harvard student) among his examples, as architects whose practice embodied both
the partnership of married designers and the principles of collective work. Indeed, Harkness later
offered an analogy between the domestic and professional realms as requiring similar commitments
to the collaborative process: "Just as it would be impossible to say exactly why a marriage is
successful," she wrote, "one can only make a guess as to why an organization works."121
120 Ibid.
121 Harkness, text on TAC's working methods quoted in "Genetrix: Personal Contributions to American Architecture:"
370. The analogy between domestic and professional partnership reappeared in more chauvinistic terms in an article in
Time magazine on Gropius, which included the following (possibly apocryphal) exchange with Frank Lloyd Wright on
the nature of collaboration: "Wright, a noted individualist, once snapped: 'Gropius, I suppose that if you were planning
to have a baby, you would turn to a neighbor for collaboration.' 'I would," replied Gropius, 'if my neighbor was a
woman."' "The Idea-Giver," Time Magazine, Vol. 94, No. 3 (July 18, 1969): 61.
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At the early years of TAC, the Harknesses and the Fletchers lived together in a setup similar to
the one described by Hudnut, in which collaboration allowed a flexible schedule of family and work
for the female partners in particular among the two married couples. A 1947 article in the Boston
Globe, titled "No Woman Should Stay Home," described the means through which "cooperation is
the keynote of a successful home life and careers of two young Cambridge women." 22 (Fig. 2.32) As
the article outlined, at the time the Fletchers and the Harknesses lived on two floors of a three-story
house on Trowbridge Street in Cambridge, MA, where they shared a maid, babysitters, and domestic
facilities in balancing childcare-at the time each couple had two children-with a rotating work
schedule at TAC. In effecting this live-work arrangement, the article suggested, "the parents heartily
believe that their mode of living can serve as a pattern for other young married couples, as well as a
basis for better community planning." 123 A second article from the same year in the Christian
Science Monitor, "Two Girls Share as Equal Partners in Modern Architects' Collaborative," further
praised the benefits of this structure of living and working for its female practitioners, noting that
"their budding success stems securely from the completely cooperative nature of their enterprise."1 24
(Fig. 2.33)
An article written by Jean Fletcher and Sarah Harkness for House & Garden in 1947, titled
"Architecture, Family Style," constituted something of a manifesto for the partners' emerging
approach to designing domestic settings to meet the changing needs of the postwar housewife. 125
Following a check-list of domestic priorities for women-"Is your house easy to run, pleasant to live
in?" "Is your husband's office less than an hour from home?"-the article described a life cycle of
living spaces from the apartment for a young couple ("little space but few responsibilities") to the
122 Barbara Brooks Walker, "No Woman Should Stay Home: Two Cambridge Wives Solve Career Problem," The Boston
Sunday Globe, March 2, 1947: A9.
123 Ibid.
124 Henley, "Two Girls Share as Equal Partners in Modern Architects' Collaborative": 10.
125 Jean Bodman Fletcher and Sarah Harkness, "Architecture, family style: two woman architects look at today's houses,
tell how they affect family life," House & Garden, Vol. 92 (October 1947),146-149.
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"transition" house ("share a maid, a garage, a washing machine, a drying yard, a jungle gym"), on to
the independence of the single-family home and, finally, the "return to a less complicated way of life"
once the family's children were married in turn. (Fig. 2.34) This circular pattern of living spaces
presaged Fletcher and Harkness's own progression from the shared arrangement of their house on
Trowbridge Street to the independence of Six Moon Hill (1949), the community of detached single-
family homes designed by the TAC partners for themselves and other office members two years later
in Lexington, MA. The project originated with the communal purchase of two adjacent plots of land
on a steeply sloping, twenty-acre site (named by the partners after the six Moon cars found in a barn
on the property), which was then divided into house lots and distributed by lottery among the
investors along a new road and cul-de-sac, purpose-built to serve the development. (Fig. 2.35) Each
family was free to design their own house based on their needs and the constraints of the topography,
supported by a communal open space and swimming pool and within a shared architectural
language. The Fletchers, for example, designed a split-level house with a two-story block containing
bedrooms above and an open children's playroom below, connected to a single-story wing containing
kitchen, living and dining rooms. (Fig. 2.36) The Harknesses designed a single-story house (later
expanded to include a two-story wing to accommodate a growing number of children) around a
central living space with skylights and fully openable exterior walls on garage-door pivots, both using
Wasco plexiglass domes based on technology developed for airplane cockpits during World War II.
(Fig. 2.37)
A later generation of architects was more critical of what they saw as the conventional postwar
domesticity of Six Moon Hill, including Mary Otis Stevens, who worked for TAC from 1956 to
1958 before designing her own house and studio in Lincoln, MA (1961-65) as a radical experiment
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in the structure of domestic life.126 Yet the group argued that the community and its houses offered a
flexibility of modern, "servantless" living that was crucial in allowing the partners to effectively
combine living and working needs-even if such needs were assumed to extend only to the female
partners. Among the domestic benefits of the planned community was a form of informal co-
parenting in which child-care duties were often shared between households, a situation well suited to
the large number of children among the partners-five for Benjamin Thompson, six for the
Fletchers, and seven for the Harknesses. Regular community meetings reflected the sense in which
the balance of individual and collective at Six Moon Hill was modeled on the same principles that
had guided the formation of TAC itself. (Fig. 2.38) Contemporary articles noted this intended
symmetry between domestic and professional settings, praising the partners for the way in which
"each of their houses has an individual character although all are unmistakably TAC products-a
double paradox since each TAC job is the result of one design team's effort within the group
framework."127
TAC's experiments in community planning continued nearby at the Five Fields development
in Lexington (1952), for which Jean and Norman Fletcher were design partners along with Louis A.
McMillen. (Fig. 2.39-2.40) The firm sought to plan a complete housing community with control
from design and construction through to marketing and the establishment of a homeowner's
organization to regulate the development.128 (Fig. 2.41) Sixty-eight low-cost houses were built
around common parkland that was jointly owned by its residents. The community was initially
126 In criticizing Six Moon Hill in particular among other postwar suburban precedents, Mary Otis Stevens claimed, "I
was against ordinary American domesticity. I didn't want my children to grow up in the conventional restrictive
environment in which I had been brought up." Liane Lefaivre, "Critical Domesticity in the 1960s," Thresholds 19 (2000):
23. On Mary Otis Stevens and the Lincoln house, see Michael Kubo, "Lincoln House and Studio," in Chris Grimley,
Kubo, Mark Pasnik, Heroic: Concrete Architecture and the New Boston (New York: Monacelli Press, 2015): 194-201;
Susanna Torre, "Building Utopia: Mary Otis Stevens and the Lincoln, Massachusetts, House," in Avital Bloch and Lauri
Umansky, ed., Impossible to Hold: Women and Culture in the 1960's (New York and London: New York University Press,
2005).
127 "The Individual House: Practice of The Architects Collaborative," Architectural Record (May 1950): 128-135.
128 TAC described the Five Fields development in "Five Fields, Housing Development," The Architects Collaborative Inc.
1945-1965: 48-53; "Five Fields Houses," in John C. Harkness, ed. Walter Gropius Archive, Vol 4: 1945-1969, The Work
of 7he Architects Collaborative (New York and London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1991): 46-58.
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regulated by a charter, created by TAG, which was explicitly framed to encourage a mix of residents
that would be racially, ethnically, and socially diverse, in contrast to the restrictive covenants typical
of many suburban developments of the period-and in contrast to the more homogeneous social
makeup of Six Moon Hill.1 29 John Harkness later recalled that at Five Fields, the partners "were very
specific that there was no restriction as to race or religion, etc."130 For the founding partners, both
Six Moon Hill and Five Fields served to demonstrate that collaborative live-work ideals could be
realized, through sensitive community planning and house design, within the postwar economic
framework of managerial capitalism and the center-suburb pattern of the American city. (Fig. 2.42)
The idealism conveyed by the female TAC founders in the firm's early years about the ability to
combine the labors of home and work was tempered, in later years, as both the office and the
partners' families grew steadily larger. While a central mechanism in promoting equality among the
founders after 1945 was an agreement that all partners would earn the same salary, including the
pooling of any income earned from teaching or other outside activities, it is unclear how this equal
redistribution accommodated the presence of two couples among the original eight members, or how
late the salary structure and work schedule of the female partners were maintained within the
129 The autobiography of Caleb Warner, a resident of Five Fields for nearly fifty years beginning after almost all the
houses were built and occupied, supports TAC's claims that the development was designed to be ethnically and culturally
diverse, if not economically (as a community designed for professionals). According to Warner, "Our neighbors were
professionals of one sort or another-psychiatrists, psychologists, doctors, architects, academics, and a few from the
business world.... Although our community reflected Lexington generally, at various times over the years Five Fields was
home to persons of various ethnicities, single-sex couples, and representatives of a variety of religious denominations. The
diversity of our community was very important to us." Warner and A. Wendy Warner, Grant Me To Find the Task: The
Life Story of Caleb Warner (Bedford, MA: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2013): 163. The founding
charter initially also specified TAC as the designer for any new homes subsequently built as part of the development, a
provision that was apparently later removed after being found to be illegal under Massachusetts state law.
130 John C. Harkness, John Cheesman Harkness: 17.
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office.1 3 1 By 1964, Ise Gropius wrote sympathetically to Ellen Jawdat (discussed in Chapter 5), a
former Harvard student then attempting to combine her own demands of architectural practice and
childcare in Iraq, that "All TAC members are, of course, in the same position as you: the children are
becoming adults and present more problems... Louis and the Fletchers being in the sixes and eights
[sic] & Chip in the sevens and considering the gratifying but horrendous freedom given to
youngsters here it must be a tremendous merry-go-round when the TAC members return to their
homes." 132 Ise confirmed that the part-time rotation between home and office was still operative for
the female founders: "Jean still works halftime and Sally is also quite active though I don't think on
as regular a basis," she wrote, though qualifying that "I say 'works', implying that work at home just
is no work, while most working mothers tell me that the office is an actual haven of peace compared
to the home."1 33 Whether the benefits of this "haven of peace" were extended equally to female office
members after the founders was another question. In her later years, Sarah Harkness acknowledged
her feeling that not enough was done for women who subsequently joined the firm, suggesting, for
example, that more could have been done to promote women to the level of principals. Such changes
in the atmosphere of the office were fully evident in portraits of the firm's partners by the 1980s.
(Fig. 2.43)
131 In 1970, principal John F Hayes characterized this founding principal as still operative: "'he original objectives of the
firm indicate a strong ideal about working together as a team and also the idea that everyone was making his maximum
contribution to the firm and that, therefore, there was no necessity to reward each one differently through salaries or
bonuses. With the exception of the two female partners, this procedure has operated through the years and the original
partners have all received the same salaries." He did not specify, however, whether this "exception" referred to the part-
time work schedule of the female partners, or to an unequal distribution of salary for the two couples, versus the four
individual partners among the founders. Hayes, quoted in "Long-Range Planning Meeting-30 October 1970,"
included in Long-Range Planning Meeting-1970, Re-distributed for Long-Range Planning Meeting ofJune 25-27, 1981
(1981): 6. MIT Museum Archives.
132 Letter from Ise Gropius to Ellen Jawdat, September 16, 1964. Harvard University, Houghton f 2013M-29.
133 Ibid.
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TAC Inc.
As TAC's work grew in parallel with the postwar baby boom in its first two decades-progressing
from suburban houses and elementary schools to secondary education and then to universities,
hospitals, office buildings, and other institutional and cultural commissions-the office changed in
size and character as well. By the mid-1960s, a conjunction of events marked the closure of TAC's
first twenty years of collaborative practice and signaled the firm's transition to more bureaucratic,
professionalized forms of organization. The simultaneous commissions of the Pan American Airways
building and the University of Baghdad after 1957, described in detail in Chapters 4 and 5, brought
the office to a new level of financial and technical capability at national and international scales, by
completing the largest commercial office building in the world and carrying the Iraqi university
campus into its first phase of construction by 1963.
These changes in the expanding scope and scale of TAC's practice were registered in the firm's
incorporation in July 1963, legally shifting management of office business operations from the
partners to a corporate Board of Directors. 134 This shift in structure reflected the evident recognition,
as described in a 1980 issue of PROCESS magazine devoted to the firm, that "When architecture is
practiced on a large scale, it necessarily becomes a business as well as an art and a profession."1 35
Contemporary texts by the firm offered reassurance that "Although it is now TAC Inc., the character
134 The date of incorporation is given in an undated office portfolio, likely produced in 1967 or 1968, in which TAC is
described as "A firm of architects, urban designers, and landscape architects organized as a partnership in December 1945
and incorporated in July 1963." Canadian Centre of Architecture Collections.
135 Leonard J. Currie and Virginia M. Currie, "TAC: Principles Process & Product," in TAC: The Heritage of Walter
Gropius, PROCESS:Architecture No. 19 (1980): 41. Currie and Currie describe the rationale for TAC's incorporation and
its effects as follows: "The corporate structure was adopted in order to share the company ownership more easily and in a
broader fashion, and also to better meet legal responsibilities and liability issues. There has been attempt to improve
business efficiency without impeding the chief objective of the firm-which is to produce well-designed and socially
responsible architecture for the use of people." As of 1980, they wrote, "Throughout the firm there seems to be a
consensus that TAC has matured and provides better service by devoting more effort to the business aspects. The day-to-
day operations are more efficiently handled by a small group of informed individuals instead of meetings involving all of
the principals." Ibid.
108
of the firm remains the same."1 36 The weekly partners' meetings continued as sessions devoted to
both design criticism and business matters, now supplemented by occasional meetings of the new
Board, including five of the founding partners and two senior associates. 137 Yet the replacement of
the partner structure by a legal structure of president, vice president, and directors and the
introduction of a system of shareholders marked the beginning of inevitable changes in the character
and conception of the office's cooperative model in later years.1 3 8 As the firm expanded physically
and economically, the space of collaboration was increasingly confined to the scale of the project
teams, represented only secondarily by the partners's meetings that were crucial to the firm's original
model.1 39
By 1965 TAC-or more properly TAC Inc.-was one of the largest and most successful offices
of the postwar era, having grown from its original eight partners into a firm with nearly 150
employees and large-scale commissions around the globe.140 In the same year, TAC was on the cusp
of completing its first major monograph, The Architects Collaborative Inc. 1945-1965, as the
culmination of its first twenty years of practice. The firm's continued expression of faith in the
cooperative idea in the pages of the monograph, discussed in Chapter 3, was reciprocated by
136 Walter Gropius and Sarah Harkness, ed. The Architects Collaborative Inc. 1945-1965: 16.
137 Ibid. This monograph text, unattributed but likely produced by TAC, describes the attempt to mediate the character
of the new office organization with the original intentions of the partners' meetings: "A formal vote is used only for
matters of a legal character, never for design decisions.... In order to comply with the law, the terms of the partnership
have been replaced by president, vice president, director, etc. However, since the notion of a frozen hierarchy would not
be in the spirit of TAC, these responsibilities are rotated. The group of partners and senior associates is large enough to
prevent domination by one person, yet small enough to meet around the conference table for informal discussion.
Decisions are made by the sense of the meeting rather than by vote."
138 Among the immediate consequences of incorporation was the reclassification of the founding partners as principals,
and the naming of additional principals for the first time since the founding of TAC two decades earlier. In 1964, Alex
Cvijanovic, William Geddes, Herbert Gallagher, H. Morse Payne Jr., Richard Brooker, Ernest Birdsall were named as
principals. Peter Morton joined was named principal in 1965, and Roland Kluver in 1966. Walter Gropius was named
the first president of the firm. Sarah Harkness, "The Architects Collaborative," in Joseph A. Wilkes and Robert T.
Packard, ed., Encyclopedia ofArchitecture, Design, Engineering 6- Construction, Vol. 5 (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
1987): 47.
139 The Architects Collaborative Inc. 1945-1965: 16.
140 The TAC monograph lists a total staff of 142 in the Cambridge office at the end of 1964. The list of present
employees as of March 1965 in the back matter of the monograph contains 175 names, not including the six remaining
founders following the death of Jean Bodman Fletcher and the departure of Robert S. McMillan. The Architects
Collaborative Inc. 1945-1965: 16, 294-295.
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professional bodies like the American Institute of Architects, which, in granting TAC its Firm Award
for 1964, commended the practice for its "notable effort in establishing a purely democratic
association of equal partners."141 These efforts, the AIA held, had "carried TAC through the
formative years into the maturity of producing architecture of a high rank without personal
idiosyncrasies"-even those of Gropius, "the self-effacing master." 142 (Fig. 2.44) In the same year, the
partners' work on the first comprehensive publication of TAC's projects was paralleled by the firm's
design for a new, purpose-built headquarters to house its expanding operations and reflect its mature
professional image to potential clients. These related products-monograph and headquarters, book
and building-both drew the firm's first twenty years to a close and announced its ambitions for the
future.
As TAC grew in the years after 1945, the loose collaborative structure of this "purely
democratic association of equal partners" had been mirrored in the geography of the firm's work
spaces, distributed in a network of clapboard houses and other rented buildings around Harvard
Square. A converted three-story house at 63 Brattle Street, rented from Radcliffe and formerly a
Harvard faculty residence, constituted TAC's main offices through the 1950s.14 3 Among the quirky
features of the old house-turned-offices was an attic mezzanine, occupied by drafting tables and fitted
with Wasco dome skylights like those used in the Harkness house, from which office members
reported being able to overhear private conversations from the second floor just below.144 (Fig. 2.45)
Partner Roland Kluver later recalled that "Drafting spaces were tucked around in the various odd
rooms of the old house in a wonderful, crazy, overcrowded way."1 45 (Fig. 2.46) By the end of the
141 American Institute of Architects, "Architectural Firm Award Honoring The Architects Collaborative," 1964, n.p.
Canadian Centre of Architecture Collections.
142 Ibid.
143 TAC partner Roland Kluver claimed the house had once been the home of G. Holmes Perkins, a professor at the
Harvard Graduate School of Design beginning in 1930 and chair of the city planning department from 1945 to 1950.
Kluver, "Early Days," in TAC Reminiscences: 33.
144 Terry Rankine, "The Second Floor of 63 Brattle, circa 1960," in TAC Reminiscences: 69.
145 Kluver, "Early Days," in TAC Reminiscences: 33.
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1950s, the main office was one among a diffuse collection of converted drafting spaces around
Harvard Square, each housing one or two principals and their project teams. The nicknames given by
TAC members to these separate spaces-including "Siberia" (90 Mount Auburn Street) and
"Bensville" (1 Story Street)-indicated their physical and conceptual distance from the head office,
or to partners, like Benjamin Thompson, who had formed quasi-independent studios, in his case
with a dedicated team that stayed together through multiple projects under his direction. 146 The first
shop for Design Research (DIR), the retail outlet for the "modern environment" spun off from TAC
by partner Benjamin Thompson in 1953, was located in an adjacent row of clapboard buildings at
57 Brattle Street.1 47 (Fig. 2.47)
The block that included both the TAC main office and DIR buildings had long been slated by
Harvard University, the firm's landlord, to become the future home of a library for the Graduate
School of Education. 148 Upon the termination of TAC's lease in 1961, the firm confronted the
problem of designing a new, purpose-built headquarters that would reflect the changing needs of the
office while maintaining a collaborative, rather than corporate, character. As Mildred F. Schmertz
outlined in a contemporary article in Architectural Record, the firm's task was "how best to gather its
sizable, widely dispersed staff under one roof for greater efficiency, without changing TAC's image
into one of 'bigness."1 4 9 (Fig. 2.48) Such a building would have to accommodate the firm's
expanding scale and scope of practice while at the same time providing reassurance that TAC, as
146 Terry Rankine, later a founding member of Cambridge Seven Associates, claimed that 90 Mount Auburn Street and 1
Story Street were commonly referred to as "Siberia" and "Bensville," respectively, by members of the Thompson team and
by others in the office. Rankine, "Memories of TAC," in TAC Reminiscences: 69, 71. As discussed later in this chapter, the
closeness of the Benjamin Thompson project team is evidenced by the fact that five members of this team split from TAC
together to form Cambridge Seven Associates with Ivan and Peter Chermayeff in 1962, while a second set of twelve
architects from this team joined Thompson upon his own departure from TAC to establish Benjamin Thompson &
Associates in 1966. See Tom Green, "TAC: May 1959-January 1966," in TAC Reminiscences: 23.
147 See "Bright Glass Prism on Brattle Street," Architectural Record (May 1970): 159-164. See also Jane Thompson and
Alexandra Lange, "Experiencing the Store: Brattle Street, 1953-69), in Design Research: The Store That Brought Modern
Living to American Homes (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2010): 34-69.
148 Benjamin Thompson & Associates went on to design the Harvard Graduate School of Education Library, completed
in 1972, on the site of the old TAC and DIR buildings.
149 Mildred F. Schmertz, "A Challenging Collaboration for TAC," Architectural Record (September 1967): 160.
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Schmertz argued, had successfully "avoided organizing its practice into any system which could
eventually resemble the over-specialized pecking orders of some larger organizations."1 50 The article
noted that multiple options for siting a new headquarters were considered, from occupying
warehouse space on Boston Wharf, to purchasing and renovating a former book bindery, to
designing a new suburban office building near the burgeoning Route 128 tech corridor outside of
Cambridge, a location that would have enabled a horizontally organized corporate office.151
Gropius's insistence proved decisive in advocating for the benefits of staying in Harvard Square for
TAC's employees and office culture, and the firm soon acquired a property at the corner of Brattle
and Story streets, just down the street from the 63 Story Street house. 5 2
TAC's new offices, at 46 Brattle Street, were officially inaugurated on November 16, 1966.153
(Fig. 2.49) At a speech given on the occasion of the building's opening, Gropius suggested the
difficulties faced by a collaborative firm-one whose method was based on a culture of shared
criticism among equals-in designing a building for a clientele of 150 in-house architects. "You can
hardly imagine," Gropius explained, "what a complicated balancing act had to be performed in order
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid., 163.
152 Ibid. The history of acquiring the property for the new TAC headquarters and eventually the Architects' Corner
remains unclear. Jane Thompson claimed, in interviews with the author (2016), that the impetus to acquire land in
anticipation of Harvard's termination of the lease came from Benjamin Thompson , implying that it was the need for a
new Design Research space, not the TAC office, that initially impelled the land purchase. Tom Green, who left with
Benjamin Thompson to form Benjamin Thompson & Associates in 1966, later claimed that "Ben and TAC acquired the
Brattle Inn and adjoining Story Street site for the new DIR building and the TAC office building." Green, "TAC: May
1959-January 1966," in TAC Reminiscences: 23. It is perhaps more likely that, if Benjamin Thompson played a role in
effecting the land purchase, this was in his role as TAC partner, though the future location of DIR may have been a
consideration. Jane Holtz Kay lists 1961 as the year "TAC bought the corner of Brattle and Story streets," i.e., including
the future sites of both the TAC and DIR buildings. Holtz Kay, "A Block on Brattle Street," The Boston Sunday Globe,
April 30, 1972: A12.
153 Ise Gropius wrote to Ellen and Nizar Jawdat on November 1, 1966, confirming the opening date: "TAC will have a
big housewarming party at their new building on November 16th. It is a great satisfaction for Grope to see TAC firmly
anchored in this way, but whenever he sees something safely launched he usually gets itchy feet and takes a new risk."
Houghton Library, Houghton f 2013M-29. The typescript of the speech given by Gropius upon the opening of the office
is marked, in what appears to be Gropius's hand, "15 Nov. 66. Opening of TAC Office." The contents of the speech
imply that this may have been a dinner or exhibition opening the night before the official opening of the building.
Gropius, "Speech at Opening of TAC Office," typescript with annotated manuscript revisions, Harvard University,
Houghton Library, MS Ger 208, folder 289.
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to do justice to the many individual suggestions of the various Partners and to bring them under one
hat in order to reach our aim of a straight-forward, easily readable design." 154 Gropius expressed
gratitude that "after making-do for so long with 7 small offices in Cambridge and Boston,
overlapping and doubling many of our efforts, we have now assembled everyone under one roof,"
taking the occasion to reaffirm his belief in "what invaluable advantages result from mutual
stimulation if a group of people of differing inclinations, interests and talents work in close contact
towards a common objective." 155 The new headquarters thus embodied "the most important asset of
an architectural firm," not the material tools needed for production but rather "that elusive spirit
which keeps creative faculties awake and stimulates the individual to positive action." While Gropius
noted that "this volatile quality needs renewal again and again," he professed to the assembled guests
his belief that TAC's new offices proved that "at present it certainly exists among us."156
Developed by a team led by principal Louis A. McMillen and lead designer H. Morse Payne
Jr., the organization of the new building reflected the attempt to maintain TAC's organization as a
collection of groups despite their consolidation into a single facility. A circulation core located at the
hinge of the L-shaped building in plan allowed each floor to be split into two halves, each serving
from one to three principals and their respective teams in an organization of small studios rather
than a single large work space. (Fig. 2.50) Each studio functioned as an office in miniature, with its
own reception desk, conference room, principals' offices, and drafting tables. (Fig. 2.51) The quality
of the building's materials was also intended to display the technical skill of which the firm was
capable. Concrete details were designed to be simple but elegant, with incised floor slab edges and
vertical joints between infill panels drawing a sharp linework across the building's facades. The
fineness of the building's execution in concrete and the clarity of its layout were clearly meant to
make an impression on clients: in Gropius's words, "We hope it proves right away that we know
154 Walter Gropius, "Speech at opening of TAC office, November 1966," typescript with annotated manuscript revisions,
MS Ger 208, folder 289, Houghton Library, Harvard University.
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid.
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what we're doing." 157 Indeed, Jane Holtz Kay, a critic for the Boston Globe, agreed upon the building's
opening that the result had "a certain refinement, a quality associated with the firm," noting that the
headquarters stood "solidly on concrete columns, neatly lined, [with] an agreeable sandblasted finish,
bronze windows, [and] bronze mullions." 158
A TAC office portfolio produced after 1968 repeated the firm's portrayal of the building as a
visible expression of its collaborative ethos. "In designing its own building," the entry on the firm's
headquarters declared, "an architectural firm is, in a very real sense, presenting its position to the
world.... Thus the design period becomes and opportunity, in fact an obligation, to evaluate and
reaffirm its basic principles." 159 To these ends, the entry noted, the Brattle Street offices "were
designed to accommodate TAC's own approach to architectural problem solving, whereby a number
of small teams work semi-independently within the larger organization," a method that "obviated the
need for large, undifferentiated drafting spaces" as found in a typical large-scale firm.160
The siting and urban form of TAC's new headquarters gave further proof of the interest in
community that provided the organizing schema for the building's interiors. An extra floor was
gained above the four stories permitted by local zoning codes by giving over a portion of the site to
an entry court reached via a passage from Brattle Street, creating the beginnings of the courtyard and
pedestrian arcade that gave the block its distinctive urban structure in later years. These processes
initiated the formation of what become known as the "Architects' Corner," an urbane group of
concrete buildings clustered off of Brattle Street in Harvard Square, so named for the number of
firms who designed their own offices there. Significantly, the firms whose buildings made up the
Architects' Corner included the successive heads of the Harvard Graduate School of Design over its
first three decades: Gropius (chair of the architecture department 1937-53), Josep Lluis Sert (dean
157 Schmertz, "A Challenging Collaboration for TAC": 163.
158 Jane Holtz Kay, "A block on Brattle Street": A12.
159 "TAC Office Building and Addition," in The Architects Collaborative, TAC office portfolio, 7 vols., n.d. [after 1970],
Bauhaus Archiv.
160 Ibid.
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1953-69), and Benjamin Thompson (chair of the architecture department 1963-68). The partners'
interests in the block as a community group continued even independent of the firm, as when
Thompson, who had left the firm two years earlier, described the issues faced in designing a
headquarters for Design Research adjacent to the TAC building in a 1968 letter to Gropius. In
completing the courtyard begun by the TAC block, Thompson wrote that the DIR building would
have to match the contextual and urbanistic demands its partners had established, beyond the
commercial imperatives of a store for modern furnishings. The problem, he explained to Gropius,
was thus "how to turn corners and face the TAC building-and the constant effort to do something
for the community scene-i.e. Brattle Street."161
At the same time, however, representations of TAC's expanding partnership and practice after
1966, produced from its new headquarters, effected not so much the image of an informal
collaborative as the impression of a professional, bureaucratic office. While both the firm's
monograph and later publications continued to reproduce images of Gropius and the founding
partners in their early years, official photographs of partners' meetings at 46 Brattle Street conveyed a
seriousness and corporate character that the firm had claimed the design of its offices was expressly
intended to avoid. (Fig. 2.52) Such images of the partners, circulated in the firm's office brochures
and in architectural magazines, clearly reflected the self-satisfaction of a firm that had achieved a
significant measure of success and stability by the mid-1960s.1 6 2 (Fig. 2.53) These group portraits
were a far cry from the establishment of TAC twenty years earlier by a group of recent school
graduates, working together in one room of Gropius's two-room office in Harvard Square. Yet the
question of whether the firm's organization had hedged in the meantime from the collaborative ethos
to a more properly corporate character of practice-a status corresponding to the firm's official
161 Benjamin Thompson, letter to Walter Gropius, October 17, 1968, Bauhaus Archiv, Berlin, GS 19, 690. Jane Holtz
Kay, by contrast, contested the idea that DIR and TAC were in good communication during the project: "Supposedly,
the new DIR would evolve through dialogue and design review with TAC. In fact, dialogue was limited but Thompson
spoke the same language as his former colleagues anyhow." Holtz Kay, "A block on Brattle Street": A12.
162 See especially the cover of Casabella 318 (September 1967), featuring a portrait by Ezra Stoller of the TAC partners-
eleven men, with only Sarah Harkness remaining among the two original women partners.
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incorporation in 1963 and embodied in its monograph and headquarters three years later-remained
open.
Collaborative Successors
The stakes of the cooperative idea in the 1960s played out not just at TAC but in the number of
successor firms launched by its office members over the course of the decade. Two of the firm's
original eight partners, Robert S. McMillan and Benjamin Thompson , left within a span of three
years to establish independent practices, while two others passed away by the end of the decade: first
Jean Bodman Fletcher, who died of cancer at the young age of forty-five in 1965, and then the elder
Walter Gropius, aged eighty-six, in 1969. While Robert S. McMillan Associates and Benjamin
Thompson & Associates operated under their founders' names, other offices established by TAC
members in the 1960s, including Cambridge Seven Associates (C7A) in 1962 and Architectural
Resources Cambridge (ARC) in 1969, spoke the team concept in their firm titles as TAC had done
before them. Significantly, many of these offices laid claim to the collaborative ethos, in many cases
framing their models of practice explicitly as improvements to or elaborations of the concepts of
anonymity, teamwork, and cooperation their members had learned from their experiences at TAC.
Such arguments were often counterposed with criticisms of how TAC's output and methods had
changed by the 1960s, laying the groundwork for their own claims to the collaborative method.
The first firm to split from TAC was precipitated by the departure of office members Lou
Bakanowsky, Alden Christie, Paul Dietrich, and Terry Rankine to join architect and filmmaker Peter
Chermayeff and graphic designers Ivan Chermayeff and Tom Geismar in establishing Cambridge
Seven Associates (C7A) in 1962. (Fig. 2.54) The combined group represented two professional and
personal lineages, each committed to the idea of a truly interdisciplinary creative practice that would
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exceed the boundaries of TAC's more narrowly defined architectural focus. 163 The first group-
Bakanowsky, Christie, Dietrich, and Rankine-had all worked under Benjamin Thompson, and had
often discussed leaving together to form a group practice that would expand TAC's collaborative
structure to an even more integrated method across the design disciplines. As Rankine later recalled
of his conversations with Paul Dietrich, the two architects "found a common belief in the
relationship of design disciplines," both feeling the desire "to do more than straight architecture,
which was what most of the offices were doing in Cambridge at that time, and that architecture
would benefit from a combined design approach ranging from exhibit design, graphic design,
through urban design." 164
In seeking to expand their purview to encompass these disciplines, Dietrich provided the link
to the second lineage within the group, represented by Peter and Ivan Chermayeff. The pair were the
sons of Serge Chermayeff, the British 6migre who led the New Bauhaus School of Design in Chicago
from 1946 to 1951 before moving to Cambridge to teach at the GSD in 1953. Serge Chermayeff, a
forceful advocate for community in architecture and urban planning as well as for collaborative
methods of practice like those espoused by Gropius and the Telesis group, saw these beliefs realized
in his sons' related interdisciplinary practices. 165 In the summer of that year, Dietrich approached
163 TAC subsequently expanded its areas of specialization as well, adding dedicated departments for Landscape
Architecture (1965), Interior Design (1968), and Publications and Graphics (1977). Sarah Harkness, "The Architects
Collaborative," in Joseph A. Wilkes and Robert T. Packard, ed., Encyclopedia ofArchitecture, Design, Engineering &
Construction, Vol. 5 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1987): 48. A less formalized version of the interiors department,
however, may date to as early as 1953; it was through this interiors group that Benjamin Thompson may have developed
the ideas on marketing modernist furnishings and other goods that led to the establishment of Design Research in 1953.
164 Terry Rankine, "The Summer of 1962: My Memories of the Start of Cambridge Seven," March 18, 2013, https://
architects. org/news/summer-1962-my-memories-start-cambridge-seven.
165 Ivan studied graphic design at Yale and established a thriving graphic design firm with Tom Geismar, Chermayeff &
Geismar, in New York City in 1957, while Peter received his architecture degree from the GSD in 1962 while working
independently as a documentary filmmaker. On the Chermayeff family, see Carson Chan, "The Chermayeff Century,"
032c, Issue #22 (Winter 2011/2012), http://032c.com/product/issue-22-winter-20112012-the-chermayeff-century/. For
Serge Chermayeffs views on collaboration and community, see Chermayeff, "Telesis: The Birth of a Group," Pencil Points
(July 1942): 45-48; Chermayeff, "Architecture and a New World," California Arts andArchitecture (May 1942): 18-19,
38, 40, and Chermayeff and Christopher Alexander, Community and Privacy: Toward a New Architecture of Humanism
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1963), which the authors dedicated "To Walter Gropius with admiration
affection and gratitude."
117
Peter Chermayeff, then working on an anti-war film about the effects of nuclear weapons, about
joining his colleagues to form a collective, multidisciplinary design practice. Assured that exhibitions,
graphics, and film would be equal parts of the work undertaken by the new firm, Peter agreed to join
the team, with "an idea that we could start a multidisciplinary firm with graphics, exhibit design,
industrial design, architecture, and urban design."1 66 Ivan Chermayeff and Tom Geismar soon came
on board as partners, in parallel to their ongoing work with Chermayeff & Geismar in New York. In
joining forces, the combined team sought to create what Rankine referred to as "the idea," a "studio
with many of the design disciplines all working happily together-a designer's paradise!" 167
Fortuitously, the establishment of the firm coincided with the interdisciplinary commission that
established its reputation, the New England Aquarium (1962-69) in Boston, an ideal demonstration
of its founders' shared interests in the integration of architecture, graphics, and exhibition design
into a holistic visitor experience.1 68 Faced with the task of naming a large group of equal partners, as
TAC had before them, the colleagues christened themselves Cambridge Seven Associates, or C7A.
A year after Cambridge Seven Associates began its interdisciplinary practice, partner Robert
McMillan, then a director of TAC S.p.A. in Rome, left the firm to establish Robert S. McMillan
Associates in 1963. (Fig. 2.55) The international character of the firm quickly matched the expertise
of the Rome office from which it originated, gaining commercial and institutional commissions
including the University of Lagos and Nigerian Parliament in Lagos, Nigeria, an office tower in
Nairobi, Kenya, and a mosque for the University of East Africa in Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika by
1968.169 By this time, the firm listed its head office as located in Lucerne, Switzerland, while
maintaining an affiliated company in Rome "for much of the actual production" of projects,
166 "Experiential Thinking," interview with Peter Chermayeff, in Chris Grimley, Michael Kubo, Mark Pasnik, Heroic:
Concrete Architecture and the New Boston (New York: Monacelli Press, 2015): 283-289.
167 Rankine, "The Summer of 1962: My Memories of the Start of Cambridge Seven."
168 On the history of the New England Aquarium project and its relation to the formation of Cambridge Seven
Associates, see Michael Kubo, "New England Aquarium 1962-69," in Grimley, Kubo, Pasnik, Heroic: Concrete
Architecture and the New Boston: 220-227.
169 Robert S. McMillan Associates, office portfolio, c. 1968, n.p.
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operating "under the direct supervision of Mr. McMillan and his associates."1 70 TAC SpA,
meanwhile, continued working on projects in Tunisia, Mali, Nigeria, and Guinea, in addition to its
expanding presence in Europe and the Arab and Persian Gulf states in these years.171 In this sense,
McMillan's firm sought to replicate the same benefits of location and client access that originally led
TAC to establish a Rome office in 1959 to conduct the University of Baghdad commission, with
McMillan and Louis A. McMillen jointly responsible for running the office in its first two and a half
years.
An article on McMillan Associates and its international growth in Progressive Architecture,
written a year after the firm's establishment, described its practice model as "an interesting departure
from the 'team' concept fostered by the alma mater of all principals in the firm, The Architects
Collaborative."1 72 According to the article, however, the difference lay in his decision to direct all
projects personally from the top down, a structure that was less an "interesting departure" than it was
diametrically opposed to TAC'S collaborative, non-hierarchical approach. The article noted that "each
client is served by McMillan, plus one of the associates as project manager," with the result that
"McMillan is the main designer of the firm, as well as being administrative and technical head of
office procedure." 173 Office portfolios advertised the firm's combination of team-based technical
expertise and comprehensive service with the singular direction of McMillan, reassuring clients that
"each... is served directly by Mr. McMillan and an associate," though "fully supported at all levels by
the staff of project architects, designers, job captains, draftsmen, modelmakers, specification writers,
field supervisors, and administrative personnel." 174
The final member of TAC's original partnership to break with the firm was Benjamin
Thompson, who left, along with most of his design team within the office, to form Benjamin
170 Ibid.
171 "The Architects Collaborative," The Architects Collaborative 1945-1965: 12.
172 "U.S. Firm Radiates from Rome," Progressive Architecture (October 1964): 240.
173 Ibid.
174 Robert S. McMillan Associates, office portfolio, n.p.
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Thompson & Associates (BTA) in December 1965.175 In turn, four members of the group that left
en masse to form BTA-Henry S. Reeder, Colin L. M. Smith, and associates Thomas G. Green and
Joseph Maybank III-soon left Thompson's firm to establish another collaborative endeavor,
Architectural Resources Cambridge (ARC), in 1969. Both splits testified to the largely autonomous
character of Thompson's studio within TAC by the mid-1 960s, a fact already presaged by the
formation of C7A by a group including five architects who had all worked together under his
direction.
The circumstances of Thompson's split with the other founding partners, combined with the
close proximity of both BTA and Design Research to TAC's offices after 1966, made his the most
fraught of the departures from the firm in the 196 0s. Thompson nevertheless remained on good
terms with Gropius in the years afterward, continuing to correspond regarding academic matters at
Harvard, where Thompson was then chair of the architecture department, and with Ise and Walter
on personal matters.1 76 Indeed, through his later interdisciplinary practice with his second wife, Jane
Thompson-including the architectural and urban planning work of BTA, the commercial and
lifestyle interests of Design Research, and the establishment of Harvest restaurant in the Architects'
Corner, among other ventures-the couple often cultivated the impression that it was Ben who most
fully embodied the ideal of "total architecture" envisaged by Gropius, in contrast to TAC's
corporatizing practice by the 1960s. Such claims paradoxically aimed to position Thompson as the
partner who best understood Gropius's philosophy of design, and thus the true inheritor of this
legacy through BTA's independent office, despite his acrimonious isolation from the TAC
175 Thompson announced his departure in a letter to the TAC partners on December 7, 1965, and BTA was incorporated
in January 1966.
176 The correspondence between Thompson and the TAC partners, and separately with Ise and Walter Gropius, regarding
his separation from TAC in December 1965 and early 1966 is preserved in the Bauhaus Archiv, GS 19, No. 690; a
portion of this correspondence is reproduced in the Reginald Isaacs papers of the Archives of American Art, Smithsonian
Institution, Washington, D.C. A smaller set of correspondence between Thompson and the Gropiuses before and after
1965-66 is preserved at Houghton Library, MS Ger 208, folder 1623.
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collaborative. 177 Jane Thompson, for example, later described the split as "a divergence of
convictions." 178 While she placed primary blame on Ben's dissatisfaction with the firm's standing
policy of redistributing all income equally among the partners, including salary gained from work
outside the office-including both his Harvard salary as chair and his "presumed, bot not real"
earnings through DIR-she also argued that "TAC was taking on projects that didn't match his
interests or temperament or values," a reference to both the firm's increasingly bureaucratic work and
its expanding commissions in the Middle East. 179
For his part, in announcing his departure in letter to the TAC partners on December 7, 1965,
Benjamin Thompson alluded only to an intractable conflation of unspecified personal and office
matters, "in which affairs of my private and business life have become irrevocably (if irrelevantly)
confused." 180 In protesting a "lack of sympathetic understanding" from his fellow partners that
rendered the situation "untenable as the continuing base of a working relationship," Thompson
ventured a deeper rebuke of an atmosphere he clearly no longer felt to be personally cooperative:
177 on the same day as Thompson's typewritten letter to the TAC partners announcing his departure from the firm, he
sent a personal letter to Gropius, written in his own hand, in which he wrote: "I want you to know that you have been a
tremendous influence to me both personally and professionally. Besides that you have been 'the closest friend.' I want to
help TAC and you in every possible way in the future. Only now I must unburden myself to the kind of freedom for
growth that my searching seems to desire." Gropius's reply, however, firmly dismissed the reasons given in Thompson's
letter to the TAC partners, suggesting that the true source of acrimony lay in his effective isolation from the firm: "But
for heaven's sake try to free yourself from the illusion that there is any confounding of your private and your business
affairs by the members of TAC. This is not so and I have made sure that you are in error.... The reason that a clarification
in TAC has become necessary is the fact that your absence from almost all TAC meetings for a year and your refraining
from showing your work in our design meetings has brought the situation to a head." He offered that "Though I am, of
course, personally very sorry that you will leave TAC I do not consider it tragic in itself.... My thoughts on teamwork
remain in principle undisturbed by this separation." Thompson, letter to Gropius, December 7, 1965 and Gropius, letter
to Thompson, December 9, 1965, Bauhaus Archiv, GS 19, No. 690.
178 "Live, Work, Play (Is This Any Way to Run a Business?)," Philip Loheed, William Pressley, Jane Thompson in
conversation with Scott Simpson, ArchitectureBoston: Ben (Spring 2011): 42.
179 Ibid. In interviews with the author (2016), Jane Thompson reiterated Ben's specific interest in schools and other
cultural commissions, and his criticisms of the office buildings and other service projects that increasingly occupied
TAC's portfolio by the 1960s, as well as its expanding presence in the Arab and Persian Gulf states. However, BTA went
on to design the InterContinental Hotel in Abu Dhabi (1976-198 1), an opportunity Jane praised as a cultural
experience. An account of Ben Thompson's opposition to projects undertaken by TAC for the U.S. Air Defense
Command, the Pan American Airways Building, and the University of Baghdad among other projects is given in Mildred
F. Schmertz, "A Life in Architecture," ArchitectureBoston: Ben (Spring 2011): 24.
180 Benjamin Thompson, letter to TAC partners, December 7, 1965. Bauhaus Archiv, GS 19, No. 690.
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I know there is an underlying rebuttal that the good of TAC must come ahead of any personal
concerns. I have lived under that doctrine for the past 18 years. I now find little personal faith
or group objectivity to prove there is any meaningful "whole" of which I am considered a flesh
and blood part. 181
In her later recounting of the reasons for Ben's departure, Jane Thompson related this loss of faith in
the firm's partnership model to a deeper criticism of the ways in which both felt the office had
changed for the worse by the mid-i 960s. While TAC had "started out like one big studio," she
claimed, "eventually the partners were running their own studios"-a statement that best applied to
Ben's own project teams, ensconced in their own space at 1 Story Street-while collaboration
operated solely "through weekly crit sessions." 182 In this view, true collaboration demanded
something more interactive than mere group criticism. She contrasted TAC's method as "a very
different scene from BTA," claiming its structure of sole ownership paradoxically offered a more fully
integrated model of cooperation among team members: (Fig. 2.56)
Ben's approach to collaboration was more open-everybody had jobs to do, but they didn't
own them. Collaboration didn't mean sitting around, looking at something, and criticizing
it, but everybody standing over a model and moving things around. It was physical, active
design. 183
Notwithstanding such criticisms of the TAC office, Benjamin Thompson maintained a dialogue with
his former partners in the years immediately after the split about the siting of an expansive new
showcase for Design Research, facing onto Brattle Street, adjoining TAC's headquarters. (Fig. 2.57)
Beginning with a design similar in character to the offices of their erstwhile colleagues, partner Tom
Green and senior associate Joseph Maybank-both ex-associates at TAC-developed a joyous
architecture of display in concrete and glass, cantilevering the building's floors and setting back the
columns behind continuous floor-to-ceiling windows to create the effect of a stacked urban bazaar.
181 Ibid.
182 "Live, Work, Play (Is This Any Way to Run a Business?)": 42.
183 Ibid.
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The unprecedented use of butted glass without mullions, held with simple clips, enabled DIR to be
what Green later described as "a building almost 'without architecture."' 184 The continuity between
the building's deep interior and the life of the street was enhanced by several retail innovations: a
floor organization of open mezzanines that drew visitors upward through the space, the setting of
objects on display (including the store's monumental neon "DIR" sign) well behind the plane of the
facade, and the use of chamfered corner diagonals to decrease reflections. Remarkable in its
transparency, DIR offered "a deceptively simply package: concrete without brutalism, glass without
glossiness, contextual [sic] without imitation."185 The building garnered a host of accolades
immediately upon its opening in December 1969. For critics like James O'Gorman, DIR was
nothing less than "a building distilled from one stream of 20th-century architecture: the one
theorised by Gropius, sloganised by Mies, canonised by Giedion, and summarised by Le Corbusier
in his 1914 project for a basic concrete (Domino) structure of posts, slabs, and connecting stairs."1 86
In this way, DIR provided a signature architectural image within the bureaucratic consistency of the
Architects' Corner, a proper foreground for the professional background of TAC's offices and the
other architecture firms that were soon housed in adjacent buildings.
By the mid-i 970s, a veritable village of self-professed architectural collaboratives and other
large-scale firms existed in and around Harvard Square, the gravitational center of professional design
practice in Boston established, in no small part, by The Architects Collaborative over its quarter-
century of work. TAC and Benjamin Thompson & Associates anchored the Architects' Corner along
with the offices of Sert, Jackson & Associates (SJA) and ex-TAC associate Earl Flansburgh, all
bolstered by the luminous images of modernism advertised by Design Research next door. Just down
the street were Cambridge Seven Associates, Architectural Resources Cambridge, and Hugh Stubbins
Associates (HSA), which completed its headquarters across the street from C7A in 1969. Like TAC,
184 Tom Green, quoted in Thompson and Lange, Design Research: 150.
185 Ibid., 147.
186 James O'Gorman, "DR US," Architectural Review (January 1972): 30.
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all of these companies worked in self-designed, purpose-built buildings, constructed in part for their
own use and supporting an array of design-related business, like Charrette, a retail provider of
architects' supplies and reprographic services, located on the ground floor of SJA's headquarters at 44
Brattle Street. At its peak, the "Cambridge School" may have included upwards of 500 people, led by
the expanding offices of TAC Inc. While these firms competed for commissions, many of their
designers worked for different firms at different times as projects were gained or lost, such that
Harvard Square "often felt like a single huge shop of architects."1 87
Cooperation and Control
In 1978, TAC was the largest dedicated architecture firm in the U.S., with some $12.4 million in
annual billings for commercial, institutional, and industrial buildings.1 88 The office had grown in size
from its founding eight principals to an international design concern with 325 employees by the
mid-1970s, spread across offices in Cambridge and Kuwait City.1 89 Just as the firm had expanded its
presence in the previous decade through Louis McMillen's participation in a trade mission to the
Arab and Persian Gulf states that brought major institutional projects in Kuwait, the United Arab
Emirates and Saudi Arabia, in 1974 principal Howard Elkus joined a trade mission to Southeast Asia
that brought the firm's commission to design the Government Services Insurance System (GSIS)
headquarters in the Philippines.1 90 By 1983 TAC opened a third office in San Francisco to satisfy its
187 Robert Campbell, "Reflecting on a Time When Harvard Square Towered With Designers," 7he Boston Globe, July 6,
2003. On the Cambridge group of architects in this period, see also "Talking About a Revolution: Cambridge in the
'60s," transcript of roundtable discussion with Norman C. Fletcher, John C. Harkness, Huson Jackson, Elizabeth Padjen,
Terry Rankine, Tad Stahl, Mary Otis Stevens, ArchitectureBoston (July/August 2003): 8-19.
188 Oliver W. Witte, "Learn from the Public Giants," Building Design & Construction (July 1978): 59.
189 Between January 1975 and January 1977, TAC reached a peak of 325 personnel in August 1975. Monthly figures for
these years are given in "Personnel Department," TAC Inc., 1976 Annual Meeting of Stockholders, 25 March, 1976 (1976)
and "Personnel Department," TACAnnual Report (1977). Employment numbers declined by roughly a third through
January 1979 (222 employees) before rising steadily again until the firm reached its high of 375 employees in January
1983, just prior to the beginning of TAC's collapse.
190 Howard Elkus, "TAC in Asia," in TAC Reminiscences: 14-16.
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growing portfolio of commissions on the West Coast, the result of the firm's attempts to shift a
greater portion of its projects back to the U.S. as a hedge against the economic volatility of work in
the Middle East.19 In the same year, the office reached a peak of 375 employees, with international
projects on four continents and the prosperous outlook of a firm that had seemingly mastered the
competitive economic landscape of the field after the 1970s. (Fig. 2.58)
Yet all was not well behind the facade of the thriving corporate office. In the year prior to
TAC's triumphant ranking in 1978, the firm underwent a fundamental restructuring intended to
redress the imbalance between the collaborative model on which it had been founded and the
corporate reality of the firm's existence three decades later. Between 1976 and 1977, the partners
established a Board of Principals (later the Policy Board) as a co-equal body to the Board of Directors
that had been in place since TAC's incorporation in 1963, splitting the management of the office
between two competing, and ultimately incompatible, models of governance. While the Board of
Directors would continue to be responsible for the day-to-day management of the firm, the Board of
Principals was intended to make decisions regarding the staffing and conduct of TAC's projects, as
well as to strategize the firm's long-term goals and interests. Those remaining among the office
founders-Norman Fletcher, John Harkness, Sarah Harkness, and Louis McMillen-all joined the
Board of Principals, hoping by these means to revivify something of the original sense of the weekly
partners' meetings where design and business matters were considered together, under the communal
governance of architects rather than the corporate direction of managers. Sarah Harkness was clear
about the intentions of this binary division as a check on the hierarchical authority of the directors,
later noting that "the Policy Board is a TAC invention. It doesn't exist in corporate law." 192
At the same time, the prospects for the long-term health of the firm gave cause for deep
concern from the perspective of the principals, in sharp contrast to the external image of TAC as an
191 Howard Elkus, "The Beginning of the San Francisco Office," in TAG Reminiscences: 17.
192 Sarah Harkness, "August 1, 1986, Memo from the Directors," office memorandum to Board of Directors, August 8,
1986. MIT Museum Archives.
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office that had successfully transcended the passing of its chief mentor at the end of the 1960s. The
combined economic effects of inflation and recession in the U.S., paired with an overcommitment to
work in the Middle East (discussed in Chapter 6) in contrast to its more diversified competitors,
threatened to preclude TAC from re-entering domestic markets in which it had worked heavily in
previous decades. Years of ineffective business policy and long-term planning had also taken their toll
as the firm grew larger. In 1976 TAC's president, H. Morse Payne Jr, outlined to the firm's
stockholders his fear that "we are entering a new an unknown era, and numerous Directors and
Associates have forecast a 'belt-tightening' to come, a slimming down of an over-fed TAC, one of
staff reduction and close control of abundant waste, without overthrowing those qualities that make
TAC so attractive." 193 As a response to such internal and external forces, the partners expressed hope
that a binary organization of corporate directorship and collaborative policy-making would enable
TAC to overcome its difficulties, and so maintain both its market position and its reputation as a
socially-concerned team of professionals.194 (Fig. 2.59)
The status of TAC's founding ethos of collaboration remained a subject of open discussion
among the partners throughout these organizational changes, visibly transacted through the
bureaucracy of stockholders' reports and office memoranda. As early as 1970, the year after Gropius's
death, the principals debated the legacy of these intentions and the possibility of their survival as, in
Sarah Harkness's later history of the era, "architects everywhere became more concerned about office
management and about architecture as a business."1 95 In this year Norman Fletcher shared his hope
that "in addition to the survival of TAC as an economic and professional entity" following the loss of
193 H. Morse Payne Jr., "President's Report," in TAC Inc., 1976AnnualMeeting ofStockholders, March 25, 1976, n.p.
MIT Museum Archives.
194 John Harkness reported to the firm's shareholders in March 1976 that "The most important accomplishment of the
Executive Committee this year has been, I believe, developing a simple organization for TAC as shown in the chart-and
at least the beginning of its execution." Harkness, "Report of the Executive Vice President," in TAC Inc., 1976Annual
Meeting ofStockholders, 25 March, 1976(1976). MIT Museum Archives. In the same report, H. Morse Payne affirmed
that "The adoption of the organizational chart is one of the major accomplishments of the year, and hopefully will prove
to be a major contribution to better office management." Payne, ibid.
195 Sarah Harkness, "The Architects Collaborative," in Joseph A. Wilkes and Robert T. Packard, ed., Encyclopedia of
Architecture, Design, Engineering & Construction, Vol. 5 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1987): 48.
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Gropius, "I would hope that the original ideas of TAC (the philosophical and ethical objectives)
survived as the younger echelon begins to take over.19 6 In contrast, principal John F Hayes cautioned
that "our torment is that we cherish this view of TAC while at the same time finding ourselves driven
to a more hierarchical and autocratic structure in order to manage a firm of over 200 people."1 97
Principal Herb Gallagher was equally direct in diagnosing this split between ideal and reality,
claiming that "part of our confusion results from applying the collaborative idea to management and
corporate structure and failing to see how the change in our scale has affected the original
concept."198 At the same time, Hayes expressed confidence that the landscape of large-scale practice
after Gropius offered "an opportunity which is at least as challenging as the original foundation of
TAC: to bring together not 8 people, but over 200 individuals to work together in teamwork which
is as serious and all-embracing as that which was initiated in 1945."199 Despite such claims, in the
decade that followed both the character of the firm and its public image increasingly became,
perhaps inevitably, that of a corporate, rather than collaborative, entity. (Fig. 2.60) By 1980, even
laudatory publications on TAC's history were obliged to note, equivocally that, "unquestionably, the
more recent emphasis on management has somewhat modified the personality of the firm." 200
196 Fletcher, quoted in "Long-Range Planning Meeting-30 October 1970," included in Long-Range Planning Meeting-
1970, Re-distributed for Long-Range Planning Meeting ofjune 25-27, 1981 (1981): 5. MIT Museum Archives.
197 Hayes, quoted in "Long-Range Planning Meeting-30 October 1970": 6. In reference to this modern business ideal,
Hayes quotes John Kenneth Galbraith: "Decision in the modern business enterprise is the product not of individuals, but
of groups.... It is fortunate that men of limited knowledge are so constituted that they can work together in this way.
Were it otherwise, business and government, at any given moment, would be at a standstill awaiting the appearance of a
man with the requisite breadth of knowledge to resolve the problem presently at hand." He continues: "Group-decision
making extends deeply into the business enterprise. Effective participation is not closely related to rank in the formal
hierarchy of the organization. This takes an effort to grasp. Everyone is influenced by the stereotyped organization chart
of the business enterprise. At the top is the Board of Directors and the Board Chairman; next comes the President; next
comes the Executive Vice-President; thereafter come the Department of [sic] Divisional Heads-power is assumed to
pass down from the pinnacle. Those at the top give orders; those below them relay them on or respond. This happens,
but only in very simple organizations." Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967):
80-81.
198 Gallagher, quoted in "Long-Range Planning Meeting-30 October 1970": 1.
199 Hayes, quoted in "Long-Range Planning Meeting-30 October 1970": 7.
200 Leonard J. Currie and Virginia M. Currie, "TAC: Principles Process & Product," in TAC: The Heritage of Walter
Gropius, PROCESS:Architecture No. 19 (1980): 42.
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While these changes in organization changed the perception of TAC's practice, they also did
little to stem the decline of its fortunes after its peak in the early 1980s, as the instability of its
foreign commitments, its lack of access to specializing U.S. markets, and its continued management
issues combined to doom the firm after 1983. The Board of Directors put it bluntly, declaring in the
same year that "financially, TAC is a mess." Noting the firm's "apparent lack of business policy," the
Board acknowledged that "it is not surprising since we are trained as architects, not businessmen. We
would not expect a business school graduate to competently design a building."201 In light of these
conditions, the directors concluded that the firm's "present policies and management techniques are
more characteristic... of a company that is going out of business than one on a path to
revitalization." 202
The Demise of TAC
The conflicts surrounding the fate of the collective ideal in this context came to a head in the
mid-i 980s, as the legacy of collaboration and the reality of incorporation were weighed against the
urgent background of financial crisis and the potential collapse of the firm. These tensions played out
around the opposed stakes of the Policy Board and the Board of Directors, co-equal bodies whose
views of governance reflected ultimately irreconcilable conceptions of TAC's nature and the means
for its continuation. In 1985, John Harkness framed the split in character and opinion between the
two entities diplomatically, suggesting that, while "the two must work together, and since their
assignments are different, there would appear to be no reason for conflict," nevertheless "they do
represent different points of view, and it is the constructive working out and balancing of these
positions which I think keeps TAC alive and vital."203 Yet within a year, relations between the two
201 "TAC Financial Management," office memorandum from Board of Directors to John Patterson, Vice President,
September 1, 1983: 1-3. MIT Museum Archives.
202 Ibid.
203 John C. Harkness, "Policy Board Report," TACAnnualReport (1985): 6.
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had exploded into an open battle over control of the office. The fight was triggered by a
memorandum on August 1, 1986 in which members of the Board of Directors, during an annual
recess in the appointment of Policy Board members, asserted their exclusive control under the firm's
by-laws over decisions regarding the appointment of principals for design projects as well as
promotions, compensations, and terminations of all stockholders within the office. 204 Such an
arrogation of authority threatened to fatally undermine the the principals on the Policy Board who
had traditionally been responsible for these issues, reducing them to secondary veto status and
effectively ending their ability to make decisions regarding the long-range planning of the practice.
More significantly, this shift in power would place all project principals in the office and their design
teams under the hierarchical control of a corporate board of directors for the first time in the firm's
history.
The founding partners immediately reacted in unison to express their shock at the perceived
reorganization of TAC as a fully corporate entity under centralized adminsitration, a structure that in
their view constituted a definitive break from four decades of the firm's guiding practice. Within a
matter of days, the remaining members of the original partnership and other principals wrote to the
shareholders and the Board of Directors to protest the potential loss of the collaborative spirit in
which the firm had been established. For Sarah Harkness, often the public voice of TAC's ethos over
the previous four decades, the conflict offered definitive proof-as she lamented a year later in the
final published statement on TAC's history by the founding partners-that "the psychological
climate within the practice of architecture has gone from the exuberance that followed World War II
to conservatism and business orientation." 205 In protesting the shift from a collaborative to a
corporate business model, Harkness protested that "The Board of Directors seems not to know the
204 "Follow-up to Yesterday's Meeting," office memorandum from The Board of Directors to Srockholders, August 1,
1986. I am grateful to Richard Brooker for providing the documents surrounding the August 1 memorandum, and to
Marc Rubin, a consultant on TAC's office management for Arthur D. Little in these years, for providing background on
the nature of the disputes between the Policy Board and the Board of Directors.
205 Sarah Harkness, "The Architects Collaborative," in Joseph A. Wilkes and Robert T. Packard, ed., Encyclopedia of
Architecture, Design, Engineering & Construction, Vol. 5 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1987): 46.
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difference between leadership and bossmanship, between good organization and military discipline,
between cooperation and control." 206 She further warned that "a dictatorship is not the answer,"
reminding the directors that "TAC needs saving, but you can't save a thing by destroying it."207
Reflecting on the firm's long history, Norman Fletcher asked: "Is the development of a corporate
office dictated to by a small group of Directors with a minimum of input from the distinguished
professionals who have been selected to be Principals in this firm the end result of what we started to
build as 'The Architects Collaborative' in 1945?"208 Principal Richard Booker was more definitive in
answering this question, concluding that the proposed changes meant "that the word
"Collaborative", so valid for over 40 years, is no longer pertinent and, for the sake of honesty, should
be removed from our Company's name." 209 Finally, John Harkness summarized the position of the
founding partners at greater length, writing that in seeking to establish "a single source of power" as
the only solution to TAC's problems,
It seems to me that this is throwing away everything that TAC has stood for over the years. It is
certainly giving up Grope's idea of getting away from the "Boss" system. It is giving up on what
has made TAC different from other offices, namely a system of collaboration and working
together in confidence, rather than being dictated to and in fear of punishment. It is even giving
up the system of checks and balances that is part of the democratic process in favor of absolute
dictatorship. It is, in fact, giving up what made TAC what it is today.210
While the directors were ultimately unable to gain the power needed to effect the proposed corporate
takeover within the firm, largely due to the continued obstinance of the original partners among the
members of the Policy Board, the crisis exposed the degree to which the founding members clearly
206 Sarah Harkness, "August 1, 1986, Memo from the Directors," office memorandum to Board of Directors, August 8,
1986.
207 Ibid.
208 Norman C. Fletcher, "August 1, 1986, Memo from the Board of Directors," office memorandum to The
Stockholders, August 8, 1986.
209 Richard Brooker, "August 1, 1986, Memo from the Directors," office memorandum to Board of Directors, August 7,
1986.
210 John C. Harkness, office memorandum to The Stockholders, August 11, 1986.
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saw the collaborative ethos as heavily threatened, if not definitively abandoned, within TAC's
practice by the mid-1980s.
Such attempts to rescue or reinvigorate the firm's founding model were increasingly at odds
with the reality of TAC's situation by this time. In the firm's annual report the year prior to the
controversy between the Policy Board and the Board of Directors, the president of the firm, John F.
Hayes, already openly acknowledged to office members that "I cannot promise you a TAC as it was,
for that would not be a TAC which was appropriate for the future." 211 Nor, however, could he
promise "the security of working for an institutional TAC which could solve all our problems."
Caught between these two poles-cooperation and control, collaboration and delegation, collectivity
and corporation-the office could instead only offer the vague opportunity "to be part of a growing
firm which we can make whatever we want it to be, if we have the commitment to do it."21 2
The end finally came for The Architects Collaborative on April 7, 1995, when the two
remaining founders among the firm's full-time staff, Norman Fletcher and John Harkness,
announced the closure of the office to the assembled staff.213 (Fig. 2.61) By this time the firm whose
staff had run to nearly four hundred at its peak had shrunk to 55 employees, victims of years of
TACs concerted efforts to reduce its overhead and expenses in the hopes of prolonging its survival. 214
The last straw in the slow but steady demise of the office was the firm's defaulting on a loan from
Harvard, to whom TAC had sold its purpose-built headquarters as part of its efforts to stay afloat.
Financially speaking, however, the writing had been on the wall for well over a decade, and there was
little to stop the impending bankruptcy of the practice. (Fig. 2.62) It remained for local academic
institutions to save what they could of the archival legacy of TAC's fifty years of work, at the same
2 1John F. Hayes, "President's Report," TAC Annual Report (1985): 4. MIT Museum Archives.
212 Ibid.
213 Bradford McKee, "TAC's Demise," Architecture (December 1995): 117-119.
214 The number of employees is given in McKee, ibid. The effort to reduce TAC's personnel after January 1983, to 220 by
September of that year and (minus a brief uptick in 1985-86) steadily thereafter, is described in "Staff Reduction
Program," TAC office memorandum from John Hayes to Directors, September 22, 1983. MIT Museum Archives.
131
time rescuing some measure of the last twenty-five years of Walter Gropius's practice in the U.S.215
Looking back on the history of the firm at the time of its collapse, Robert Campbell, the architecture
critic for the Boston Globe, wondered how TAC's collaborative ethos had failed to guarantee its
continued success, noting that "if ever a firm deserved to survive its founders and prosper into future
generations, it was this one, based as it was on the principle of collective accomplishment and
personal anonymity." 216 He ventured that by the mid- 1990s, "perhaps that very anonymity came to
seem bland, in an age of big-name architects and signature buildings."217 As TAC's legacy came to
center exclusively on the figure of Walter Gropius in the decades after both he and the office had
passed from the scene, the statement proved to be both a prescient forewarning of the imminent
rewriting of the firm's history and a prediction of the ongoing revival of individual authorship in
architectural practice.
215 Nancy Levinson, "Funds Raised By Preservationists Save Gropius Archives After TAC's Demise," Architectural Record
(September 1995): 19.
216 Robert Campbell, "Architects Collaborative Closes Doors After 50 Years," The Boston Globe, May 5, 1995: 65.
217 Ibid.
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Chapter 3
Collective Practice and the Limits of Historiography
The refusal of Gropius to remain a 'master' and his disappearance into the reality ofAmerican professional
life were paid for with a harsh price that necessarily afects any discussion of his career.
-Manfredo Tafuri and Francesco Dal Co, 19761
Master and Disciple
The vectors of architectural influence are typically assumed to travel in one direction only: from
master to disciple, elder to younger, originary author to legatee, "genius" to emulator. Take for
example the master diagram that opens Roxanne Williamson's American Architects and the Mechanics
of-Fame, mapping the "career connections of major American architects." 2 (Fig. 3.1) The timeline
purports to trace a pattern of correlation between architectural employers and "mentors" during their
formative periods of development and the later successes of their employees and "proteges" in the
field, ranked according to an "index of fame." 3 One of numerous attempts to visualize the trajectory
of modernism's rise and fall at the cusp of the postmodern turn, the resulting tangle of lines
illustrates both the extension and the limits of such arrows of influence, as the pathways along which
much of the received history of twentieth-century architecture has been directed.4
Williamson's diagram is clearly inspired by the canonical flowchart of the development of
modern artistic movements propagated by Alfred H. Barr, Jr. and the Museum of Modern Art, a
I Manfredo Tafuri and Francesco Dal Co, Modern Architecture (New York: Rizzoli, 1976): 307.
2 Roxanne Williamson, American Architects and the Mechanics of Fame: (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991): 3.
3 Williamson defines fame tautologically, as "the sort of reputation that arises out of truly innovative designs, the kind of
work deemed important enough to be included in the history textbooks." Ibid., 13.
4 Examples of such visualizations include Charles Jencks's series of "evolutionary trees" after 1970 (discussed later in this
essay); Klaus Herdeg, The Decorated Diagram: The Decorated Diagram: Harvard Architecture and the Failure of the Bauhaus
Legacy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983); Alexander Caragonne, The Texas Rangers: Notesfrom the Architectural
Underground (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).
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timeline endlessly repeated in art-historical surveys. 5 (Fig. 3.2) The map of American architects
directly adopts the structure of Barr's diagram, with names and movements ordered chronologically
from top to bottom and connected via a thicket of arrows that flow from employer to employee,
from influencer to influenced. In Williamson's more convoluted version, the attempt to diagram
influence not among a smaller constellation of movements but between a far larger set of individual
names creates an increasingly knotted web of connections as it multiplies and flows forward in time,
seemingly overburdened by this relentless proliferation of authors.
Like Barr's master diagram, which splits historically overlapping groups into strict binaries as a
necessary function of the arrows that bind predecessor X to successor Y (like the separation between
the entry "Bauhaus," identified with two locations and dates-Weimar 1919 and Dessau 1925-
from the dateless and placeless entry "Modern Architecture"), Williamson's chart also relies on an
insistent splitting of individuals from groups, partners from collaborators. Dissociated within the
temporal space of the diagram, these uncoupled terms are situated no longer according to their
primary periods of activity (as with Barr's movements) but more anachronically according to the
birth dates of their protagonists, now attached to biography according to the metric of fame rather
than located organically in time. 6
It would be easy enough to criticize the complication or the imprecision of Williamson's chart.
Instead, we might seek to untangle the threads of historiography implied by its vectors, to look for
evidence of other groupings that these arrows of influence carry away with them as they flow in time.
5 This image first appeared as the cover of Alfred H. Barr, Jr.'s Cubism andAbstractArt (New York: Museum of Modern
Art, 1936). See also Barr's sketches of the chronology of modern art as a "torpedo moving through time," of 1933 and
1941 (bottom). The Museum of Modern Art Archives, New York: Alfred H. Barr, Jr. Papers, 9a. 15. Reproduced in Sybil
Gordon Kantor, Alfred H. Barr, Jr. and the Intellectual Origins ofthe Museum of Modern Art (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2002): 367.
6 The phrase "mechanics of fame" is adopted from George Kubler, who nevertheless would seem to offer a rebuke to such
attempts to identify and valorize predecessors over successors rather than situate them within the dynamics of historical
time: "The mechanics of fame are such that their predecessors' talent is magnified, and their own is diminished, when
talent itself is only a relatively common predisposition for visual order, without a wide range of differentiation. Times and
opportunities differ more than the degree of talent." Kubler, The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things (New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1962): 7-8.
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Most conspicuously absent from such narratives, in particular, are the collective and corporate
practices that came to constitute no less than the dominant form of architectural production in the
United States after World War II. Falling largely outside the framework of individual actors that
populate such conventional histories, we might seek to identify these corporate bodies within the
blank spots that appear between names and lines of connection, abstracted behind the threads of
authorship and influence.
In what follows I propose to trace the path of one such collective practice and its
historiography after World War II: the one enclosed in Williamson's diagram by the curving lines at
bottom right-first solid (as from employer to employee), then dotted (designating "partnership or
close association")--that bind the seemingly originary name of "Gropius" with the smaller and more
cryptic entity designated by the acronym "TAC," separated by a distance of some thirty years. The
two bodies tethered together across this temporal distance are The Architects Collaborative (TAC),
the team-based firm established in Cambridge, Massachusetts in 1945 and the largest dedicated
architecture practice in the United States by the 1970s, and the figure of Walter Gropius, the
German emigre who constituted one of its eight founding partners and worked within the firm for
the last quarter-century of his career.
The formation of TAC reflected the unique conjunction of recent school graduates forming a
partnership with an accomplished elder figure-already renowned first as the founder of the Bauhaus
and later as chairman of the Harvard Graduate School of Design-in which all of the firm's partners
insisted on their equality and lack of hierarchy in both practice and external appearance, regardless of
their individual pedigrees. Diagrams of influence like Williamson's negate this image of equality,
graphically separating the elder Gropius in order to assign him temporal and authorial primacy over
135
his collaborators, often described in histories simply as "his" students. 7 (Fig. 3.3) As such the arrow
constructs an implied relationship of influence in time from the disciplined parent (Pius, as Gropius
was known to his closest friends: pious, conscientious) to his presumed disciplinary subordinates (his
filia, his afilliations). 8 The resulting conjunction isolates a single, "signature" member of this
collectivity from the nameless remainder of the group, subsumed and anonymized under the
abstraction of the acronym: TAC.9 In between, other names appear in eddies of tangential or parallel
lines: [Marcel] Breuer, [Hugh] Stubbins, [Edward Larrabee] Barnes. Only one arrow extends
outward from the acronymic entity named TAC, and this not to any of its unnamed partners but
rather more curiously to the figure of an architect--[Peter] Eisenman-who would later frame his
own disciplinary position as an explicit rejection of the firm as a lineage of influence.10
Far from an atypical construction, such attempts to trace the dynamics of legacy point us to
the conventional means by which much of the history of modernism in the twentieth century has
been narrated. Such accounts have been canonized in flowcharts, maps, and timelines that seek to
codify and make legible a historiographical framework of influence, proceeding via the avenues of
7 Among the founding partners, only three attended the Harvard Graduate School of Design under Gropius's
chairmanship: John C. Harkness (graduated 1941), Jean Bodman Fletcher (1944), and Louis A. McMillen (1947?). Of
these, only Harkness studied in Gropius's one-year master's class, while Gropius had been Bodman Fletcher's thesis
advisor. Four others studied at Yale: Norman C. Fletcher (1940), Benjamin Thompson (1941), Robert S. McMillan
(1943), and McMillen (1940) prior to attending Harvard. The eighth partner, Sarah Pillsbury Harkness, graduated from
the Cambridge School of Architecture and Landscape Architecture in Cambridge, MA (1940?).
8 While Gropius's name appears circa 1886, the year of his birth, the placement of TAC is less precise, landing sometime
around 1915, a date presumably derived from the birth of one of the firm's other seven partners. Jean Bodman Fletcher
and Sarah Pillsbury Harkness were born in 1915; John C. Harkness in 1916; Robert S. McMillan and Louis A.
McMillen in 1917; Norman C. Fletcher and Benjamin Thompson in 1918.
9 This acronym is one of only two that appear amidst the swirl of authorial names. The other is DMJM, for Daniel,
Mann, Johnson & Mendenhall (also established in 1945). This acronym serves in the diagram primarily as a predecessor
for Cesar Pelli and Frank 0. Gehry, two architects who later established signature practices after working for the firm.
Oddly, the acronym is not connected to the name of Anthony Lumsden, the head of the design division at DMJM and a
collaborator of Pelli's there, who also later established his own practice (he appears instead as a legatee of Eero Saarinen).
Like TAC, its individual partners are unnamed outside of the acronym.
10 In retracing the steps that led to his PhD dissertation at the University of Cambridge, Peter Eisenman conspicuously
located his decision to return to the academy in having become "disillusioned with practice after working with Walter
Gropius's Architects Collaborative [sic] in Cambridge, Massachusetts" in the summer of 1959. Eisenman, postscript to
The Formal Basis ofModern Architecture [Ph.D Dissertation, Cambridge, 1963], published in 2008 (Zurich: Lars Muller):
379.
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temporality, geography, or intentionality. By the time of accounts like Williamson's, the discursive
binary of Gropius and TAC had come to play a characteristic role within this framework, as a
conjunction that seemingly confirmed the master narrative of an early twentieth century European
avant garde (personified in the figure of Gropius) and its dissolution in contact with the realities of
mainstream architectural practice in the United States after World War II (subsumed within the
abstraction and disappearance of entities like TAC).
Navigating against the currents of influence we encounter in such conventional narratives, we
might seek to develop strategies for redrawing these lines, to rejoin what has been separated or to
reorient their flows. This might suggest, for example, an attempt to reverse the directionality of the
arrows, evading the chronology of influence in order to better reflect the property of inclusion by
which the larger entity (TAG) encompasses each of its members (Gropius). A provocative argument
for just this sort of chronological reversal has been made by the art historian Michael Baxandall, who
cautions us that "to think in terms of influence blunts thought by impoverishing the means of
differentiation." 1 Commenting on the problematic nature of influence as a means of relating artists
(but also architects) occupying different temporalities and intentions, he describes the trope of
influence as "a curse of art criticism primarily because of its wrong-headed grammatical prejudice
about who is the agent and who the patient: it seems to reverse the active/passive relation which the
historical actor experiences and the inferential beholder will wish to take into account."12 Instead,
Baxandall advocates for a reversal of this causal sequence, granting agency to chronological successors
(who look actively back toward the past) over their predecessors (whose actions neither determine
nor predict the future):
If one says that X influenced Y it does seems that one is saying that X did something to Y rather
than that Y did something to X... If we think of Y rather than X as the agent, the vocabulary is
much richer and more attractively diversified: draw on, resort to, avail oneself of, appropriate
I1 Michael Baxandall, "Excursus against influence," in Patterns of Intention: On the Historical Explanation of Pictures (New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985): 59.
12 Ibid.
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from, have recourse to, adapt, misunderstand, refer to, pick up, take on, engage with, react to,
quote, differentiate oneself from, assimilate oneself to, assimilate, align oneself with, copy,
address, paraphrase, absorb, make a variation on, revive, continue, remodel, ape, emulate,
travesty, parody, extract from, distort, attend to, resist, simplify, reconstitute, elaborate on,
develop, face up to, master, subvert, perpetuate, reduce, promote, respond to, transform,
tackle... 13
Taking up Baxandall's expanded lexicon would allow us to narrate the history of TAC in the opposite
direction: rather than assigning originary status to the father (Gropius) over his legatees, we might
seek to personify the young architects who joined together and sought out Gropius, to identify them
as actors equally worthy of authorship.
Enacting such a procedure here has the immediate benefit of granting primacy to the collective
over the individual, a fairer reflection of the intentions embodied in the deliberately anonymous
naming of The Architects Collaborative. 14 This narrative would additionally deflect the weight
typically given to Gropius's numerous statements advocating the virtues of teamwork among
holistically-trained designers, in which he urged the next generation of architects "to learn to
collaborate without losing their identity" in order to overcome "the ideology of the past century
[that] has taught us to see in the individual genius the only embodiment of true and pure art."15
Drawing instead on the various theorizations of collaboration and anonymity among TAC's
13 Ibid. A related argument for the creative potential of influence-in-reverse is developed by Harold Bloom in The Anxiety
ofInfluence: A Theory ofPoetry (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), to which the title of this essay
obviously alludes. On the reversibility of influence in time and its historiographic consequences, see also T. S. Eliot,
"Tradition and the Individual Talent" [1919], in Selected Essays (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1932): 3-11
and Jorge Luis Borges, "Kafka and His Precursors," in Labyrinths: Selected Stories & Other Writings (New York: New
Directions Publishing, 1962): 199-201.
14 The Architects Collaborative was the first major architectural practice in the United States whose title did not include
the individual names of partners. Here I differentiate private firms like TAC (typically limited liability partnerships or
corporations) from working groups, professional societies, or other team-based entities whose structures were not
primarily market-driven. Among TAC's predecessors in deemphasizing the signature were artistic societies (the Societe
Anonyme, established 1920), working groups of architects, landscape architects, and planners (the Telesis group,
established 1939), and federal architectural agencies such as the Architect's Department of the Tennessee Valley Authority
(established 1933). In the U.K., precedents included industrial and interior design concerns like Isokon Ltd. (with which
both Walter Gropius and Marcel Breuer practiced prior to their emigration to the U.S.) and architectural collectives like
Tecton (established 1932), self-defined as a group rather than a firm and whose individual members continued to be
identified under their own names.
15 Walter Gropius, "The Architect Within Our Industrial Society," in Scope of TotalArchitecture (New York: Harper &
Brothers Publishers, 1955): 85, 86.
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members might allow us to avoid reducing the firm to a mere translation of Gropius's ideas through
a group of "disciples" who would realize this group ideal in practice-a deceptively simplistic model
of theory and its application, pronouncement and its realization. This would have the effect of
deconstructing the persistent myth surrounding the firm's origins, namely that Gropius established
the office as "his" firm.
Indeed, this inverted chain of directionality bears a stronger historical relationship to the actual
circumstances of TAC's formation, through a sequence of events that ran largely in the opposite
direction from the one implied by lineages like Williamson's. The partners who came together to
form TAC were linked not primarily by an allegiance to Gropius but through a network of
overlapping personal and professional connections among the seven younger architects that brought
them together during World War II. Sarah Harkness later described the union of the partners in
these years idealistically as "the outcome of several coincidences amongst people who were not even
acquainted with one another, but who each had a dream in mind of a group practice."16 Gropius
joined in the fall of 1945 as essentially the last piece in this puzzle of associations, chosen by the
younger collaborators as much for his stature as a respected senior practitioner as for his sympathetic
attitude toward collective work.
Work and Teamwork
A conspicuous aspect of The Architects Collaborative throughout its existence was its partners'
repeated definition of their practice not according to a language of influence, legacy, or inheritance,
but rather through one of collaboration, teamwork, and anonymity. Its founders were united in the
firm's early years by their belief in the model of shared input among holistically trained designers, a
16 Sarah Harkness, text on TAC's working methods quoted in "Genetrix: Personal Contributions to American
Architecture," Architectural Review (May 1957): 370.
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method capable of producing what Gropius described as "Total Architecture."1 7 In contrast to the
specialization and division of tasks associated with other large-scale practices in these years
(particularly Skidmore, Owings & Merrill), TAC's partners regarded themselves as generalists able to
criticize each other as equals, Gropius included.1 8 Yet the collaborative method at TAC was not
simply design by committee. Its partners were careful to emphasize that their ideal model relied on
individual as well as collective agency, formalized through the in-house rule that each project would
be led by a single partner with ultimate responsibility for decision-making following this group
criticism.
To understand the intended balance between individual and collective at stake within this
structure of practice, we might turn to the statements made by the founding members of TAC upon
the conclusion of the firm's first twenty years of existence, an anniversary commemorated by the
publication of its first major monograph, The Architects Collaborative 1945-1965, in 1966. (Fig. 3.4)
As discussed in Chapter 2, the appearance of the monograph as a summation of TAC's practice was
accompanied in the same year by the consolidation of its offices, by then with a staff of over 150
employees, in a purpose-built headquarters in Harvard Square. (Fig. 3.5) The partners' introductions
to the monograph reiterated their continued faith in the collaborative model after twenty years of
work, an ethos that resonated in titles like "TAC's Teamwork" (by Walter Gropius),
"Collaboration" (by Sarah P. Harkness), "Search for a Common Language" (by John C. Harkness),
and "The Idea of Anonymity" (by Louis A. McMillen). The nature of their separate contributions
spoke further to the delicate balance between signature and anonymity, with each partner's name
attached to an individually authored text, though all sought to outline the principles of the
17 Walter Gropius, Scope of TotalArchitecture (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1955).
18 Note that this concept of holism entailed a delimited disciplinary definition of the architect, expanded to include
problems of planning but not landscape architecture or engineering; these would be kept outside the framework of the
architects' office, as they were at TAC, though the architect would collaborate heavily with these fields as part of what
Gropius described as "a closely co-operating team together with the engineer, the scientist and the builder." Gropius,
Scope of TotalArchitecture: 80. In this sense TAC remained in the conventional category of firms consisting solely of
architects (even if holistically trained), unlike more integrated (and consequently much larger) firms like Skidmore,
Owings & Merrill that incorporated engineers and other disciplines within the office.
140
cooperative ideal they shared.19 (Fig. 3.6) John C. Harkness affirmed the hope that "the interrelation
of the principals in the firm should not weaken or reduce their individuality, but should make the
work handled by each, singly or in groups, part of a common language."20 Sarah P. Harkness
suggested further that the individual and the team were mutually dependent constructs, arguing that
"The essence of collaboration is the strength of the individual. When collaboration is operating as it
should, a good idea will be carried by conviction, recognized by others without loss of their own
prestige." 21 Benjamin Thompson likened the group's creative method to jazz music as a form of
"design in action," one in which "Unity of the group centers around a common theme; yet each jazz
combination develops different styles and a team personality based on the special characteristics of
the musicians." 22 For his part, Gropius affirmed his conviction that "What makes our group function
is a common method of approach, a kindred way of responding to the challenges of our day, a
similar 'Weltanschauung,' if you will." 23 The office's success, he argued, was the result of "the give-
and-take of a group of equals who are willing to work concertedly but without losing their
identities." 24
For TAC's partners, anonymity constituted both the key characteristic and the ideal expression
of this balanced model of collaboration in practice. Louis A. McMillen cited the firm's name as
evidence of this shared goal among its members, declaring that "When we called our firm 'The
Architects Collaborative' instead of Fletcher, Fletcher, Gropius, Harkness, Harkness, McMillan,
McMillen and Thompson, we were conforming to our ideal of anonymity." 25 Only once TAC and its
collaborative approach had become "firmly established as a group venture in the world of
19 Walter Gropius and Sarah P. Harkness, ed., The Architects Collaborative 1945-1965 (Teufen: Verlag Arthur Niggli,
1966).
20John C. Harkness, "Search for a Common Language," in The Architects Collaborative 1945-1965: 27.
21 Sarah P. Harkness, "Collaboration," in The Architects Collaborative 1945-1965: 26.
22 Benjamin Thompson, "Miscellaneous Comments," in The Architects Collaborative 1945-1965: 23.
23 Walter Gropius, "TAC's Teamwork," in The Architects Collaborative 1945-1965: 24.
24 Ibid.
25 Louis A. McMillen, "The Idea of Anonymity," in The Architects Collaborative 1945-1965: 27.
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architecture..., did the identity and diversity of the individual reemerge and become recognizable as
an essential factor of the cooperative effort." 26 Even then, McMillen claimed this shift was less a
reclaiming of signature than a revelation of the internal mechanisms of the collective method itself,
"more in the nature of opening a door of the drafting room to the public or to the client to let them
view and understand the operations within." 27
In the same year, Benjamin Thompson-though soon to leave the anonymity of TAC to
establish a practice under his own name-wrote separately of a parallel search for forms of
communal architectural expression that would reflect this shared character of production.28 (Fig. 3.7)
"We don't dare to be anonymous because we think of anonymity as conformity, and thus follows a
loss of identity," he claimed. 29 Instead, Thompson ventured that "a higher level" of expression was
possible as the mark "of a true community architecture," though one that "could only come after
egotism and upstage-itis have been overcome, leaving the confident self-assurance to design for other
humans than ourselves."30 In this way, anonymity was seen as a shared attribute of both the office
and its products, binding the democratic idealism of the partners' collaborative method to the
architectural character of their work.
Unresolved in such statements was the question of whether the model the partners envisioned
could accurately be described as anonymity at all, or rather as a form of collective authorship, a
reactivation of the signature at the level of the group. Unlike contemporaneous invocations of
essentialized or timeless modes of cultural production supposedly without authors (or more precisely,
without the author-function), from Gideon's "anonymous history" to Bernard Rudofsky's
"architecture without architects," in the case of TAC the assignation of authorship was clearly
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Thompson left TAC in December 1965 along with the members of what had by then become his de facto studio
within the firm; Benjamin Thompson Associates (BTA) was incorporated in January 1966.
29 Benjamin Thompson, "Remarks on Anonymous Architecture," Connection (June 1965): 16-18.
30 Ibid.
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maintained, but now in the form of a team-image rather than that of individual names.31 At the
same time, the partners' statements reiterated a parallel stress on the maintenance of personal identity
within the group as a hedge against conformity, seen as anti-democratic if anonymous in the strict
sense. In contrast, TAC's "group venture" appealed instead to less rigid concepts of shared cultural
consciousness-Gropius's 'Weltanschauung'-in the search for an ostensibly more democratic model
of group practice, premised on a precarious balance between the individual and the collaborative
ethos. 32 (Fig. 3.8)
The external imaging of TAC in its early years revealed the inherent tensions between the
"ideal of anonymity" in practice and the individuality of its members, Gropius in particular. As the
firm began to receive its first major commissions, group portraits of the partners belied McMillen's
claims of a smooth transition from the public establishment of the "group venture" to the later
freedom for "the identity and diversity of the individual" to emerge. Despite the intended equality
among the partners, the evident presence of Gropius among the collective induced a subtle hierarchy
to these portraits, structuring them according to his figure. We can gain a sense of the shifting
interplay among these concepts in practice by comparing official and unofficial images of the TAC
partners taken in its early years. An informal photograph (likely taken between 1949 and 1950)
provides a literal image of an "opening a door of the drafting room." It captures the weekly partners'
31 Sigfried Giedion, Mechanization Takes Command: A Contribution to Anonymous History (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1948); Bernard Rudofsky, Architecture Without Architects (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1964). On the
"author-function," see Michel Foucault, "What is an Author?" [1969] in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1977): 113-138.
32 These concerns were presaged by the group at Harvard associated with the student journal TASK (published irregularly
from 1941 to 1948), which included Louis McMillen among the editors of the second issue (1942). in An Opinion on
Architecture (Boston: Century Press, 1941), a manifesto published by an early grouping of these students as a critique of
the perceived formalist tendencies of the school, its authors point to "The Problem of Personality," identified
paradigmatically with the figure of Frank Lloyd Wright, "an obscure genius... overshadowed by his own personality."
While its authors call for collective work "among architects, engineers, contractors, and the working class" as "THE
CREDO AND THE FAITH OF ARCHITECTURE TODAY," they evince a telling ambivalence toward the
consequences of genuine anonymity, qualifying that while "we advocated the principle of collective work as the only one
which can solve the architectural problem... we do not mean to deny the value of personality. Collaboration and
collective work does not mean anonymity, but a meeting of personalities in mutual understanding." Elsewhere, the
authors maintain that "We must recognize the existence of the genius as a philosophical necessity.... there has been in
the past, and there will be in the future the man of self-sufficiency in analytical and comprehensive work: the man of
synthesis and creation. We call for collaboration but a Leonardo could work alone."
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meeting, the central construct through which office projects were presented and criticized by all
principals equally. (Fig. 3.9) The office members sit loosely encircled around a drafting table piled
with drawings, surrounded by textile swatches and the everyday detritus of the office; Gropius
appears here as simply one among the partners, embedded comfortably in this workaday context.
Compare this with contemporaneous portraits of the TAC principals by Walter R. Fleischer in which
Gropius is always situated at the center of the composition, flanked symmetrically by his younger
collaborators, hierarchically ordered by gender rather than according to their own relationships-
dissociating for example the two married couples among the partners, the Harknesses and the
Fletchers. 33 (Fig. 3.10-3.11) Such official portraits conflated the image of the firm with that of its
work, taken not in the space of the office (as would happen after the completion of the firm's
purpose-built headquarters in 1967) but on the site of its first major non-residential commission, in
the commons building that anchors the Harvard Graduate Center complex. While the informal
picture captures the process of the Graduate Center in production, the official photograph constructs
an image of the office as a team, coincident with the image of its first major commission as the
emblem of both these collective efforts and a collective public architecture.
33 Of these two photographs, the portrait of the founding members on the staircase of Harkness Commons at the
Harvard Graduate Center (Fig. 3.9) has become the most frequently reproduced image of the TAC office. Despite its
extensive circulation, the photograph has not previously been attributed as far as I am aware. The contention that it was
taken by Fleischer, a photographer for the Harvard News Office, is supported by the existence of two other portraits of
the TAC partners taken at Harkness Commons on what appears to be the same day, with the partner dressed identically
as they are in the stair photograph. The first is a photographic print provided to me by principal Perry Neubauer
(compiled during his research for Standing Still (2005), a documentary on the then-surviving TAC founders), depicting
the partners in the grill room of the Commons building, standing in front of Hans Arp's wood relief Constellations
(1950). (Fig. 3.10). While this image is also unattributed, a second photograph, clearly taken as part of the same series, is
held in the photographic archives of the Harvard News Office and is attributed to Fleischer. The latter two photographs
appear to have been taken in succession, the Neubauer print constituting an earlier, less composed take, with the edges of
the dining hall furniture visible in the lower right corner and the unexpected appearance of Nell Harkness, Sarah and
John's daughter, to the left of the seated partners. In the photograph attributed to Fleischer, these details have been
corrected. The Neubauer print may have come from the personal collection of John Harkness: Neubauer recalls that the
photograph was in Harkness's possession at the time of his research, an idea confirmed by the presence, in the same
folder of prints provided to me, of personal portraits of Harkness's early years, some of which appear in his self-published
autobiography, John Cheesman Harkness (n.d.). This provenance further suggests that the Fleischer photograph in the
Harvard News Office archive is the more official one, and the Neubauer photograph possibly an earlier, rejected version
that Harkness kept for his own collection. The existence of both photographs, taken in the same building on the same
day as the more commonly circulated staircase image, seems to confirm that all three are by Fleischer.
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Signature and Anonymity
Despite the repeated emphasis of TAC's founders on the principles of collaboration and anonymity
as the key to understanding their practice, the disciplinary reception of the firm after 1945 fell
increasingly back onto formulaic narratives about the prewar European masters and their legacy after
World War II. Given Gropius's singular identification with the pedagogy of teamwork among
holistically-trained designers, first at the Bauhaus and later at Harvard, and his numerous
pronouncements on collective work in these years, critics tended to interpret TAC's working model
as the application of these statements to the professional context of postwar practice in the U.S. Even
sympathetic profiles of TAC in its early years tended to focus on the figure of Gropius above all,
emphasizing his declarations (even if emphasizing his equality within the collective) above those of
his partners and and implicitly consigning the firm's younger members to the status of his legatees.34
(Fig. 3.12) Gropius became the anointed voice of TAC in the architectural press, if not synonymous
with its output, despite the abundant evidence that he was not the primary author of the firm's work.
What such narratives revealed was the growing inability of architectural critics to reconcile the
work of team-based practices with the historiographic demands of authorship that were seemingly
required in order to assess the legacy of modernism and its heroic prewar figures after World War II.
In parallel with the formation of TAC among other collective firms, Henry-Russell Hitchcock
speculated on the critical consequences of this shift in practice, predicting the rise of an emerging
"architecture of bureaucracy" as a mode of production distinct from that of genius.35 Taking as a
34 See for example the special issue of lArchitecture d'Aujourd'hui in February 1950, edited by Paul Rudolph, devoted to
Gropius et son icole-"Gropius and his school." The issue includes a portfolio of Gropius's work in the U.S. that mixes
projects by Gropius and Marcel Breuer between 1937 and 1941, his work with Konrad Wachsmann under the General
Panel Corporation, and projects by TAC after 1945.
35 Henry-Russell Hitchcock, "The Architecture of Bureaucracy and the Architecture of Genius," Architectural Review
(January 1947): 3-6. Recent discussions of Hitchcock's text in the context of postwar architectural theory include Joan
Ockman, introduction to the reprint of Hitchcock's text in Hunch 12: Bureaucracy (2009): 142-146; Michael Kubo,"The
Concept of the Architectural Corporation," in Eva Franch i Gilabert, Amanda Lawrence, Ana Miljacki, Ashley Schafer,
ed., OfficeUS: Agenda (Basel: Lars Muller, 2014): 37-45.
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given the victory of the prewar avant garde and the resulting stylistic consensus around modernism
after World War II, Hitchcock famously predicted the evolution of a new professional entity to meet
the increasing scale and scope of design tasks in a postwar society: the bureaucratic office, whose
technical competency would engender the standardized, consistent quality of "all building that is the
product of large-scale architectural organizations, from which personal expression is absent."36 In
contrast, Hitchcock was careful to reserve "an entirely different world" of design practice for those
monumental or special cultural commissions requiring artistic or creative synthesis, "the world of the
architecture of genius." Here the genius was defined as the anti-bureaucrat, "the sort of architect who
functions as a creative individual rather than as an anonymous member of a team"; his method would
be "a particular psychological approach and way of working at architecture which may or may not
produce masterpieces." 37
Significantly, Hitchcock already warned that this dichotomy between the competent prose of the
bureaucrat and the imaginative poetry of the genius, at once productive and discursive, would
require the architectural critic to develop different tools to evaluate the built results of such practices.
Henceforth it would no longer be possible to judge bureaucratic production on the same artistic
criteria that had applied to the prewar avant garde, whether the interpretive framework of signature
and authorial intention or the expressive attributes of imagination, creativity, or synthesis. While in
Hitchcock's formulation these discursive categories were intended to be held separate and applied to
wholly different types of practice, little was said about how such binaries-the genius versus the
bureaucrat, the "creative individual" versus the "anonymous member of a team"-might function as
differentiating labels among the members of a single group. No attempt was made to assess the work
36 Ibid. Emphasis mine.
37 Ibid. Emphasis mine.
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of a collective entity in which competing historical claims were made as to the status of authorship
between signature and anonymity, whether these came from inside or outside the collective. 38
Among the team-based practices established after 1945, TAC constituted a uniquely problematic
case in terms of such categorizations. None of the other corporate entities founded in the context of
postwar professional practice in the U.S. included the presence of a prewar figure like Gropius within
a generationally distinct group of practitioners, and none insisted on their equality in the terms
posed by TAC. Firms like Skidmore, Owings & Merrill (SOM) or Caudill, Rowlett, Scott (CRS)
consisted solely of this younger generation of architects, unburdened by the presence of their avant
garde predecessors in the flesh. Other practices organized around prewar modernist figures, like the
offices of Ludwig Mies van der Rohe and Marcel Breuer, corporatized over time yet deliberately
remained identified with their titular leaders. 39TAC was a composite construction: a postwar
collective of recent graduates, but also the medium for the singular image of Gropius during the last
twenty-five years of his work. The peculiar conjunction of Gropius with a group of younger
collaborators constituted a particular problem of anachronism, in which the figure of Gropius was
seen to correspond increasingly to the prewar period, despite his evident presence within a
partnership of young school graduates that would become one of the most prominent offices of the
postwar decades.
James Marston Fitch pointed to this conundrum in his 1960 monograph on Gropius, identifying
him with those outsized cultural figures who "lived on into a world in which their works had become
commonplace," producing a temporal dilemma in which "the prophet had overrun his prophecy."40
38 In his text Hitchcock specifically counterposed the practice of Albert Kahn & Associates, representing the bureaucratic
firm par excellence, with that of Frank Lloyd Wright, the epitome of the genius. On the other side of this dichotomy from
attempts to parse questions of authorship within an acknowledged collective, a parallel case could be made that Wright's
atelier model (cultivated at his Taliesin studios in Arizona and Wisconsin) functioned far more as a team-based practice
than has been acknowledged.
39 For a related exploration of the concepts of signature and anonymity in relation to the office of Ludwig Mies van der
Rohe, see Timothy Hyde, "Signature: Or, the Life and Death of Anonymous," in Ana Miljacki, ed., Under the Influence
(Cambridge, MA: MIT SA+P Press, 2014): 152-163.
40 James Marston Fitch, Walter Gropius (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1960): 7.
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Fitch was clear about this historiographic problems posed by this dichotomy, in which such figures
"have simultaneously the scale of legendary heroes and the normal dimensions of colleagues and
contemporaries," a phenomenon that "has complicated enormously the necessary task of weighing
their contributions to contemporary life." 41 In the case of Gropius, he existed as both "the creator of
the world famous Bauhaus and the most influential architectural teacher alive, [and] at the same
time, a successful practicing architect with the greatest volume of work in his entire career."42 Caught
in the ellipsis between Gropius's early years and "his" later career was TAC, the entity through which
this great volume of work took place.
In confronting this temporal and scalar problematic, critics tended to fall back onto two primary
modes of assessment, often in tandem: the extraction of an author (Gropius) from within the group,
or the sublimation of authorship and intentionality through the abstraction of the collective
(TAC).43 An early image of the tensions between these divergent narratives is provided by Giedion's
monograph on Walter Gropius (1954), enigmatically split into the binary subtitle "Work and
Teamwork"-a curious juxtaposition of an authored oeuvre (work) with an anonymous mode of
practice (teamwork). (Fig. 3.13) The cover, designed by Herbert Bayer, depicts an overlay of
Gropius's face onto an abstracted, unidentified image of TAC's work (in this case the unbuilt
McCormick office building in Chicago).44 Gropius's face is subsumed within the graphic cage of the
building's facade pattern of windows and balconies, rendered in blue against a white background, not
in front of this background but seemingly behind or even enmeshed within it, an ambiguous
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Another sense of this tenuous splitting within a single practice was reflected in the self-image promoted by Skidmore,
Owings and Merrill (SOM) as a firm characterized by consistent products rather than by signature architects-one
supposedly so anonymous that a partner claimed "it could even be called the ABC Company"-despite the parallel
acknowledgment of Gordon Bunshaft as the firm's lead designer, and his description as office "dictator." "Skidmore,
Owings & Merrill, Architects, U.S.A.," Museum ofModern Art Bulletin, Volume XVIII, No. 1 (Fall 1950): 7. The
description of Bunshaft as dictator is from "Designers For a Busy World: Mood For Working," Newsweek (May 4, 1959):
100.
44 Sigfried Giedion, Walter Gropius: Work and Teamwork (London: Architectural Press Ltd., 1954).
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layering of personhood and anonymity. Such images locked the image of an author, the assignation
of "his" work, and the abstraction of "teamwork" in an uneasy relationship of irreconcilable terms.
Such dynamics induced an increasing tension between public representations of Gropius alone
and that of TAC, the firm in which he practiced. 'The result was the narrative isolation of Gropius
above and apart from the collective, in order the better to identify and account for his presumed
signature within the firm's work-but also as a means to track the arrows of modernism's influence
from prewar avant garde to postwar mainstream, from Europe to the U.S., and from the generation
of the "founding fathers" to their inheritors. Gropius provided a ready synecdoche not merely for the
corporate body of TAC but increasingly for the prewar European "masters" in the United States and,
by extension, the fate of the avant garde after World War II.45
Surveys such as Manfredo Tafuri and Francesco Dal Co's Modern Architecture (1976) provide a
symptomatic example of the force such tropes had acquired at the close of what had by then come to
be categorized, at the endpoint of this historical arc, as "late" modernism. 46 Tafuri and Dal Co begin
their account of architectural production after the 1950s with the need to take stock of the canonical
figures of the prewar avant garde, those "traditional 'masters' of the modern movement" whose work
after World War II had now "arrived at a final accounting."47 Seeking to isolate the solitary figure of
Gropius as a convenient stand-in for the postwar dissolution of modernism at large, the authors
45 The titles and chapter titles of the major surveys on twentieth-century modernism in this period attest to the
historiographic concern of postwar critics to account for the legacy of the prewar avant garde, variously referred to as
masters, pioneers, founding fathers, etc. To note only some of the most prominent examples, see Nikolaus Pevsner,
Pioneers ofthe Modern Movementfrom William Morris to Walter Gropius (London, Faber & Faber 1936); Peter Blake, The
Master Builders: Le Corbusier, Mies van der Rohe, Frank Lloyd Wright (New York: Norton, 1976); Charles Jencks,
"Gropius, Wright and the Collapse into Formalism," in Modern Movements in Architecture (Garden City, N.Y., Anchor
Press, 1973); Manfredo Tafuri and Francesco Dal Co, "The Activity of the Masters After World War II," in Modern
Architecture (Milan: Electa, 1976); William H. Jordy, "The Aftermath of the Bauhaus in America: Gropius, Mies, and
Breuer" (1968), reprinted in Jordy, "Symbolic Essence"and Other Writings on Modern Architecture andAmerican Culture,
ed. Mardges Bacon (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005): 187-224.
46 As the capstone to such narratives, the periodizing label of "late" modernism served to confirm the secondary, negative
framing of the generation of postwar successors like TAC as a confirmation of the master narrative of a revolutionary
European avant garde and its "collapse into formalism" in contact with the realities of mainstream practice. See especially
Charles Jencks, Late-Modern Architecture (New York: Rizzoli, 1980).
47 Manfredo Tafuri and Francesco Dal Co, Modern Architecture (Milan: Electa, 1976): 306.
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describe TAC as his creation alone, no more than the product of Gropius's desire "to realize in
America his constant ideal of teamwork designing as evidence of the continuity between the
specialist group and society as a whole."48 So, the authors tell us, "In 1946 he created The Architects
Collaborative [sic], gathering around himself some of his former students and, as was his wont,
reserving to himself the role of methodologist within the group."49 Symptomatically, the story of
agency is told backwards through the intentionality of Gropius and his presumptive influence on
"his" students, betraying an indifference to the real circumstances of TAC's formation and
implicating the figure of Gropius as the singular culprit of this narrative. Such evident distortions
revealed more about the historiographic assumptions underlying contemporary accounts than they
did about their subject, unwittingly pointing to the compulsion of critics like Tafuri and Dal Co to
assign an authorial voice to Gropius alone.
As TAC's commissions increased in scale and scope through its first two decades of practice, these
authorial claims were inevitably projected onto the interpretation of the firm's work, as critics
searched for discernible traces of intentionality beyond the firm's rhetoric of anonymity. An especially
prominent position in such accounts was reserved for the Pan American Airways building in New
York City (1958-63), designed by TAC in consortium with Pietro Belluschi and Emery Roth &
Sons. Critics attacked the project from the outset for both its extreme scale and its perceived banality
-"a colossal collection of minimums," as Ada Louise Huxtable derided it-and the resulting public
and architectural outcry over its construction did permanent damage to the reputations of its major
protagonists, Gropius in particular.50 A common feature of these judgments was the interpretive
conflation of the building and its characteristics with the personae of its presumed authors. Critics
searched in Pan Am's laconic qualities for evidence of Gropius's imprimatur, as a statement on
architecture and the city that might take its place among the trio of towers associated with the
48 Ibid.: 307.
49 Ibid.
50 Ada Louise Huxtable, "Architecture Stumbles On: Recent Buildings Are Nothing Much to Brag About." 7he New York
Times, April 14, 1963, 119.
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modernist masters that took shape in New York City in the 1950s. 5 1 At the same time, the unsettled
attribution of authorship over the tower's final design also gave ammunition to the critical perception
of Pan Am as a building whose aesthetics embodied the anonymous, corporate character of its
architects.
Sibyl Moholy-Nagy invoked both of these readings in her review of Pan Am and the subsequent
project by Marcel Breuer & Associates for a adjacent tower over Grand Central Terminal, criticizing
the work of "The Gropius T.A.C. team, so anonymous that it has left to its leader the glaring spotlight
of world publicity."52 Portraying the firm's other partners as incapable of superseding the authority of
the master, for Moholy-Nagy the tower's mute aesthetics provided damning evidence that the firm
had "dutifully turned its pencils in the same groove of a stuck conceptual record." 53 Other prominent
critics echoed similar criticisms of the building's unrelieved scale and monotony in relation to its
prominent urban setting. Tafuri and Dal Co cemented their critique of Gropius by portraying Pan
Am as the ultimate sign of the master's dissolution into mere professionalism, condemning him for
the willingness "to legitimize with his signature ostentatious urban paradoxes like the Pan American
Building of 1958."54 For William H. Jordy, the inability to distinguish any individual signature
within TAC's work (whether Gropius's or otherwise) was similarly problematic: while buildings like
Pan Am or the U.S. Embassy in Athens were "not without quality... they are essentially without
personality."55 Repeating the trope by which TAC's work stood in for the greater collapse of postwar
modernism in the U.S., for Jordy such buildings revealed the fundamental "blandness of both visual
qualities and theoretical commitment in most modern architecture" by the late 1940s, a quality
51 The others were the Seagram Building, designed by the office of Ludwig Mies van der Rohe (1958), and the United
Nations complex (1952), designed by the office of Wallace K. Harrison following notorious disputes over its authorship
with Le Corbusier, a member of the international Board of Design Consultants convened for the project.
52 Sibyl Moholy-Nagy, "Hitler's Revenge," Art in America (September-October 1968): 42-43. Emphasis mine.
53 Ibid.
54 Tafuri and Francesco Dal Co, Modern Architecture: 307. Emphasis mine.
55 William H. Jordy, "The Aftermath of the Bauhaus in America: Gropius, Mies, and Breuer" (1968), reprinted in Jordy,
"Symbolic Essence" and Other Writings on Modern Architecture andAmerican Culture, ed. Mardges Bacon (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2005): 215. Emphasis mine.
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"more evident in Gropius's work" and its "mildness" than in that of his fellow emigres. 56 As for the
implications of this supposed lack of qualities for Gropius's reputation, Jordy saw these dynamics as
similarly damaging to his status as modernist master, as, "his fame secure, his work at the close of his
career blurs his former position to that of the merely distinguished professional." 57 Such reviews
made the language of authorship explicit in conveying the means by which the synthetic mastery of
the avant garde had been subsumed into the bureaucratizing formalisms of postwar practice,
corrupting both producers and their products. 58 (Fig. 3.14)
In his speculation on the modes of embodiment in architectural history, Timothy Hyde has
identified the ways in which, in accounts such as these, "the signature stands in for what is actually a
complex anonymity, with anonymity understood here not only in its colloquial sense of an unknown
authorship but in a theoretical sense as an uncoupling of the consequences of authorship from
individuated acts of authoring."59 The reception of Pan Am frequently conflated these two senses of
anonymity, one as an attribute of the building and its qualities ("Indistinguishable from others of its
kind; unexceptional; bland, generic, nondescript"), the other of its architects ("Nameless, having no
name; of unknown name"). 60 The Gropius who is made to appear in such narratives
--"commonplace," "willing to legitimize with his signature," "merely professional"-forms a natural
corollary to the abstraction of TAC, associated with "mildness," "blandness," "essentially without
personality." The signature has become anonymous, while anonymity becomes a characteristic of the
signature.
56 Ibid.: 214. Rem Koolhaas later echoed such assessments of Pan Am as a building "without qualities" in his comparison
of the tower with the Seagram Building and the U.N. Secretariat, describing it as "so effortlessly integrated that it is,
ironically, both unavoidable as and hard to locate. The biggest building in the world leaves no footprint. It is a
disappearing act, an apotheosis of background." Koolhaas, "Eno/abling Architecture," in Robert E. Somol, ed., Autonomy
and Ideology: Positoning an Avant-Garde in America (New York: Monacelli Press, 1997): 298. Emphasis original.
57 Ibid.: 216.
58 See for example the summary judgment contained in the title of Meredith Clausen's history of Pan Am, The Pan Am
Building and the Shattering of the Modernist Dream (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).
59 Timothy Hyde, "Notes on Architectural Persons," The Aggregate website (Transparent Peer Reviewed), accessed October
1 5, 2013, http://we-aggregate.org/piece/notes-on-architectural-persons.
60 "anonymous, adj." OED Online. Oxford University Press, June 2016. Web. 25 July 2016.
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The dissolution of character, of personality-of personhood, in Hyde's terms-that critics saw in
buildings like Pan Am was seen to apply equally to Gropius and his team. As Anna Vallye notes,
"Moral-aesthetic formulations of blandness or superficiality in Gropius's American production were
frequently expressed as a weakness in his authorial position, his status as both the designer of a
specific set of architectural works and the originator of a specific legacy in theory and design."61 We
are left with the figure of Gropius as what Vallye has described as a cipher, "a code name for the
historical eclipse of the modern movement and a blind spot for critical assessment."62 The
problematics of legacy are exacerbated in this case by the presence of an author who deliberately
sought to efface his own signature by advocating for the principles of anonymity, teamwork, and
collaboration in both pedagogy and practice over the length of his career. 63 For critics like Tafuri and
Dal Co, this abdication of authorship could only be a negative, providing a damning coda to his
practice and pointing to the essential conundrum of Gropius's status within the group: "the refusal of
Gropius to remain a 'master' and his disappearance into the reality of American professional life were
paid for with a harsh price that necessarily affects any discussion of his career." 64
Vallye points to the ways in which these stakes ultimately served to condemn Gropius's authorial
stature: "Like the dilemma of the split in quality between Gropius's early and late work, the scholarly
investigation of the collaboration problem has reinforced the logic of authorial erasure by splintering
61 Anna Vallye, "'A Figure Covered with Labels': The Reception of Gropius's American Work," in Design and the Politics of
Knowledge in America, 1937-1967: Walter Gropius, Gyorgy Kepes (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 2011): 37.
62 Ibid.: 32.
63 Similar narratives conditioned the reputations of other Bauhaiisler in the United States. Louis Kaplan offers a
provocative reading of Liszl6 Moholy-Nagy, another figure narratively tied to the fate of the modernist "masters" in the
United States, as an artist specifically motivated by the effacement of the signature in favor of practices of anonymity. In
discussing the historiographic consequences of the "signature effect" in relation to the construction of authorship. Kaplan
points to "the double band of the signature effect (between signified subject and signifying matter)" as a mechanism that
"prescribes a series of tensions... that shuttle between identity and and anonymity, between originality and plagiarism,
between necessity and chance, between authorship and its resignation." In this manner, Kaplan writes, the signature
becomes a problem for history-not just the history of the signature, but the signature of history." See especially Kaplan,
Ldszld Moholy-Nagy: Biographical Writings (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1995).
64 Tafuri and Dal Co, Modern Architecture: 307.
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the consistent articulation of work over time."65 The consequence of this logic of erasure has been a
progressive rupture of the historiography of TAC into two opposed categories. One the one side
stands the figure of Gropius as genius, a role he disavowed and a reputation his work could never
adequately fulfill, built as it was on a handful of early buildings-themselves designed with
collaborators-and thereafter produced within a collective body.66 On the other side of this binary
there remains the history of his anonymous collaborators, first reduced to the status of mere students
or acolytes of the master and ultimately condemned to irrelevance and abstraction within the
historical record.
The Anxiety of Anonymity
The historiographic construction of anonymity as a term of critique proved to be as damaging for
TAC's reputation as the problematics of the signature were for Gropius. Far from the figure of
Gropius's cipher, the abstracted ground of TAC-an entity "so anonymous that it has left to its
leader the glaring spotlight of world publicity"-came to function as a stand-in of a different sort. As
a vehicle for the reduction and erasure of authorship, the consequences of teamwork in practice were
far different from the "ideal of anonymity" desired by the members of TAC in its early years. Such
statements instead engendered a form of historiographic anonymity (and its consequent distortions
of historical accounts ever in search of authors, signatures, and other figures in whom to invest
intentionality), rather than an anonymity of process or a positive sublimation of the individual to the
larger project of collectivity.
Gropius's death in 1969 reinforced the collapse of TAC's reception after the 1970s, once
detached from the biographical narrative of the author. Within a decade, the discursive split between
65 Vallye, Design and the Politics of Knowledge in America, 1937-1967: Walter Gropius, Gyorgy Kepes: 40.
66 Architects with whom Gropius worked in partnership or collaboration prior to TAC included Adolf Meyer (1910-25),
Maxwell Fry (1934-36), Marcel Breuer (1937-41), and Konrad Wachsmann (1942-52).
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Gropius as author and TAC as anonymous corporate entity was largely taken for granted in the
architectural literature, reinforcing the false impression that Gropius was the primary actor in the
founding of the office. The last monographic treatment of the firm was produced in 1966, and the
few accounts of TAC after Gropius's death in 1969 remained largely focused around the question of
his authorship alone within the firm's oeuvre, a phenomenon reinforced by the construction of the
archive of both Gropius's and TAC's work.67 (Fig. 3.15)
Once separated from this authorial presence, the abstracted image of TAC came to serve as a
ready example for the critical dismissal of bureaucratic practice as a submission to the demands of
capital. For Tafuri and Dal Co, the firm offered a paradigmatic example of these processes and their
consequences: "by its nature, and subject as it was to the laws of the American market, TAC very
soon became a many-branched, impersonal concern equipped to deal with the major professional
ventures and open to any sort of request from public or private clients." 68 Surveying the legacy of the
avant garde masters and their postwar followers, Tafuri and Dal Co took up the dichotomy laid out
by Hitchcock in 1947 in order to lament a condition in which "a true and proper 'architecture of
bureaucracy' settled in everywhere," while the field "came to be dominated not by individual
architects intent on communicating their opinions of the world but by large studios in which the
tasks were parceled out with virtual assembly-line standards." 69 In this categorization, TAC became
simply one among a group of equally technocratic U.S. firms, "equipped to work at an intense speed
67 The construction of this archive has served to reinforce the binary division between Gropius and TAC. In contrast to
the meticulous organization of Gropius's personal papers and archival documents related to the Bauhaus, materials on
TAC have remained fragmented since the firm's sudden bankruptcy in 1995, when portions of the then-extant office
drawings, slides, and documents were hastily scattered among a consortium of institutions in Boston including the MIT
Museum, the Harvard Graduate School of Design, and the Boston Architectural Center. The consequences of this split
can be seen in the four volumes of The Walter Gropius Archive (New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1990-
91), published as an illustrated catalogue of the holdings of the Gropius archive at the Busch-Reisinger Museum (now
Harvard University Art Museum). While the Busch-Reisinger holds the original documents published in the first three
volumes, covering Gropius's work up to 1945, the majority of the material that appears in the fourth volume
(1945-1969) remains unaccounted for. Further, while the fourth volume is subtitled The Works of The Architects
Collaborative, this includes only a selection from the "TAC Projects in which Gropius Had a Major Part," given in an
index at the front of the book. How this involvement was determined is never established.
68 Tafuri and Dal Co, Modern Architecture: 339.
69 Ibid.
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of production and to fulfill demands for high technological levels in buildings as anonymous as the
architectural concerns that build them. "70
The historiographic ellipsis surrounding TAC's work by the 1970s is most fully registered by the
only monographic treatment of the firm produced in the decade after Gropius's death, a special issue
of the Japanese magazine PROCESS: Architecture, published in 1980.71 (Fig. 3.16) The first section of
the issue,"Works of Walter Gropius in America," conforms to the conventional reliance on the image
of Gropius as author of the firm's work, beginning with a full-page portrait of the genius himself,
granting his imprimatur to the projects that follow-those works that Gropius "proved willing to
legitimize with his signature." Some of the projects in this section are illustrated with photos of
Gropius hovering and gesturing over architectural models of TAC's buildings, visually constructing
the image of his architectural authorship within the pages of the monograph. (Fig. 3.17) In contrast,
the second section of projects after 1969, generically titled "Recent Works of TAC," reveals the
weight of editorial ambivalence in how to present the work produced after Gropius's death. Instead
of an image of the iconic father figure, the section begins with an altogether different aesthetic: an
abstracted graphic of the world, marking the international locations of the projects produced in the
1970s. (Fig. 3.18) The image is now truly anonymous, simply data points on a map.
An extreme example of the systemic elision of TAC appears in Charles Jencks's Modern
Movements in Architecture (1973), the revisionist history best known for its categorization of six
traditions of modernism, as codified in his "evolutionary tree" of twentieth-century architectural
production. 72 (Fig. 3.19) Indebted in its own way to Barr's diagram of influence, Jencks's genealogy
70 Ibid.
71 "TAC: The Heritage of Walter Gropius," PROCESS: Architecture No. 19 (October 1980).
72 Charles Jencks, Modern Movements in Architecture (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1973). The first version of Jencks's
diagram appeared as "The Evolutionary Tree," Architectural Design (October 1970): 527. Subsequent revisions include
versions published in his Architecture 2000: Predictions and Methods (New York, NY: Praeger, 1971); the revised enlarged
edition of The Language ofPost-Modern Architecture (New York: Rizzoli, 1978 ff.) in which the tree begins Part Three,
added from the original 1977 edition, and The New Moderns: From Late to Neo- Modernism (New York: Rizzoli, 1990).
Jencks revisited the accuracy of the diagram in retrospect in Architecture 2000 and Beyond: Success in the Art of Prediction
(Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Academy, 2000).
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produces a temporal splitting much like that of Williamson's chart, with the signature of Gropius
allied to the "Heroic" prewar avant garde of the Bauhaus, while the anonymity of TAC is grouped
with other large-scale "Bureaucratic" practices of the post-World War II boom. In a chapter of the
book devoted largely to Gropius (along with Frank Lloyd Wright) and his perceived "collapse into
formalism" after World War II, the various TAC projects used to illustrate this progression are
ascribed to Gropius's authorship alone, while the existence of The Architects Collaborative remains
unmentioned. Where the acronym "TAC" appears, this occurs not within the body text but solely in
the captions to three images (out of 236 total) situated in the marginalia; even in these instances the
firm is relegated to secondary status alongside the master, as an addendum to projects whose
authorship is designated as "Walter Gropius with TAC." (Fig. 3.20) The repression of the firm's
presence extends into the index of the book, where a half-page of references are given under
Gropius's name-again including the same three projects accompanied by the parenthetical "(with
TAC)"-while omitting any listing for the firm itself. In the place where one would expect The
Architects Collaborative to be listed independently, one finds only an absence.
The degree to which TAC's presence is suppressed through the apparatus of these histories points
to the deep ambivalence felt by Jencks and other contemporary critics towards assessing the large-
scale bureaucratic firms that had come to dominate architectural production in the United States by
this time. While Jencks's account would seem to be an almost caricatured example of the sort of
elision of TAC that had become common by the 1970s, all too easy to criticize for its inaccuracy, it
demonstrates the force of received histories of modernism that had set in on the cusp of the late- and
post-modern turns in architectural production. Only such an extreme repression of the reality,
indeed the very existence, of TAC in favor of the signature of Gropius could allow Jencks to
proclaim, for example, in the introduction to his second edition of the book, that
In 1984, fateful year, when our architectural future is being stamped by ever larger bureaucratic
firms, when our biggest offices such as those led by Walter Gropius [sic] perpetrate a form of
historicist kitsch in the Middle East... it is time to reassess our recent past and Western culture
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together: criticize the unthinking modernism and historicism which are so commercially
successful. 73
Such is Gropius's authorial weight that his ghostly signature is compelled to appear here again,
"leading" the office fifteen years after his death. In parallel, the abstraction of TAC is left as a floating
signifier, denied an image, unmoored from its own history and condemned to the marginalia of the
historical record as a footnote to the authorship of Gropius. 74
The evident anxieties over how to envision the work of TAC and other "anonymous"
bureaucratic practices mark a particular form of historical closure by the close of the 1970s. Despite
Henry-Russell Hitchcock's call in 1947 for new modes of criticism adequate to the bureaucratic
office, it was still impossible to critically or historically situate the reality of such practices without a
continued reliance on the conventional tropes of authorship, influence, and intentionality. In the
case of The Architects Collaborative, the result was a falling back onto the simplifications of binary
categories that repeated, in varying terms, the same fundamental dichotomy between signature and
anonymity: the architecture of genius and the architecture of bureaucracy, work and teamwork, the
heroic prewar and the bureaucratic postwar, the heritage of Walter Gropius and the abstracted map
of TAC's "late" work.
A look at the historiographic absences that have taken place within the gaps of these
dichotomies, like that of TAC, leads to troubling questions about the adequacy of the traditional
methodological apparatus of the architectural historian in situating or properly evaluating this kind
73 Charles Jencks, Modern Movements in Architecture, second edition (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd, 1983): 8.
74 Jencks's quote provides a particularly egregious example of the problems of chronology that accompany the signature.
Timothy Hyde connects these problems to the historiographic construct of personhood and the related problem of
presentness, a form of temporality that "forges a narrative order, commonly chronological, that accompanies the
appearance of persons." He notes that "such an emphasis on presentness... may well be a liability, because among its
consequences is the obscuring of forms of multiplicity or collectivity in which the presumption of a unified time would
be misleading." Hyde, "Notes on Architectural Persons," n.p. It is a similar problematic of chronology that induces the
swirls of arrows in diagrams like Roxanne Williamson's, in which an entity composed of multiple persons, identified to
their respective dates of birth, cannot be in two places at once. The arrow serves in such cases as a patchwork device to
connect what has been separate in a tenuous gesture of reconstitution, yet one that necessarily introduces the
directionality of influence.
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of production. Attending to the historiographic case of TAC and its dissolution under the signature
of Gropius requires us to confront both the shadings of anonymity with which the firm described its
intentions and the abstraction into which its later history increasingly disappeared. This
confrontation would necessarily undo the ways in which, as John Harwood notes, "Such abstractions
pull away from the archive of architectural history, the primary facticities architectural history seeks
to wrestle into form." 7 5
A lasting residue of these historiographical abstractions is that The Architects Collaborative has
remained largely absent from histories of postwar architectural practice, while the authorial presence
of Walter Gropius has become the vehicle for dismissing the firm's work in the breach. This double
construction has posed a crisis for historians, most of whom have chosen to shoehorn the history of
the firm back into the narrative mode of other supposedly singular authorial practices before and
after World War II. In this way, the firm's "ideal of anonymity" gradually gave way to the anxiety of
anonymity. The arc of TAC's reception might thus serve as a cautionary tale for both the historian
and the architect to be attentive to the nuances of such appeals to collectivity. For as we have seen, in
the idealization of anonymity, historiographically speaking, one very often gets what one wishes for.
75 John Harwood, "Corporate Abstraction," in Perspecta 46: Error (2013): 228.
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Chapter 4
Real Estate, Ethics, and the Problem of Pan Am 1954-1963
Our present desperate way ofsolving problems of collaboration on large projects is simply to throw afew
prominent architects together in the hope that five people will automatically produce more beauty than
one. The result, as often as not, becomes an unrelated assemblage of individual architectural ideas, not an
integrated whole of new and enriched value.
-Walter Gropius1
The speculative development that began as Grand Central City and was completed as the Pan
American Airways Building was mired in controversy from its origins. Resistance to the project first
concerned the fate of the declining Grand Central Terminal and its possible demolition, as a sacrifice
to the corporate building boom that reshaped the area around Park Avenue during the 1950s. Once
the preservation of the terminal was no longer in doubt, opposition focused on the tower proposed
for the site by the developer Erwin S. Wolfson and his chosen architects, Emery Roth & Sons, then
on the revised scheme that followed the engagement of The Architects Collaborative (TAC) and
Pietro Belluschi as consultants. At the time of its opening in 1963, the Pan Am building stood as the
largest commercial office tower in the world, adding nearly three million square feet to an intensely
pressured urban site. Many critics remained convinced that no office building should be built on the
site at all, irrespective of its design, lest it increase congestion to the point of overload atop one of the
densest transportation hubs in the world. So too, critics warned that a tower on this site would block
the famed vista down Park Avenue and overshadow the pinnacle of the New York Central Building
that had traditionally crowned it. (Fig. 4.1)
I Walter Gropius, address upon receiving the degree of Doctor of Humane Letters, Columbia University, March 1961.
The lecture text was published as "True Architectural Goals Yet to be Realized," Architectural Record, June 1961: 147-
152, and in revised form as "The Role of the Architect in Modern Society" in Gropius, Apollo in the Democracy: The
Cultural Obligation of the Architect (1968).
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In joining these already-heated debates about the Grand Central site, TAC and Belluschi were
charged with elevating the bare financial premises that had given it shape by providing symbolic
value, a form of cultural currency that might rescue the public viability of the project and distinguish
it in its competitive context. TIhe resulting changes to the design following TAC and Belluschi's
arrival, aimed at modifying the spatial and aesthetic impact of the project, included rotating the
tower's position within the city grid, reducing its square footage, faceting and breaking up its profile,
redesigning a complex series of public pathways through the lower levels of the building, and
integrating the work of artists including Gyorgy Kepes, Josef Albers, and Richard Lippold into the
building's public spaces. Yet for all these substantial reorientations, the final design fared little better
in the eyes of its critics. For opponents of Pan Am, such changes ultimately did little to mitigate the
negative urban impacts of the project, mere aesthetic window-dressing over the essentially uniform
financial imperatives that had brought the project into being and largely dictated its result.
As the Grand Central City scheme developed into Pan Am, I argue, the project came to
constitute a crucible for the corporatization of architecture in the postwar period, as a highly visible
terrain on which the ethics of architectural authorship in relation to the corporate world were
negotiated. Both the corporate organization of Emery Roth & Sons and the collaborative ethos of
TAC came to play specific roles in this complex. In testing the boundaries of TAC's team-based ideal
from the more corporate organization of the Roth partnership, the development of Grand Central
City revealed the failures of TAC and Gropius in particular to sufficiently account for the economic
forces that would constrain their role, or for the discursive slippages that would level the critical
distinctions between these different modes of practice. The collaborative model of TAC-neither
corporate nor individually authored, neither explicitly positioned to resist the demands of U.S.
commercial building nor tailored to serve them-was particularly ill-suited to navigate these currents
of patronage and public reception. As interpretations of Pan Am's form tended to elide the
distinctions among the various actors that had produced it, TAC suffered the consequences of an
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irresolvable task: to provide recognizable evidence of creative authorship within a project that was
developed by a consortium of architects and governed by abstract financial demands, and to do so
via a team-based approach to design that was ultimately resistant to the production of signature
form.
The Corporate Client
"The myth created by some critics that builders owe an obligation to society should be laid low for
all time. Nothing is further from the fact." So protested Richard L. Stanley, editor of the trade
magazine Real Estate Forum, in a special issue in September 1962 devoted to the Pan American
Airways Building in New York City.2 (Fig. 4.2) Unreservedly taking the side of the developer and the
architects of Pan Am as the building neared completion, Stanley continued:
A builder is engaged in producing a product-in this case office space-and like any other
business man must sell his product to his customers-in this case corporate business-at a price
and of a quality to compete with other builders. If he doesn't succeed, his building will stand
empty. Builders are not philanthropists. They supply a need. They are in business to make profits
like every other business. Not to build monuments.3
True to the magazine's motto- "Who we serve proves how we serve"--Stanley sought to defend these
corporate interests and their successful realization in Pan Am against those "ivory-tower 'experts"'
who were, in his opinion, guilty only of "piously attacking its architectural quality." In time, he
argued, the building would be judged more favorably. "Undoubtedly when the books are closed and
the Pan Am building is weighed in the balance it will prove to have been one of the most daring and
complicated, yet at the same time most uniquely desirable, building projects of this or any other
time."4 In such developer-centric arguments, good architecture was defined according to its capacity
2 Richard L. Stanley, "Scotching a Myth," Real Estate Forum V. 17, No. 9A (September 30, 1962): 3.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
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to fulfill the business demands of its corporate clients, more properly subservient to the interests of
economics than to art.5
As the Grand Central City scheme took shape after 1954, these economic concerns lay at the
center of broader public debates over the sweeping changes taking place in midtown New York City,
as a proxy for the broader transformation of U.S. city centers according to the interests of large
organizations. Authors like Jane Jacobs stressed the national implications of the wave of construction
taking place in midtown Manhattan and centered along Park Avenue in particular. "It is misleading
to think of this fantastic absorption of expensive space as a 'New York' boom," she wrote, "for
although the boom is geographically localized in Manhattan, this is really the 'US' building boom, or
most of it." 6 Statistics bore out the claim. Jacobs noted that the 40 million square feet of office space
that were completed or slated to be built circa 1957-some 64 buildings, with 20 more planned-
constituted roughly one and a half times as much new building as in the rest of the U.S. combined.
This new quantity of building, a 40% increase in office space in New York City, was in itself greater
than the total quantity of available office space in any other city in the U.S.7 As maps published in
Architectural Forum by Jacobs and others made clear, spatially the portion of this building boom in
midtown Manhattan was concentrated most visibly around the fifteen blocks of Park Avenue
5 Sara Stevens argues against the easy opposition, often made by architects and historians, between architectural idealism
of the presumably amoral economic self-interest of developers. Rather, she claims that the professionalizing field of
developers in the twentieth century developed what she refers to as "economic moralism," an ethics of real estate practice
in combination with economic theory. Within this framework, she claims, developers argued that the economics of new
development in city centers were inherently good-that "investing in downtowns was morally the right thing to do"-as
a kind of parallel morality to that of architects. Stevens, Developing Expertise: Architecture and Real Estate in Metropolitan
America (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2016): 8-9.
6 Jane Jacobs, "New York's Office Boom," Architectural Forum (March 1957): 105.
7 Ibid. Articles in Architectural Forum the preceding year tracked this increase in office space in New York City, with early
versions of the map of Park Avenue and midtown New York that appeared in Jacobs' article. See "Fabulous New York
office boom keeps growing; rental market still firm" and "NY boom doubles uptown land prices; key parcels-$250 psf.
bid, $300 asked," Architectural Forum (January 1956): 12-14.
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extending from the New York Central Building northward, as genteel prewar apartment buildings
gave way to rows of glass and steel office towers. 8 (Fig. 4.3)
Whether the urban and architectural consequences of this expansion were beneficial was
another matter. Jacobs, for one, condemned the results of this economic shift: "Esthetically,"she
cautioned, "the boom is pretty much a bust." While she noted that this wave of construction had
produced "a half dozen or so stars and another two or three creditable performances"-a status
implicitly accorded to a handful of signature towers that included the Seagram, Lever House, and
Union Carbide buildings along Park Avenue-she made clear that the bigger issue lay in the far
greater quantity of generic buildings, produced for large organizations whose chief interest was the
production of maximum rentable floor space for as-yet-unknown tenants. Jacobs lamented the fact
that, notwithstanding these few outstanding products of the building boom,
the dominant effect is the ubiquitous, depressing mediocrity of the supporting cast. Block upon
block or the new buildings are as like one another as as fundamentally boorish as block upon
block of tenement building-just blander. We may have had uglier periods of city building, but
never duller.9
Such sentiments were echoed in the popular press by Ada Louise Huxtable, who wrote in the New
York Times that by 1960-with the exception of those few "prestige structures" like Jacob's half-dozen
stars-the majority of skyscrapers built along Park Avenue were "unpardonably ugly."' 0 Huxtable
derided these formulaic developer buildings for "making the city less and less a place of beauty," as
8 This concentration of building in the blocks extending northward from Park Avenue was in large part due to the sale of
these blocks by the New York Central Railroad after World War II, as the decline of the railways in favor of automobile
and air transit and the rising profitability of office space in midtown Manhattan led the company's director, Robert
Young, to parcel and sell its real estate holdings. The history of the New York Central's ownership and construction of
these blocks over the railway tracks leading to Grand Central Station from the north, and the concomitant construction
of Park Avenue itself as a multi-level conjunction of gardens, apartment and hotel buildings with the Grand Central
complex at its terminus, is summarized in Meredith L. Clausen, The Pan Am Building and the Shattering ofthe Modernist
Dream (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005). See also Douglas Haskell, "The Lost New York of the Pan American Airways
Building," Architectural Forum (November 1963): 106-111.
9 Jane Jacobs, "New York's Office Boom": 111.
10 Ada Louise Huxtable, "Towering Question: The Skyscraper," 7he New York Times Magazine, June 12, 1960: 16.
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"the current crop of skyscrapers rises, row on row, shapeless and characterless, monotonous
monuments to mediocrity."'1 Only three years prior, Huxtable had sought to explain the aesthetic
and urban virtues of these new buildings in positive terms to a public that lacked the criteria to
evaluate the laconic visual language of the modernist glass and steel office tower, claiming that their
"unprecedented dramatic effects of reflected sun and shadow on flat, vitreous facades add a brilliant,
if unpremeditated, beauty to the urban scene." 12 By 1960, however, the negative sociological
consequences of this relentless development for urban life in midtown Manhattan had become
clearer. The skyscraper, which in its earlier rarity had been "at a distance so impressive and so
beautiful in the subtle transformations worked by changing light and weather," had, in its relentless
proliferation through mostly generic examples, become "a socio-economic colossus that reaches into
every aspect of city life." 13
A central question for understanding the causes of this urban transformation lay in how to
assess the relative responsibilities of architects, clients, the city, and the public in mediating this
seemingly unceasing wave of standardized, corporate construction. Critics like Jacobs and Huxtable
were clear about the underlying impact of New York City's zoning laws in dictating the form of the
buildings sought by developers-Huxtable in particular advocated for the revisions to the Zoning
Law that would follow the year after her article on the "Towering Question" of the urban
skyscraper. 14 Yet they placed ultimate responsibility at the feet of architects for their choices in
n Ibid.
12 Ada Louise Huxtable, "The Park Avenue School of Architecture," The New York Times Magazine, December 15, 1957:
56. This was the first article published under Huxtable's byline in the New York Times. She had previously been credited
in the Times as a correspondent, in an article-length letter contesting a Stuart Preston review of architecture in
Connecticut and Venezuela. Huxtable, "Dissenting View: Correspondent Questions Venezuelan Architectural
Achievements," The New York Times, September 8, 1957: X10.
13 Ada Louise Huxtable, "Towering Question": 16.
14 Ibid. The article was written just prior to the 1961 Zoning Law that sought to reward developers for avoiding the
bulky, "wedding cake" massing in favor of more slender towers, allowing them to trade ground-level open space for
higher allowable building heights. Huxtable advocated for these changes in the article, at which time the previous (1916)
zoning law was under revision.
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resisting, or complying with, these demands. 15 Huxtable pointed repeatedly to the troubling
alignment between the architects' purview and their clients' requests: while in seeking to discipline
the corporate office building, "We must have a higher standard of performance among architects," at
the same time, "Architects themselves cannot practice on a higher level until their clients are
converted."1 6 Eschewing the option to blame the economic constraints that governed office building
for their typically ungainly design-the zoning laws that permitted bulky, stepped-back towers and
the developers who sought to maximize their profits within these given envelopes-she cautioned
that this mode of evaluation "makes it possible to skirt around the basic issue: the free, creative
choice which every architect must exercise within the specific limitations that vary with the job."'7
Such defenses led ultimately to the problem of judgment: "By playing down design responsibility,"
Huxtable warned, these architects' lack of accountability would ultimately lead to a "lack of
differentiation between good and bad architecture or good and bad architects.1 8 She insisted that, in
the final accounting,
... the fact remains that a building is usually only as good as is designer, and the fate of the new
building rests firmly with the artist-architect. He, in turn, is dependent upon an enlightened or
open-minded client. Because we live in a society where practical men of affairs distrust art and
consider scientific efficiency the ultimate good, it has been a simple, profitable and esthetically
disastrous process to discount the artist-architect and to reduce the art of architecture to a
commercial operation.19
15 In her first article on the construction reshaping Park Avenue, Huxtable noted that architects were already "worried
about a vast panorama of bungled mediocrity if the curtain wall is treated with less than the proper professional respect."
She noted that "The critic of architecture shares the professional's alarm, but is also increasingly aware of the delicate
question of the role and responsibility of the architect in the determination of the new style." Huxtable, "The Park
Avenue School of Architecture": 54.
16 Huxtable, "Towering Question": 70.
17 Huxtable, "The Park Avenue School of Architecture": 56.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid. In response to Huxtable, the architect Peter Blake, then the associate editor of Architectural Forum, protested that
"To say that good architects could produce good buildings despite the restrictions in force at present is to suggest that
good writers could produce good books even if bureaucrats told them what to write." Peter Blake, "'Free' Architecture,"
The New York Times, January 5, 1958: 51.
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This position served to counter the arguments made by advocates, like Stanley, who sought to
abdicate architects-and ultimately their corporate clients-from responsibility for the proliferation
of generic volumes that Huxtable derided as "economically 'styled' rather than architecturally
designed." 20
Corporation-Architect
The problem of choice in delivering such"styled" economic products posed equally critical questions
concerning the nature of the design practices that were seen to be most heavily affiliated with these
commissions. In the language of critics like Huxtable, this complicity implied a lack of individual
judgment or discernment provided by the "artist-architect," that singular figure capable of exercising
the "free, creative choice" that might transcend mere economic motives. Such statements pointed to
concerns not merely about the demands of an increasingly corporate clientele, but about the
corporate organization of the design firms that often served them. If the enlightened individualism of
the architect was required to mediate the more anonymous constraints of the typical office
development-designed to serve the diffuse financial interests of group-organized lenders and real
estate companies by providing flexible rental space for unknown tenants-the counter-figure to this
individual persona, the corporate architect, was seen to bear a special role in catering to this
expanding class of corporate clients.21 Such relationships took on a different tenor from the design of
prestige buildings for brand- and design-conscious corporate clients, which fell more comfortably
into traditional discussions of architecture's capacity to express or ennoble the motives and character
20 Huxtable, "The Park Avenue School of Architecture": 56.
21 On the group structure of clients, lenders, and real estate firms, see Louise Cooper et al., "The Architect Today,"
Architectural Forum (October 1955): 116-123; Frederick Gutheim et al., "The Corporate Client," ArchitecturalForum
(December 1955): 106-113; Frank Fogarty, "The Lender's Influence," Architectural Forum (July 1956): 140-143;
Fogarty, "The Real Estate Operator," Architectural Forum (August 1956): 118-122; "The Growth of Group Finance,"
Architectural Forum (September 1958): 118-119.
167
of its patrons. 22 Nor did such products fall as easily into discussions of "signature" developers-often
figures who traded on outsized personas in their own right-who sought the marketing value of
name-brand architects with whom they developed long-term relationships as a way of adding value
to their projects. 23 Nor, conversely, could these projects be entirely subsumed within the separate
problem of "design by committee" by developers or builders with in-house architectural teams,
including "package-builders" that provided complete services from design to construction. 24 Instead,
generic office buildings like those that lined Park Avenue seemed to instantiate a more ambiguous
problem of architectural agency: how to evaluate the design of anonymous buildings, for anonymous
tenants, by anonymous architects.
Contemporaries were explicit in expressing their fears over this expanding nexus of corporate
architectural organizations and corporate builders. Joseph Hudnut, who had fought against Walter
Gropius's collaborative pedagogy while dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Design in favor of
22 For contemporary discussions of these issues of corporate patronage, see "The Corporate Client," Architectural Forum
(December 1955): 106-113 and "The Corporate Clients: What Are Their Attitudes?," Progressive Architecture (June
1966): 158-160. The body of recent literature on architecture produced for signature corporate clients in this period
includes Reinhold Martin, The Organizational Complex: Architecture, Media, Corporate Space (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2003); Alexandra Lange, "Tower Typewriter and Trademark: Architects, Designers and the Corporate Utopia,
1956-1964," Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University (2005); John Harwood, The Interface: IBM and the Transformation
of Corporate Design, 1945-1976 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011); Louise Mozingo, Pastoral
Capitalism: A History of Suburban Corporate Landscapes (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011); Wim de Wit, Design for the
Corporate World: Creativity on the Line, 1950-1975 (London: Lund Humphries: 2017).
23 Sara Stevens analyzes two such case studies: the developer Herbert Greenwald and the firm of architect Ludwig Mies
van der Rohe, and the developer William Zeckendorf and his employment of I. M. Pei and his collaborators as an in-
house design firm, later split off to form I. M. Pei & Associates. Stevens, Developing Expertise: 139-234. In practice, the
architects of these commissions were typically signature designers backed by team-based production process, as with Eero
Saarinen and Associates, I. M. Pei & Partners, Eames Office, the Office of Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, or, in a more
ambiguous case of signature within group practice, Gordon Bunshaft of Skidmore, Owings & Merrill.
24 Stevens presents the case study of Equitable Life Insurance Company and the design of the Gateway Center in
Pittsburgh via a "design by committee," eventually involving the architects Eggers & Higgins once the major aspects of
site planning and building layouts were determined. Stevens, Developing Expertise: 98-138. On the competition between
architects and "package-builders" in this period, see Louise Cooper et al., "The Architect Today," Architectural Forum
(October 1955): 116-123 and "Those Worrisome Package Builders," Architectural Forum (April 1958): 120-123.
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"inner experiences, unprofaned by the collective conscience," warned of the alignment of these group
methods in professional practice with the economic interests of large organizations. 25 He argued that
... the corporations of our time, to whom architecture sometimes means little more than the
dressing up of floor space with esthetic surface, also exercise a determinate influence on the
design of buildings (quite reasonably, to be sure) through the architects best suited to their
purpose. They are apt to prefer, as did the emperors and the bishops, architects who are like
themselves.... Such preferences have given rise to a practitioner unique to our time: the
corporation-architect, the architect whose esthetic is pre-harmonized to that of big business. 26
In Hudnut's view, the architects who chose to work for corporate clients mirrored the abstract
character, and often the group structure, of the firms they served. (Fig. 4.4) "The corporation-
architect has often a very shadowy personality," he wrote, and was "sometimes himself a corporation
-or something very like one." Speculating on the implications of this collusion for the character of
architectural production, Hudnut warned, "I can imagine no method more subtly corrosive of
individuality." 27
For critics of the transformation of midtown Manhattan in the late 1950s, the first scheme for
Grand Central City seemed to encapsulate precisely the corrosive products of this identity between
corporate architect and corporate client. Its architects, Emery Roth & Sons, presented a perfect
image of the type of office "whose esthetic is pre-harmonized to that of big business," the
architectural corporation that was perfectly organized to produce corporate buildings. As the
25 Joseph Hudnut, "The Post-Modern House," Architectural Record (May 1945): 75. The battle between Gropius and
Hudnut over the Basic Design course at Harvard prior to Gropius's retirement from teaching in 1952 and Hudnut's
departure the following year-and more broadly between Gropius's universalizing, Bauhaus-derived formal pedagogy and
a more humanistic model that could incorporate history, context, and individual expression-is described in Jill
Pearlman, Inventing American Modernism: Joseph Hudnut, Walter Gropius, and the Bauhaus Legacy at Harvard
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2007).
26 Joseph Hudnut, "Architecture and the Individual," Architectural Record (October 1958): 169-170. In this article,
Hudnut claimed, "I know at least one architect who has, among his two hundred employees, a dozen or more who,
segregated in a "style department" not unlike that of General Motors, develop their designs in a collaborative manner." In
eliding the differences between corporate and collaborative modes of practice, it is unclear whether Hudnut is alluding to
specialized production firms like Emery Roth & Sons or SOM, or to holistic practices like TAC.
27 Ibid, 170.
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producers of numerous previous developments in midtown Manhattan for developer clients like the
Uris Corporation and Wolfson's Diesel Construction Company, the Roth partnership was
responsible for a substantial portion of the glass and steel office buildings that increasingly crowded
the blocks around Grand Central. 28 TIhe firm's outsized impact on the transformation of midtown
Manhattan was evident in articles that chronicled the New York building boom, like Jacobs', in
which a roster of barely distinguishable Emery Roth & Sons buildings marched along the page in
uniform rows, much as they did along Park Avenue and its adjacent streets. 29 (Fig. 4.5) For his part,
Wolfson played an equally outsized role in New York City's construction boom. By some estimates,
Diesel Construction Company was responsible for nearly $300 million in new office building in the
city after 1946, more than that of any other individual investor. 30 Yet he lacked the outsized persona
of developers like William Zeckendorf-Wolfson's predecessor in competing for the Grand Central
City site-choosing instead to trade more quietly on a reputation among real estate professionals as a
reputable and responsible builder of office buildings, many of them by the Roth partnership.31 These
difference in persona were evident in the schemes each developer originally offered for the Grand
Central site: while Zeckendorf proposed a structurally heroic landmark to replace Grand Central
Terminal, a hyperboloid 80-story tower designed by I. M. Pei, Wolfson and Roth's design was for a
relatively anonymous, 55-story glass and steel volume that would have been distinguished primarily
by its prominent site, wedged between the preserved Terminal to the south and Warren & Wetmore's
New York Central Building to the north.
28 Of the forty-one buildings illustrated in Jacobs's article, fourteen were by Emery Roth & Sons.
29 See in particular Jacobs, "New York's Building Boom" and Roth, "High-Rise Down to Earth." Both articles feature
extremely similar maps of the construction boom in New York City-Jacobs' showing all projects in midtown
Manhattan, Roth's showing solely buildings of Emery Roth & Sons projects in the area. The two maps are drawn with
nearly identical boundaries and include many of the same projects.
30 Ogden Tanner, "Grand Central's Wolfson," Architectural Forum (November 1958): 132-133.
31 Ibid. The article describes Wolfson as having "a strikingly high reputation among members of his profession....
Wolfson is hardly the needle-eyed, cigar-chomping type of real estate speculator. A trim, courteous, and friendly man
whose taste runs to conservative grey suits, he would look as much at home in a college faculty meeting as he does
mapping building strategy in his four-room office-apartment suite in Manhattan's West 58th St." Ibid., 133.
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Emery Roth & Sons was uniquely successful among the firms that partook heavily of this wave
of postwar office development, a list that included Kahn & Jacobs, Harrison & Abramovitz, and
Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, among others. The firm had gained a reputation as an office singularly
able to translate the economics of development efficiently and effectively into tiered tower volumes
that maximized flexible rental space and minimized cost for design and construction, based not least
on its ability to quickly and accurately estimate construction costs to within two or three percent of
the final total. The result of these methods was, as Business Week characterized it, "not daring or
maverick design, but a routine brand that the Roths turn out almost on a production basis."32 Such
articles praised the success of this "Architect For Business In a City of Towers" as Grand Central City
(now Pan Am), the firm's most prominent office commission to date, neared completion. (Fig. 4.6)
True to the image of deep affinity between the interests of corporate client and corporate
architect, published commentary by Emery Roth & Sons on its practice mirrored those of writers
like Stanley who defended the economic imperatives of developers like Wolfson, one of the firm's
main repeat clients.33 Richard Roth, the design principal of Emery Roth & Sons, described his
company's approach to commissions in terms that echoed Stanley's defense of Pan Am, arguing that
ours is not a field of architecture in which we try to create masterpieces. The entire endeavor in
our office is to create the best that can be produced within the restrictions that are placed upon
us; and these restrictions are seldom those of our client, but rather of lending institutions;
economics; and municipal authorities' laws.34
Colleagues stressed the suitability of the firm's approach to the needs of its clients. According to one
unnamed builder, "Roth designs for the client who has to rent his building on the basis of a place to
work in, not as a monument to posterity." 35 This attitude was especially tailored to the problems of
32 "Architect For Business In a City of Towers," Business Week, September 1, 1962: 54-55.
33 On Wolfson, see Ogden Tanner, "Grand Central's Wolfson"; "A Sixth Sense for Construction," Engineering News-
Record, May 28, 1959: 55-57; "Builder of Skylines: Erwin S. Wolfson," Time, February 22, 1960: 92; "Intellectual
Builder: Erwin Service Wolfson," The New York Times, September 8, 1960: 30.
34 Richard Roth, "High-Rise Down to Earth," Progressive Architecture (June 1957): 196.
35 "Architect For Business In a City of Towers": 55.
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the speculative office building for non-specific tenants, which constituted the bulk of Emery Roth &
Sons' work in these years. Roth succinctly summarized the abstract, anonymous economy of these
commissions: "We're in the business of designing buildings for businessmen who put up buildings
for other businessmen."36
Grand Central City
The ineluctable constraints of the Grand Central City project would challenge the seeming
isomorphism of Wolfson and Emery Roth & Sons, the structural alignment between corporate client
and corporation-architect that had functioned so seamlessly on other sites in midtown Manhattan.
While the urban consequences of this balanced equation of finance and architecture had already been
called into question by critics like Jacobs and Huxtable, this image of identity would run aground on
a site that demanded the production of iconic visual form, as the only product ultimately capable of
rescuing the project from the economic and spatial constraints that burdened it.
The severe economic challenges of the plot acquired from the New York Central Railroad by
Wolfson were determined largely by its location directly above the rail lines to Grand Central
Terminal, necessitating costly and logistically difficult structural work to allow any building to be
built above the tracks without disrupting train service. A new building would be expected to
accommodate circulation for some 25,000 office workers and 250,000 passengers per day to and
from the Terminal through its lower levels, including access to the concourse level of the Terminal,
one floor above the tower's ground level, as well as the elevated vehicular lanes of Park Avenue that
would continue north around the Terminal and through the Grand Central tower before rejoining at
street level to the north.37 Popular scientific and business magazines reveled in the complexity of
36 Ibid. A version of this sentence is quoted anonymously in "The Skyline Factory," Newsweek, September 18, 1967: 98.
37 These figures are given in Armen P. Armagnac, "The Most Complicated Building Ever Built," Popular Science
(September 1960): 67-72, 216.
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these constraints, illustrating the project with cutaway drawings that detailed the enormous logistical
challenges of the project. 38 (Fig. 4.7-4.8) These demands set extreme minimums for the size, height,
and bulk of the tower that would be required in order to make the land pay for Wolfson: it was
originally projected to be the largest office building in the world, with some four to five million
square feet of rentable space.39 Such extreme magnitude, which was required to make the project
economically feasible by keeping costs per square foot within an acceptable range for prospective
tenants, would give any building on the Grand Central site a singular visual and economic presence
in New York City, regardless of its architectural quality.
In its urban setting, however, the tower's bulk would be constrained both by the presence of
the Grand Central Terminal building, which now stood to be preserved following protests by
Douglas Haskell and other prominent critics, and by the tower of the New York Central Building
immediately to the north, putting any new building into a close spatial and visual relationship with
these two volumes. This site stood at the crosshairs of what Jacobs identified as the three major zones
of corporate office construction by the late 1950s: the area around Grand Central to the south and
east, the area around Rockefeller Center and Madison Avenue to the west, and Park Avenue above
42nd street-particularly the stretch between 50th and 60th Streets-as this merged into the other
two zones. The Grand Central City site lay precisely at the intersection of these three zones, binding
at once the two major prewar examples of multi-level, multi-block urbanism (Rockefeller Center and
the Grand Central development) with the major urban axis along Park Avenue, along which Emery
38 See especially "The Most Complicated Building Ever Built" and "Sky-High Deal For a Skyscraper," Fortune (December
1960): 141-143, 266-268, 271; Stanley, "Growth of a Giant," Real Estate Forum, Sept 30, 1962: 37-58.
39 This scale (similar to that of Zeckendorf and Pei's scheme, which was projected to house more than five million square
feet of space) would have been roughly twice the size of the Empire State Building, with some 2.25 million square feet of
floor space. Contemporary articles listed the Empire State Building as having 1.8 million square feet of rentable space at
the time, and the RCA Building, now 30 Rockefeller Plaza, as having 2.3 million square feet. See "Plan 50 Story Office
Bldg. in New York," Chicago Daily Tribune, May 8, 1958: D8. The Grand Central City building would have been
comparable in scale to Merchandise Mart in Chicago (4 million square feet) and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.,
with some 3.7 million square feet of offices within a a complex of 6.5 million square feet.
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Roth & Sons had left their mark so heavily over the preceding decade. 40 Furthermore, the site's
singular placement on the central axes of both Park Avenue and 44th Street, facing mid-street on all
four sides rather than being continuous with the building fabric, would give any tower built there
unparalleled visual prominence both north-south and east-west within the Manhattan grid. (Fig. 4.9)
Located at both the spatial and conceptual terminus of the wave of corporate building that had
preceded it, then, Grand Central City at once constituted the apotheosis of this building boom and a
site whose anomalous visual, physical, and economic constraints would necessitate a reconfiguration
of the mechanisms that had served so well on these other sites. The tower would not be merely
another surface or corner within a city block of adjacent buildings, as with many of Roth and
Wolfson's previous projects, but would stand in isolation on its site, facing street axes on three sides
and the low volume of Grand Central Terminal on the fourth. The project thus threatened to be an
undistinguished speculative building designed on a site that implicitly demanded an iconic form, as
public reception would soon make clear.
The first scheme for Grand Central City released by Wolfson and Emery Roth & Sons made
clear the burdens of this singular site and the inadequacy of the design approach that these partners
had employed so profitably on less conspicuous sites in midtown Manhattan. Unlike the project that
had preceded Wolfson's for the Grand Central site-developer William Zeckendorf's project with I.
M. Pei to replace Grand Central Terminal itself with a structurally daring form that would have been
the world's tallest tower-the Grand Central City project lay closer to the more generic buildings
built elsewhere in midtown Manhattan by Wolfson and Emery Roth & Sons.41 A tempera rendering
40 This status was reflected in Pan Am's prominence in the later Regional Planning Association urban plan for midtown
Manhattan of 1969, for which it provided the central example of the multi-level, vertical urbanism advocated by the
plan. See Regional Plan Association, Urban Design Manhattan (April 1969).
41 On the Zeckendorf and Pei project, see "The Hyperboloid, New York, New York 1954-1956 (Unbuilt)," in Philip
Jodidio, Janet Adams Strong, L M Pei, Complete Works (New York: Rizzoli, 2008): 45 ff. The real estate firm led by
Zeckendorf, Webb & Knapp, had first formed as a company in 1922 to assist the NY Central Railroad in managing its
leases after it was ordered by the city to cover its railroad tracks along Park Avenue from 96th to 45th Streets, creating a
real estate boom in midtown Manhattan along with Park Avenue in its subsequent landscaped form. See Zeckendorf and
Edward McCreary, Zeckendorf 7he Autobiography Of the Man Who Played a Real-Life Game of Monopoly and Won the
Largest Real Estate Empire in History (New York: Plaza Press, 2014): 35 ff.
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by Robert Schwartz, first published in newspapers and architectural journals in February 1955,
depicted a nearly pure extrusion of the permissible building envelope that was given within the
existing zoning law and the site constraints, with four to five million square feet of space.42 (Fig.
4.10) At its top, the 65-story mass was stepped back slightly along its east and west sides, resulting in
a timid compromise between the tiered volumes of the generic speculative buildings built to satisfy
zoning constraints and the desire for a slender, more rectilinear profile that would relate to the iconic
towers already standing along Park Avenue. The long direction of the tower was aligned north-south
to Park Avenue, while the short direction was set roughly to the width of the New York Central
Building, suggesting an attempt to make its volume disappear behind the Warren & Wetmore tower
at the same time that the dramatic rendered perspective conveyed the desire to project an iconic
image. The design appeared to be caught between its status as a background-for Grand Central
Terminal to the south and the New York Central Building to the north-and this singular
appearance. This conflict became evident in the parti wall that appeared as a pure white backdrop for
the volume of Grand Central Terminal, as a prophylaxis that served to separate the one from the
other. Seen from the east and west, the building would appear much like the tiered, glass and steel
facades of the adjacent Wolfson and Roth buildings that lined the streets of midtown Manhattan,
stepped back in three shallow planes from base to top. Viewed from the north and south along more
prominent axis of Park Avenue, the tower would mimic more closely the profile of recent iconic
42 The Emery Roth & Sons scheme appeared, illustrated by the Schwartz rendering, in "New Plan Studied on Grand
Central," 7he New York Times, February 8, 1955: 20 and "Grand Central's Outdoor Concourse," Architectural Forum
(February 1955): 116-119. The Schwartz rendering constituted the primary image of the building prior to its
completion, along with photographs of the large-scale model built by Norman Briskman and displayed in Grand Central
Terminal in November 1959 and reproduced in various other media thereafter. The revised version of the Schwartz
rendering that appeared in 1958 was clearly intended to be comparative, and was constructed so as to provide a visual
catalog of the precise changes that marked its difference from the first scheme. These included the reorientation of the
slab perpendicular to Park Avenue, its faceting into an octagonal slab, its more richly developed facade and the breakup
of its massing into vertical sections and through the "infinite" edge of its roof profile, the modifications to the base, and
the elimination of the blank backdrop framing Grand Central Terminal. A similar attempt was made to visually separate
Pan Am from the terminal, achieved via the glowing effect of a pronounced halo behind the terminal. The architectural
effect here was now one in which the lower edge of the tower and the cornice of Grand Central would appear to slide
past each other dynamically, a modernist gesture of compositional tension to counteract the otherwise symmetrical layout
of the tower and base on its site.
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corporate buildings like Lever House, with a lower volume (though more cubic than horizontal) that
spanned between the two Grand Central buildings as the base for a thinner vertical profile rising
above. The uneasy negotiation between these differing profiles resulted in an awkward, ungainly
mass, one whose most prominent visual features were the two blank walls that bookended the lower
volume to act as backdrops for the Grand Central terminal and tower respectively.
The fate of the Wolfson and Roth proposal after its announcement in early 1955 pointed to
the limits of both developer and architect in relation to the extreme demands of the Grand Central
site. While Wolfson had been the first developer to convince the new chairman of the New York
Central Railroad, Robert Young, to lease the Grand Central site for building in the fall of 1954, his
proposal with Emery Roth & Sons was effectively usurped even prior to its publication in February
1955 by Zeckendorf and Pei, whose far more heroic scheme for the site, designed specifically for
large corporations, was apparently more compelling to Young as more commensurate with the
"monumental idea" that would be required to justify demolishing Grand Central Terminal, as Young
advertised at the time.43 (Fig. 4.11) The Zeckendorf and Pei scheme, which remained unpublished at
the time, ultimately foundered following a sustained public campaign led by Douglas Haskell, the
editor of Architectural Forum, to save the concourse within the terminal at minimum as part of any
new scheme for the site-and possibly by Zeckendorf's difficulties in financing the huge scheme.
Wolfson and Emery Roth & Sons took this as an opportunity (as apparently did other architects,
possibly including Frank Lloyd Wright) to release their scheme in February 1955 as a means of
43 Pei described the loss of Grand Central as a monument as acceptable if in service of a "monumental idea." See Clausen,
7he Pan Am Building and the Shattering ofthe Modernist Dream (hereafter Pan Am): 45, 47. On the design of the scheme
specifically for large corporations, see "80-Story Building Planned Atop Grand Central Station," The Washington Post and
Times Herald, Sep 8, 1954: 23.
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capitalizing on public desire to save the Terminal, even as the Zeckendorf plans for the site remained
the ones publicly described by Young for some months afterward. 44
While the Emery Roth & Sons proposal was initially praised by Haskell as an example of how
Grand Central Terminal and its concourse could be saved, he soon expanded his purview to the area
around Grand Central as a whole, shifting focus to the unwelcome increase in density and
congestion such a quantity of new office space would impose on this pressured site. 45 Though it
spared the Terminal building from destruction, Haskell wrote, in its visual bulk and undistinguished
profile, the Roth scheme negatively impacted "the almost equally magnificent space" of the city
surrounding it. In particular, such a building would overwhelm the scale of the Grand Central tower
that, Haskell wrote, terminated the traditional vista of Park Avenue gracefully, "containing and
dignifying its surroundings" and thus "keeping the city from being endlessly impersonal and
terrifying." 46 A generic office building like the Emery Roth & Sons scheme would destroy this unity,
he warned, making the area around Grand Central no "more than a collection of separate, coolly
efficient buildings."47 As Haskell and others increased their advocacy for public space around Grand
Central against the interests of the real estate developers who sought to densify the area, the Wolfson
and Roth project lay dormant for three years before its republication in May 1958 as "Grand Central
City," reduced in scale to a 50-story tower with three million square feet of space, following an
44 Shortly after the Zeckendorf and Pei plans to develop the Grand Central site were announced, a publicly released
proposal by the firm of Fellheimer and Wagner presented an alternative scheme for the site focused mainly on restoring
street through-traffic that had been blocked by the original Grand Central complex, and which also included demolition
of the Terminal. Clausen, Pan Am claims that several architects, including Frank Lloyd Wright, made proposals for the
Grand Central site following the abandonment of the Zeckendorf and Pei project, but does not cite any evidence of these
projects.
45 "Grand Central's Outdoor Concourse": 116-119.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
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unexpected inquiry from a potential tenant looking to lease offices in a building on the Grand
Central site.48 (Fig. 4.12)
By the time the reduced Wolfson and Roth scheme was revived in early 1958, the failure of the
scheme to gain either critical or financial traction suggested the need for some additional mediating
entity, outside the previously harmonious relationship between anonymous developer and
anonymous builder. The Grand Central City scheme exposed, in particularly legible terms, the
incapacity of this approach in providing anything beyond a mere expression of economic and zoning
constraints on a site that evidently demanded a more convincing display of civic building if the
project were to succeed, whether for investors, tenants, or the public. In this sense, the close
symmetry between Wolfson and Emery Roth & Sons, the firm most associated with the mediocrity
of the speculative building boom by the late 1950s, seemed to confirm the fears of critics who
warned of the consequences of such architectural complicity in the production of profit for an
increasingly abstract class of corporate financiers, as these expanded to include more diffuse consortia
of developers, real estate operators, life insurance companies, and other groups of investors.
Something more was required to differentiate the Grand Central project from the wave of speculative
building whose culmination it would inevitably mark, whether for the investors and high-class
tenants that the development would have to attract in order to make such a risky investment pay, or
48 Glenn Fowler, "Grand Central 'City' Is Planned," The New York Times, May 8, 1958: 1. The project was announced
simultaneously in three other newspapers on the same date: "50-Story Office Building: Will Be World's Largest," The
Boston Globe; "Builder Plans 50-Story $100 Million Skyscraper On Grand Central Site," The Wall StreetJournal; and
"Plan 50 Story Office Bldg. in New York," Chicago Daily Tribune. Clausen cites the publication of a revised rendering by
Schwartz in the New York Times article, based on the original 1954 rendering, as evidence that neither Wolfson nor Roth
saw anything wrong with the original scheme. Clausen, Pan Am: note 69. Furthermore, she describes the May 8, 1958
Times article as "illustrated with the same rendering that had been published three years earlier." Ibid., 49. Yet there were
significant changes between the 1954 and 1958 schemes, clearly visible in the two renderings. These included the
reduction in height of the tower from 65 to 50 stories, and changes in the profile of the base to form an L-shaped mass,
lower to the north and taller to the south, as a screen for Grand Central Terminal. The revised 1958 rendering appeared
as late as November 1958 in Tanner, "Grand Central's Wolfson": 133, with a caption noting that "Tower treatment is
being restudied." Such changes, and the apparent haste with which the renderings were revised and re-released upon the
reactivation of the project in early 1958, may equally suggest that the inadequacy of the original scheme, and its need for
revision, was well understood by Wolfson.
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for public discussions that increasingly centered on the question of whether development on such a
sensitive site could ever be more than negative.49
Artist-Architect
In attempting to overcome this impasse, Wolfson and Roth sought what was in essence a
supplement: a figure that would not be primary to the production or realization of Grand Central
City, yet one that could address the apparent lack that threatened the dissolution of the project. This
remedy would come through the identification not of a replacement architect but a consultant who
might lend a more convincing authorial presence to the project that would serve to reinforce, rather
than undermine, its basic economic and developmental premises. 50 In her history of the Pan
American Airways building, Meredith L. Clausen describes Wolfson and Roth as seeking an "artist-
architect," invoking the term used by Huxtable in opposition to the large organizations whose
practice had served to "reduce the art of architecture to a commercial operation," as well as by
Hudnut, to describe the type of anti-corporate architect on whom "the fate of the new building
rests." A list of such "artist-architects" was provided to Wolfson by Richard Roth-perhaps compiled
by Roth's son, Richard Roth Jr., who was then a recent architectural graduate from the University of
Miami and, perhaps, seen by developer and architect to be more attuned to contemporary creative
49 Clausen suggests that Wolfson doubted "whether another Roth building would draw the kind of high-class tenants he
was hoping-and financially needed-to attract." Clausen, Pan Am: 51.
50 Ibid, 59. Clausen characterizes the decision as follows: "Given the increasingly public awareness of the critical nature of
the site, the importance of a reputable architect, and the magnitude of the economic factors at stake.... [and] to blunt
further criticism as well as enhance his chances of securing financing for the huge project, Wolfson needed a highly
respected design architect, preferably one with a big name, who could provide him with a 'prestige' building that would
'sell better to the money people.' As Richard Roth was a close personal friend as well as long-standing business partner
whose professional efficiency and economy Wolfson valued, he proposed their bringing in an 'artist-architect' to work
with the Roth firm as design consultant." Ibid.
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practitioners. 5 1 This list, which may have included Gordon Bunshaft of SOM and Edward Durrell
Stone, also included figures that carried a particular academic imprimatur, beyond or perhaps even
independent of their architectural work: Walter Gropius, who had retired as chair of the Harvard
Graduate School of Design in 1952; Josep Lluis Sert, his successor at Harvard, and Pietro Belluschi,
then dean of the department of architecture at MIT.
The criteria by which Gropius and Belluschi were chosen as consultants from this list is
unclear, as is the precise role that Wolfson and Roth envisioned them playing in developing the
Emery Roth & Sons scheme that was hastily modified and republished in May 1958. An
announcement of Gropius and Belluschi's involvement in Architectural Forum implied that Gropius
and Belluschi's presence was not intended to bring major alterations, claiming that "Some changes
will be made in the preliminary plans first issued by the Roth office but no change is contemplated
in total size."5 2 For his part, Belluschi acknowledged his later conviction that Wolfson's motives in
hiring him and TAC as consultants were ultimately driven by marketing concerns, describing the
decision as "primarily a public relations move." 53 Citing the difficulty Wolfson had faced both in
attracting the necessary investment in such a risky endeavor and increasingly in defending the project
on urban and sociological grounds as criticism mounted, Belluschi also pointed to the difficulty of
51 The number of architects that appeared on this list is unclear. A list of fifty architects is claimed in "Gropius and
Belluschi Advise On Grand Central Tower Design," Architectural Forum (September 1958): 47. A list of "leading
architects" provided to Wolfson by Roth is cited in Ogden Tanner, "Grand Central's Wolfson": 200. Richard L. Stanley
cites a list of ten "distinguished architects" in "Genesis of a Giant," Real Estate Forum, September 30, 1962: 22. Clausen
claims that Roth Jr. drafted the list for his father, and that Wolfson, the supposed aesthete, was "unfamiliar with an of the
names mentioned." Clausen, Pan Am: 59-60 and note 92.
52 "Gropius and Belluschi Advise On Grand Central Tower Design": 47.
53 Clausen cites the source of this quote as "Interview: Pietro Belluschi," Progressive Architecture (June 1990): 122-123.
However, this quote does not appear in the text of the interview, conducted by Jim Murphy with "valuable assitance"
provided by Clausen. It is unclear whether Belluschi's quote comes from the full transcript of the conversation or from
another interview conducted by Clausen.
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this consulting role in addressing these demands without challenging the fundamental constraints
that determined the project: "It was intrinsically an impossible job aesthetically." 54
In contradistinction to such unstated motives, public promotion of the project on behalf of
Wolfson clearly attributed the decision to hire Gropius and Belluschi as consultants to the desire for
evidence of signature that, implicitly, could not be provided by Emery Roth & Sons. A press release
confirmed the intention to stamp the project with their imprimatur: "Manhattan's world famous
skyline will receive the touch ofacknowledged masters in the panel of eminent architects who are
collaborating" on the Grand Central City scheme; "With this appointment, Drs. Gropius and
Belluschi will, for the first time, lend their genius to the design of a Manhattan skyscraper." 55
Richard Stanley, Wolfson and Roth's advocate in Real Estate Forum, argued that altruistic motives
alone lay behind the decision, claiming that "Roth felt, and Wolfson agreed, that the job was of such
magnitude and the structure's impact on the skyline and the immediate neighborhood was so
significant that it deserved more than one mind or one group of talents to work on it." 56 A profile of
Wolfson in Architectural Forum reinforced the idea that while the developer's previous office
buildings had, "in effect, been designed by highly competitive rent schedules, by New York's ancient
'wedding-cake' zoning envelope, and by the present widespread fixation on bland, shiny curtain
walls," in choosing Gropius and Belluschi for Grand Central City, he sought "to balance economics
against esthetics and come up with a truly significant piece of civic architecture."57 Photographs by
Carl Mayden, taken in August 1958, offered a literal image of this provision of imprimatur by
54 "Interview: Pietro Belluschi": 123. Belluschi argued that "the Pan Am building was a very difficult thing, because first
of all you have such a visible project, and you have many objections. You have an owner who's going to invest hundreds
of millions of dollars, and you have a tremendously technically difficult thing, so you have to make compromises which
are not quite of the same kind." Ibid., 122.
55 J. P. Lohman Organization, press release prepared for Erwin S. Wolfson, Herbert and Stuart Scheftel, and Alfred G.
Burger, Belluschi Papers. Cited in Clausen, Pan Am: 61.
56 Stanley, "Genesis of a Giant": 22. Clausen claims that Wolfson's choice was more cynical, quoting Roth's son, Richard
Roth Jr., on the developer's reasons for hiring Gropius and Belluschi: "It wasn't altruism, I can promise you that." Ibid.
57 Tanner, "Grand Central's Wolfson": 200.
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Gropius and Belluschi, who were portrayed conferring over sketches of the project with pencils in
hand-a clear staging in the case of Gropius, who was known not to draw.58 (Fig. 4.13-4.14)
This image of authorship in service to enlightened patronage, conferred by the academic
pedigrees of Gropius and Belluschi as much as by their built work, served to elide the significant
differences in approach that the naming of these two consultants would provide in practice. In
choosing this pair of names, what Wolfson received were not two artist-architects of the type called
for by Huxtable and Hudnut, but a collaborative firm and a professional consultant-architect who
had retired from signature practice, respectively. Belluschi's self-declared specialization as a consultant
may have offered the figure of an architect who could provide the required image of authorship
without the problems of an architect seeking stronger control over the design-an acquiescence
perhaps signaled by the double remove of Gropius, the first consultant chosen, suggesting a second,
Belluschi, to the project architect and developer.59 Yet what Wolfson sought in Gropius-and what
subsequent critics would look for in his presence-turned out to be significantly different from the
role that TAC, the team-based firm of which he was a part, ultimately played in the development of
Grand Central City.
58 Another photograph from the office of James Ruderman, taken at the first joint meeting of Gropius and Belluschi with
Roth and Wolfson in New York (sometime prior to September 1958) after signing the contract formalizing their
involvement on July 18, 1958, shows a large sketch perspective of a modified massing based on the Emery Roth & Sons
scheme and with the same viewpoint as the Schwartz renderings. Organized in three tiers closer to the wedding-cake type
on its east and west sides, this version of the tower is far thinner for much of its height, suggesting this scheme may have
been intended to reduce the building's profile behind Grand Central Tower. The Ruderman photograph appears in
Clausen, Pan Am: 96. The photograph is similar to one from the same meeting that appears in "Gropius and Belluschi
Advise On Grand Central Tower Design": 47. While this meeting make have taken place in August 1958, it is evidently
not from the same occasion as the photographs by Mayden, as Gropius and Belluschi are dressed differently between the
two sets.
59 Clausen cites Gropius's notes from a meeting with Wolfson in June 1958 to suggest that Gropius recommended
Belluschi as a second consultant, rather than Wolfson having picked both together from the list made by Roth or Roth
Jr.: "he [Gropius] was also shown the list of potential design consultants... It was evidently Gropius who at this point
suggested bringing in one other consultant and recommended Belluschi, with whom he had previously worked. Wolfson
agreed, and Belluschi was asked to join them." Clausen, Pan Am: 60.
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Speculative Development and Prestige Building
TAC and Belluschi initially sought to modify the signification and meaning of Grand Central City
by effecting a subtle shift among the corporate building types that were available for critical
interpretation during the New York City building boom of the 1950s. The Grand Central City
commission stood at the intersection between two financially distinct forms of corporate architecture
which, prior to the revisions to the city's zoning laws in 1961, were typologically distinct as well. The
first was the speculative office building, built for initially unspecified future tenants and generally
designed to maximize generic, flexible rental space that would fill the permissible building envelope
on a given site. Wolfson and Roth's previous projects almost exclusively took this form, which was
typically marked by tiered building profiles that critics like Huxtable disparaged as the "wedding-
cake" type, stepped back above set heights to conform to zoning laws that required the access of light
and air to street level.60 (Fig. 4.15) The second, more prominent type was the prestige tower, built for
owner-occupant corporations that sought the brand value of an iconic headquarters, both for
marketing purposes and for attracting and retaining staff.6 1 These typically featured more tailored
profiles that required a reduction in the total area of the tower compared to the wedding-cake form,
sacrificing rental space in order to provide more singular volumes capable of giving visual identity to
their owners. Prior to the 1961 zoning law, the primary models for this latter type were Lever House
(completed in 1952), which combined a low, elevated horizontal base with a slender vertical slab
60 Huxtable, "Towering Question": 69. She names the type based on the fact that "In effect, the law specifies a shape-an
empty 'wedding cake' mold-into which the builder may push his structure until the mold is filled. By filling the mold
completely, he makes the greatest profit." Ibid.
61 Frederick Gutheim described the benefits of the iconic headquarters as follows: "To the director of personnel the
characteristics of the space assigned to him in a new building may be less important than the capacity of the building
itself to attract good applicants for employment and reduce costly turnover among critical classes of employees. This was
a major objective in Lever House.... Specialists in advertising or publicity may keenly appreciate that the design of a
building or the fame of its architect can exceed in effectiveness any other device for securing favorable public attention
for the company or its product." Put another way, the difference between speculative and prestige building was in some
sense a difference in marketing audience: the qualities of speculative office space were designed to be advertised to
potential future tenants, while the aesthetic benefits of the signature tower were meant to be marketed to current and
future employees within the corporation itself. Gutheim et al., "The Corporate Client": 108.
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above, and the Seagram Building, set back at street level to form an urban plaza defined by the facade
of the tower rising behind it. (Fig. 4.16-4.17) Published drawings of Lever House by Skidmore,
Owings & Merrill clearly demonstrated its difference from the generic massing of the speculative
building, showing a section through the SOM tower along Park Avenue contrasted against a
silhouette of the wedding-cake massing that represented the maximum buildable area on its site. (Fig.
4.18)
Contemporary discussions of the corporate construction boom in New York City were clear
about the inequalities between these two types of commissions, and particularly about their differing
possibilities for the creation of a meaningful aesthetic contribution to the city. In her article on the
New York building boom, Jacobs acknowledged that while "Proud buildings in proud context are
proved as solid, durable investments," at the time, "the only New York office building based on this
premise is that undertaken by a few owner-occupant firms." 62 Such possibilities for "proud building"
were unavailable to speculative buildings from the leasing conditions that condemned most
speculative buildings, financed by insurance companies, to the ungainly profiles that were required to
maximize their rental returns. While Jacobs did not name the "half a dozen or so stars" that she felt
could be distinguished among the general mediocrity of the corporate construction boom, this list
was implicitly composed of signature towers such as SOM's Lever House, Union Carbide, and
Chase-Manhattan buildings and Ludwig Mies van der Rohe and Philip Johnson's Seagram Building,
all of which were featured among the forty-one illustrations of towers completed or planned in
Manhattan after 1947.63 Huxtable was even more explicit in contrasting the forms of speculative
building, generic and financially determined, to the exceptionalism of the prestige tower:
62 Jacobs, "New York's Building Boom": 113. Jacobs described the economic structure underlying speculative buildings as
follows: "In this boom, the office buildings are financed by insurance companies, and their mortgage commitments do
not become effective unless and until about 75% of space is signed for in advance by financially responsible tenants on
long leases. The limit to building is leasing." Ibid.
63 Ibid., 107.
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Unfortunately, the "wedding cake" mold is extremely homely, but the law dictates that it is the
real architect of the city's buildings. A straight tower or a soaring shaft, like the Seagram
Building, slices off the profitable sides of the cake, leaving only the center piece. Needless to say,
this kind of esthetic altruism does not appeal to the speculative builder.... At present, better
design can be achieved only through this kind of financial sacrifice. Lever House, the Seagram
Building, the Pepsi-Cola building and the new Union Carbide headquarters-all prestige
structures on Park Avenue-are exceptional examples in which rentable space has been given up
voluntarily by building less than the law allows.64
Huxtable drove home the comparison by invoking a building by Emery Roth & Sons, at 400 Park
Avenue, as "a standard product of the present law," one that "hiccups its way upward, tight against
adjacent buildings, squat and square below, zigzagging uneasily above." "Its undistinguished
commercial profile," she concluded, "is a striking contrast to Lever's slender architectural
distinction." For his part, Richard Roth made no bones about the constraints that governed his firm's
speculative buildings-sometimes described as "Rothscrapers" to denote their ubiquitous wedding-
cake profiles65-in contrast to these signature commissions. "Unlike the buildings that are built for
single large-corporation occupancy, (Lever House, Canada House, House of Seagram, Johnson Wax,
et a)," Roth wrote, "ours are a combination of the art of architecture and the economics of big
business." 66 (Fig. 4.19)
Critics were equally clear about their valuation of the prestige tower over the generic
speculative building as a type that could mediate the presence of the corporation in the city and, in
so doing, confirm architecture's traditional role in creating identity for its patrons. A 1955 article in
64 Huxtable, "Towering Question": 69.
65 The term "Rothscraper" is from "The Skyline Factory," Newsweek, September 18, 1967: 98. While authorship of this
article is credited to Ada Louise Huxtable in both Clausen, Pan Am and Robert A.M. Stern, Thomas Mellins, David
Fishman, New York 1960: Architecture and Urbanism Between the Second World War and the Bicentennial (New York: The
Monacelli Press, 1995), the text of the article itself has no byline. Instead, it only quotes Huxtable: "as New York Times
architectural critic Ada Louise Huxtable sees it, Emery Roth & Sons is 'as responsible for the face of modern New York as
Sixtus V was for baroque Rome."'
66 Richard Roth, "High-Rise Down to Earth": 196. Tom Schachtman quotes a more informal exchange between the
younger Richard Roth Jr., a recent architecture graduate, and the developer Percy Uris about the Seagram Building,
which was visible from the offices of Uris Corporation: "'I said something about the Seagram's Building being
beautiful... and Percy retorted that 'The only beautiful building is the one that's fully rented."' Schachtman, Skyscraper
Dreams: 7he Great Real Estate Dynasties ofNew York (Boston: Little, Brown, 1991): 199.
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Architectural Forum on the corporate client noted the difficulties of grappling with the claiming that
"American architecture is still getting acquainted with its newest and most valuable client-the large-
scale organization." In this adjustment to the exigencies of diverse corporate building types, its
authors lamented, as yet "too many of the largest and most important buildings are at best mute,
unable to speak for the high ideas and purposes that called them forth but were unable to give them
shape."67 In this complex, the tasks of the prestige building would be to provide these large
organizations with what "its architecture now typically lacks... it must, in the words of the
advertising fraternity, 'build character.' The buildings must give this individual organization its
individualfacefor all to see." 68 Such longing for the "individual" client-though now mapped onto
the body of the corporation-formed a natural corollary to the urging of Hudnut, Huxtable, and
others for the mediating role of the "artist-architect" in relation to this increasingly corporate
clientele. Only such a relationship, it was hoped, could restore the traditional structure of
architectural production between patron and designer at a moment when both threatened to
transform into more diffuse, abstract entities.
The Grand Central City project rested uncomfortably between these two poles of corporate
production. While the physical and financial imperatives of the commission were those of the
speculative building, its unprecedented site and urban prominence seemed to demand the image of
the prestige tower. Furthermore, the union of Wolfson and Roth-whose previous experience
together had essentially been solely in speculative office construction-was particularly ill-suited to
negotiate this slippage between the conditions that precipitated the project and the symbolism it was
implicitly required to produce. Burdened by these problems of signification, the design of the project
would have to negotiate this difference between the mode of its production and its visual appearance.
67 Gutheim et al., "The Corporate Client": 106. Italics mine. The article formed part of a ten-part series on "Architecture
in America," appearing in Architectural Forum from October 1955 to August 1956. Subsequent articles in the series
explored the impact of contractors, engineers, laborers, lenders, and real-estate operators on the design and building
industry.
68 Ibid., 110. Italics mine.
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The arrival of TAC and Belluschi as consultants, and the team's subsequent modifications to
the Grand Central City scheme, went hand in hand with the attempt to reconcile this misalignment
between form and content. In this sense, shifting the massing of the building into a clearer
configuration of slender tower and low base can be regarded as a strategy to reorient its signification
to that of the prestige tower, and so to meet the demand for corporate iconicity in comparison with
its signature predecessors along Park Avenue. 69 Perhaps, it was hoped, the form of the tower might
read as if built for a single occupant-client, attentive to the particular aesthetic and urbanistic
demands of the site-even though it had been designed for initially unknown tenants, at a scale
determined not by single occupancy but by the need to provide maximum rental space in order to
justify the cost of its construction.
In this respect, photographs of an early model of the TAC and Belluschi scheme, developed
prior to November 1958 and apparently preferred by TAC, are telling. 70 (Fig. 4.20) The model shows
a more extreme version of the base-and-slab type common to the prestige tower, with a low, two-
story base extending beneath a thinner, more slender tower that hovered above it, the tower's short
sides extending over the east and west faces of the base to rest on thin columns that continued the
vertical divisions of the facade to the ground. Like Lever House, this version included a courtyard
69 Phyllis Lambert relates a story of Gropius and TAC being considered to design the Seagram Building circa August
1954, included on a list prepared by Eero Saarinen with three categories: "could but shouldn't," "should but couldn't,"
and"could and should." TAC, she claimed, was listed in the "could and should" category. According to Lambert, "By
reputation... Gropius should have been on this list, but in design, he always relied on others, and his recent Harvard
Graduate Center was less than convincing." Lambert also recounts visiting TAC houses and schools near Boston, where
members of the office "showed me houses and schools using the lift-slab technique of which they were inordinately
proud." She describes Gropius and Saarinen as the only two architects who "made appointments with me in which they
made direct proposals.... Gropius asked to meet me on his return from Japan when I was about certain that Mies should
be the architect, and I told him so. I was extremely disconcerted when, as I left him at LaGuardia airport, having visited
with him a house in Long Island that TAC had designed, he pleaded with me to let him design the building." Lambert,
Building Seagram (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2013): 34-35 and note 74. On contemporary
rankings of architects by their contemporaries according to talent and creativity, see Pierluigi Serraino, The Creative
Architect: Inside the Great Midcentury Personality Study (New York: The Monacelli Press, 2016).
70 Clausen claims TAC preferred this version. Clausen, Pan Am: 97. This photograph also appears as the first image in
TAC's description of Pan Am in its monograph, The Architects Collaborative 1945-1965 (Teufen: Arthur Niggli, 1966),
displayed prominently on the title page of the Pan Am entry. This version is referred to (though unillustrated) in "Grand
Central's Wolfson," which noted the scheme was being restudied (as of November 1958) for having too little square
footage.
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within the two-story base, though it is unclear whether this extended to ground level, as with its
precedent, or remained an elevated space for the upper floor alone. The lower volume of the base,
combined with the more dramatic cantilever of the tower on its short sides, would have produced a
more independent relationship of solids between the tower and Grand Central Terminal, with the
two volumes sliding past each other vertically more forcefully than in the built version. Sketches
dated to an August 19, 1959 meeting between Gropius and Belluschi were used to study the relation
between faceted slab and base, in configurations that ranged from a thin horizontal reveal between
them to interpenetrations of the two volumes. (Fig. 4.21) Other schemes explored the idea of
demolishing the New York Central Building to the north entirely, in order to create a public plaza at
the terminus of Park Avenue for which the Grand Central City tower would be the new backdrop, a
solution reminiscent of the Seagram Building as the alternate precedent for the massing of the
prestige tower. (Fig. 4.22-4.23) In this case, however, this solution was compromised by the elevated
lanes of Park Avenue that ran around Grand Central Terminal and would be required to ramp
around the edges of the plaza to reconnect with Park Avenue to the north, as well as by the
developer's inability to cede this amount of space as a loss of rental income.
Despite TAC and Belluschi's attempts to make the project conform more closely to the
available types of the prestige tower, the desire for a slender tower on a low base ran up against the
constraints that required an unprecedented scale in order to be feasible at all. By Wolfson's
calculations, the minimum square footage required for a return on his investment would alone make
the building the largest office tower in the world. The first TAC and Belluschi proposal, which
contained a "mere" 1.5 million square feet of rentable space-slightly less than the Empire State
Building-was insufficient. The revised proposal, close in form to the building as built, kept the
same basic profile of faceted slab and base but simply enlarged its basic elements, increasing the base
to six floors and thickening the tower to provide the necessary bulk. The result was a compromise: a
building too large to mask its status as a speculative building on its crowded Grand Central site, yet
188
one designed to convey the formal structure of a prestige building that might transcend its status as
mere development. (Fig. 4.24)
Corporate Identity
The gap in signification between the generic economics of the speculative building and the demand
for iconicity on the Grand Central site became further exposed following the arrival of Pan American
Airways as the anchor tenant for the building in 1960.71 As the tower came to be known as the Pan
Am Building, the name under which it opened in 1963, the application of corporate symbols to the
building marked the difference between the architecture of Grand Central City, which required the
addition of explicit advertising in order to speak on behalf of its corporate tenant, and owner-
occupant headquarters that could be tailored from the outset to embody the image and character of
their clients. While the designers of such prestige buildings were tasked with providing images that
could intrinsically communicate the specific nature of the corporations they represented-as in the
whiskey-colored bronze patina of the Seagram Building or the lapidary, soap-bubble skin of Lever
House-Pan Am could only extrinsically name its primary renter of office space, through the
71 Juan Trippe, the president of Pan American Airways, began secret negotiations with Wolfson to be the lead tenant at
Grand Central City on July 28, 1960. A 1 6 0-page agreement was officially signed on September 28, 1960 for Pan Am to
provide $117M rental payments in excess of 25 years, in exchange for 629,004 square feet of offices, including two of the
larger floors of the base, the fourth and fifth floors of the tower and the balance of office space below the 51st floor, and a
major sales office at the corner of Vanderbilt Ave and E. 45th St. A $25 million electronic reservations and
communications center for Pan Am was installed on the fourth floor, designed by IBM. The agreement with Pan Am put
the building over the 50% rental mark at the time, including previous rental agreements with corporations including
Westinghouse and Alcoa. Stanley, "Genesis of a Giant": 13-15.
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supplement of logotypes that sought to give the project an identity beyond the financial abstractions
that had brought it into being. 72
The major architectural features of Grand Central City were already determined by the time of
Wolfson's agreement with Pan Am in September 1960, leaving the application of branding as the
only significant means to tailor the appearance of a building whose aesthetic qualities otherwise bore
little meaningful relation to the characteristics Pan Am sought to associate with travel. According to
Richard Stanley, originally Wolfson "had sought diligently for a General Motors, General Electric,
U.S. Steel or I.B.M." to lease twenty-five to forty percent of the project's rentable space in exchange
for the ability to brand its architecture, confirming that the tower's architecture had little to do with
any specific corporate identity prior to Pan Am. 73 Though Stanley claimed that Juan Trippe, the
president of Pan American Airways, liked the building's architecture, Trippe's interest in the Grand
Central City project apparently derived primarily from his recognition of the tower's unique scale
and location as a billboard along the four axes of the Manhattan grid: as "a shrewd businessman,"
Stanley wrote, Trippe "was not unaware that there was a million dollars worth of advertising a year
for Pan American World Airways in having its name on so prominent a building." 74 The
intercontinental character of its financing (with the British investor Jack Cotton joining Wolfson in
October 1959, possibly the first case of significant foreign investment in a real estate development in
72 Given Pan Am's late arrival as anchor tenant, after the fundamental design decisions for the building had been made, I
omit a fuller discussion of Pan Am as a corporation, its international philosophy in relation to the discourse of Pan-
Americanism, or how these expansionist ambitions became manifest in the company's buildings, including Trippe's
establishment of InterContinental Hotels in 1946. On these themes see "Pan Am Signs On," Clausen, Pan Am, 128-138
and Ana Miljatki, "Intercontinental Comfort: Little Americas Abroad" and related magazine articles reproduced in Eva
Franch i Gilabert, Milja'ki, Michael Kubo, Ashley Schafer, ed., Office USAtlas (Zurich: Lars Muller, 2015): 426-427 ff.
On Pan Am and InterContinental, see "Intercontinental Hotels: Design for Tourism," Architectural Record (October
1953): 14-15 and Ruth Sheldon Knowles, "Enterprise & Diplomacy: Pan Am Airways' Hotel Unit Helps Itself by
Aiding Nations," The Wall StreetJournal, April 14, 1964: 18.
73 Stanley, "Genesis of a Giant": 13. A contemporary article in the New York Times noted that it was customary for
tenants to be able to name such office buildings if they rented one third or more of the total floor space. See "Tenant Can
Pick Building's Name," The New York Times, January 4, 1959: R1.
74 Stanley, "Genesis of a Giant": 14.
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the U.S.) also matched Pan Am's expansionist ambitions, as "Trippe liked the idea that there was
British money in the project, giving it an international flavor appropriate to his own company." 75
As Pan Am gained the ability to brand Grand Central City in its image, the problem of
corporate identity thus fell from the realm of architecture to that of the logotype, which was now
tasked-in place of the role Architectural Forum had earlier claimed for corporate architecture itself
-with the need to "give this individual organization its individual face for all to see." 76 The process
of interpolating these symbols onto the facades of the Grand Central City design exposed the mis-fit
between these two modes of signification, as well as between the architectural intentions of its
designers and the brand imperatives of its new sponsor. Negotiations on branding began in August
1960 between TAC and the designers of Pan Am's branding, Edward Larrabee Barnes and Charles
Forberg, both former students at Harvard under Gropius; Forberg was also Gropius's son in law.77
Gropius sought to defend the architectural character of the tower against the unwelcome intrusion of
billboard-like signage, arguing that "the dignity of the building" would be compromised by the large,
thirty-foot tall signs initially desired by Pan Am. 78 Trippe, on the other hand, requested that the Pan
Am name appear on each of the building's eight faceted facades. The members of TAC continued to
push to limit the branding to the north and south faces of the tower only, commensurate with the
broader scale of the facades facing up and down Park Avenue. Both sides agreed in May 1961 to a
compromise in which the Pan Am name would appear on the north and south facades while its
75 Ibid. On Jack Cotton as an investor in the Grand Central City project, see "Britain's Energetic Investor," Architectural
Record (January 1960): 14-16 and Clausen, "Wolfson Financing," Pan Am: 86-88.
76 Gutheim et al., "The Corporate Client": 106. On the rise of "corporate identity" design programs and the role of the
logo in this period, see Nan Adams, "Corporate Identity as a System," Dot Zero 2 (1966): 14-21; Lester Beall,"The
Trademark: A Graphic Summation of Individuality," TRADEMARKS/USA, exhibition catalogue (Chicago: Society of
Typographic Arts, 1968); "Walter McQuade, "The Search for Corporate Identity," Fortune (December 1970): 140-141.
On the relationships between corporate identity programs and art practices in this period, see Caroline Jones, "Frank
Stella: Executive Artist," in Machine in the Studio: Constructing the Postwar American Artist (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1996): 114-188; Buzz Spector, Objects and Logotypes: Relationships between Minimalist Art and Corporate
Design (Chicago: Renaissance Society at the University of Chicago, 1980).
77 Forberg married Ati Gropius, the adopted daughter of Walter and Ise, in 1947; the couple later divorced. In 1981 Ati
Gropius married the architect John M. Johansen, a student at Harvard under Walter Gropius from 1939 to 1942.
78 Memorandum, August 1960, cited in Clausen, Pan Am: 138. Both sides eventually agreed to fifteen-foot tall signage.
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globe symbol, designed by Barnes and Forberg, would appear on the building's shorter east and west
sides. 79 Gropius continued to insist that these signs remain visibly independent of the architectural
elements of the building, protesting to Roth and Wolfson that a proposal to install the globes flush
with the vertical mullions on the east and west facades would give the tower the appearance of a
billboard. 80 As built, the lack of coordination between the architecture of the tower and the Pan Am
branding was particularly evident on these east and west faces, where the radius of the globes
extended below the band of the mechanical floors at the top of the tower to overlap with the lintel
that separated this band from the office floors underneath. (Fig. 4.25) Combined with the redesign
of the tower's roof to accommodate a heliport well after the building was already under construction
-an alteration that, as Gropius wrote, "destroys the effect of the open [vertical] mullions silhouetted
against the sky" that had been a prominent feature of the 1958 rendering-the result was an
awkward compromise between signage, mechanical, and facade elements at the building's roofline.81
If more fundamental changes to the building's profile and orientation had failed to fully shift
Grand Central City from the appearance of a speculative building to the iconicity of a prestige
building, the Pan Am signage constituted a retrospective attempt to transmute its architecture into a
signature image, one that would henceforth represent its major tenant rather than its developer or
investors. In this sense, these symbols essentially formed a communicative bridge that was required
to mask the gap between the underlying financial structure of the project and its public expression.
This need for the building's naming to perform as a brand-image began even before the design of the
Pan Am logo had been settled, as evidenced by the generic typeface used in advertisements and
model photographs of the building prior to the design of the final Pan Am font by Barnes and
79 Memorandum, May 1961, cited in Clausen, Pan Am: 196-199.
80 Walter Gropius, letter to Emery Roth and Erwin S. Wolfson, cited in Clausen, Pan Am: 196-199.
81 Clausen, Pan Am: 196-199.
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Forberg.82 (Fig. 4.26) Beyond the addition of the heliport, the only other exterior expression of Pan
Am's corporate identity, later branding efforts extended to the building's interior spaces, including
the Pan Am ticketing office and communications center, also designed by Barnes and Forberg and, at
the level of public art, through Richard Lippold's sculpture, titled "Flight," installed in 1963.83
Marvel or Monster?
Further problems in the reception of the final design for Pan Am were caused by persistent
ambiguities regarding the building's authorship. While the solicitation of Gropius and Belluschi was
intended to give an intellectual stamp to the future development of the project through the addition
of these names, it remained unclear to critics how to assign authorship over the project between
Emery Roth & Sons, Gropius, TAC, and Belluschi. This consortium was alternately described as
consisting of three co-equal designers (with Richard Roth standing in for the Emery Roth & Sons
firm), or as a corporate firm advised by two academic practitioners, or as a joint effort of two team-
based firms (Emery Roth & Sons and TAC) along with a professional consultant (Belluschi). Some
sources, like Architectural Forum, initially described the team as wholly subsidiary to Wolfson rather
82 The large-scale cutaway model of Grand Central City, built by Norman Briskman, was originally displayed to the
public in Grand Central Terminal prior to the Pan Am branding in November 1959 and appeared in photographs in
various other media without the logo, as for example in Andreas Feininger's photographs of Gropius, Roth, and Wolfson
with a similar model in February 1959. See "Model of Grand Central City Shown," The New York Times, November 3,
1959: 35. A similar (possibly the same) model subsequently appeared with Pan Am branding, but with a generic typeface
for the Pan Am name, in photographs of Wolfson and Trippe following their agreement in September 1960 and
thereafter. See for example "Sky-High Deal For a Skyscraper": 140. The 1962 Real Estate Forum issue on Pan Am
included numerous advertisements and images that indiscriminately mixed renderings, drawings, and photographs with
no branding, the generic typeface, and the final Pan Am font and logotype. On Briskman, the Grand Central City
model, and other models designed for Pan Am, see "Building Models [All] Business," The Times Record, August 9, 1960:
12; Jane Jacobs, "The Miniature Boom," Architectural Record (May 1958): 106-111, 196.
83 Lippold was criticized on much the same grounds as TAC for his involvement with Pan Am, as an artist willingly
complicit with corporate interests. See Alice T. Friedman, "Through the Network of Wires: Portsmouth Abbey, Richard
Lippold, and Postwar Syncretism," Interiors, Vol. 6, No. 3 (2015): 235-258.
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than authors as such, referring to a more equivalent "three-man 'advisory panel of architects"' in
service to the developer.84
These ambiguities of authorship were in evidence on multiple registers within the development
of Pan Am, owing not just to the structure of this three-way consortium but to the nature of the
entities involved. As we have seen, the collaborative model of TAC and the discursive binary of
Gropius and TAC themselves presented critical problems for Pan Am, as with other work by the
firm. So, too, did the relative anonymity of the Roth partnership and its large-scale organization,
even as Richard Roth was occasionally called upon to serve as a voice for this corporate body.85 TAC
and Belluschi had both previously collaborated as team members on large-scale projects, particularly
for the Back Bay Center in Boston (1953), an air-rights development that shared a number of similar
features with the later Pan Am project.86 Nor did Belluschi, the lone individual designer among the
group, present a conventional image of architectural authorship. While Belluschi seemed to represent
the figure of Gropius's "primadonna" architect-a "fiercely ambitious" designer who, though he
relied on a support staff to execute his designs,"rarely acknowledged the participation of others in his
work"-his methods for achieving this control in practice were complicated by his specialization as
an architectural consultant to other design firms after leaving his Portland office in 1951. In contrast
to TAC's holistic approach, Belluschi's firm had been hierarchically organized, "highly stratified and
staffed by skilled architects who worked for him under his supervision, with [Belluschi] firmly in
84 "Gropius and Belluschi Advise On Grand Central Tower Design": 47.
85 See Roth, "High Rise Down to Earth" and "The Forces That Shaped Park Avenue," Perspecta 8 (1963): 97-102.
86 Clausen claims that "The impact of the Pan Am project as a whole on the TAC office-its size, organization, direction,
and reputation-which, my sense is, was profound, has not been examined." Clausen, Pan Am: 397, note 119. While it
is clear that Pan Am was important for the expanding TAC office in the early 1960s, such claims ignore the context of
TAC's work in these years. As discussed in Chapter 5, TAC's commission to design the University of Baghdad in 1957 far
exceeded Pan Am both in program and in the international logistics required to execute it, requiring, for example, the
opening of a branch office in Rome in 1959. So too, TAC had begun to gain significant commissions in Germany and
elsewhere in Europe after its Interbau housing block (1956) and the U.S. Embassy in Athens (1959). While it is beyond
the scope of this chapter to explore the specific impact of the Pan Am project on the functioning of the office, it is more
likely that the combination of these various international commissions, combined with Pan Am in the U.S., had a far
greater importance for the structure of the TAC office in these years.
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control," a model of organization that Belluschi conceived of as "like an SOM in miniature."87 After
beginning his tenure as dean at MIT in 1951, however, Belluschi-who later declared that he had
"had enough of this 'business' of architecture" at the time-gave up his practice, transferring his
Portland office to SOM and choosing to specialize as an architectural consultant to other design
firms. 88 While the shift may have been intended to consolidate Belluschi's authorial control over the
design aspects of buildings as distinct from their execution, this specialization presented the
contradictory image of a signature architect placed in a subsidiary role within larger project teams
like that of Grand Central City. In this sense, despite Wolfson's explicit attempt to leverage their
reputations to create an imprimatur for the project, neither Gropius nor Belluschi offered an easy
image of creative genius to critics who sought to situate Pan Am among the signature towers rising in
midtown Manhattan.
Unsurprisingly given this distributed authorship, both contemporary and later writing on Pan
Am revealed difficulties in assigning agency over the design decisions that determined the tower's
final form. Some authors-particularly those in business magazines and real estate publications-
continued to describe the project as primarily a product of Emery Roth & Sons, even after the arrival
of Gropius and Belluschi. Other accounts emphasized the role of Belluschi, even while
acknowledging that he abandoned a significant role in the project relatively early.89 Numerous critics
identified the tower above all with Gropius, seeking to situate it as the third in a trio of towers
associated with the European modernist masters in New York City in the 1950s.90 Few gave
87 Clausen, Pan Am: 70.
88 Ibid. The SOM quote is from "Interview: Pietro Belluschi": 122. Belluschi claimed his Portland office had around
thirty employees prior to its transfer to SOM. Ibid. On Belluschi's specialization as a consultant, see Meredith L.
Clausen, Pietro Belluschi: Modern American Architect (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999): 198 ff.
89 In this respect, it is significant that Meredith Clausen was Belluschi's biographer prior to writing The Pan Am Building
and the Shattering ofthe Modernist Dream, the only dedicated book on the history of the project.
90 The others were the Seagram Building, designed by the office of Ludwig Mies van der Rohe with Philip Johnson
(1958), and the United Nations complex (1952), designed by the office of Wallace K. Harrison following notorious
disputes over its authorship with Le Corbusier, a member of the international Board of Design Consultants convened for
the project.
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significant attention to the role of The Architects Collaborative other than as a subsidiary to Gropius,
often through the typical locution of "Walter Gropius with TAC," giving the elder partner primacy
over the firm.91
These authorial difficulties were compounded by the changing stakes of TAC and Belluschi's
involvement with the development of the project after 1958. According to Meredith Clausen, the
contract that Gropius and Belluschi signed with Wolfson in June 1958 designated Gropius as
"'leader' and final arbiter of the design" for Grand Central City, as primus inter pares within the
team. 92 Clausen ascribes this decision both to the presence of the TAC team and to the shared belief,
articulated by both TAC and Belluschi prior to 1958, that individual authority to make final
decisions was required as a counter to teamwork-a principle all the more important here given the
role of Wolfson's preferred architects, Emery Roth & Sons, within the team. 93 Indeed, Clausen cites
Richard Roth, Jr. on the Roth firm's hope that TAC and Belluschi's input would be largely limited to
the four-month schematic design phase, to be finished by December 1, 1958.94 In fact, Gropius and
TAC gained agency as the project developed while Belluschi's decreased, a fact that was evident in
subsequent publicity photos of the project's ostensible authors. (Fig. 4.27) According to Roth, Jr.,
after a few months Belluschi "just left" the project, remaining as a critic but abdicating a more
91 Other TAC partners that were heavily involved with Pan Am included Norman C. Fletcher and Alex Cvijanovic, who
wrote the project description for Pan Am in the Walter Gropius Archive. See Cvijanovic, "Pan American World Airlines
Building, New York City," in John C. Harkness, ed., Walter Gropius Archive, Vol 4: 1945-1969, The Work of The Architects
Collaborative (New York and London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1991): 352-353.
92 Grand Central Building, Inc., letter to Walter Gropius, representing The Architects Collaborative, and Pietro
Belluschi, July 18, 1958, cited in Clausen, Pan Am: 397, note 119.
93 Clausen chooses to identify this joint belief with Belluschi alone, ascribing it to his business sense rather than to TAC's
statements on the creative need for individual decision-making as a counterpart to group criticism: "Gropius... equipped
with an office as Belluschi was not, was to have the final word on design, as in their words (most likely Belluschi's) it had
'been proven good business practice to have the design decision made by one person as the coordinator."' Clausen, Pan
Am: 60. Further, she incorrectly claims that the principle of individual decision-making following group criticism at TAC
was only articulated after the Pan Am project, using this assessment-possibly based on her reliance on The Architects
Collaborative 1945-1965 (1966) as a source of statements on the firm's methods-to suggest that this method was only
"adopted as a wise procedure as a result of the experience with Belluschi" at Pan Am. As discussed in detail in Chapter 2,
articles on TAC as early as 1947 described the firm's internal rule of assigning one partner with final responsibility to each
project, as well as the structure of group criticism and decision-making in the weekly partners' meetings.
94 Interview with Richard Roth, Jr., May 25, 1994, cited in Clausen, Pan Am: 61 and 376, note 100.
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significant role in the final design work, while, in Belluschi's words, Gropius and TAC "took over." 95
Paradoxically, Clausen ascribes this to the refusal of Belluschi, the auteur, to fight for control and
credit within the team-based structure of Grand Central City, contrasting this to the supposedly
"headstrong, assertive, domineering personality" of Gropius, the proselytizer of non-hierarchical
collaboration. 96
Despite initial claims such as those of Architectural Forum that TAC and Belluschi's input on
the Grand Central City scheme would be limited to "Some changes... in the preliminary plans," the
arrival of TAC and Belluschi instead triggered a fundamental redesign of the massing, orientation,
and appearance of the project. 97 Designed to shift the signification of the tower as a corporate
emblem, these modifications would have equally profound consequences for both Pan Am's urban
impacts and its subsequent reception. Yet the result of the team members' shifting roles was a
sequence of design decisions that could not easily be ascribed to a single set of authorial intentions,
yet which were expected nevertheless to cohere aesthetically and urbanistically. he desire to rotate
the tower ninety degrees to face Park Avenue has been credited to Gropius, though how this choice
was made within the TAC team remains unclear.98 Clausen claims the Roth office was initially
resistant to this reorientation, citing the increased structural and logistical costs for the tower to span
additional railway tracks across Park Avenue as outweighing the benefits of orienting more of the
interior office spaces panoramic to views up and down Park Avenue. In contrast, TAC principals Alex
Cvijanovic and Norman Fletcher both later credited Belluschi with the octagonal faceting of the
tower, ascribing this to a desire to reduce the visual bulk of the tower by breaking up its profile. 99 To
similar ends, TAC was credited with the idea to express the mechanical floors via windows recessed
95 Cited in Clausen, Pan Am: Chapter 1, note 126.
96 Ibid., 104.
97 "Gropius and Belluschi advise on Grand Central tower design": 47.
98 Clausen, Pan Am: 98 ff.
99 Cvijanovic, "Pan American World Airlines Building, New York City": 352. Clausen credits Belluschi for the octagonal
profile, and describes his interest in the contemporary Pirelli building, including his suggestion to Wolfson to visit the
building on a trip to Europe.
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behind the tower's perimeter columns, breaking the tower's shaft vertically into thirds.1 00 The
appropriate scale of the facades for these revisions in the tower's profile and direction, however, was
apparently subject to disagreement between TAC and Belluschi. According to Cvijanovic, Gropius
and TAC favored a more forceful, plastic exterior treatment to match the visual prominence of the
reoriented tower and, perhaps, to differentiate the building at the far scale from the glass curtain
walls that increasingly surrounded it along Park Avenue. Clausen claims that Belluschi preferred a
"more lacy, finely textured" facade with smaller windows to offset the bulk of the tower, a decision to
which Gropius eventually agreed. The detailed design of the building's facades, based on a system of
precast "Mo-Sai" concrete and quartz panels, was subsequently developed by TAC with Belluschi's
input.101 (Fig. 4.28)
The inability to identify authorial intent with the various features of Pan Am's final form gave
ammunition to the idea that its signature qualities were simply copied, second-rate versions of other
signature precedents. Contemporary authors typically ascribed the building's form either to the
contemporary example of the Torre Pirelli in Milan (Gio Ponti with Pier Luigi Nervi and Arturo
Danusso, 1950-58), well publicized in the international architectural press around the time of TAC
and Belluschi's first involvement with the Grand Central project in 1958, or further back to the
faceted, hexagonal office tower projected by Le Corbusier for Algiers (c. 1936-38), as part of the cite
d'affaires he proposed in various versions following his Plan Obus of 1933-34.102 (Le Corbusier's
interest in the free-standing, six-sided slab continued after World War II in his town plan and civic
100 Clausen, Pan Am: 98 f.
101 Ibid., 100 and note 39.
102 A profile of the Pirelli Tower was published in Architectural Record in December 1956, and certainly would have been
known to TAC and Belluschi thereafter. The building subsequently appeared in mainstream U.S. and British journals
including Progressive Architecture (September 1959), Architectural Design (December 1960), Architectural Forum
(February 1961), and Architectural Review (March 1961). The project had appeared previously in European journals
beginning with Domus in March 1956 and continuing thereafter in Baumeister, lArchitecture dAujourdhui, Werk,
Zodiac, Casabella, and numerous other sources. In turn, the faceted, octagonal slab of Portland House, in London
(Howard Fairbairn & Partners) may have taken inspiration from Pan Am. Construction began in 1960, and the project
was completed in 1963. The first proposal for Portland House was circa 1956, but may have been modified after. See
"Portland House," Concrete Quarterly, No. 57 (Summer 1963).
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center for St. Die, c. 1945, which was also published in U.S. architectural journals.)1 03 (Fig. 4.29-
4.30) Douglas Haskell, for example, viewed Pan Am's faceted profile not as evidence of authorial
intent but rather as a derivative formal device, citing this seeming unoriginality as proof of the
corporate character of Pan Am's design. Haskell wrote that the building's prismatic form only
demonstrated that "once again a speculative job has been imitative rather than enterprising, for this
creation on the best corner of New York is really a clumsy copy of a Le Corbusier building of 1931
[sic], enlarged and wrapped in a bear rug." He thus regarded the building's octagonal shape as
evidence of its architects' "self-betrayal" in copying this Corbusian prototype, though he conceded
that the resulting form "does have a vivid presence, being a shape scarce in New York."1 04
Yet the provenance of Pan Am's profile was more complex than mere copyism would suggest.
Both TAC, and TAC and Belluschi jointly, had previously proposed multiple projects involving
faceted, slab-like towers as far back as 1952, suggesting that the design of Pan Am was less an
example derived from other sources than a reflection of these architects' interests in finding a tower
form that would be memorable enough to function as an adequate visual terminus for the Grand
Central City complex. The most immediate precedent for both the specific complexities of the Pan
Am site and the form of its tower was the Back Bay Center scheme for Boston, developed in 1953 by
a consortium of TAC, Belluschi, Walter F. Bogner, Carl Koch & Associates, and Hugh Stubbins Jr.105
(Fig. 4.31) Both the context and the design of the Back Bay project shared striking similarities with
the economic and physical determinants of Pan Am. It was an early example of air-rights
development over rail and automobile lines, a crucial feature of the constraints that later governed
103 The St. Die project was published in Architectural Record (October 1946): 78-80 and Domus (June 1953): 1-6.
104 Haskell, "The Lost New York of the Pan American Airways Building": 110-111.
105 On the Back Bay Center, see "Firm Organized to Build Back Bay Civic Center," The Christian Science Monitor, May
22, 1953: 2; W. Clifford Harvey, "Hynes Bids Bostonians Aid Civic Center," The Christian Science Monitor, September
11, 1953: 1; Harvey, "Proposed Boston Center Acclaimed for Design," The Christian Science Monitor, January 29, 1954:
11; Walter F. Bogner, "The Boston Back Bay Center Project: General Description of Project" and Hugh Stubbins Jr.,
"The Process of Design," Journal ofArchitectural Education, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring 1955): 43-44; "Boston Center,"
Architectural Forum (November 1953): 104-115; "Boston's Back Bay Center for Stevens Development Corporation,"
Architectural Record (October 1953): 143 ff.; "Proposed Back Bay Center Development for Stevens Development
Corporation," Progressive Architecture (January 1954): 73-86.
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the Grand Central site. The project was designed to be built over the freight yard of the Boston &
Albany Railroad, a subsidiary of the New York Central Railroad company whose decision to sell its
parcels around Grand Central would instigate the building boom along Park Avenue and the
development of Grand Central City. Furthermore, the developer for the Back Bay Center, Roger L.
Stevens of the Stevens Development Company, would be designated along with Zeckendorf in 1955
as the real estate agent for the New York Central in the sale and development of its land holdings
around Grand Central. 106 The Back Bay Center complex would have had a total scale close to that of
Pan Am, with 1.4 million feet of offices and 900,000 square feet of retail space.1 07 Like Pan Am, the
project was anchored by a slab-like, polygonal tower (hexagonal rather than octagonal in this case),
placed directly over and oriented perpendicular to the line of the incoming transit lines so as to be
visible at a distance for travelers entering Boston by highway. 108 Both the Pan Am and Back Bay
towers were thus oriented to face the longest urban axis in each case, presenting themselves as
monumental forms at the urban scale.
While Belluschi has commonly been credited with suggesting the octagonal form of the tower
as a means of reducing its visual bulk, the joint involvement of both Belluschi and TAC in the Back
Bay Center lends weight to the notion of sympathy between both consultants on this aspect of the
design. Furthermore, an earlier TAC project shows that the office was already interested in the
potentials of a faceted slab as an urban form prior to the Back Bay project. In its design for the
106 Clausen, Pan Am: 44.
107 W Clifford Harvey, "Hynes Bids Bostonians Aid Civic Center," The Christian Science Monitor, September 11, 1953:
1.
108 On air-rights precedents in this period, see David Gissen, "Megastructures and Environmental Gentrification," in
Manhattan Atmospheres: Architecture, the Interior Environment, and Urban Crisis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 2014): 29-66 and Elihu Rubin, Insuring the City: The Prudential Center and the Postwar Urban Landscape (New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2012). Like the Back Bay Center and the Prudential Center, the project
eventually built on the Back Bay site, Pan Am became a precedent for subsequent air-rights projects in other cities.
Wolfson and Jack Cotton joined again while Pan Am was in construction to propose an air-rights development flanking
Union Station in Chicago, over the rail tracks of the Chicago Union Station Company. See Thomas Buck, "Skyscrapers
Planned on Air Rights Site," Chicago Daily Tribune, July 20, 1961: 3 and Austin C. Wehrwein, "Air Right Project Slated
in Chicago," The New York Times, July 20, 1961: 43. Haskell, "The Lost New York of the Pan American Airways
Building" discusses previous precedents in NYC for multi-level (if not strictly air-rights) large-scale developments,
particularly Rockefeller Center and the original Grand Central development.
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headquarters of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (AAAS) in Washington, D.C. in 1952,
TAC proposed a slab-like, six-sided office building that was shaped to fit the irregular polygon of the
site.10 9 (Fig. 4.32) John C. Harkness described the faceting of the building to fit the site as being of
particular interest to Gropius, as a solution that placed "greater emphasis on the urban context as a
generator of the form of the building" versus rectilinear and triangular schemes that were also tested
by the office.' 1 0 Unlike Back Bay and Pan Am, the long facades of the slab were here oriented along
the street rather than facing the long axis of Massachusetts Avenue, perhaps constrained by required
setbacks on the irregularly-shaped site.
Following the Back Bay and AAAS projects, TAC's interest in the faceted slab continued in
their unbuilt scheme for a proposed Government Center in Boston in late 1958, coincident with the
firm's initial involvement with Pan Am and just prior to the subsequent planning of the Government
Center area by Adams, Howard & Greeley (1959) that was later developed by I. M. Pei &
Partners.III On the same site for which TAC would later design the John F Kennedy Federal
Building (1961-66), the firm again proposed the hexagonal slab form for a private office building, in
this case oriented perpendicular to the primary view facing the Boston waterfront, hemmed in by
civic and retail buildings on three sides. (Fig. 4.33) Within the developed Government Center plan
after 1961, the federal office building that TAC designed on the same site was reoriented ninety
degrees to face the open plaza in front of Boston City Hall, now facing the major axis of arrival from
Congress Street.1 1 2
109 The site, on Scott Circle, is incorrectly described as being on Dupont Circle by in the Walter Gropius Archive. A
building for the AAAS was ultimately built on the same site by Faulkner, Kingsbury, and Stenhouse in 1955.
110 John C. Harkness, ed., Walter Gropius Archive, Vol 4: 59.
111 See "New Plan for Oldest Boston: Architect's Version of Proposed Government Center," The Christian Science
Monitor, October 15, 1958: 1; "TAC Proposes Government Center for Boston," Progressive Architecture (December
1958): 33.
112 The story of the repositioning and reorientation of the JFK tower from the schematic version included in the Pei
master plan, in dialogue between Gropius, Fletcher, and Henry N. Cobb of Pei & Partners, is told in Norman C.
Fletcher, "The John F. Kennedy Federal Office Building in Boston," in J. Carter Brown, ed., Federal Buildings in Context:
The Role ofDesign Review (Washington, D.C.: National Gallery of Art): 39-43. In the same volume, see also David
Crane, "The Federal Building in the Making of Boston's Government Center: A Struggle for Sovereignty in Local Design
Review": 21-38.
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'This lineage of projects reflects TAC's developing interest throughout the 1950s in both the
office tower as a type and the faceted slab as a monumental urban form." 3 While the hexagonal
profiles of these towers and their urban orientation clearly took inspiration from Le Corbusier's
Algiers and St. Die projects, contemporary accusations of copyism by architectural critics both
undermined the interests that TAC and Belluschi invested in the project and, perhaps, betrayed an
inability to evaluate these formal aspects of the project in the absence of clear statements of authorial
intention among the various collaborators. Even the most proximate source for Pan Am's form, the
Pirelli Tower in Milan-completed in 1958 and published in American architecture journals after
1956, two years before TAC's involvement at Pan Am-was insufficient for explaining the utility of
the faceted profile as a specific solution to the Grand Central site. (Fig. 4.34) The shift from the
hexagonal shape of TAC and Belluschi's previous tower projects to the octagonal form of Pan Am can
perhaps best be explained as a formal acknowledgment of its singular site, with four facades oriented
axially to the four street directions faced by the tower, interpolated by four diagonal, chamfered
facades. A comparison of the floor plans of the towers makes clear that the basic organization of
Pirelli, a prestige building that was itself conceived as a modification of U.S. office prototypes, was
essentially unavailable in the case of a speculative office building at the scale of Pan Am, requiring its
small circulation cores to be pushed to the edges of the floor plates in order to enable such a slender
profile. In this sense, Pan Am shares more in common with the earlier prototype of Le Corbusier's
Algiers tower, similarly based on central elevator cores oriented parallel to the shorter dimension of
the slab and surrounded by open floor plates. (Fig. 4.35)
3 This lineage of projects additionally goes against Meredith Clausen's claim that Gropius and TAC had not worked on
office tower projects before or were "out of touch" with American business. This is particularly true in the case of the
Back Bay Center, a large-scale development similar in scope to Pan Am which continued for three years before falling
victim to Stevens' inability to gain favorable tax abatements from the City of Boston for the scheme. This lineage also
includes TAC's unbuilt proposal for the McCormick office building in Chicago (1953). The fact that these projects
remained unbuilt is not, in itself, evidence for the notion that Gropius lacked engagement with U.S. business concerns.
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Appearance or Disappearance
Compounded with the anonymity of its corporate patronage, these ambiguities of authorship and
influence over the major features of Pan Am's design contributed to the project's unsettling lack of
resolution in the public eye. Critics of the building pointed repeatedly to these perceptual difficulties
in assessing the overall effects of Pan Am's massing, orientation, profile, scale, and design details. The
project was commonly judged to be alternately too monumental in scale or too small in detail and in
its urban and architectural ambitions, overscaled in mass and underscaled in its textured facades,
both prominent foreground and relentless background.11 4 While contemporary articles regularly
employed terms like "giant," "behemoth," and "monster" to describe the building as it neared
completion, for example, Douglas Haskell regarded the project's corporate imperatives as
insufficiently ambitious for the monumental urban potential of the Grand Central site. 1 5 "Actually
what is wrong with Pan Am is not that it is so very big or that it might produce extreme congestion
or that the forces which produced it are so very formidable," Haskell wrote, but rather "The trouble
is, on the contrary, that its underlying ideas are so inadequately small, and are formed to the lowliest
kind of business imagination." 1 6 Similarly, in The Heart of Our Cities, architect and urbanist Victor
Gruen described Pan Am as a "disappearing" monument, despite its massive scale and expense. In
"Appearance or Disappearance? That Is The Question," Gruen elaborated his conviction that sheer
physical or economic scale were not in themselves synonymous with effect, defining urban
appearance as "the inherent quality of an object itself plus its impact on those who experience the
114 Rem Koolhaas later recognized the paradoxical nature of Pan Am in precisely these terms, describing the building as
"both unavoidable and hard to locate.... a disappearing act, an apotheosis of background." Koolhaas, "Eno/abling
Architecture," in Robert E. Somol, ed., Autonomy and Ideology: Positioning an Avant-garde in America (New York: The
Monacelli Press, 1997): 292-299.
11 See Stanley, "Genesis of a Giant"; James T. Burns, Jr., "The Pan Am Building: A Behemoth is Born," Progressive
Architecture (April 1963): 61-62; Ada Louise Huxtable, "Marvel or Monster? Grand Central City is Mass Architecture,"
The New York Times, January 24, 1960: X13.
116 Haskell, "The Lost New York of the Pan American Airways Building": 108.
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object through their senses." 117 Speculative office buildings, particularly designed via group
authorship, was particularly susceptible to such accusations of failure in achieving a meaningful-
that is, perceptible-impact on their urban surroundings, regardless of their scale or specific design
features. Viewed in these terms, Gruen regarded Pan Am as a monumental failure of planning and
execution, writing that
The new Pan American building in Manhattan, with its 2,000,000 [sic] square feet of building
area, is the largest office building ever constructed. It has not improved the appearance of
Manhattan: rather, it has diminished it, and this in spite of the act that untold millions of dollars
were involved, that two of the most famous American architects (Walter Gropius and Pietro
Belluschi) were retained as design consultants, that its builder, the late Erwin S. Wolfson, was
motivated, at least to some degree, by praiseworthy aims. The fact is that by virtue of its location
this building contributes to a deterioration of those prerequisites which are vital to a city.118
The contradictions of Pan Am's ambiguous scale-at once generic and monumental, too minutely
detailed and too massive-filtered into other reviews as well. James T. Burns, Jr. noted that "The new
building forms a vast anonymous background" for Grand Central Station and the Grand Central
tower, "but at the same time dwarfs them with its intensity, making them appear insignificant."1 19
Even proponents of the building, like Mildred F. Schmertz of Architectural Record, acknowledged
"The Problem of Pan Am," pointing to the interpretive impasses of patronage, authorship, and form
117 Victor Gruen, 7he Heart of Our Cities: The Urban Crisis: Diagnosis and Cure (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964):
168.
118 Ibid., 170.
119 Burns, Jr., "The Pan Am Building: A Behemoth is Born": 62.
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that complicated critical assessments of the building.1 20 Ada Louise Huxtable also identified these
conundra in her review of the revised Grand Central City design following TAC and Belluschi's
involvement, questioning how the project should ultimately be judged: "Marvel or monster?"121
Huxtable captured the paradoxical status of Pan Am's scale and appearance in a subsequent review of
the building after its completion, describing it as "a colossal collection of minimums"-a massive
urban form built out of reductive commercial efficiencies, one whose ambiguous scale and
authorship were seemingly insufficient to overcome its status as a fundamentally anonymous
speculative building at a monumental scale.122
In attempting to reconcile the unsettling urban and architectural form of Pan Am, later
authors searched for signs of intent in Gropius's own statements on the tower form in relation to the
democratic obligations of the architect and the changing character of postwar urban life in the U.S.
Two months after signing the contract to join the Grand Central City team, Gropius argued, in "The
Curse of Conformity," for the role of the artist-architect in providing symbolic forms that could
overcome the abstract, dehumanizing aspects of an increasingly technocratic, business-oriented
society.12 3 In seeking "to find the humanized image for society's aspirations and ideals, Gropius
120 Mildred F. Schmertz, "The Problem of Pan Am," Architectural Record (May 1963): 151-158. Schmertz pointed
astutely to the contradictions of criticism that governed reviews of Pan Am upon its opening: "Newspapers whose real
estate pages are models of indifference to the social and esthetic implications of the events they report have given free rein
to their art critics and editorial writers, who have been blasting away at Pan Am with holy zeal.... All have pronounced
the building ugly, of course, for how could it be otherwise? This universal disparagement of Pan Am is extremely
unfortunate for two important reasons. The journalistic criticism it so far has received does not contribute to anyone's
understanding of the real forces which shape cities and buildings. To understand all is not necessarily to forgive all, but to
know more is to cope better, and the economic and social dynamics behind Pan Am should be better comprehended by
both citizen and architect. As serious as the failure of this type of criticism to educate is its unfairness to the architects of
the Pan Am Building, Walter Gropius, Pietro Belluschi and Richard Roth, and to its late owner, Erwin Wolfson. If a
painting or sculpture fails as a work of art, it fails as a thing of consequence, excuses are irrelevant, and it does not deserve
our regard. If a building is less than a total aesthetic success, however, it may be a brilliant compromise with
incontrovertible forces which reasonable criticism must consider. Pan Am is such a brilliant compromise." Ibid., 153.
121 Huxtable, "Marvel or Monster?": X19.
122 Ada Louise Huxtable, "Architecture Stumbles On: Recent Buildings Are Nothing Much to Brag About," The New
York Times, April 14, 1963: 119.
123 Walter Gropius, "The Curse of Conformity," The Saturday Evening Post, September 6, 1958: 18-19, 51-52, 54. This
text was subsequently published as "Unity in Diversity" in Gropius, Apollo in the Democracy: The Cultural Obligation of
the Architect (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968): 21-32.
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wrote, "By virtue of his ability to give visible symbols to significant order, the artist may once again
become society's seer and mentor, and as custodian of its conscience solve the American paradox."1 24
In grafting these philosophical statements onto Pan Am, critics sought to understand the project as
an attempt by Gropius, as singular author, to provide just such a "visual symbol" of order in the
rapidly corporatizing context of midtown Manhattan, increasingly the spatial center of the postwar
U.S. business boom.
A text by Gropius on the project in the year prior to its opening, "The Pan Am Building in its
Urbanistic Context,"125 seemed to provide evidence for this one-to-one relationship between
intention and realization. (Fig. 4.36) In it, Gropius reiterated the idea that "We have to invent our
own significant standards of beauty by creating a new urbanistic order from the realities of American
life."1 26 Citing the changing character of the area as it became "a commercial center of big
corporations," Gropius wrote that in accepting the Grand Central City commission, "The
unbalanced appearance of the present Park Avenue called for the creation of a strong point of
reference for the unbalanced building masses" that increasingly crowded the Grand Central site.1 27
Two years after the completion of Pan Am, Gropius described the use of scale to control the visual
form of buildings in terms that recalled TAC's push to reorient the tower to create a sufficiently
prominent form in its urban setting. "The effect of a building will be intense," Gropius wrote,
124 Gropius,"Unity in Diversity": 32.
125 Though Gropius made similar arguments for Pan Am in quotes and correspondence that appeared in other articles in
these years, the text in Real Estate Forum, a professional trade magazine, seems not to have gained traction in architectural
or public press in these years. Neither this issue of Real Estate Forum nor Gropius's text, for example, are cited in
Clausen's otherwise comprehensive list of publications on Pan Am in this period. Gropius's essay appears to be quoted in
Schmertz, 157, though without attributing the written source.
126 Walter Gropius, "The Pan Am Building in its Urbanistic Context," Real Estate Forum, Sept. 30, 1962: 61.
127 Ibid., 60. In a text inset below the Gropius essay, Paul Zucker, a professor at the New School who had defended Pan
Am in a conference there in 1961, similarly praised its monumental scale as providing a "unifying factor" and a necessary
"point of reference" in its urban context. Clausen cites Gropius's correspondence in March 1961 requesting Zucker to
write an article in defense of the project, yet claims incorrectly that "there is no evidence that Zucker ever wrote or
published the article." Clausen, Pan Am: 193-194.
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only when all requirements for human scale have been fulfilled for any potential distance or
point of view. From far away the silhouette of a building should be simple so that it can be
grasped as a symbol even by an ever-so-primitive spectator.... When we approach more closely,
we start to distinguish protruding and receding parts of a building, and their shadows will serve
as scale regulators for the new distance. And finally, standing close by and no longer able to see
the whole edifice, the eye should be attracted by new surprises in the form of refined details and
textures. 128
Read in these terms, the changes made by the TAC team to the form of the tower-reorienting it to
face the long Vista of Park Avenue in order to restore the visual balance with the corporate buildings
rising around it-seemed to confirm the desire to make Pan Am transcend its status as a speculative
building to function as an urban icon. Despite the presence of more pragmatic arguments for these
design changes, including the real estate benefits of improving views from the building as well as
simplifying the layout of its floor plates, critical reception has focused less on these prosaic concerns
-which would require a greater attention to the role of TAC and Emery Roth & Sons in the design
process-than on reinforcing the imprimatur of Gropius by emphasizing Pan Am's status as an
emblem not just of its clients, but of U.S. commercial and technological culture at large.
The interpretation of Pan Am has been burdened by the paradox of reconciling such
statements by Gropius on overcoming the corporatization of urban life with the building's history as
a speculative enterprise, built to satisfy the profit motives of a commercial developer and later
branded by a multinational corporate tenant. For Manfredo Tafuri, this misalignment between
theory and practice constituted proof of the decline of Gropius's authorial and sociological
commitment in the postwar context, as an architect willing "to legitimize with his signature
ostentatious urban paradoxes like the Pan American Building of 1958."129 In this view, buildings like
Pan Am served as crucibles for the complicity or resistance of architects in facing the cultural
128 "Architectural Details: Walter Gropius," Architectural Record (February 1965): 133. Compare this with James T.
Burns, Jr.'s negative assessment of these differences in near and far scale at Pan Am: "Since the building sits on a crowded
site, one must get some distance away in order to see it as a whole. Then it becomes apparent that the precast, three-
dimensional elements introduced onto the facade to give interesting effects of light and shadow blend into each other to
give the impression of just another curtain wall." Burns, Jr., "The Pan Am Building: A Behemoth is Born": 62.
129 Manfredo Tafuri and Francesco Dal Co, Modern Architecture (Milan: Electa, 1976): 307.
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contradictions of postwar capitalism, a test that Tafuri identified with their attitudes toward the U.S.
skyscraper as a fundamentally mute expression of these forces within the city. Citing Gropius and
Adolf Meyer's entry for the Chicago Tribune Tower competition of 1922, Tafuri claimed that "It is
the indifference of the skyscraper which Gropius [sic] understands as the ultimate reality and that, in
spite of everything, he tries to defy." 130 In the case of the Tribune tower, Tafuri argued, this was
achieved through a syncopated rhythm of projections and recessions within the facade, "articulations
that make every attempt to restore a communicative dimension to this structure, in itself indifferent
and completely inarticulate."131 (Fig. 4.37) In applying this framework to Pan Am, critics searched
for an authorial position on the corporate imperatives of the office building through these decisions
concerning the scale and visual prominence of the building, ultimately condemning the project, and
its architects, for the inability to make the tower "speak" in its urban setting. Anna Vallye has
summarized the consequences of this interpretive dialectic for the status of both author and building,
writing that "Nowhere had the thematics of form and disappearance around the figure of Gropius
coalesced more publicly and with greater symbolic force than in the "travesty" of the Pan Am (later
MetLife) Building." 132 As Vallye notes, the range of responses to the building tended to reinforce "an
irresolvable conflict between form and its negation, vision and its occlusion," restating these formal
and interpretive dialectics under different guises: appearance or disappearance, muteness versus
130 Manfredo Tafuri, "The Disenchanted Mountain: The Skyscraper and the City," in Giorgio Cucci, Francesco Dal Co,
Mario Manieri-Elia, Tafuri, The American City: From the Civil War to the New Deal (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1979): 405.
131 Ibid. Tafuri identifies the realism of Rockefeller Center development-which, as later at Grand Central City, "came
into being on the basis of an analytic study of its economic possibilities"-as marking "the end of any utopian ideal of
comprehensive public control over the urban structure," and thus as "the definitive eclipse of the 'skyscraper as an
individual," freed from the need for iconicity as with its antecedents. Yet he also identifies Rockefeller Center as a victory
for the 1916 New York City zoning law, precisely the mechanism later came under criticism at Pan Am for its
ineffectuality in preventing a large-scale development on the Grand Central site. Like Rockefeller Center, Pan Am
aligned with what Tafuri describes as "a rational organization of the constituent elements of the city-local traffic,
pedestrian traffic, underground transportation, parking, commercial areas, skyscrapers, leisure and recreation." Tafuri,
"The Disenchanted Mountain": 484-485.
132 Anna Vallye, "'A Figure Covered with Labels': The Reception of Gropius's American Work," in Design and the Politics
of Knowledge in America, 1937-1967: Walter Gropius, Gyorgy Kepes, Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University (2011): 50.
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signification, indifference versus communication, speculative building versus prestige tower,
background or foreground, marvel or monstrosity.133
The irreconcilable ambiguities of Pan Am's site, form, and authorship are evident in a
photograph that appeared three years after the building's opening in The Architects Collaborative
1945-1965, as something of a definitive view of the building in its urban setting. (Fig. 4.38) Of
unknown authorship, this image does not appear in any other press on Pan Am or publications of
TAC's work, and the evidence suggests that it was commissioned specifically for the monograph as
just this sort of definitive representation. 134 The photograph is taken from a unique position
compared to the more commonly circulated images of the building, either looking frontally down
Park Avenue, or upward from street level.1 35 Given pride of place in the monograph, the elevated
view places the building between the iconic vertical shafts of the Chrysler and Empire State buildings
behind, and the New York Central tower in front. This perspective is clearly intended to
monumentalize Pan Am, as the newest among New York City's vertical icons. Yet its profile is very
different: lower and wider, without a crown-a faceted slab rather than a slender, tiered pinnacle. It
sits uneasily among its neighbors, hovering between prominent surface and mute object, neither fully
foreground nor background. In placing Pan Am relative to these signature buildings, the photograph
suggests the critical demand for an equally iconic tower on one of the most prominent sites in the
city. At the same time, it makes clear how the wall-like mass of Pan Am was prevented from meeting
133 Ibid., 51.
134 The photograph appears uncredited in The Architects Collaborative 1945-1965. A list of photographers is included in
the back matter of the monograph, but these are not correlated to specific photographs as they appear in the book. It
may be by J. Alex Langley, whose name appears on this list, and whom the 1962 issue of Real Estate Forum lists as the
official photographer for Pan Am. Langley took various aerial photographs of the Pan Am building for LIFE Magazine
around the time this photograph may have been taken, circa June 1963. An uncropped slide of this photograph appears
uncredited in the TAC office slide library, Loeb Special Collections, Harvard Graduate School of Design. While other
photographs of Pan Am by Joseph Molitor appear in the TAC monograph and in other publications, this photograph is
not included among the negatives in the Molitor papers, Avery Architectural & Fine Arts Library, Columbia University.
135 There are only two locations from which the photograph could have been taken, offering further proof of the
intentionality of this viewpoint. Either from an upper-level roof terrace of the Waldorf-Astoria just up Park Avenue-
compare this for example with Armin Landeck, "View of New York" (1932), a lithograph that show nearly the same
perspective as the later photograph; or from the Emery Roth & Sons tower that rose just south of the Waldorf in the year
after Pan Am was completed, from which one would have nearly the same view.
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this demand by the flawed urbanistic and financial premises from which it had taken shape. In this
regard, both TAC and the consortium of firms that designed the building were uniquely ill-suited to
provide this sort of landmark. Committed to the avoidance of signature, the collaborative stakes of
its architects were fundamentally at odds with the public desire for iconicity, a paradox that would
condemn Pan Am to stand as both the apotheosis of TAC and the turning point in Gropius's status
among the modernist masters.
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Chapter 5
Bureaucracy and Genius at the University of Baghdad 1957-1983
Because there are so few technically-trained professionals in the countries concerned, there has been a great
call on technicians from the West.
-Raglan Squire1
Oil, of course, is a great historymaker these days, but only when it is converted into something constructive
does it make a real mark.
-Ise Gropius, letter to Ellen and Nizar Ali Jawdat 2
Export Practices
The steady expansion of U.S. architectural practice after the 1950s frequently followed the path of
geopolitical and economic interests abroad. As the shifting dynamics of the Cold War implicated
new territories as puzzle pieces in the global map of U.S. and Soviet influence, the newly post-
colonial states of the Arab and Persian Gulf gained importance both as potential allies within the
developmental framework of U.S. technical assistance, and as sources for the increasingly valuable
strategic currency of oil. 3 Governmental and financial aid programs like Point Four sought to embed
U.S. influence within national modernization efforts in these states, while pro-U.S. alignments like
I Raglan Squire, "Architecture in the Middle East," Architectural Design, March 1957: 74.
2 Letter from Ise Gropius to Ellen and Nizar Ali Jawdat, November 20, 1957. Harvard University, Houghton f
2013M-29.
3 The majority of oil consumed in both the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the 1950s continued to be produced from
domestic sources. The strategic interest of the U.S. in the oil resources of the Gulf lay primarily in ensuring stability of
supply to Europe within the framework of the Marshall Plan, particularly to avoid the potential consequences of political
instability caused by disruptions or dramatic price fluctuations in the supply of petroleum. For a discussion of the
objectives of the Point Four program in Iraq, see Henry Wiens, "The United States Operations Mission in Iraq," Annals
ofthe American Academy ofPolitical and Social Science, Vol. 323 (May 1959): 142-3; "The United States in the Middle
East," in James L. Gelvin, The Modern Middle East: A History, 4th ed. (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press,
2015): 300-316.
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the Baghdad Pact-established in Iraq in 1955 along with Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan as a territorial
hedge against Soviet incursion into the Middle East-competed with other transnational formations
in the region, particularly the Pan-Arabist movement embodied by the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser in
Egypt that culminated with the creation of the United Arab Republic after 1958. (Fig. 5.1) In
parallel, consortia of U.S. and European oil companies extended their interests beyond the major
prewar sources of foreign petroleum (including Venezuela, Colombia, and Indonesia) into the Arab
and Persian Gulf states after World War II. While concessions in these oil-producing territories had
often been gained by U.S. and British interests in the early twentieth century, their capacities were
only fully understood and exploited in the postwar period. 4 At the same time, these newly
independent states, freed from direct British and French control, increasingly contested and
renegotiated the terms of prewar concessions on the way to full nationalization of their oil interests,
generating lucrative new revenue streams that could be used to support ambitious national programs
of modernization and development. Such renegotiations paralleled the decline of British colonial
influences (along with British planners and architects) in favor of U.S. interests in the postwar
period, particularly under regimes whose authority was directly indebted to the British prior to
World War II (as with the Hashemite monarchies in Iraq after 1932 and Jordan after 1946) or
subsequently to the U.S. and Britain (as with the rule of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in Iran after
1953).
Foreign architects quickly came to play a crucial role within this intersection of Cold War
diplomatic entanglements, the global infrastructures of petroleum and finance, and the expanding
developmental efforts of post-colonial nations. By the mid-1960s, many of the U.S. firms established
or newly enlarged in the years immediately after World War II had gained significant commissions in
the Arab and Persian Gulf states. The expanding presence of U.S. architects in the region included
4 On the history of U.S. oil companies in the Arab and Persian Gulf, see Robert Vitalis, America's Kingdom: Mythmaking
on the Saudi Oil Frontier (New York: Verso, 2009); Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the
World 7hey Shaped (New York: Bantam Books, 1979); Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Questfor Oil, Money and Power
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991).
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projects by Sert, Jackson and Gourley (after 1955) and The Architects Collaborative (after 1957) in
Iraq; Brown Daltas & Associates (after 1957), Edward Larrabee Barnes Associates (after 1958), and
Victor Gruen International (after 1965) in Iran, and Minoru Yamasaki Associates (after 1958),
Skidmore, Owings & Merrill (after 1962), Caudill Rowlett Scott (after 1964), and Edward Durell
Stone (after 1965) in Saudi Arabia. 5 Such commissions played a fundamental role in the expansion
in size and scope of these architecture practices to become large, often corporately organized firms in
these years, including the establishment of international branch offices, as in the case of TAC in
Rome after 1959.6
In addressing the problems and the potentials of these newly competitive territories for
architectural work, U.S. firms sought both to navigate the shifting geopolitical currents particular to
each nation-including countries like Iraq, where public hostility to U.S. and other foreign
influences culminated in the coup d'etat of July 14, 1958-and to stake out differing modes of
practice that would enable them to pursue, and gain, significant commissions in the region. In
addressing the cultural, aesthetic, and technical questions particular to these new contexts, then,
aspects of the discursive and competitive terrain of practice that had marked prewar competition in
the U.S. reasserted themselves. In this landscape of position-taking, two types (or tropes) of U.S. and
European practice emerged as particularly well-suited to address the desires of governmental and
institutional clients in the Arab and Persian Gulf states. One was the figure of the signature architect,
invited to "give form" to modernizing national aspirations, often through the design of monumental
cultural complexes and new government centers, such as Le Corbusier in Chandigarh, India after
5 An initial timeline of these and other projects by U.S. architects in the Gulf states is given in Michael Kubo, "Petroleum
Power: Architecture and Oil," in Eva Franch i Gilabert, Amanda Lawrence, Ana Miljacki, Ashley Schafer, ed., OfficeUS:
Agenda (Basel: Lars Muller, 2014): 160-167.
6 These efforts were paralleled by the involvement of large architecture-construction-engineering firms in both
infrastructural and architectural work in the Arab and Persian Gulf states, including the presence of conglomerates such
as Bechtel Group, Frank E. Basil, and Metcalf & Eddy Inc. See Richard Finnie, Bechtel in Arab Lands: A Fifteenth-Year
Review ofEngineering and Construction Projects (San Francisco: Bechtel Corporation, 1958). On Bechtel's work in Saudi
Arabia, including the firm's involvement with The Architects Collaborative in the design and construction of Jubail New
Town, see Jeffrey Craig Smith, "Mega-Project Construction Management: The Corps of Engineers and Bechtel Group in
Saudi Arabia" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1991).
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1947, Frank Lloyd Wright, Le Corbusier, and Alvar Aalto in Baghdad, Iraq after 1956, and Louis I.
Kahn in Dhaka, Bangladesh after 1962.7 In contrast to such heroic figures, corporate bodies like
Skidmore, Owings & Merrill (SOM), and Caudill Rowlett Scott (CRS) pursued commissions
through the image of technically sophisticated, "expert" practice, as firms capable of building the
nation and its economic and cultural infrastructures more prosaically through universities, medical
centers, housing, urban and regional planning, military complexes, and airports, among other
projects. Some U.S. architects, like The Architects Collaborative (TAC), in effect worked across both
ends of this discursive spectrum, often gaining commissions through the genius model (as embodied
by Walter Gropius, one of the firm's founding partners), but developing them in practice through
more bureaucratic forms of organization. At the same time, the U.S. government enlisted architects
on both sides of this spectrum to build diplomatic facilities abroad, including Sert, Jackson &
Gourley's U.S. Embassy in Baghdad (1955-6 1) and Edward Larrabee Barnes's U.S. Embassy in
Tabriz, Iran (1958-66), while U.S. companies like Hilton and InterContinental mirrored these
geopolitical agendas through international hotels that sought to promote the virtues of American
culture abroad. 8
In competing to participate in national modernization in the Arab and Persian Gulf states,
U.S. architects encountered cultural and technical issues that would challenge both the changing
nature of their practices and the universalizing rhetoric of architectural modernism in relation to
these efforts. In their assessment of the course of modern architecture in the Middle East, Sandy
7 Le Corbusier, for example, wrote with regard to his Olympic stadium and sports complex in Baghdad that "I am sure
the Iraq authority will appreciate this double thing: my work and my name." Letter from Le Corbusier to the Director of
Major Projects, Baghdad. May 10th, 1963, Fondation Le Corbusier, P4 (3) 340; cited in Mina Marefat, "Le Corbusier in
Baghdad," Brownbook, No. 55 (January-February 2016).
8 On the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, see Sandy Isenstadt, "'Faith in a Better Future': Josep Lluis Sert's American Embassy
in Baghdad, Journal ofArchitectural Education, Vol. 50, No. 3 (February 1997): 172-188. On the international
geopolitics of Hilton and InterContinental Hotels, see Annabel Jane Wharton, Building the Cold War: Hilton
International Hotels and Modern Architecture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Ana Milja'ki,
"Intercontinental Comfort: Little Americas Abroad" and related magazine articles reproduced in Miljacki, Kubo, Franch
i Gilabert, Lawrence, ed., Office US Atlas, 426-427 ff.; "Intercontinental Hotels: Design for Tourism," Architectural Record
(October 1953): 14-15, and Ruth Sheldon Knowles, "Enterprise & Diplomacy: Pan Am Airways' Hotel Unit Helps
Itself by Aiding Nations," 7he Wall StreetJournal (April 14, 1964): 18.
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Isenstadt and Kishwar Rizvi have described the "burden of representation" that confronted foreign
practices in newly post-colonial contexts, as they were tasked "to find forms that would make sense
of the novel configurations of land marshaled under new flags and the varied combinations of ethnic
groups that were expected to cohere under new systems of law."9 Such firms engaged these political
and cultural concerns through the architectural issues of construction and labor, as evident, for
example, in decisions to employ technically sophisticated, transnational materials like reinforced
concrete over locally produced materials like brick. Through such choices, these architects sought to
mediate between the communication of a universalizing technics, implicit in the international
language of modernism itself, and self-conscious efforts to signal their understanding of, and
adaptation to, local or regional aesthetic traditions. In this fashion, Isenstadt and Rizvi suggest, U.S.
and European architects implicitly acknowledged the cultural problematics that accompanied
notions of modernization in post-colonial contexts, by seeking ways in which "modern architecture,
when it took up some notion of local heritage, could represent itself as the healing praxis for that
which it had injured."1 0 While corporate firms projected what Sibel Bozdogan has described as a
"supranational aesthetic of bureaucratic efficiency" as a means of mediating these tensions, other
architects operated through modes of creative signature that, they claimed, were better able to meet
the cultural demands of nation-building efforts in these countries.I On the architectural front, then,
the notion of a "rule of experts" was contested as foreign firms pursued commissions through the
competing modes of bureaucracy and genius in this expanded geopolitical and cultural context.12
9 Sandy Isenstadt and Kishwar Rizvi, "Introduction: Modern Architecture in the Middle East: The Burden of
Representation," in Isenstadt and Rizvi, ed., Modernism in the Middle East: Architecture and Politics in the Twentieth
Century (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2008): 20.
10 Ibid.
I Sibel Bozdogan, "Democracy, Development, and the Americanization of Turkish Architectural Culture in the 1950s,"
in Isenstadt and Rizvi, ed., Modernism in the Middle East: Architecture and Politics in the Twentieth Century: 119.
12 See Timothy Mitchell, Rule ofExperts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley and London: University of California
Press, 2002).
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A revealing case study for these dynamics of authorship and cultural signification is TAC's
design for the University of Baghdad (1957-1983), among the earliest examples of involvement by
U.S. firms in the Arab and Persian Gulf states.13 (Fig. 5.2) TAC's commission to design the
University campus formed part of an extensive modernization program under the Iraq Development
Board, created in 1950 to expend seventy percent of the country's expanding oil revenue on national
development, first through infrastructural projects and after 1956 through iconic cultural projects by
foreign architects including Le Corbusier, Alvar Aalto, Frank Lloyd Wright, and Gio Ponti. While
the majority of these projects ended in 1958 following the overthrow of the U.S.- and British-
affiliated Hashemite monarchy, TAC's commission for the University continued. The project
proceeded in fits and starts through major political and economic shifts in Iraq into the country's
second building boom under Saddam Hussein in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and continued even
after the end of the oil boom in 1983, possibly extending to the First Gulf War of 1990-91. So too,
this initial involvement led to the firm's expanding presence in the Arab and Persian Gulf states
throughout this period. As described in the next chapter, within a decade of the beginning of the
Baghdad commission the TAC office was heavily dependent on work throughout the region, with
commercial and cultural commissions first in Kuwait and eventually in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran,
and the Emirates from the 1960s until the end of the second boom in crude oil prices in 1983. These
included subsequent commissions to design major university campuses in Iraq (an unbuilt project
for Mosul University) and further abroad in Libya and Tunisia.
Revisiting the origins of TAC's regional involvement through the University of Baghdad poses
key questions regarding the broader dependency of U.S. architects on projects in the Arab and
Persian Gulf states after World War II and the impacts on the size and scope of their practices at
home. In particular, how did the firm's increasingly bureaucratic organization allow it to continue
3 The shift away from British planners and architects by the 1950s and the parallel entry of U.S. and continental
European architects (including Aalto, Le Corbusier, Ponti, and Willem Dudok) reflected a broader geopolitical transition
from the British colonial apparatus through which Iraq had been established in 1932 in to Cold War framework of the
Baghdad Pact and Marshall Plan-affiliated countries in Europe, such as Italy, France, the Netherlands, and Finland.
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working through changing political and cultural currents in Iraq, particularly after the coup d'etat of
July 14, 1958, which spelled the end of the monarchy and its allegiances to the U.S., along with the
eradication of the Development Board and most of the projects by international architects it had
commissioned for Baghdad? A crucial factor in TAC's continuity across political regimes was their
success in self-positioning as an expert practice, in contrast to other modes of address that sought to
navigate this new landscape through the rhetoric of cultural synthesis and artistic genius. The
continuation of the commission also depended on the firm's stakes in shaping the educational as well
as the physical structure of the first consolidated university in Iraq-including the first department
of architecture in the country-as a crucial infrastructure for national development. In this context,
the increasing corporatization of TAC reflected the broader imperatives placed on U.S. firms that
sought to meet the transnational complexities of these cultural and architectural demands.
The Genius University
The cultural and discursive context in which the University of Baghdad took shape can be
illuminated by comparison with the proposal that immediately preceded it: Frank Lloyd Wright's
Plan for Greater Baghdad (1957), which included a university as part of a larger cultural complex for
the city, on the same peninsula in Karada where TAC would be offered its commission in 1957.14
(Fig. 5.3) The presence of two projects for similar programs on the same site pitted two paradigmatic
examples of postwar practice against each other: the self-styled, authorial persona of Wright against
the collective body represented by TAC. 'hese two projects made vastly differing claims for agency
within the Iraqi context. While Wright's scheme offered a personal appeal to the Iraqi monarch,
14 In the comparison that follows, I rely on Neil Levine's comprehensive history of Wright's Plan for Greater Baghdad,
and the context of the Minoprio & Spencely and Macfarlane master plan for Baghdad within which the other
Development Board projects were conceived, in Levine, 7he Urbanism ofFrank Lloyd Wright (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2015): 334-384. I am grateful to Levine for his comments on an early presentation on the University of
Baghdad in his seminar on Baghdad at Harvard University in 2013 as well as in subsequent discussions, and particularly
for his generosity in making available archival materials from his research on Wright and the Development Board projects
to his seminar students.
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Faisal II, and the mythologization of his rule through a symbolic cultural landscape of historical
references, TAC's University project constituted a demonstration of expertise within the
developmental framework of foreign technical assistance by U.S. firms. The consequences of these
differing political and cultural stakes became evident following the overthrow of the Hashemite
monarchy on July 14, 1958, an event that instigated a decade of subsequent regime changes that
would culminate in the Ba'th Party's rise to power after 1968. The political flexibility of TAC's work
allowed the firm to continue designing the University project throughout these numerous political
changes, constructing the campus into the second Iraqi building boom under Saddam Hussein from
1979 to 1983, by which time TAC's work had expanded to include large-scale urban planning and
architectural commissions in Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra.15 In contrast, the prospects for Wright's
grand urban scheme-which fully ended with the architect's death in 1959-had likely faded even
prior to the 1958 coup d'etat, and this disfavor may have provided the immediate impetus for the
Development Board's commissioning of TAC to design a university on the Karada site.
The authorial differences in the mode of production of Wright's and TAC's schemes for
Baghdad, which ultimately governed both their final forms and their opposing legacies after 1958,
have also reinforced differences in the terms on which these projects have been understood. Beyond
the evident aspects of orientalism that attach in different forms to both projects, Wright's Plan for
Greater Baghdad has typically been placed in relation to his oeuvre through the lens of creative
signature. Informed by a personal catalog of literary and cultural references, Wright drew his design
15 TAC's continuing work in Iraq after the overthrow of Abd al-Karim Qasim in 1963 and through the regime of the
Ba'th Party after 1968 included a scheme for the University of Mosul (unbuilt, c. 1966-78); Sheraton Hotels for Mosul
(unbuilt, c. 1976-80), Baghdad (c. 1977-82), and Basra (c. 1977-82), and a master plan for the development of
Khulafa Street in Baghdad (c. 1978-82), including building designs for Al Khulafa Mosque Extension, Shorja Square
Underpass, Maidan Square Transportation Center, and Maidan Square Apartment Building. All of these projects were
developed with Hisham Munir & Associates as local consultant. Munir lists work on the University of Baghdad as
continuing all the way to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the subsequent First Gulf War, at which time Munir
left the country. An overview of the Khulafa Street projects, the Ishtar Sheraton Hotel, and the planned extensions to the
University of Baghdad campus is given in "Medinaat Al Salaam: Baghdad 1979-1983," PROCESS:Architecture No. 58
(May 1985): 27-36, 66-67, 90-93. On the Khulafa Street master plan, see The Architects Collaborative, Urban Design
Study: Khulafa Street Development Project, Preparedfor Amanat Al-Assima, Baghdad, Iraq (1982) and TAC with Giorgio
Lombardi, Ove Arup & Partners, Suhair al-Mosully (consultants), Ahmadiya Area Revitalization, Preparedfor Amanat Al
Assima, Baghdad, Republic of Iraq (1982).
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from multiple periods across the pre-Islamic and Islamic history of Iraq, seeking to to make these
allusions legible both symbolically and spatially in the final design. By contrast, attempts to situate
TAC's university in relation to Walter Gropius's career have often led to judgments of the design as
banal or derivative in authorial terms, technocratic in conception and unconvincing in execution,
including, as will be discussed, buildings supposedly copied from the firm's previous work. The
historiographic separation between Wright's signature practice and TAC's team-based approach, and
the critical tendency to regard the university as designed by Gropius rather than TAC, have thus
prevented a direct comparison of the two schemes, despite their similarities.
Understood within a framework of competition between two modes of U.S. architectural
practice in Iraq, however, Wright's plan and TAG's university immediately bear comparison as
projects to develop the same basic educational program (though conceived very differently) for the
same location, designed within a year of each other by the only two U.S. firms invited to participate
in the Development Board program in Baghdad in these years. Furthermore, the two commissions
may have been regarded as competitive by the Development Board more directly than previous
accounts have suggested. Indeed, there is evidence of a direct temporal relationship between these
two projects, and it is possible that the demise of the one was linked to the commissioning of the
other. 16
In adopting differing modes of address to the Hashemite monarchy and the bureaucratic
apparatus of the Development Board, respectively, the competition between Wright's Plan and TAC's
University uncannily replayed the discursive and professional dichotomy between the architecture of
genius and the architecture of bureaucracy, framed a decade earlier by Henry-Russell Hitchcock in
16 The origins and timeline of the University of Baghdad commission have not previously been sufficiently well
established to explore the question of whether these two practices were evaluated by the Development Board in direct
comparison for the university site at any point. This has been due in part to the unavailability of the documentary
material discussed later in this chapter, particularly the correspondence from Walter and Ise Gropius to Ellen and Nizar
Ali Jawdat, through which a far more precise chronology of the initial development of the TAC commission can be
determined.
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the context of U.S. and European postwar practice. 17 Hitchcock might not have anticipated that this
dialectic would structure the presence of foreign architects in Baghdad, through projects that catered
alternately to the monarch's desire for legitimization or to the Development Board's search for
foreign expertise. In this sense, a comparison of TAC and Wright's competing engagements in
Baghdad reveals both the contestation between bureaucracy and genius in practice and the migration
of these interpretive categories to the Arab and Persian Gulf states, as part of a globalizing discourse
on modernism in the postwar period. Their differing political and social affiliations also reveal vastly
differing interpretations of Iraq's cultural heritage and postwar modernization, and of the concepts of
internationalism, technical assistance, and expert practice in relation to national development.
Wright's Plan for Greater Baghdad was developed as a personal appeal to Faisal II, the nominal
Hashemite ruler of Iraq prior to 1958 in conjunction with 'Abd al-Ilah, the crown prince and former
regent before Faisal came of age in 1953, and Nuri al-Said, the powerful statesman who served
multiple terms as Prime Minister in the decades prior to the July 14 coup d'etat. In choosing the site
for the project he was offered in early 1957, to design a cultural center including an opera and civic
auditorium, Wright made much of the fact that he was granted two meetings with Faisal II on his
first trip to Baghdad in May 1957, the only one of the international architects invited to Baghdad to
be awarded this privilege. Furthermore, Wright claimed that he was granted an aerial tour of the city
in Faisal's private plane in order to select possible sites for his commission, and that the island he
chose for the cultural center, then owned by the royal family, was given to him personally by the
monarch. It was on this tour, Wright later recounted to the fellows at Taliesin, that he identified the
island on the Tigris, adjacent to the Karada peninsula provisionally marked for a university by the
17 Henry-Russell Hitchcock, "The Architecture of Bureaucracy and the Architecture of Genius," Architectural Review
(January 1947): 3-6.
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Development Board, as his preferred site for a cultural center over the location he had originally been
given, on the site of the British Trade Fair in Karkh immediately south of the British Embassy.18
(Fig. 5.4)
It was rhetorically meaningful for Wright to stress that the transactions of site and program had
been between genius and genius, granted through the hand of Faisal II as patron. After having been
notified that the unoccupied island site he had coveted from the air was owned by the royal family,
Wright reported, he appealed directly to the monarch, after which "he put his hand on this island
place on the map and looked at me with an ingratiating smile and he said, 'Mr. Wright, it is
yours."' 19 In the same talk, Wright reiterated the potential of "this little island the king put his hand
on and gave to me specifically," then called Pig Island but promptly reconceived in Wright's
imaginative map as the Isle of Edena.20 This contact with the ruler clearly impressed Wright: in his
words, "Now that converted me to monarchy right then."21 He subsequently dedicated his project to
the king and the crown prince, declaring that "in IRAQ monarchy has proved worthy."22
Wright's claim that he had been awarded the island by the king himself-a site that he would
quickly surmount to absorb the university planned for the Karada peninsula-thus legitimized the
18 It remains unclear whether Wright actually toured the city in Faisal's private plane or if this was an artistic reimagining
of his more prosaic arrival in Baghdad via commercial airline. In his talk at Taliesin upon his return, Wright did not
clarify the nature of his aerial tour: "Flying over [Baghdad] I saw an island, unoccupied, practically in the heart of the
city.... when I came down and looked at the map there was that island with noting on it whatever.... So I went after that
island. And they said, 'Oh no, Mr. Wright, we cannot, we assure you, do anything with the island. The island belongs to
the imperial household."' Pfeiffer, Frank Lloyd Wright: His Living Voice: 51. Levine cites interviews with Nezam Amery
and William Wesley Peters, both of whom were with Wright in Baghdad on his May 1957 trip, as claiming that Faisal
"lent him his plan so that he could see the land" (Amery) and that the site was chosen only after Wright had arrived in
Baghdad, not on the flight there (Peters). Levine, 426, note 112. A contemporary article in Time implied that this aerial
viewing of the site took place upon Wright's arrival: "Circling in over Baghdad by airplane, he spotted a long narrow
island in the middle of the Tigris. He discovered that it was royal property, went straight to King Feisal II. Recounts
Wright: 'The young king took me by the arm, smiled and said, "It is yours."' "New Lights for Aladdin," Time Magazine,
May 19, 1958: 82.
19 "A Journey to Baghdad," transcript of Wright talk at Taliesin Fellowship, June 16, 1957, in Brooks Pfeiffer, ed., Frank
Lloyd Wright: His Living Voice (Fresno: Press at California State University, 1987): 51.
20 Ibid., 50.
21 Ibid., 52.
22 Frank Lloyd Wright, "Proposed-This Nine-Year Plan for the Cultural Center of Greater Baghdad," June-July 1957,
MS 2401.379 M and "Transcript of Tape Recording of Mr. Wright's Speech," typescript of talk given to Iraqi Society of
Engineers, May 1957, MS 2401.377-78 C, Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation Archive; cited in Levine, 426, note 160.
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authority behind his expanding ambitions in much the same way that his design, in turn, would
offer a legitimization of Faisal II's rule. The Plan for Greater Baghdad mythologized the monarchical
state by incorporating a catalog of historical references drawn from Sumerian, Babylonian, and
Abbasid periods in the region's history, implicitly positioning the Hashemite monarchy as the
inheritors of this fictionalized Islamic and pre-Islamic past. 23 A central symbolic element in this
nexus of references was the Round City built under the Caliph al-Mansur (714-755 AD), which
Wright misattributed to Harun al-Rashid (763 or 766-809 AD), the fifth Abbasid Caliph, thus
conflating the mythological foundation of the city of Baghdad with its flowering under the
Caliphate, a period recorded in the Thousand and One Nights beloved by Wright as a child.24 The
Round City provided the organizing pattern for the university within Wright's plan, grafting the
symbolism of the first planned architecture for the city of Baghdad onto the design of an educational
complex that would implicitly usher in a new golden age of development under the Hashemite
monarchy. This constructed lineage thus positioned Faisal II as the contemporary genius of Iraqi
modernization, an al-Mansur (or, in Wright's imaginary, a Harun al-Rashid) for his time.
In seeking to glorify the monarchy for which the Plan for Greater Baghdad was produced, the
stakes of Wright's project would seem to have reinforced the political aims that underlay the
Development Board's decision to invite foreign architects to design cultural buildings as public signs
of national progress. This shift in priorities, inaugurated by the Development Board's second six-year
plan (1955-60), reflected the government's growing need to produce visible symbols of
23 The Hashemite monarchy indeed claimed lineal descent from Fatima, daughter of the Prophet Muhammad. Levine
cites a contemporary guide, An Introduction to the Past and Present of the Kingdom of Iraq (Baltimore, MD: Lord of
Baltimore Press, 1946), which stressed this legitimization in terms similar to Wright's: "With the establishment of the
Kingdom of Iraq under King Faisal I in 1921, not only did Iraq gain her political entity... but by choosing a Hashemite
as head of the State she also restored to the throne the very family from which the Abbasid Caliphs themselves had
sprung." An Introduction to the Past and Present of the Kingdom of Iraq: 3.
24 Wright openly acknowledged both his personal, mythological interpretation of Baghdad's history and his projection of
this literary imaginary onto the contemporary reality of the city. As he told the Taliesin fellows, "I've been very
sentimental about this journey because when I was a chap, oh long before I was your age, I was enamored of Hashid
[sic], Aladdin and the wonderful lamp, Sinbad the Sailor, and scores of those tales of the Arabian Nights. Of course that
was Baghdad to me. And Baghdad of course is there now, but not the Baghdad I dreamed of then." Pfeiffer, Frank Lloyd
Wright: His Living Voice: 50.
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modernization in order to pacify a increasingly unsettled urban population, the cultural
superstructure to be built atop an infrastructural base of irrigation, flood control, and water storage
that had been the focus of the first six-year plan (1951-56). (Fig. 5.5) Lord Salter, a British advisor
to the Development Board, warned in 1955 that "popular resentment, caused or aggravated by the
failure to devote a substantial part of the public revenues from oil to work giving widespread and
visible benefits quickly, may increase political instability." 25 At the same time, however, a major cause
of these public grievances was the perceived dependence of the monarchy on British, and
increasingly U.S., influence, a situation that dated from the installation of the Hashemite family by
the British upon Iraq's official independence from the Mandate in 1932. As reaction against foreign
interference grew in the 1950s, a design like Wright's thus posed a particular problem of
signification, as a project by a U.S. architect designed explicitly to legitimize the historical narrative
upon which Hashemite rule was based.
For his part, Wright had himself inveighed against the commercialism of the West and warned
against its encroachment in Iraq as part of the country's development. "If we are able to understand
and interpret our ancestors," Wright argued, Baghdad need not "adopt the materialistic structures
called 'modern' now barging in from the West upon the East." 26 In arguing against the other foreign
offices that had been given commissions by the Development Board, Wright attacked what he
regarded as both the materialism and the professionalization of Western culture and its architects, an
assessment for which a firm like TAC would have provided a ready example. In Genius and the
Mobocracy (1949), Wright had already warned against the false community of collective architectural
practice in the U.S., warning that "professionalism is parasitic-a body of men unable to do more
than band together to protect themselves."27 Indeed, in a letter to the prime minister and the
Development Board, Wright lamented that he had already "come too late to save [the country] ...
25 Lord [Arthur] Salter, The Development ofIraq: A Plan ofAction (Baghdad: Iraq Development Board, 1955): 118.
26 "New Lights for Aladdin," Time Magazine, May 19, 1958: 82.
27 Frank Lloyd Wright, Genius and the Mobocracy, 4.
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from the invasions of the Proffesional [sic] Architecture of the West."28 Instead, in a talk given to the
Iraqi Society of Engineers during his May trip, he appealed for Iraqis to look "deep... [into] your
[own] inheritance," interpreting this heritage as encompassing both the pre-Islamic and the Islamic
history of the region.29 He argued that these references offered an intrinsic connection to the genius
loci of the place-in his words, "a genius of itself"-and demanded that "an architect should not
come in and put a cliche to work." 30 In this formulation, the genius of the site was thus bound to the
genius of the architect as its interpreter, and to the genius of the client as his patron.
Though an educational program was never officially included by the Development Board as
part of his commission, Wright's imaginative conception of a university mirrored the ethos of
creative genius that he sought to express in the more monumental forms of the opera and cultural
center on his Isle of Edena. Lacking a brief, and determined to avoid the emphasis on
professionalization that typified contemporary universities in the U.S., Wright's scheme instead
articulated an organic educational model that stood apart from the Development Board's
comparatively narrower interest in training a class of specialists to participate in the country's
modernization. Wright had outlined this holistic conception of pedagogy in the decade prior to his
arrival in Baghdad, arguing in Genius and the Mobocracy that "Until architecture, philosophy, and
religion become one as they are in organic architecture," Wright claimed, "we are not going to be
able to make such fruits of science as we already know in abundance, really constructive."31 Further,
he asked, "What hope have we for indigenous culture when even our 'universities' are not founded
upon study of the principles and aesthetics of innate-organic-structure." 32 In Baghdad, Wright
saw this "indigenous culture" as comprising a dense overlay of literary and archaeological references
28 Wright, "To the Minister and His Development Board, City of Baghdad, Iraq" (draft), n.d. (1957), MS 2401.379 BB,
Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation Archive; cited in Levine, 426, note 118.
29 "Transcript of Tape Recording of Mr. Wright's Speech," typescript of talk given to Iraqi Society of Engineers, May
1957, MS 2401.377-78 C, Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation Archive; cited in Levine, 426, note 114.
30 Ibid.
31 Frank Lloyd Wright, Genius and the Mobocracy, 11.
32 Ibid.
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-a palimpsest to which the formal elements of his university and cultural center, he might well have
imagined, could provide the key for the educated Iraqi citizen of the future.
The form of the university that appeared within the Plan for Greater Baghdad mapped this
organic conception literally into a circle of faculties attached to a ring road, a "Ziggerat [sic] of
Parking" that demarcated the boundary of the campus at the same time that it conflated a Sumerian
prototype with the plan of the Abbasid Round City of Baghdad. (Fig. 5.6) Within this circular
enclosure-the "curriculum," in Wrightian double entendre-the university departments were laid
out in counter-clockwise fashion, proceeding (in sequence from the entrance arch at the street that
connected the campus to the opera house and cultural center) from fine arts to architecture,
sociology, government, law, engineering, religion, athletics, gymnasium, sciences, and agriculture.
Unlike TAC's later proposal for the University, the allocation of these departments and their
adjacencies were metaphorical rather than based on identifiable needs, organizing the faculties in a
conceptual sequence from the arts, to secular and spiritual governance, to the human, physical, and
natural sciences. Given both his preference for genius and his opposition to technocratic conceptions
of education, Wright may have imagined this cyclical progression from culture to nature as a diagram
for the cultivation of a genius appropriate to modern Iraq, parallel to the flowering of the arts his
opera and cultural center would inaugurate. A triangle of broadcasting studios for radio and
television at the center of the campus suggested the dissemination of these fruits of genius to the
nation, with towering profiles that celebrated the creation of the region's first Arab-controlled
television network in Iraq the year prior to Wright's plan.33 (Fig. 5.7)
Given the ineluctable association of the Plan for Greater Baghdad with Faisal II, it is perhaps
little wonder that the project failed to win the approval of the Development Board, particularly given
the rising public dissatisfaction with British and U.S. influence on the monarchy. The authorial
relationship of genius architect to genius ruler that Wright proposed was thus politically contingent
33 See William A. Rugh, Arab Mass Media: Newspapers, Radio, and Television in Arab Politics (Westport, CT: Praeger
Publishers, 2004): 186.
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on the survival of the Hashemite monarchy as well as on the continued lack of resistance to the
foreign interests that lay behind it. Wright's arrogation of both the Karada site and the university
program beyond the scope of his original commission made him the only one of the foreign
architects invited to Baghdad to willfully disregard the confines of the master plan for Baghdad,
produced in 1956 by the British firm of Minoprio, Spencely, and Macfarlane, that governed the sites
offered by the Development Board. Indeed, Wright may not have held much hope that his efforts
would lead to a commission for the university on the Karada peninsula, or that his prospects for the
cultural center for which he had originally been commissioned would not be adversely affected by
this gambit.34 Thus both the university and the cultural center in Wright's scheme relied, each in
their own way, on political and spatial conditions that failed to obtain even prior to the demise of
Faisal's rule. The inability to reconcile the Plan for Greater Baghdad within the framework of the
other Development Board projects is suggested by the Board's invitation of Hugh Spencely, a co-
author of the master plan for Baghdad, to review Wright's proposed choice of both the Island and
Karada sites in late September 1957, a month after Wright submitted his project. By September 7
the Development Board had apparently already decided to offer TAC the university on the Karada
site, and the firm received news of the commission at nearly the same moment that Wright's plans
were being reviewed.
Ambassadors Abroad
In contrast with Wright's personal appeal to Faisal II, TAC's commission for the University of
Baghdad was gained through contacts formed in the interstices between U.S. professional training,
the bureaucratic channels of the Development Board, and the emerging terrain for modernist
34 At the time Wright was working on the cultural center and the university, he claimed: "I do not know that there is very
much hope for the Baghdad projects. This is really my proposition to them.... I sort of came in came in on the tail end
of things [sic], so what impression I can make now, I do not know-but I am going to try." Wright, "YOUTH OF
AMERICA: THE POETIC PRINCIPLE (Monona Terrace, State of Wisconsin, Baghdad," Talks to Taliesin Fellowship,
23 June 1957," reel 189, 1, 7, MS 1502.258, Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation Archive; cited in Levine, 426, note 119.
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architectural practices in Iraq in the 1950s. The key interlocutors in this transnational exchange were
Ellen and Nizar Ali Jawdat, architects who had studied under Gropius at the Harvard Graduate
School of Design from 1942 to 194 7-a period when women and foreign students made up a
significant portion of the student body during wartime-before returning to practice in Baghdad,
where they became advocates of Gropius and TAC for the Development Board commissions taking
shape in the 1950s. (Fig. 5.8)
The Jawdats epitomized the elite class of foreign-educated professionals, increasingly trained in
the U.S., that comprised the generation of young Iraqi architects who began their practices after
World War II. Ellen Jawdat (nee Ellen Stone Coan) was born in Srinagar, India in 1921 to Janet
Tyron Stone and Frank Speer Coan, then a YMCA secretary in Lahore and Hyderabad, and later the
general secretary of the English-Speaking Union of the United States (1935-42) and a Near and
Middle East Expert for the U.S. Office of War Information after 1942.35 After receiving a degree in
art history from Vassar in 1942, Ellen enrolled at the Harvard Graduate School of Design under
Gropius, where she graduated in 1947. Nizar Ali Jawdat, born in Damascus, Syria in 1921, was the
son of Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi, then the governor of Aleppo and later Prime Minister of Iraq through
rotating terms in 1934-35, 1949-50, and June to December 1957, the period in which TAC was
officially commissioned to design the University.3 6 During Jawdat al-Ayyubi's appointment as the
first Iraqi ambassador to the U.S. from 1942 to 1947, his son Nizar Ali enrolled at the Harvard
Graduate School of Design, where he and Ellen met and were married. After returning to Baghdad,
Ellen began her practice as an architect-the first woman to do so in Iraq-while Nizar Ali worked
35 Ruth Coan Fulton, ed., Coan Genealogy 1697-1982 (Portsmouth, NH: Peter E. Randall, Publisher, 1983): 346-347.
36 These terms as Prime Minister were often rotated with other political officials representing other social, ethnic, and
religious constituencies within the Iraqi elite, including frequent terms by Nuri al-Said, with whom Jawdat al-Ayyubi had
studied in the Ottoman military college in Istanbul prior to Iraqi independence. See Hanna Batatu, "Prime Minsters
Under the Monarchy (23 August 1921 to 14 July 1958)," in Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary
Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Ba'thists, and Free Officers
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978): 182-184 ff. Batatu identifies al-Ayyubi's class origin as "official lower
middle-class, son of a chief sargeant in the gendarmie." Batatu, 180-181. A Time article from 1957 described Jawdat al-
Ayyubi's term in that year as a function of "the custom of summer replacements" for Nuri al-Said, his "longtime comrade
in arms." "Out of the Heat," Time Magazine, Vol. 70, No. 1 (July 1, 1957): 26.
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as architect for the Iraqi Railways office in fulfillment of his five years of public service, required in
exchange for the government's sponsorship of his studies at Harvard. The couple practiced together
intermittently on projects in Baghdad, including the Women's Headquarters of the Red Crescent
(1948-50) and the Jawdats' own house, originally built as student housing in 1948 and modified by
the couple for their private use after 1955. (Fig. 5.9) Ellen continued to practice architecture
independently while Nizar Ali established a company as a supplier and contractor for the building
industry, including the first provision of air conditioning technology in Iraq.37 As part of her
advocacy for expanded opportunities for modernist architects in Baghdad in these years, in 1954-55
Ellen organized an invited international competition for the National Bank of Iraq, won by William
Dunkel and completed in 1956, as the first competition in the country to feature a developed brief
and anonymous submissions.38 (Fig. 5.10)
The correspondence between Walter and Ise Gropius and the Jawdats from 1948 to 1969 sheds
considerable light on both the origins of the University of Baghdad commission and its subsequent
history.39 Following the Jawdats' return to Baghdad in 1947, the couple remained cordial with their
former professor at Harvard, as evidenced by Gropius's reply in December 1948 to a letter from
Nizar in that year, thanking him for sending news from Baghdad. "I am very glad indeed to hear
37 "Out of the Heat," Time Magazine, Vol. 70, No. 1 (July 1, 1957): 26; "Nizar Ali Jawdat," obituary, The Washington
Post, January 29, 2017. The Jawdats' built projects together appear in Raglan Squire, "Architecture in the Middle East,"
ArchitecturalDesign, March 1957: 96 ff., along with Ellen Jawdat's American School for Girls in Baghdad (1956).
38 Ellen Jawdat in interview with the author (2013); Nizar Ali Jawdat and Ellen Jawdat, curriculum vitae, after 1986,
personal papers of Ellen Jawdat, Washington, D.C. Though it was not sponsored by the Development Board, Neil Levine
describes the National Bank of Iraq competition as "a trial run for the Development Board's program" after 1955. Levine,
The Urbanism ofFrank Lloyd Wright, 424, note 62. The competition was preceded by the Rafidain Bank, on Shorja
[Bank] Street adjacent to the future site of the National Bank, designed by Philip Hirst and completed by 1956.
39 Among the letters described here, those written by Walter and Ise Gropius to the Jawdats in particular have not
appeared in any previous account of the University of Baghdad. I first became aware of their existence during an
interview with Ellen Jawdat at her home on June 24, 2013, when she provided me with a folder of these letters from her
personal files. These letters correspond closely to the letters sent by Ellen and Nizar to Walter and Ise, which are preserved
at Harvard University among the Walter Gropius papers, 1925-1969 [MS Ger 208, Houghton Library]. Following the
interview, I worked with Ellen Jawdat and Leslie Morris of the Houghton Library to arrange for these letters to be
absorbed into the Harvard collections in 2013, thus reuniting both sides of the correspondence for the first time. I am
exceedingly grateful to Ellen Jawdat for providing access to these letters and for her assistance in interpreting them, as
well as for her generosity in giving them as a gift to Harvard University.
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from you," Gropius wrote, wishing the couple the "hope that you both are happy and can do some
constructive work for your country."40 The correspondence continued informally for six years
thereafter, when the Jawdats apparently wrote once again to the Gropiuses around February of 1954,
serendipitously just two months before their Rockefeller Foundation-sponsored trip to Australia, the
Philippines, and Japan in April of that year. In reply, Ise ventured to the Jawdats the possibility of
adding Baghdad to the list of cities to be visited on their return from Japan in August and September
(the final arrangements also included Hong Kong, Bangkok, Calcutta, Karachi, Athens, Rome, and
Paris).41 Indeed, the Gropiuses traveled to Baghdad from August 19th to 24th, 1954, between
Karachi and Athens, staying at the Tigris Hotel on the recommendation of the Jawdats. 42 Burdened
by the heavy professional demands of their two months in Japan, where, Ise lamented, "we can
hardly manage to see the place for the hundreds of people who want to talk to [Walter]," the couple
expressed the desire only to see Baghdad as tourists; as Ise wrote to Nizar, "We hope, therefore, that
no news of modern architecture and W Gropius has come to Iraq yet, exept [sic] to your personal
friends, and that we shall enjoy the unusual chance of being left alone to explore the city or whatever
else may be of interest."43
Events, however, conspired to prevent the Gropiuses from the prospect of an anonymous visit,
and eventually to draw them into discussions of the projects then being planned by the Iraq
40 Letter from Walter Gropius to Nizar A. Jawdat, December 1, 1948. Harvard University, Houghton f 2013M-29. In
the letter Gropius also responds to an apparent request from Nizar to join CIAM, suggesting that he write, with Gropius
as a reference, to Sigfried Giedion, then General Secretary for the group, to propose establishing a CIAM working group
in Iraq.
41 "In two months we shall leave for Australia where Grope was invited by the architectural organisation and from there
we go to Japan for two months on request of the Rockefeller Foundation. Maybe we can dip down into Baghdad on the
return trip via Europe. It would be a tempting thought, but I don't know how we shall stand up to all the rigors of
travelling as public figures." Letter from Ise Gropius to Nizar and Ellen Jawdat, February 2, 1954. Harvard University,
Houghton f 2013M-29. The letter alludes to a description by the Jawdats of having divided their practice in Iraq into an
architectural design office (presumably run by Ellen) and a contracting office (presumably run by Nizar), likened
favorably by Ise to Walter's fight against AIA rules in the U.S. preventing architects from engaging in contracting work.
See Gropius, "Gropius Appraises Today's Architect," ArchitecturalForum, May 1952: 111-112, 166, 170, 174, 178, 182.
42 Letter from Walter Gropius to Ellen and Nizar Ali Jawdat, April 13, 1954; Letter from Ise Gropius to Nizar Ali Jawdat,
May 26, 1954; Letter from Ise Gropius to Ellen Jawdat, July 29, 1954; Harvard University, Houghton f 2013M-29.
43 Letter from Ise Gropius to Nizar Ali Jawdat, May 26, 1954. Harvard University, Houghton f 2013M-29.
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Development Board. David D. Newsom, then Public Affairs Officer for the U.S. Embassy and
director of the United States Information Service (USIS) in Baghdad as well as a friend of the
Jawdats, was informed by Ellen of the impending visit by the Gropiuses, and wrote formally to
Walter in June 1954 to suggest holding a photographic exhibition of examples of modern American
architecture to coincide with his visit, suggesting he might attend the opening in lieu of a more
formal lecture. 44 Newsom noted the presence of "an active group of young architects in Iraq who
would consider it a distinct honor to have the privilege of meeting you while you are here," and
hoped that Gropius's presence there "would give... the opportunity to meet some of those in the
architectural and engineering world on an informal basis." 45 Photographs of the event, held on
August 22nd or 23rd, show Gropius indeed giving a lecture to an assembled group of guests on the
lawn of the U.S. Embassy with Ellen and Nizar in attendance, flanked by presentation boards with
mounted photographs of contemporary U.S. architecture. 46 (Fig. 5.11) A guest list for an
accompanying lunch at the U.S. Embassy and dinner following the opening (possibly at the Jawdats'
house) named a roster of governmental and cultural figures including Abdul Jabbar Chelebi, the
director of the Development Board; Sayid Nedim al'Pachachi, then Minister of Economics; Dr.
Abdul Aziz Dury, Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences and listed as a "perpetual promoter of
University idea"; Sd. Yusuf Gailani, Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Henry Wiens,
director of the U.S. Point Four program in Iraq.47
44 David D. Newsom, letter to Walter Gropius, June 18, 1954. Bauhaus Archiv, GN Kiste Nr. 3, Mappe 123.
45 Ibid.
46 Bauhaus Archiv, Werkverzeichnis 151, Baghdad University. That these photographs are from the August 1954 trip is
confirmed by a letter from Newsom to Walter Gropius on September 15, 1954, enclosing the photographs and thanking
Gropius for his "kindness in attending and speaking to the architects at our center last month." Bauhaus Archiv, GN
Kiste Nr. 1, Mappe 4.
47 Harvard University, Houghton Library, MS Ger 208, folder 956. This list is undated, but is almost certainly from the
August 1954 visit by the Gropiuses, corresponding to the exhibition opening and lecture. The occupations and titles
listed for various of the guests, such as Henry Wiens, confirms that these events took place in 1954 rather than 1957, the
only other visit by Gropius prior to the July 14 coup d'6tat. Furthermore, the dinner is listed as having taken place on a
Sunday night, corresponding to August 22, 1954, one of the two dates given by Gropius to Newsom as his preferred days
for the exhibition opening. The list was likely prepared by Ellen Jawdat for Gropius.
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In arranging the exhibition and lecture, Newsom presumably hoped to appeal to the same elite,
educated class of U.S.-affliated professionals of which Nizar and Ellen were already a part. The guest
list named a number of young, Western-trained architects including Qahtan Awni (trained at the
University of California Berkeley), Jaafar Allawi (trained at the University of Liverpool), and Rifat
Chadirji (trained at the Hammersmith School of Arts and Crafts in London), described as "son of
head [sic] of Socialists." 48 English and U.S. policy tracts later cited by TAC as guides to the region,
like William Polk's What the Arabs Think (1952), similarly pointed to the importance of these
"Western-educated men and women of the younger generation who are the doctors, lawyers,
professors, engineers and white-collar workers of the Arab world," and in particular to the feeling
among U.S. professionals that "they are the most vocal section of the population and to a large
extent are bound to be the key to the Arab world's immediate future." 49 Such attempts to foment
positive feeling for the presence of U.S. actors in Iraq would additionally have to overcome the fact
that, as Polk wrote, "in spite of the excellent libraries, music collections, films and scholarship
48 Ibid. Kamil al-Chadirji was the leader of the National Democratic party, prominent among the socialist parties that
gained power under Qasim after the July 14 coup d'6tat. In a letter to the Gropiuses from Rome on October 4, 1958,
following the coup d'etat, Nizar Ali Jawdat wrote that Rifat Chadirji had replaced Mahmoud Hasan, previously Director
of the Second Technical Section of the Development Board, and that "His father heads one of the major parties which
are in power now," noting, "you have met him in my house." Harvard University, Houghton Library, MS Ger 208, folder
956.
49 William R. Polk, What the Arabs Think (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1952): 18. This pamphlet was cited in
the bibliography of the TAC Report on the University ofBaghdad of 1959, in which Polk, then a professor at the Center
for Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard, is also cited as a consultant expert on "General Arab Conditions and the
Educational Approach."
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programs which USIS offers, many young men and women boycott USIS.... In short, many of the
USIS offices are hard put to attract an audience." 50
By the time the Gropiuses returned to the U.S. in September 1954, their attitude had evidently
shifted to a more explicit interest in participating in the building program taking shape in Baghdad.
Replying for the first time on TAC letterhead rather than on personal stationery, Walter wrote to the
Jawdats immediately upon their arrival home in Cambridge:
I have been so happy in Baghdad that I would greatly enjoy, if an opportunity should arise, to do
architectural work for your country. I have pondered whether it was not wrong not to have
thrown overboard my itinerary and to try to go and see your King, but you can't imagine what
an upheaval changes in our itinerary would have caused, particularly regarding plane
reservations. 51
Gropius also followed up on a discussion that apparently took place in Baghdad to send promotional
materials on TAC's work for the Jawdats to circulate in Iraq, offering "to send you the promised
material as propaganda weapons in favor of modern architecture to be used for your King, or
50 Ibid., 54. Newsom later described the difficulties of promoting U.S. interests in Iraq in this period: "I have never been
[in] a country that was as cynical as Iraq was then. Many Iraqis-the educated elite-were intensely pan-Arab in
outlook. They thought that Iraq was an artificial creation resulting from [the] infamous Sikes-Picot [sic] agreement which
enabled France and Great Britain to carve up the Middle East after World War I.... The Iraqis had a strong belief that the
Cabinet, which was periodically reshuffled, were made by either the British or American Embassies. It was believed that
we were still manipulating events in Iraq. There was very little distinction made between the U.S. and Great Britain. We
were both the 'Gray Eminences' in Iraq.... It was a a classic situation, seen in other parts of the world, of a government
in power, which was friendly to us [the U.S.] and with which we believed we could work, but which ruled over a
population and an elite which was resentful of both the government and the perceived foreign interference." [13] The
Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, interview with David D. Newsom
by Charles Stuart Kennedy, June 17, 1991 (published 1998), http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Newsom,%2ODavid
%20D.toc.pdf.
51 Letter from Walter Gropius to Nizar and Ellen Jawdat, September 9, 1954. Harvard University,
Houghton f 2013M-29.
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whoever may be interested."5 2 Gropius cited the firm's proposal with I.M. Pei for Hua Tung
Christian University in particular as "good evidence for our capability to adapt to the conditions of
foreign countries," and this project would later be invoked as a comparative precedent for the
University of Baghdad campus plan.53 In response, Ellen Jawdat expressed her intent to promote
Gropius for a role within the architectural development taking place in Iraq:
I can't tell you what a boost to our spirits your few days with us were. Not only we, but
everybody who met you reacted in the same way-we felt as though a large window had been
opened.... for all of us your visit brought such a wealth of new ideas, wise advice, and most of all
a kind of calm optimism, that we must find some way of reviving the experience.... So it was
indeed refreshing to watch your instinctive understanding of the situation, in no way minimizing
the problems, yet not being overwhelmed by them. We are more than ever convinced that we must
find some way for you to make your contribution to this country, for in addition to the architectural
contribution, that is that immeasurable added dividend. 54
Ellen further suggested an appeal to Faisal II directly as the means to push for Gropius's involvement
in Iraq, noting that "The King returns from England in a month, and I hope that he will be in a
receptive frame of mind. Nizar visited him in the north a few weeks after you left, and he expressed
the keenest interest." 55 This discussion would have taken place just prior to the commissioning of
52 Ibid. These documents can be determined based on a corresponding list marked "Nizar Ali Jawdat, Baghdad, Iraq,
September 9, 1954" accompanying a carbon copy of this letter in the Bauhaus Archiv. These were: Gropius, "Blueprint
for an Architect's Training," Kokusai-Kentiku, Vol. XVIII (1951): 61-67; two copies of Gropius, Architecture and Design in
the Age ofScience (New York: Spiral Press, 1952); special issue of lArchitecture dAujourd'hui, February 1950 on "Gropius
et son ecole"; "The Architects Collaborative," lArchitecture dAujourd'hui, December 1953: 50-51; "Boston Center,"
Architectural Forum, November 1953: __ and photographs by Robert D. Harvey of the Back Bay Center model;
"Harvard Builds a Graduate Yard," Architectural Forum, December 1950: 61-71 and photographs by Walter R. Fleischer
and Fred Stone of the Harvard Graduate Center; "Hua Tung Christian University," January 1952: 66-79 and seven large
black and white photographs of Hua Tung Christian University; unidentified "Gropius Exhibition pamphlet, Berlin." A
letter from Ellen Jawdat to the Gropiuses, January 14, 1955 thanks them for sending "the superb Giedion book" among
these documents-presumably Giedion's Walter Gropius: Work and Teamwork (New York: Reinhold, 1954), indicating
that this was sent as well-and confirms that these materials were "going the rounds" in Baghdad. Harvard University,
MS Ger 208, folder 956. In a subsequent letter from Ise Gropius to Ellen Jawdat on May 6, 1955, Ise indicated that the
Gropius had also requested that a copy of the newly-released Scope of TotalArchitecture (New York: Harper, 1955) be sent
to the Jawdats by the publisher. Harvard University, Houghton f 2013M-29.
53 Ibid. Emphasis mine. Hua Tung appears among the comparative plans in The Architects Collaborative, Report on the
University of Baghdad Designed by The Architects Collaborative, Cambridge, Massachusetts, US.A., c. January 19 59, along
with Harvard, MIT, Oxford, and the University of Mexico.
54 Letter from Ellen Jawdat to Walter Gropius, October 3, 1954. Harvard University, MS Ger 208, folder 956. Emphasis
mine.
55 Ibid.
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Minoprio & Spencely and P. W. Macfarlane by the municipality of Baghdad to develop a master plan
for the city in late December, at the beginning of the development process that would proceed in
earnest with the official launch of the Development Board's program of cultural buildings two years
later, in December 1956.
The advocacy for Gropius's involvement in planning and architectural work in Baghdad
appeared to operate not through a direct appeal to Faisal II, however, but rather via the more
informal bureaucratic channels of influence that circulated around the Development Board. Possibly
as early as 1952, the Jawdats prepared a short essay along with an accompanying information sheet
on Walter Gropius, apparently to be circulated by Ahmed Jabbar Chelebi, a friend and the director
of the Development Board, arguing for the appointment of a coordinating regional planner of
international stature to oversee the Board's expansive efforts. 56 (Fig. 5.12) "It has been suggested," the
Jawdats wrote, "that with the vast amount of architectural work being undertaken by the
Development Board throughout Iraq, it is essential that there be one supervisory office to co-
ordinate these individual projects, and to schedule their design and construction as parts of a
coherent long-range scheme for the filling of the country's architectural needs." 57 In so doing, the
Jawdats articulated the need for a scope of ambition that would exceed the master plans that were
soon produced for individual cities in Iraq (including plans by Minorio, Spencely, and Macfarlane
56 Typescript of essay and information sheet written by Ellen Jawdat, n.d. Harvard University, Houghton f 2013M-29.
Ellen Jawdat later confirmed in emails to the author (2013 and 2017) that these documents were written for Chelebi,
who intended to promote Gropius for the University project, following a visit by Nizar to his office at the Development
Board "to urge him to consider what a perfect choice Gropius would be to design the University complex." Chelebi, she
suggested, must have asked Nizar to prepare a written memorandum, which Ellen then wrote. It is unclear whether or
how these documents were subsequently circulated; Ellen recalls that Chelebi intended to hand these in person to "a close
friend," rather than to submit them more formally to the Development Board. The date of these documents remains a
mystery. Ellen Jawdat stated in both emails and interview with the author (2017) her conviction that these were prepared
prior to 1954, and as early as 1952, in the first year or so after national oil revenues became available to the Development
Board and and Chelebi began laying the ground to solicit international architects for commissions in the country.
57 Typescript of essay and information sheet written by Ellen Jawdat, n.d. Harvard University, Houghton f 2013M-29.
Though the originals seem not to have survived, copies of this essay and the accompanying information sheet were
included in Ellen Jawdat's personal file of correspondence with the Gropiuses prior to the absorption of these papers into
the Harvard collections.
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for Baghdad, Mack Lock and Partners for Basra, and Raglan Squire and Partners for Mosul), arguing
instead for coordinated planning at a territorial scale:
Based on reports and the advice of economists, irrigation experts, specialists in population
studies, health and education authorities, etc., Iraq's building schemes should be studies with a
view charting a master plan which takes into account the relation of cities to towns, towns to
villages; the expansion or change of such units as they are affected by industrial or agricultural
progress; the logical settlement of tribes in new villages, and the provision of adequate housing,
education, medical, sanitary, and community facilities; the relation of Iraq's vast irrigation
schemes to the growth of agricultural populations; and transportation links (air, rail, road, and
waterways) between the various communities in the country.58
In proposing that these expanded planning efforts take place via the creation of "one central
architectural office in the Development Board, producing work of a single high standard," the
Jawdats named two international figures as the only ones capable of overseeing such a comprehensive
task: Le Corbusier and Gropius. 59 Of the two, Gropius was clearly preferred by the Jawdats, leading
them to propose his appointment as either the director of or consultant for such a coordinating
office:
It is apparent that the coordination of schemes of such a vast scope should be entrusted not only
to a superior architect, but to a regional and town planner of recognized excellence and wide
experience.... Le Corbusier, the eminent French Architect and City Planner, has been appointed
by the Government of India to fill a similar need in that country. The only other architect-
58 Ibid. Indeed, it can be argued that this expanded regional scope was taken up by the Development Board in part
through the commissioning of Constantinos Doxiadis in October 1955, on the recommendation of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, to provide "a large-scale housing and community development program not
just for Baghdad but for several cities throughout Iraq." Levine, 351. This was in contrast to the more limited scope of
the master plan for the city of Baghdad by Minoprio & Spencely and P. W Macfarlane, who were commissioned in late
1954 by the lord mayor of the municipality of Baghdad, Fakhruddin al-Fakhri, not by the Development Board. Levine,
340.
59 In an interview with the author (2017), Ellen Jawdat has claimed that Gropius was discussed from the beginning only
in relation to the university commission, notwithstanding the presence of her essay
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planner of this generation of similar stature is Walter Gropius. The suggestion is therefore made
that Dr. Gropius be asked to undertake such work for the Development Board of Iraq. 60
Such a direct solicitation for the introduction of a foreign architect into the Iraqi context appears to
have operated within a network of exchanges in which individuals involved with the Development
Board each advocated for specific international architects, for both the planning and architectural
work being developed by the Board in these years. It remains unclear whether more formal or
coordinated efforts lay behind the roster of international architects that were eventually invited to
participate in the IDB building program in these years or whether, as in the case of Jawdats and
Gropius, different actors argued independently for their preferences. 61
60 Ibid. The accompanying curriculum vitae of "Data Concerning Dr. Walter Gropius" listed his planning and
architectural work from the founding of the Bauhaus to his "Practice in partnership with Architects Collaborative (group
of six [sic] young architects under 35 yrs.)," though incorrectly giving 1948 as the date for the establishment of TAC. It
also listed the following as "Personal qualifications" for Gropius:
'Adaptability: Has worked under many different conditions, and in many countries, and is primarily interested in finding
building methods and styles suitable to special conditions [of] the society, climate, etc. in question.
Administrative Ability: ability to delegate authority
Extreme Modesty
Possesses great imagination, vision, and enthusiasm
Personal interest in Arab Countries and in the ways they are utilizing and developing their resources.
Harvard University, Houghton f 2013M-29. The personal nature of the appeal and the various errors in data both lend
weight to the suggestion that the Jawdats prepared this document, rather than Gropius or TAC.
61 Rifat Chadirji, in particular, has claimed that he in particular among a group of young architects including the Jawdats
was involved in proposing international architects to the IDB in this period. Mina Marefat cites an account by Chadirji
from 1997, listing him additionally as having joined the technical division of the Development Board as of 1952:
"I noticed they had some projects like Baghdad Central Station, the Parliament, and the Palace, which were
commissioned to British architects whose work were conventional and not modern.... This was a concern among us,
young architects. In a meeting between Allen [sic] Jawdat, Nizar Ali Jawdat, Qahtan Awni and myself, we decided to
approach the authorities and state our concerns. A meeting was arranged to see the then minister of planning, Dr.
Nadeem Pachachi. We met him privately in his home and after expressing our concerns, it was agreed that a list of
international architects be prepared and submitted to him.... I prepared the list and it was submitted personally by
Qahtan Awni to Dr. Nadeem Pachachi. (May [have] been submitted by Ellen Jawdat)." Letter from Chadirji to Marefat,
October 18, 1997, cited in Marefat, "1950s Baghdad-Modern and International," TAARII Newsletter, No. 2-2 (Fall
2007): 6. Elsewhere, Marefat cites a 2007 interview in which Chadirji reduces this account to a personal appeal by him
and Awni to Pachaci: "When I saw the list of who they are commissioning to do buildings... it was all by old-fashioned
British architects, mostly third-rate... I made an appointment to see the Minister of Planning, with my colleague
[Qahtan] Awni.... 'You are inviting people to design prestigious buildings and spending money. Why not invite the
best?' So he said, 'Who are the best?"' Marefat,"From Bauhaus to Baghdad: The Politics of Building the Total University."
TAARJ Newsletter, No. 3-2 (Fall 2008): 2-3. According to Neil Levine, Chadirji claimed in 1992 that these events took
place in 1952 (aligning with Ellen Jawdat's belief that her documents advocating for Gropius to Chelebi were written
around the same time). Levine also cites Mohammed Makiya as claiming in July 2012 that in fact "there were never
anything more than some informal discussions." Levine, 424, n. 63. In contrast, Ellen Jawdat claimed in an interview
with the author (2017) that Makiya was the main advocate for including Wright among the invited architects.
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It is also unclear when discussions of Gropius's involvement first came to center on the
university commission in the years between 1952 and 1957.62 While their personal correspondence
continued regularly through October of 1955, it was not until September 1957 that Walter Gropius
received a letter from the Jawdats relaying that an offer of the commission to design the University of
Baghdad campus was due to come from the Development Board. Gropius replied enthusiastically on
TAC letterhead on September 20th, in a manner that suggested the news was unexpected:
What a surprise to receive your letter! This project would indeed have greatest interest for all of
us in TAC, and I shall be glad to come over as soon as we have received the official invitation
from your Development Board.... The task to design a new University will be most thrilling to
us and closest to my own design ambitions, particularly as it will be dedicated to education
which is, in my opinion, the backbone of culture in any country.
Today I write only to thank you for your decisive help which I take from you as a most
precious present. 63
Indeed, Walter Gropius and Robert S. McMillan traveled to Baghdad from November 2nd to 10th,
1957 to discuss the commission. Gropius wrote again to Ellen and Nizar upon his return to the U.S.,
62 An undated letter prior to 1957 from Ellen to the Gropiuses [Harvard University, MS Ger 208, folder 956] describes
plans for a university scheme in Baghdad in a manner indicating that this was already known to Gropius, though noting
that the project had been delayed: "The university scheme is temporarily halted until the English firm of Minoprio-
Spenceley have made their recommendations for the Baghdad City plan & have settled on the site for the university
center. So it sits... & we keep talking." It is unclear, however, whether this was meant to refer to Gropius's possible
involvement. Neil Levine suggests that the letter dates to "prob. mid-1955" [Levine, 424, n. 71]. The letter describes two
events which correlate to a letter by Ise Gropius of October 3, 1955, seemingly confirming them as having taken place
before that date: a delivery of goat-hair rugs to Cambridge to explore selling such Iraqi rugs through Design Research,
discussions of which had been ongoing since the Gropiuses' arrival in Athens in late August 1954 following their
Baghdad trip [see postcard sent by Walter and Ise to the Jawdats from Athens, c. August 25-28, 1954]; and the expected
arrival of the Jawdats' fourth child in October (Hammad Jawdat, born November 1, 1955). Harvard University,
Houghton f 2013M-29. The Jawdat letter also refers to the completion of "The big school whose plans you saw" as set
"to open in the fall," as the last of Ellen's projects to be finished before she closed her formal architectural practice (a
decision she described to the Gropiuses as of January 14, 1955, citing medical reasons). This may refer either to the
Women's Headquarters of the Red Crescent, complete as of the project's publication in Architectural Design, March
1957, or more likely to the American School for Girls, which was described in the same publication as "already being
used, [but] far from complete." Raglan Squire, "Architecture in the Middle East," Architectural Design, March 1957: 96.
63 Letter from Walter Gropius to Nizar and Ellen Jawdat, September 20, 1957. Harvard University, Houghton
f 2013M-29. This was only the second letter to the Jawdats written on TAC letterhead, following the letter of September
9, 1954 in which Gropius first openly suggested his interest in architectural work in Iraq. Gropius's letter also mentions
"an announcement of the Board's decision in The Iraq Times of September ninth." The article mentioned is "Board
Decisions," Iraq Times, September 9, 1957, cited by Levine as stating September 7 as the date of the Development
Board's decision to commission TAC. Levine, The Urbanism ofFrank Lloyd Wright, 424, note 72. The letter from the
Jawdats with news of the University commission appears not to have survived.
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reiterating "my most emphatic thanks for everything you have done for us in Baghdad." 64 The trip,
he wrote, "could not have been more satisfactory, for we have covered a lot of ground collecting facts
and data which will enable us to go ahead immediately with the design as soon as we get the green
light from the Development Board." 65 Discussions of the contract and payments continued between
Gropius, McMillan, and the Development Board through December, and by April 1958 Gropius
reported to the Jawdats that "We are amidst the work on the University, particularly on the
educational approach to the whole problem.... This is a most formidable but highly interesting
task."66
Around the time of Gropius and McMillan's departure for Baghdad in late October, Ise
Gropius wondered in a letter to the Jawdats whether Frank Lloyd Wright, or his staff, remained
convinced as of that fall that the university commission was still theirs. 67 In fact, the timing of the
Jawdats' letter of September 20 informing Gropius of the impending Development Board
commission strongly suggests a direct relationship between the official demise of Wright's Plan for
Greater Baghdad and the decision to offer TAC the University on the Karada site. Wright submitted
his completed scheme in August, and Minoprio and Spencely were asked to review the drawings in
late September, just after the official decision to commission TAC was apparently made and just
64 Letter from Walter Gropius to Nizar and Ellen Jawdat, November 21, 1957. Harvard University,
Houghton f 2013M-29.
65 Ibid. In a letter from Kahtan Hassan Fahmi Al-Madfai to Ellen Jawdat on September 29, 1957, Al-Madfai confirms
news of Gropius's selection for the University and offers himself if Gropius and TAC will require the services of Iraqi
architects: "I heard that there is a possibility that Dr. Gropius may visit Baghdad and take over the project of the
University, for which I thanked all the Oriental and the Occidental Gods." Private collection of Ellen Jawdat.
66 Letter from Walter Gropius to Nizar and Ellen Jawdat, April 3, 1958. The contract is discussed in Gropius's letter of
November 21, 1957, and in a subsequent letter by Robert S. McMillan to Nizar Ali Jawdat on December 12, 1957.
Harvard University, Houghton f 2013M-29.
67 Ise Gropius wrote to Ellen Jawdat on October 27, 1957, in advance of Walter and McMillan's trip to Baghdad,
describing visits by students to their house in Lincoln that fall to see "the oldest modern." When "a young Swiss together
with an American student from Taliesin showed up," Ise wrote, "I asked them how Mr. Wright had enjoyed his trip to
Baghdad. I also asked what building Aalto had been asked to do ('Time' had mentioned that Aalto, Corbu & Wright
were busy in Baghdad) and mentioned that Walter was just leaving to look into the planning for the Arab university. The
young men looked surprised and said that Mr. Wright had already designed that as well as the building Aalto was
supposed to do and we looked sort of sheepishly at each other and then laughed it off. Wonder what situation Walter will
actually find when he gets there." Harvard University, Houghton f 2013M-29.
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before or coincident with the Jawdats' message to Gropius. In light of this timing-and the fact that
Wright's was the only one of the internationally commissioned projects for which Minoprio and
Spencely were asked for comments-it is tempting to speculate either that the Wright scheme had
fallen into disfavor by this time, leading to the Development Board to contact Gropius soon
thereafter, or, conversely, that an impending decision to offer the University to Gropius created a
conflict with Wright's attempt to absorb both the site and the program of the University into his own
plans, thus necessitating Minoprio and Spencely's review as authors of the master plan that governed
the distribution of these competing projects. Such a request suggests the possibility that Spencely's
description of Wright's drawings as "fantastic" in his review of the project was meant, perhaps, to
imply that the project wasfantastical: that is, unable to be realized within the confines of the master
plan for Baghdad or the government's developmental ambitions for the country.
Companies of Scholars
Unlike the personal, poetic character of Wright's Plan for Greater Baghdad, TAC's presentation of
the University of Baghdad scheme spoke the bureaucratic language of expertise from its origins. The
project was developed in two phases on either side of the July 14 coup d'etat, though both were
officially presented to the Iraqi government only after the military general 'Abd al-Karim Qasim had
come into power. The first scheme, which the original contract called on to be delivered by August
1958, was reported to be ready by late September and was submitted by TAC in its Report on the
University ofBaghdad of January 1959, a 10 4 -page technical report accompanied by a pilot plan and
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floor plans for the campus, model photographs, and six colored perspectives. 68 Following a meeting
in Baghdad the following month to discuss whether to proceed with the project, a revised second
scheme of the project was submitted a year later on January 20, 1960, with a preliminary design
drawing set supplemented by an detailed 155-page description of the building program titled
Preliminary Design Report, The University of Baghdad. (Fig. 5.13)
While there were significant changes to the organization of the campus and the architectural
expression of its major buildings between the first and second schemes, including a considerable
increase in the program and number of students to be accommodated by the new university, the
fundamental task that TAC was assigned remained the same across these two phases. In approaching
the creation of the first consolidated university in Baghdad, TAC was responsible for planning the
administrative and departmental structure of the university, as well as the complete design of the
campus and its facilities. Unlike European and U.S. universities that had developed piecemeal over
time (the January 1959 report gave Harvard, MIT, Oxford, and the University of Mexico as
comparative examples for the Baghdad plan, along with TAC's unbuilt proposal for Hua Tung
University in Shanghai), the commission for the University of Baghdad offered an "opportunity
which has been given to no other similar institution" in either East or West. "For the first time," the
anonymous text of the TAC report suggested, "it might be possible to plan a total university-both
the physical plant and the philosophy of education-to make use of and profit from the experience
68 Ise Gropius's letter to the Jawdats of April 3 indicated that "payments due to [TAC], according to the contract, for over
2 months have not been forthcoming," suggesting that the contract was signed around February 1958. Ise subsequently
wrote to Ellen on April 30 that "the contract called for delivery of the plans 6 months after the agreement was made"-
i.e., around August 1958-but worried that these plans would be delayed by the lack of payment, a fact that was
confirmed by Walter in a letter to the Jawdats of May 29, 1958. While the Report on the University ofBaghdad is undated,
the January 20, 1960 text references "the preliminary design report submitted by the Consultants [TAC] in January
1959" and confirms that "General approval for the project was given by the Prime Minister at a meeting with the
Consultants in February, 1959 after his review of the preliminary design plans." The report further references a meeting
of the Development Board on February 15, 1959 in which changes and additions to the original program were specified.
TAC, Preliminary Design Report, 1-2.
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of major Western universities and at the same time to cater to the particular needs and desires of the
people of Iraq.6 9
The central question in conceptualizing this "total university" was its expected role in the
country's ongoing modernization efforts, particularly through the expansion of an elite, educated
class of graduates that could serve in the future tasks of national development. While its participation
in the university as a technically sophisticated office of coordinating experts directly reinforced these
aims, TAC cautioned in its initial report against a conception of the future university as dedicated
solely to the production of technicians. The firm argued that it was crucial for the government to
avoid an exclusive focus on the immediate provision of expertise, in favor of a more flexible,
integrated educational program encompassing a humanistic curriculum beyond the narrow scope of
professional training:
It is possible that in Iraq today, there are many who think in terms of immediate needs. Many in
America do. Yet, our past experience suggests some dangers to be avoided. Forty years ago, when
America was undergoing a rapid industrial expansion and we felt strongly the need for new
roads, railroads, dams, and our cities were growing higher and broader, there were many who
demanded that our universities produce engineers. Today, we are still aware of our imperative
need for scientists and doctors. Yet, gradually, we have come to realize that we will produce better
engineers, scientists, and doctors if we give them broad education than if we simply train them in
their specialties. With this in mind, it is well to emphasize that a university, above all human
endowments, is a gift of the present to the future. 70
Instead of the tendency toward professionalization, TAC proposed a pedagogical structure that
would oppose the technocratic emphasis on specialization that, in its view, increasingly plagued the
culture of education in the U.S. as well. "As specialization of knowledge has increased and
professional schools within a university have multiplied," the firm wrote in the Report, "the concept
of a unity of knowledge or of a synthesis of the great variety of specializations has been almost
overwhelmed by the 'success' of specialization and analytical methods.... We would suggest therefore
69 The Architects Collaborative, Report on the University of Baghdad Designed by The Architects Collaborative, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, US.A., c. January 1959, 1.
70 Ibid., 3-4.
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as a root concept the balance of unity and diversity, of synthesis and analysis, of integration and
differentiation." 7 1 Furthermore, the rapid expansion of the University's program in relation to
national development and the disaggregated character of its existing facilities and departments left
TAC wary of projecting the future structure of departments or facilities as a mere extrapolation of
current needs for specific fields of knowledge. "In considering the problem of designing facilities for
5,000, 8,000, or 12,000 students," TAC wrote,
we are first led to ask-In what schools or for what professional degrees? In an area which is
absorbing technological facilities as rapidly as the countries in the Middle East, there may be
expected to be rather rapid shifts in the number and nature of professional people needed in the
various stages of development. Nor can all of these be predicted accurately at the present time....
Should engineers be given a priority over agriculturalists even though the country's future
appears to indicate a continued reliance on agriculture? Might not engineers be even more
important than doctors and public health officials even in the area of the control of
communicable diseases? And how fast are elementary and secondary schools to be made
available? The approach to a plan for a University in terms of enrollments of individual colleges
appears tenuous, especially as the relationship among the units of the university might well shift
over a period of time.72
These problems of projection thus returned TAC to the question of whether to plan the university's
administrative and physical structure according to departments with separate facilities, or with a
more integrated structure that would allow for flexibility and change over time. Conceptually, the
report asked, "Are [universities] agglomerations of college buildings per se or are they companies of
scholars devoted to common professional pursuits?" 73 Partner Robert S. McMillan echoed this
terminology in describing the firm's approach to the University of Baghdad, likening the problem to
71 Ibid., 7-8.
72 Ibid., 12-14. Both the difficulties of projection and the desire for an expanded humanities curriculum beyond
professional specializations were supported by a comparative table of enrollments in institutions of higher learning in
Iraq in 1954 and 1957, in which the largest increase was in the College of Arts and Sciences (a nearly three-fold increase
from 295 to 802 students), with more modest increases in most other departments. The only departments with decreases
in enrollment were the College of Commerce and Economics (1164 to 493 students), the Law School (1000 to 562
students), and the College of Religious Jurisprudence (101 to zero students).
73 Ibid., 14.
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that of designing "a 'single industry town'-the industry being education." 74 In organizing the
Baghdad campus around shared facilities rather than separate departments, these "companies of
scholars" would become the organizing principle for the University as a whole. The terms of this
conception of the university thus bore a specific parallel to the holistic creative model on which TAC
itself had been established, as a collaboration among generalists rather than an organization of
discrete specializations.
Among the few contemporary architectural critics to offer a detailed analysis of the educational
theory that underlay TAC's design for Baghdad, Giulio Carlo Argan identified the sociological
parallels between the proposed structure of the university and the firm's own self-conception, as well
as its effective function in modeling a social organization that would be reproduced within educated
Iraq society.75 Pointing to the central importance of pedagogical theory within Gropius's practice
both in Germany and in the postwar context of the U.S. university, Argan wrote that "Gropius is
finally going to erect in Baghdad his ideal project-the university town:"
For thirty years he has been preaching that education is the primary function of today's society,
that of its self-development. And it is in this direction that he and his group, The Architects
Collaborative International have worked. The university is the school at its apex; it is here that
the gap between the ideal society and the real society is bridged. The university is a community
that fulfills the very highest of the productive functions, theproduction ofits own structure.76
In pursuing this ideal, Argan reiterated the firm's argument that the model for the University should
emulate a communal, non-specialized model close to that of TAC itself: "as a unified community," he
claimed, the University "should not be subdivided into air-tight departments, nor foster a
specialization which does not have at its base a common culture." As a model of professional
74 Robert S. McMillan, "Visual Problems in Town Planning: The 'University Town' at Baghdad," transcript of paper
delivered at "The New Metropolis in the Arab World," an international seminar sponsored by the Congress for Cultural
Freedom and the Egyptian Society of Engineers, Cairo, December 17-22, 1960: CAI/ 15, 3.
75 Argan later pointed to Gropius as the paradigmatic figure of a sociologically progressive modernism in Walter Gropius e
la Bauhaus (1951), a seminal text in Italy on the connection between politics and architectural modernism in the postwar
period.
76 Giulio Carlo Argan, "A town for scholarship ["La cittA-scuola"], Casabella continuita, No. 242, August 1960: vii.
Translation original; emphasis mine.
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expertise, Argan wrote that in the Baghdad scheme, "Gropius, the theoretician of an integrated
society, and his educational advisers have avoided such fragmentation; they regard this community of
young people as a kind of ideal society in nucleo."77
In a longer, unpublished manuscript of this article that was read and commented on by the
Gropiuses prior to publication, Argan went further in outlining the paradoxes inherent in designing
a University for "a society with an ancient structure and deeply rooted traditions," yet one "whose
extraordinary riches in petroleum offer the possibility of very rapid technical progress." 78 In the
context of expanding modernization efforts in Iraq, he argued,
The University evidently has the two-fold duty of preparing the cadres of leaders, but also of
preventing an overspecialized and essentially technical training from cutting them off from what
should be the cultural evolution of the country; from making them unresponsive to the concrete
problems of a society not yet organized for such new tasks; and finally from imposing those
cadres on society as a rigid and constrictive superstructure. 79
Argan thus identified the conflicting demands of a university program tasked with the production of
an expert class of technicians, yet designed by architects who hoped to temper these needs through
an emphasis on liberal education as a sign of national development.
Diagrams of the administrative and physical organization of the university in the 1959 Report
on the University ofBaghdad made clear how TAC sought to relate its pedagogical ideals to the spatial
structure of its campus on the Karada site. (Fig. 5.14) Dividing the university administration into
two major functions, instruction and operations, the report proposed that most university
instruction be placed under the aegis of a single Dean of Arts and Sciences, rather than splitting
these two domains into separate deanships on the model of the typical U.S. university. The Dean
77 Ibid.
78 Giulio Carlo Argan, "Walter Gropius and the design of the University of Baghdad, Iraq," typescript with manuscript
corrections, Walter Gropius Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University (MS Ger 208, folder 314), typescript p. 4.
Two carbon copies of this text appear in the Walter Gropius papers, differing in sequence from the published version and
with handwritten comments possibly by Ise Gropius, suggesting that these were sent to the Gropiuses prior to
publication.
79 Giulio Carlo Argan, "Walter Gropius and the design of the University of Baghdad, Iraq," typescript p. 4.
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would be further responsible for coordinating both general and discipline-specific studies, each
supported by an assistant dean, thus avoiding the need to appoint a separate Dean of General Studies
without authority over departmental faculty.
This administrative pattern corresponded to a physical structure of shared teaching facilities
across departments, rather than a campus based on separate faculties in which each would have
discipline-specific classrooms, libraries, and offices. Instead, the report proposed that buildings be
grouped together essentially by type, in rings extending outward from a campus center toward the
river on three sides. The campus center would contain the university library, theater and auditorium,
central administration building, faculty club, and mosque, joined by covered passages around an
open plaza. (Fig. 5.15) This central precinct would be surrounded by a mat of connected blocks of
classrooms and laboratory spaces, respectively. While each school would have a permanent
headquarters within this matrix-for example allowing physics, chemistry, and astronomy offices to
be located closer to the laboratory areas while the humanities and social sciences were grouped into a
single office block along with education, engineering and architecture, law, business, and economics
-TAC argued that this structure of shared facilities would better accommodate future changes in
departmental sizes and space needs, as well as preventing the effective segregation of different schools
into permanent, discrete sections of the campus over time. Teaching spaces would be surrounded in
turn by three clusters of student residences served by a ring road, with individual faculty and
administrative housing located along the river at the western edge of the campus. The radial pattern
of housing clusters connected back to the campus center via paths based on an existing network of
10-foot high dykes that remained on the site following its reclamation, a feature that was rendered
into the pilot plan as a means of providing level changes within the campus. (Fig. 5.16) This pattern
of "spoke lines" thus provided a legible symbol of the flood control efforts that had marked the first
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phase of the Development Board's work, now incorporated as both a rhetorical device and a primary
structuring element within the university plan.80
The Expert University
In contrast to such appeals to the broader humanistic character of a new university for the nation,
both the Development Board and the U.S. interests that operated in Iraq prior to 1958 were aligned
in the expectation that the University of Baghdad would produce an educated class of experts, in
much the same terms of "immediate need" that its architects had warned against. The guests Gropius
had met on his 1954 trip to Baghdad included Henry Wiens, responsible for the Point Four program
as Director of the United States Operations Mission (USOM) to Iraq from 1954 to 1956. In a
defense of the Point Four program published in the aftermath of the July 14 coup d'etat, Wiens
confirmed that among U.S. aims, "In education, emphasis was placed on technical training."81 These
efforts included the provision of advisors for a series of special technical schools established prior to
1958, as well as for governmental efforts to emphasize agricultural and technical work in the city's
public schools, and the sending of Iraqi officials, technicians, and students to the U.S. for university
observation and training programs. Such educational efforts were seen to be of paramount
importance for economic and developmental efforts in Iraq, a country in which only twenty-three
percent of the school-age population was enrolled in educational institutions and some ninety
percent of the population remained illiterate as of 1950.82
The desire to train technicians for national development was key among the factors that
enabled TAC to continue work on the university project following the coup d'etat that brought
80 The Architects Collaborative, Report on the University of Baghdad Designed by The Architects Collaborative, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, U.S.A., c. January 1959, 32.
81 Henry Wiens, "The United States Operations Mission in Iraq," Annals ofthe American Academy ofPolitical and Social
Science, Vol. 323, Partnership for Progress: International Technical Co-Operation (May 1959): 142-3.
82 Phebe Marr, The Modern History ofIraq (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985): 110.
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Qasim to power, an event that signaled the official demise of the majority of cultural projects
sponsored by the Development Board during the monarchy. Among the commissions that had
begun under Faisal II, only those explicitly associated with concrete governmental and social needs
under Qasim were chosen to continue, while others, such as Aalto's museum and Wright's opera
house and cultural center, were abandoned. The new regime proceeded with Gio Ponti's headquarters
for the Development Board itself, now purged of its U.S. and British advisors and reorganized as the
Ministry of Planning. So too, Le Corbusier's project for a national stadium and sports complex
initially continued until the architect's death in 1965, before its eventual revival and the construction
of the gymnasium portion of this complex between 1974 and 1980 by one of Le Corbusier's former
associates, Georges-Marc Presentd.83 The TAC university proposal was the only other of the
Development Board projects to continue after 1958, and the only project by a U.S. firm, a
particularly difficult proposition in the pro-Soviet context of the Qasim regime.
Unlike cultural programs seen to be of dubious value for post-revolutionary Iraq, like opera or
art, the national tasks assigned to the university were not only continued, but significantly increased
under Qasim's government. Already regarded by some within the monarchy as potential sources of
both leftist dissent and nationalist sentiment opposed to foreign influence, educational institutions
took on expanded importance within governmental plans after 1958, modeled in part on a Soviet-
style planned economy as a spur to national economic development.84 In December 1959, just prior
to TAC's submission of its revised second scheme for the University on January 20, 1960, Qasim
announced a "provisional revolutionary plan" that included significantly increased investments in
education along with housing and healthcare, as forms of social welfare that were seen to be crucial
83 On the history of Le Corbusier's Olympic complex after 1958, see Mina Marefat, "Mise au Point for Le Corbusier's
Baghdad Stadium," Docomomo, No. 41 (September 2009): 30-40; Marefat, "Le Corbusier in Baghdad," Brownbook, No.
55 (January-February 2016), and Cec "The Le Corbusier Gymnasium in Baghdad: discovery of construction archives
(1974-1980)," May 30, 2012, http://ifpo.hypotheses.org/3560 (accessed January 26, 2013).
84 Phebe Marr, The Modern History ofIraq, third edition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2012): 100. On nationalist
ideology and the tradition of leftist dissent in education in Iraq prior to 1958, see Reeva S. Simon, Iraq Between the Two
World Wars: The Creation and Implementation ofa Nationalist Ideology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
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to national development, in contrast to the emphasis on irrigation and agriculture that had marked
the Development Board initiatives prior to 1958.85 These changes included nearly doubling the
national budget devoted to education between 1958 and 1960.86
Despite its problematic status as a U.S. firm in the post-revolutionary context of the new Iraqi
republic, TAC sought to negotiate these political shifts by appealing to the expanded role of
education within the new planned economy under Qasim. After delivering the preliminary scheme
for the University in January 1959, delayed for four months amid the political turmoil following the
coup d'etat, members of TAC traveled to Iraq to present the design to the new government in
February 1959, unsure of the fate of the project. 87 Qasim gave general approval for the project
during the meeting, though not without requesting changes that would significantly enlarge the
national scope of the university program. These included substantial increases in the number of
students to be accommodated by the campus, from 8,370 to 12,000-a figure that would later be
expanded to 18,000-and corresponding changes to the sizes of the library (increased from 400,000
to one million volumes), auditorium (increased from 1,800 to 5,000 seats), dormitory and dining
facilities, classrooms and laboratories, infirmary, elementary school, faculty houses, and guest houses
85 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (2012): 100.
86 This budget was increased from almost ID 13 million ($36 million) in 1958 to ID 24 million ($67 million) in 1960.
Marr, 7he Modern History of Iraq (2012): 100.
87 Following the resolution of issues concerning payments to TAC by May 1958, as Ellen Jawdat reported in a letter to
Ise Gropius that month (Houghton Library, MS Ger 208, folder 956), Walter Gropius wrote in a letter of May 29 that
"we [TAG] plan to come to Baghdad with the finished representation about in September." Ise confirmed in a letter to
the Jawdats on September 9 that, while Walter had planned to present the project in Baghdad that month, under the
political circumstances "He is not going, of course, as TAC has not heard directly what the men who are now in charge
are planning. But he has kept his part of the bargain, the plans for the first phase are finished and he will ask now
whether they want to see them and read the report.... TAC has no direct information from Baghdad yet and they are
told that the new men are so busy trying to get into the picture that quite a while may elapse before they will get around
to university plans." Harvard University, Houghton f 2013M-29. Nizar Ali Jawdat, then relocated with Ellen to Rome
following the coup d'etat, reported to Walter Gropius in a letter of October 4, 1958 that "The Development Board are, I
understand, anxious to continue with some of the main schemes, I am sure -ASidea-riq4 [crossed out] The University
will fall under that category." Houghton Library, MS Ger 208, folder 956. Nizar Ali wrote again to Walter on Nov 18,
1959 that "I am glad to hear that the project is progressing well, and I hope that all will go smoothly at the time of
presentation in Baghdad." Bauhaus Archiv, GS 19, 284.
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to be built for the campus. 88 The new plan also called for the addition of a Women's College for 500
students to be added to the university campus.
More significantly for the form of the new university as a whole, Qasim apparently requested
the addition of a tower as a prominent vertical element that would make the construction of the
campus visible at a distance-and, more specifically, visible to Qasim from his office within the
Ministry of Defense-thus signaling the cultural importance of the university at once to both its
client and the general public as a symbol of national progress. 89 This imperative led to the addition
of an administrative tower as an anchor for the heart of campus in the revised scheme of the
university that was delivered a year later in January 1960, standing on axis with the entry road as it
turned toward the ring road that enclosed this central precinct. (Fig. 5.17) TAC also sought to
leverage its professional expertise to facilitate the smooth conduct of the university commission
within this uncertain climate, as the firm's June 2, 1959 contract for the University required a deposit
of $1 million in the first year and $2.3 million in the second year to a Swiss bank account in order to
guarantee regular receipt of payments from the Iraqi government.9 0 Work continued, and by July
1961, international contractors had responded to the first bid tender for University construction
(then with a budget of $80 million), which included the administrative tower and the entry gate to
the campus. 9 1 Yet such attempts to ensure the uninterrupted progress of the project remained subject
88 TAC, Preliminary Design Report, The University of Baghdad, January 20, 1960: 6.
89 Louis A. McMillen, "The University of Baghdad, Baghdad, Iraq," in John C. Harkness ed., Walter Gropius Archive, Vol.
4: 1945-1969, The Work ofthe Architects Collaborative (New York and London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1991): 189.
90 TAC, microfilm of contract, June 2, 1959, with renewals in 1961 and 1964, MIT Rotch Library [now relocated to
MIT Museum], cited in Marefat, "The Universal University: How Bauhaus Came to Baghdad," in Pedro Azara, ed.,
Ciudad del espejismo: Bagdad, de Wright a Venturi = City of mirages, Baghdad, from Wright to Venturi
(Barcelona: Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya, 2008): 158 and note 15. Marefat also claims here that TAC "had
considerable help from the Jawdats and their connections in developing contract language" adapted to the Iraqi context.
91 "Everybody's Baby," Time Magazine, Vol. 78, No. 2 (July 14, 1961): 66.
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to continued political instability in Iraq, as suggested by communications with the Jawdats after the
fate of the project following the Ba'th coup d'6tat of February 1963 in which Qasim was killed.92
Not least among the forms of technical expertise that would be enabled by the new university
program was the first dedicated school of architecture in Iraq, established in 1959 as a separate
faculty within the department of engineering, coincident with the planning and design of the
consolidated University of Baghdad campus. Unsurprisingly given his pedagogical interests, Walter
Gropius evinced a particular interest in the value of an architectural curriculum from the beginnings
of the University commission. According to Fuad Uthman, a member of the faculty of architecture
from 1961 to 1969, Gropius expressed his thoughts on the potential creation of a faculty of
architecture in Baghdad in 1958. "Concerned about the shoddy quality of most buildings in the
country," Uthman recalled, Gropius "strongly recommended that the school deal with the
development and improvement of local construction techniques," suggesting "that the country
needed a school of building construction more than one of architecture."93 Such a program would
have particular cultural value in a national context in which "Most new buildings continued to be
poor imitations of modern western buildings," one in which Gropius "saw the age-old building
traditions of the Middle East, slowly perfected over generations, rapidly being replaced by new
materials and construction methods which neither builders nor designers had mastered adequately." 94
Such ambitions to foment a national building tradition that would be simultaneously
indigenous and modern, however, continued to rely on models of imported expertise. Robert
92 Ise Gropius wrote to Ellen Jawdat on October 27, 1963 of Walter Gropius's concern regarding difficulties with the
progress of the University project, alluding to news from Nizar Ali Jawdat (then about "the Rome-Baghdad situation." Ise
cautioned, however, that "you know he is a man who absolutely never gives up and as long as the financial situation
permits he will not abandon this scheme." The nature of these difficulties is unclear. By January 11, 1964, Ise reported to
Ellen that "Grope wants Nizar to know that TAC has come to a compromise with the Iraqis and work is going on again.
There was a very polite letter from the minister and they have given it in writing that the necessary changes for the plan
are going to be paid for." Harvard University, Houghton f 2013M-29. It is unclear whether "the Rome-Baghdad
situation" also referred to the effects of Robert S. McMillan's departure from the TAC Rome office around April 1963 to
establish his own practice.
93 Fuad A. Uthman, "Exporting Architectural Education to the Arab World," Journal ofArchitectural Education, Vol. 31,
No. 3 (February 1978): 27.
94 Ibid.
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Mather, a professor of architecture at the University of Texas who came to the University of Baghdad
in 1963 as a visiting professor, described the school's initial faculty of architecture as composed
equally of U.S. and British-trained Iraqi architects.95 Classes were conducted in English, in some
cases necessitating "the development of an Arabic architectural vocabulary where none had
previously existed"-a translation problem paralleled by the need to establish a positive term for the
figure of the architect, or architectural engineer (muhandis mimari), in a context in which the
engineer (muhandis) had traditionally represented the dominant form of building practice. 96By
1978, of the 200 architects practicing in Iraq, some 180 had been trained at the University of
Baghdad, with the remainder having studied in the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and European schools on
both sides of the Cold War divide.97 As the first faculty of architecture in the Arab and Persian Gulf
states, graduates of the University of Baghdad also proceeded to populate subsequently created
departments of engineering and architecture throughout the region, including the college of
engineering at Kuwait University, established in 1966.
The specific U.S. model for the University's pedagogy after 1963, including the faculty of
architecture, was provided by the University of Texas at Austin. Even prior to this official
relationship, the foundational architectural curriculum had been modeled on the five-year sequence
95 Robert Mather, "A New Program at Baghdad," AIA Journal, December 1965: 57-60. According to Uthman, in his
role at the University of Baghdad, Mather "addressed himself largely to the issues Gropius had raised when he was in the
country." Uthman, "Exporting Architectural Education to the Arab World": 28.
96 Uthman, "Exporting Architectural Education to the Arab World": 29. Uthman describes the unsatisfactory nature of
the two primary Arabic expressions for the architect at the time the faculty of architecture was established, muhandis
mimari (translated in English as architectural engineer) or mimar (translated as builder or contractor, and seen as "down
the social ladder" from the engineer, or muhandis). He suggests that muhandis mimari constituted an acceptable
compromise, leveraging the association with engineering to increase the prestige of the architectural field, and that by the
time of the article in 1978 the term had "become accepted not only in Iraq but [in] most of the Arab world as the
professional term for architect." Uthman: 27. Ellen Jawdat wrote in 1957 of a growing "public appreciation of the special
role of architect: a realization that his [sic] training equips him to do more than embellish the bare structure provided by
a contractor and that his services include an attempt to solve the demands of climate, social function, aesthetic
preferences and budget of the client." In contrast to to Uthman's terminology, however, Jawdat claimed that "This model
of the architect, clearly patterned on U.S. professional models, was distinct from the traditional primacy in the Arab
world of the master builder [mimar], the synthetic figure that "serves all the categories of builder, mason, engineer and
architect." Ellen Jawdat, "The New Architecture in Iraq," Architectural Design, March 1957: 79.
97 Uthman, "Exporting Architectural Education to the Arab World": 30.
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of typical U.S. undergraduate architecture programs, and was drafted in 1959-60 by Hisham Munir,
who had received his B.Arch. from the University of Texas in 1953 prior to attending the University
of Southern California.98 Kenton W Keith, a USIS officer in Baghdad in the mid-1960s, later
described the broader alliance between the University and its Texas counterpart in these years as "a
kind of twinning relationship" that involved exchanges of both students and professors, one deep
enough that "it had a life of its own and it was operating outside the context of our official
relationship."99 He noted that this exchange was encouraged on both sides as "a relationship that was
of benefit to the Iraqis and of benefit to the long range interests of the U.S." Keith further suggested
a desire to continue this connection even after the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 that made any public
affiliation with the U.S. government impossible in Iraq, claiming that "the Iraqis actually signaled
that they would like to keep that relationship going even as they were breaking diplomatic
relations." 100 Such exchanges testified to the degree to which TAC's ambitions for the educational
and physical structure of the campus had succeeded in creating an expert university for the training
of experts, including forms of professional training fashioned after the same U.S. models of
architectural practice that were embodied in TAC's own presence in Iraq.
From Rome to Baghdad
Beyond the TAC office in Cambridge, the development of the University of Baghdad project relied
on the formation of a transnational network of expert practices, ranging from draftsmen and
engineers in Rome to local architects in Baghdad, climate consultants in Princeton, and
environmental data drawn from Phoenix. Key to this network was TAC's creation of a branch office
98 Ibid., 29.
99 Kenton W. Keith, USIS Rotation Officer, Baghdad (1966-1967), interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, 1998. The
Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, "Iraq Country Reader," adst.org/
wp-content/uploads/2 012/09/Iraq.pdf, 164.
100 Ibid.
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in Rome in 1959 to execute the Baghdad commission, possibly the first international branch office of
a dedicated architectural firm in the U.S. 101 (Fig. 5.18) Rome had geographical advantages for
projects in the Middle East, cutting the travel time to Baghdad in half (via connections in Athens,
Istanbul, and Beirut) with the expansion of international airlines like Pan American and affiliated
regional carriers like Lebanese International Airways. Equally importantly for TAC's work, Italy
presented an inexpensive labor force of draftsmen compared to the U.S.102 The Rome location also
increased proximity to the firm's collaborators, like the Italian civil engineer Umberto Vannini,
employed by TAC in residence between Italy and Iraq, and Panero-Weidlinger-Salvadori, the
engineers for the University of Baghdad and itself a branch office for Weidlinger Associates, based in
New York City.1 03 In these years Rome also acted as a home for U.S. expatriate artists and architects,
particularly centered around the American Academy, some of whom, like James Wines, would
become involved in TAC's work in Baghdad through this geographical proximity.1 04
101 TAC S.p.A., alternately TACROM or The Architects Collaborative International Ltd., was listed with a location at
Via Nomentana 126 in the information given for Robert S. McMillan among the conference participants at "The New
Metropolis in the Arab World," held in Cairo, December 17-22, 1960. The office location appeared on TAC letterhead as
Viale Gorizia, 24 /c as of June 1965. See letter in Bauhaus Archiv, June 19, 1965, GN Kiste Nr. 3, Mappe 113.
102 Robert S. McMillan later claimed that after the TAC Rome office was formed following the Baghdad commission,
"Most of the architects were brought from the Unites States for the job." "U.S. Firm Radiates from Rome," Progressive
Architecture, October 1964: 239. Though large, the size of the TAC Rome office in these years is unclear, as is the
question of whether there was a differentiation between architects, possibly largely from the U.S. as McMillan claimed,
and draftsmen.
103 Mina Marefat claims that it was Nizar Ali Jawdat who suggested the formation of an office in Italy to Gropius, and
that Panero-Weidlinger-Salvadori, S.A. already had an office in Rome at the time. Marefat, "The Universal University:
How Bauhaus Came to Baghdad," in Pedro Azara, ed., Ciudad del espejismo: Bagdad, de Wright a Venturi = City of
mirages, Baghdad, from Wright to Venturi (Barcelona: Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya, 2008), note 19. It is equally
possible, however, that this engineering office was established in Rome specifically to work with TAC on the University of
Baghdad, as a branch of Weidlinger Associates in New York City. Matthys P. Levy, an engineer at Weidlinger Associates,
suggests that this was the case, describing "our work with Walter Gropius at The Architects Collaborative (TAC) on the
University of Baghdad, a huge project for which we prepared preliminary designs in New York [at Weidlinger Associates]
and passed them to an office we had set up in Rome called Panero Weidlinger Salvadori." Levy, "Matthys P. Levy," The
Structural Design of Tall and Special Buildings, No. 14 (200 5): 197.
104 See "Haven of Art and Study: Americans Live and Work at American Academy in Rome," in "America's World
Abroad," special issue of LIFE Magazine, December 23, 1957. The article includes James Wines, then a sculptor, among
U.S. artists living and working in Rome. Wines later worked on a large fountain sculpture for the central area of the
University of Baghdad c. 1961--see letter from Wines to Gropius October 4, 1961 f., after a visit by Gropius to Wines's
studio in Rome, asking Gropius to write a letter of recommendation for his application for a Guggenheim Fellowship,
which he received in 1962. Bauhaus Archiv, GN Kiste Nr. 3, Mappe 113.
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In establishing a base in Rome, the TAC office joined a community of foreign architects and
artists for whom the city served as a waystation to large-scale commissions in post-colonial nations
including the Arab and Persian Gulf states. A 1963 article in Time charted the links between this
"colony of American firms" in Rome and the governments of post-colonial "emerging nations" that,
rather than severing ties with U.S. actors after independence, had increasingly "found a more useful
path to national pride: hiring foreign architects to design government buildings, hospitals,
universities, and even cities."1 05 For development authorities in Middle Eastern and African countries
seeking the labor of foreign firms, Time suggested, Rome offered "the nearest reservoir of technical
talent and the best transportation" to provide services for these "underdeveloped nations." 106 The
article further outlined the particular forms of knowledge that foreign architects and engineers were
required to advertise in seeking such work, as both vendors of expert services and U.S. ambassadors
abroad: "These firms, which constitute a sort of architectural peace corps, stress speed, diplomacy,
language fluency and building techniques that can easily be learned by unskilled labor." 107 While the
U.S. offices listed in the article were largely engineering and architecture conglomerates, TAC may
have been the only exclusively architectural practice among this group, choosing instead to
collaborate with separate engineering firms like Panero-Weidlinger-Salvadori.1 08
The TAC Rome office also provided the base for later practices that were sought to take
advantage of these connections to work in Africa and the Middle East. These included Robert S.
McMillan, a founding partner of TAC, who split off along with other members of the Rome office to
105"Architects for the Developing [World]," Time Magazine, February 12, 1963: 94.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid. It is unclear whether the firms described in the Time article were located only in Rome, or whether, like TAC,
these were international branch offices of U.S. firms. Among the firms included, Whiting Associates International arrived
in 1953, described in the Time article as "the largest of the Rome-based American firms." McGaughy, Marshall,
McMillan & Lucas established a headquarters in Rome in 1963. These offices were later joined by firms like Brown
Daltas (not included in the Time article), which relocated its base in 1974 from Tehran to Rome, having already set up a
U.S. branch in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in 1962. On Brown Daltas, see Michael Kubo, "Brown Daltas," in Franch i
Gilabert, Kubo, Miljacki, Schafer, ed., OfficeUSAtlas, 597 and "Americans Abroad: Brown and Daltas in Iran,"
Architectural Record (October 1962). For Paul Weidlinger's thoughts on collaboration with architects, see his
"Cooperation Between Architects and Engineers?," Progressive Architecture/Pencil Points, June 1946.
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establish his own firm, Robert S. McMillan Associates, in 1963.109 In leaving TAC, McMillan sought
"to satisfy the ever-growing demand for superior architectural services emanating from the newly
independent countries of Africa," particularly to serve clients "who are all too frequently given a
pedestrian job by one or another of the large foreign architect-engineer firms that operate in the area,
and who are often inclined to award commissions to an American firm rather than one from a
country with a history of colonialism in Africa or the Near East."' 1 0 Among the benefits of an office
in Rome, the article noted that, as was the case for the TAC office, the location ensured "the
opportunity to have a principal at a project site within 24 hours should any problems arise requiring
major decisions or should a client request on-the-spot-consultation."1 I
In Baghdad, the ability to navigate the University commission through local constraints relied
on the presence of Hisham A. R. Munir, the associate architect for the project from its early years
until 1990, when he left for the U.S. amid the political turmoil of the First Gulf War."1 2 (Fig. 5.19)
Like the Jawdats, Munir was among the group of young Iraqi architects who embodied the new
exchanges between U.S. architectural pedagogy and professional experience and the formation of
109 "U.S. Firm Radiates from Rome," Progressive Architecture, October 1964: 239. At the time of its founding in 1963,
Robert S. McMillan Associates included fellow principal John H. Griffis and associates Riccardo Bonicatti, Barrie
Dewhurst, Joseph H. Onuma, Herbert D. Rader, and Richard E. Swibold, all ex-members of TAC. Among the firm's
projects related to the University of Baghdad commission in type and form were the University of Lagos, Nigeria, and a
mosque for the University of East Africa, Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika.
10 Ibid.
111 Ibid., 240.
112 A comprehensive account of Hisham Munir's career, spanning from his first works in Iraq in the late 1950s to his
departure in 1990, has yet to be undertaken. While such an assessment is beyond the scope of this dissertation, the brief
description here is indebted to Sharon C. Smith and Michael Toler of the Aga Khan Documentation Center at MIT,
with whom I worked in 2015 to establish an archive of Munir's work as a basis for future scholarship. This work involved
the creation of a database of Munir's known projects, a series of interviews with Munir by the author and Michael Toler
in Washington, D.C. in June 2015 to establish an oral history of these projects, and the collection of original materials
held by Munir in Washington, D.C., as well as research by Smith and Toler into extant materials in Baghdad.
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self-consciously modernist practices in Iraq. 13 After receiving architecture degrees in Texas and
California in 195 6 -in both cases designing buildings on Iraqi sites as thesis projects-and gaining
experience by working for various offices in Dallas and Los Angeles, Munir returned to Baghdad in
1958 to seek the architectural and infrastructural commissions that were increasingly available in
Iraq under the Development Board.'1 4 Significantly, these were often highly technical in both
building type and construction technology, as with his first project, a competition-winning entry for
a tuberculosis hospital in Mosul, designed in reinforced concrete and completed in 1964.
After working in partnership with the senior architect Midhat A. Madhloom, the initial
associate architect for the University of Baghdad, Munir eventually established his own practice,
Hisham Munir & Associates, and continued with the commission. He continued to work as
associate architect for all of TAC's projects in Iraq until his departure in 1990; this joint relationship
was strong enough, according to Munir, that the firm eventually asked him to direct a TAC branch
office in Baghdad, though he preferred to maintain a separate practice under his own name. 115
Munir later acknowledged the professional impact of the TAC office on his work, crediting this
collaboration with the expansion of the Munir office-possibly up to some 100 employees-and the
build-up of its technical expertise in these years. Indeed, many of Hisham Munir & Associates'
commissions showed affinities in form and construction with TAC's international projects after the
1950s. These included the firm's Government Guest House (1964-67)-built to house foreign
dignitaries in anticipation of the government's unrealized ambitions to host a Pan-Arab conference in
"3 Within a list of "The First 20 Iraqi Architects in 20 Years (1936-1956)," published in PROCESS:Architecture in 1985,
all of the architects listed received their degrees from foreign schools, prior to the establishment of the first department of
the first architecture department in Iraq at the University of Baghdad by Munir and others after 1959. All of the
graduates prior to 1951 studied at schools in the U.K. (including Midhat Madhloom and Mohammed Makiya), with the
exception of Numan Jalili, who studied at the University of Cairo. The graduates from U.S. schools after 1951 included
Qahtan Awni (University of California-Berkeley, 1951), Hazim Al-Tak (University of California-Berkeley, 1951),
Nasir Al-Asadi (University of Texas?, 1952), and Munir (University of Texas, 1953). "Medinaat Al Salaam: Baghdad
1979-1983," PROCESS:Architecture, No. 58 (May 1985): 132.
114 Hisham Munir, "Curriculum Vitae," n.d. (after 1989): 2. Aga Khan Documentation Center.
115 Hisham Munir in interview with the author, 2012.
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Baghdad following the first Arab League Summit in Cairo in 1964-which bore formal parallels to
TAC's U.S. Embassy in Athens (1956-59). (Fig. 5.20)
Munir's master's thesis at the University of Southern California had been dedicated to the issue
of climate, precisely the subject that emerged as a dominant instrument of exchange between U.S.
and European discourses of technical and scientific expertise and questions of regional architectural
aesthetics in the Middle East among other post-colonial contexts in this period. Munir argued in his
thesis that this subject formed the very basis of national progress, claiming, "Of all the factors that
help or impair the development of a nation, the most permanent is climate."116 The problem posed
for architects, he wrote, was thus "to develop and recommend means and methods of climate control
that would lead to an indigenous regional architecture."1 17 Through this focus on climate, Munir
offered his thesis in the hope that it might "serve as a guide as well as a stimulant for the architects
and people involved in the recent building movement in Iraq." In seeking to apply this universalizing
scientific framework in the Iraqi context, however, Munir argued that this would lead not to the
replication of international modernisms but rather to the rejection of foreign influence and the
cultivation of an "indigenous" national aesthetics:
It is only through such patience and honest approach to our problem that we would be able to
develop architecture that we can call our own; and through patience and understanding we
would be able to discard the foreign imports. Coupled with modern technique we should resort
to our rich background for inspiration toward creative, healthy indigenous Iraqi architecture....
With these factors architects will be well protected and equipped with motives that will protect
them against an invasion of all sorts of imported cliches and styles. 118
Munir suggested that a new "climate consciousness" had been made possible by Iraq's renegotiation
of its oil treaty with the Iraq Petroleum Company from 1950 to 1952 and the availability of this
116 Hisham Munir, "Climate Control and Architecture in Iraq," M.Arch. Thesis, University of Southern California,
August 1956: 1.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid., 2.
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revenue to the Development Board that had been created in tandem. 1 9 For the national building
industry, the result was that this "Capital has also increased the purchasing power of suitable and
expensive material"; in particular, "it has made possible the erection of national plants producing
native cement, thus putting concrete at the architect's disposal."1 20
Munir's analysis of the Iraqi climate was based in part on a comparison with U.S. desert
regions like Arizona (significantly, perhaps, where Wright's Taliesin West studio was also located), a
global parallelism of climatic data that would later play a role in TAC's University project. Noting
that "The arid climate of the southwest region of the United States has a great similarity to that of
Iraq," Munir pointed to the dam-building and flood control efforts of the Development Board's first
six-year plan to argue that "Iraq, however, has an advantage over its parallel in the United States; by
virtue of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, Iraq could possess large bodies of water that would modify
the general dry climate through easier effort."'21 The result of these efforts, Munir predicted, was that
"the settling and developing of the California desert and that of Arizona will have its parallel in the
western desert of Iraq as the dam projects and artesian wells come within completion."1 22
As TAC developed the University of Baghdad design following Munir's involvement as
associate architect, the global exchangeability of climate data from Phoenix to Iraq was articulated by
Victor Olgyay, a professor at Princeton University whom TAC listed as a part of the firm's "extensive
use of expert assistance" on the project.1 23 A section of the January 1960 report that accompanied
TAC's preliminary drawing set titled "Abbreviated Climatic Evaluation of Baghdad," likely produced
119 As oil production in Iraq increased by the early 1950s, the Iraqi government renegotiated with the Iraq Petroleum
Company in October 1950 to increase its national share of oil revenue. A second agreement was reached in 1952,
modeled on the "50/50" agreement that Saudi Arabia had negotiated with the Arabian-American Oil Company
(Aramco) in December 1950, giving the government fifty percent of the IPC's profits. Revenues to the Iraqi government
increased from ID 14 million ($32 million) to ID 40 million ($112 million) from 1951 to 1952. Phebe Marr, The
Modern History ofIraq (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985): 110.
120 Hisham Munir, "Climate Control and Architecture in Iraq": 63-65.
121 Ibid., 77-78.
122 Ibid. Munir also cited Wolfgang Langewiesche, "How to Live Comfortably in the Southwest Desert," House Beautiful
(April 1950): "What works in Baghdad and Damascus will work in Phoenix and Tucson."
123 TAC, Preliminary Design Report, 7he University of Baghdad, January 20, 1960: 6.
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by Olygay, included comparisons to and data from Phoenix, which, as the report noted, "as a hot
and dry region, has similar climatic characteristics as Baghdad."1 24 (Fig. 5.21) Like Munir's thesis,
Olgyay's charts expressed the character of such climatic analyses as at once universalizing and regional
in their architectural ambitions, a combination of a globally applicable science with the promise that
this technical method could yield design solutions that could be tailored to regionally specific
conditions.1 25 Later publications such as Olgyay's Design With Climate (1963) offered an image this
dialectic between generalized expertise and an ostensibly enlightened localism, offering a "bioclimatic
approach to architectural regionalism" that sought to bridge between a globally transferable scientific
apparatus and the questions of regional architectural language that accompanied national
modernization efforts of countries like Iraq. (Fig. 5.22) TAG's second scheme for the University of
Baghdad displayed the influence of this climatic expertise, with building facades featuring a variety of
concrete brise-soleil that echoed the catalog of facade systems presented by Olgyay in his book three
years later.126 (Fig. 5.23-5.24) So too, the urban pattern of "Hot-Arid Zone Housing" Olgyay
offered as an example in Design With Climate shared similarities with TAC's campus plan for the
university, with three clusters of student dormitories, with buildings grouped tightly to maximize
shade, each anchored via a landscaped path to a civic center with administrative, educational, and
124 TAC, Preliminary Design Report: 123. See also the bioclimatic chart of "Meteorological Data of Baghdad, Iraq (Above)
Compared to Phoenix, Arizona, U.S.A. (Below)" included there. This section of the TAC report corresponds to a separate
publication by Victor Olgyay, "University of Baghdad; climatological evaluations," in the possession of the TAC office.
This appears to be a photocopy of earlier report, "Climatological Evaluation and Recommendation for the Baghdad
Area." The Olgyay publication appears to have been bound, possibly after 1966, since the address for the TAC office
listed on the front cover is 46 Brattle St., the headquarters the firm designed prior to that year.
125 On Olgay and the global climate discourse in this period, see David Leatherbarrow and Richard Wesley, "Performance
and Style in the Work of Olgyay and Olgyay," arq, Vol. 18, No. 2 (2014): 167-176; Daniel A. Barber, "The Nature of
the Image: Olgyay and Olgyay's Architectural-Climatic Diagrams in the 1950s," Public Culture, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2016):
129-164;
126 TAC described the importance of climate in designing these facade systems in its January 1960 report: "Throughout
the project, particular consideration has been given to the peculiar climatic conditions, specifically to the excessive sun
heat in Baghdad. Systems of horizontal cantilevers and vertical baffles have been devised, the use of which changes
according to the respective orientation of a facade. These devices protect the windows against direct sun rays and result
also in substantial reduction in required air conditioning equipment. They offer simultaneously consistent and rich
architectural details which will give the design a strong architectural character." TAC, Preliminary Design Report, The
University of Baghdad, January 20, 1960: 5-6.
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recreational facilities. (Fig. 5.25-5.26) Such parallels confirmed the degree to which climate offered a
unifying technical and aesthetic discourse across the collaborative geography that joined the U.S.,
Italy, and Iraq.
Universal and Regional Aesthetics
"Universitas means 'wholeness'," TAC reminded the Development Board in its initial proposal for
the university in 1959. To that end, the firm argued, "the aim of the designers has been to achieve
accordingly a 'human pattern' throughout the campus which can offer the creative setting for a full,
well-integrated life of the students." 127 For TAC, this design approach to a "total university" for
Baghdad was ultimately intended to achieve a cultural synthesis that might mediate between foreign
and local traditions in creating an educational structure that would be at once regional and global.
Yet this notion of universality was weighted unequally between local and imported influences, as the
introduction to the firm's 1959 Report made clear. "What we are suggesting," TAC explained,
is that it is all too easy to impose western patterns and social and philosophical values on eastern
culture without remembering how much the East has to teach the West. A great gain might be
made if the University of Baghdad were somehow to synthesize the materialistic and scientific
gains and knowledge of the West with the mysticism, philosophy, and aesthetics of the East.
Perhaps, therefore, a step forward in world understanding might be made if a university, situated
between East and West, were to be so planned and developed as to provide both the intellectual,
emotional, and physical environment to encourage synthesis of both types in the development of
a world culture. 128
In arguing for symbiosis, TAC thus repeated the affiliation of material and scientific expertise with
the U.S. and Europe-an affiliation that encoded its own position as an expert practice in the Iraqi
context-opposing this technical capability to the "mysticism, philosophy, and aesthetics" of Iraqi
127 Ibid., 94.
128 Ibid., 8-9.
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culture.1 29 In the concluding section of the 1959 Report, a single page dedicated to the architectural
character of the university, the firm elaborated on the principles of this intended synthesis between
foreign technics and local aesthetics. "The architecture of the campus," TAC claimed, would be
"both contemporary and regional," through the incorporation of "indigenous Arabic elements, flat
roofs, patios, arcades, parapets, open staircases, open galleries, arches and vaults-but without
imitatively borrowing adornment of the past." 130 Through the employment and patterning of such
elements, the firm argued, "The sequence and character of these buildings is meant to represent the
national pride and the cultural dignity of the modern Arab."
These sentiments were echoed by contemporary critics who sought to evaluate the adaptations
of architectural modernism to the developmental context of modernization efforts in the Middle
East. The dichotomy between foreign technocracy and national aspirations was subject in these years
for contemporary philosophers like Paul Ricoeur, who contrasted the specter of "universal
civilization"-abstracted beyond technics to "the scientific spirit itself" and thus associated with the
philosophical framework of European enlightenment-with the need to protect national cultures, as
"the strain of two different necessities which are both pressing." 131 In decrying the spread of
uncritical, consumerist forms of modernization without regard for the past, Ricoeur identified the
paradox that confronted foreign architects in post-colonial contexts: how to "become modern and to
return to sources; how to revive an old, dormant civilization and take part in universal
129 Giulio Carlo Argan repeated this dichotomy in his Casabella article on the University of Baghdad, characterizing the
project as one in which "For the first time, typological and formal elements from an oriental tradition and yet in no sense
'vernacular' appear in an architectural projects signed by Gropius." Argan praised what he regards as a successful search
for "idiomatic integration" via a formal structure of "indigenous cadences in a closely-reasoned architectural composition,
with the reasoning being unmistakably Western." Argan, "A town for scholarship," Casabella continuita, No. 242, August
1960: vii.
130 The Architects Collaborative, Report on the University ofBaghdad, 94.
131 Paul Ricoeur, "Universal Civilization and National Cultures," History and Truth (Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, 1965): 271.
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civilization."1 32 Among architectural critics, Sigfried Giedion called similarly for the need to identify
a "regional approach that satisfies both cosmic and terrestrial conditions," a search that he admitted
"meets its greatest problem in the so-called 'technically underdeveloped areas"' of modernizing
nations like Iraq.1 33
In a 1960 review in Casabella, Ernesto N. Rogers-a colleague of Gropius and an architect
whose own office, BBPR, would later be involved with planning and design projects in Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia-attempted to situate TAC's design among such attempts by U.S. and European
architects to mediate between the universal "science" of modernism and regional architectural
imperatives abroad. He regarded the aesthetic project of the modern movement as burdened by a
language that remained "largely alien to local culture" in the Middle East, offering "only the signs of
improvements in the aesthetics of technology" despite its greater constructional and functional
honesty.1 34 Rogers further reiterated the association of this technical culture with the U.S., and the
corresponding conviction that the task of U.S. architects abroad would be to reconcile such images
of technology with the demand for forms of national expression in the post-colonial context of
countries like Iraq. He noted that "while hitherto these nations sought mainly the help of engineers
for bridges, dams, and oil wells, now they want to be helped in creating a characteristic image of
themselves: they call on architects to create the image of their human characteristics in the sense of
132 Ibid. Isenstadt and Rizvi point to this paradox, between an ostensibly ahistorical modernism and nationalist historical
imperatives, as a defining one for the trajectory of modern architecture in the region: "In the Middle East particularly, a
central tenet of postwar modernism-the irrelevance of the past for the problems of the present-swiftly came into
conflict with an earlier ideal of nationhood rooted in ethnic genealogy but growing toward material progress.... In such
ways, traditional forms were reintroduced by modernism itself; the immediately recognizable motifs could appear as a
proof of their persistence, however denatured." Isenstadt and Rizvi, ed., Modernism in the Middle East: 20.
133 Sigfried Giedion, "The State of Contemporary Architecture I: The Regional Approach," Architectural Record, January
1954: 132-137. See also Pietro Belluschi, "The Meaning of Regionalism in Architecture," Architectural Record, December
1955: 131-139. At the time, Belluschi was chairman of the selection committee for the U.S. Office of Foreign Buildings
Operations (FBO) which had chosen Josep Lldis Sert to design the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. In his article, Belluschi
praised Sert's design as a positive example of "how a great modern artist can use his gifts toward a sensitive version of a
regional architecture which is both creative and appropriate."
134 Ernesto N. Rogers, "Architecture for the Middle East" ["Architettura per il Medio Oriente"], Casabella continuith 242,
August 1960, vii. Translation original.
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their cultural aspirations."13 5 It was within this framework that Rogers praised the choice of Gropius
and TAC to design the University of Baghdad, both for their interest in the structure of education
and for their understanding of the need to provide Iraqis with just such a "characteristic image of
themselves" as part of the country's modernization efforts.136 In navigating these tensions between
foreign and local aesthetics, Rogers argued,
The University of Baghdad is a characteristic example of the dialectical evolution of history. One
might complain of a few instances in which purity has been set aside, but it must be admitted
that even certain liberties of vernacular [sic], a few local idiomatic forms, are due to the specific
intention of not alienating a work designed to further the development of a given culture; and to
do this by employing certain semantic values of that very culture, through which-by utilizing
foreign cultures-it becomes more intelligible to those who must use it in order to strengthen
it. 137
If the varying brise-soleil facades of the library and other buildings for the University expressed the
universal technics of climate and its application to the University campus, other formal elements
signaled TAC's attempt to identify "semantic values" that would bind the modern architecture of the
campus to national cultural imperatives. Not least among these devices was the use of a language of
concrete arches, structural as well as rhetorical, among the buildings that comprised the campus
center. In the first scheme for the university, this arched motif was employed in particular for the
mosque and the campus theater and auditorium, respectively the spiritual and secular cultural icons
of the campus. (Fig. 5.27) In the second scheme, the theater and auditorium preserved this language
in modified form, while the mosque, relocated to stand in isolation outside the campus center, was
redesigned as a free-standing dome resting on three points.
By the time TAC began design work on the University in 1957, the use of arches as a
regionalist sign had become something of a trope in designs by U.S. architects for cultural buildings
abroad, as for example in Paul Rudolph's unbuilt design for a U.S. Embassy in Amman, Jordan
135 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
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(1954), the entry to Raymond & Rado's U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia (1953-58), or the
warehouse wing of Richard Neutra and Robert Alexander's U.S. Embassy in Karachi, Pakistan
(1955-61). (Fig. 5.28-5.30) Such buildings testified to the growing awareness among U.S. architects
of the tensions inherent in adapting modernist architectural language to satisfy nationalist demands
for signification in foreign contexts, particularly within the geopolitical framework of the U.S.
Embassy program. So too, the arch form had emerged as a motif among contemporary artists and
architects in Iraq in this period, as later work by Rifat Chadirji, Mohammed Makiya, Hisham Munir,
and others would attest.1 38 Yet this language had begun to appear as a sign of regionalist rhetoric for
commissions within the U.S. as well, as evidenced by TAC's unbuilt scheme for a civic center for
Tallahassee, Florida (1955-56), the immediate predecessor for the auditorium at the University of
Baghdad. (Fig. 5.31) The multi-purpose arena within the Tallahassee complex was inspired in turn by
at least two canonical early modernist precedents: the rotating stage of Gropius's Total Theater for
Erwin Piscator (1927), which provided the organizing principle for the circular seating plan in TAC's
scheme; and Le Corbusier's unbuilt competition entry for the Palace of the Soviets (c. 1931), which
offered the structural form of a monumental parabolic arch from which the radial roof structure of
the Tallahassee arena was suspended. (Fig. 5.32-5.33) In TAC's design, however, the angular
structure of steel beams in Le Corbusier's project was substituted for a language of concrete vaults,
fanning outward over fixed seating areas on either side of a circular central platform that could be
reconfigured for different events or subdivided to create smaller theater spaces.1 39 These roof forms
partook in turn of a growing array of experiments with serial vaults and other thin-shell concrete
structures among U.S. architects by the mid-1950s, allied to a search for more monumental forms of
138 On the possible provenance of the arch motif within Baghdad's art and architectural scene of the 1950s, see Amin
Alsaden, "Architecture-Art-Architecture: Constructing Baghdad's Modernism," paper delivered at Abstraction Unframed:
Fourth Annual Conference of the Association for Modern and Contemporary Art of the Arab World, Turkey and Iran (AMCA),
Abu Dhabi and Sharjah, May 22-24, 2016.
139 The Architects Collaborative, A Civic Centerfor Tallahassee, Florida, August 1, 1956. The report specifies a contract of
February 23, 1956.
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structural expression appropriate to large-scale cultural buildings including stadiums, auditoriums,
and airports. 140
In developing the Tallahassee arena into an auditorium for the University of Baghdad three
years later, TAC's design underwent a series of subtle but meaningful modifications, first in the
transition Florida to Iraq and then between first scheme for the University, submitted in January
1959, and the revised second scheme for the campus a year later. Perhaps most importantly for the
building's signification, the initial design for the University auditorium eliminated the parabolic arch
that acted as the major visual element of the Tallahassee design in favor of a simpler structure of
reinforced concrete piers supporting the radial barrel vaults above. In abandoning the dominant
structural motif of the earlier project and its explicit homage to Le Corbusier, the Baghdad design
thus effectively altered the meaning of the arched concrete forms that remained, divorcing them
from a modernist visual language of heroic structural form to serve as signifiers of regionalist
adaptation, now among those "idiomatic forms" that Rogers had suggested were necessary to prevent
the alienation of the project in the Iraqi cultural context. In contrast, the lighter, almost billowy
profile of shallow concrete vaults in Tallahassee became tighter and more substantial through the two
versions of the Baghdad scheme, perhaps to reaffirm visually that these continued to play a
structural, rather than merely decorative, role. (Fig. 5.34) The design of the second scheme for the
auditorium distanced it from Gropius's Total Theatre precedent as well, with the flexibility of the
reconfigurable center stage based no longer on rotation (as in Tallahassee) but more simply on the
ability to subdivide between smaller and larger theater spaces. (Fig. 5.35-5.36)
Despite these changes in the form and meaning of the auditorium as they were developed in
the University scheme, later critics were quick to dismiss the Baghdad design as no more than a copy
140 Many of these projects are summarized in Proceedings ofa Conference on Thin Concrete Shells (Cambridge, MA: MIT,
1954), including Kresge Auditorium at MIT (1950-55). Eduardo Catalano, among the pioneers of thin-shell concrete
structures in North America, began teaching in the graduate program at MIT in 1956.
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of its predecessors, and its arched forms as superficial decorative motifs in the Iraqi context. 141
Manfredo Tafuri, for example, derided such elements as "puerile environmental touches, which in
reality are strictly from Disney," appropriate to the "typical American export products" produced by
TAC in Baghdad and elsewhere. 142 For Charles Jencks, the forms of the University of Baghdad
constituted proof that TAC was merely one among a class of "ever larger bureaucratic firms" that
sought to "perpetrate a form of historicist kitsch in the Middle East." 143 More contemporary
historians have perpetuated these assessments as well, as in Gwendolyn Wright's characterization of
the buildings of the University campus as "orientalist fantasies in high-tech concrete."144 Yet the
narrative of an unthinking translation from the Tallahassee arena to the Baghdad auditorium is
complicated by the presence of numerous sketches in which members of the TAC design team
explored both the structural form of the auditorium and its position relative to other major cultural
buildings within the campus center, the mosque in particular.1 45 (Fig. 5.37) In seeking to give
meaning to the formal and spatial relationship between the auditorium and mosque as secular and
religious gathering spaces within the campus center, these drawings suggest other precedents for
TAC's campus design, particularly Eero Saarinen & Associates's complex of Kresge Auditorium and
Chapel at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, MA (1950-55), in which the
technical structural expression of the auditorium and its thin-shell dome is set against the archaizing
form of the non-denominational chapel, built in rough brick and supported by a ring of low
141 It is perhaps significant that while the TAC team have been readily characterized as bureaucratic copyists in using
basing the University of Baghdad auditorium on the firm's earlier Tallahassee arena, historians have been more generous
in discussing the parallel case of Frank Lloyd Wright's opera house within the Plan for Greater Baghdad, which provided
the model for his later Grady Gammage Auditorium in Arizona. See, for example, Joseph M. Siry, "Wright's Baghdad
Opera House and Gammage Auditorium: In Search of Regional Modernity," The Art Bulletin, Vol. 87, No. 2 (June
2005): 265-311.
142 Manfredo Tafuri and Francesco Dal Co, Modern Architecture/2 (Milan: Electa, 1976): 307.
143 Charles Jencks, Modern Movements in Architecture, second edition (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd, 1983): 8.
144 Gwendolyn Wright, "Global Ambition and Local Knowledge," in Isenstadt and Rizvi, ed., Modernism in the Middle
East: Architecture and Politics in the Twentieth Century: 221.
145 University of Baghdad, slides [#5728], Loeb Library Special Collections, Harvard University. The date and authorship
of these sketches is unspecified in the slides. A similar sketch of the structural form of the Tallahassee dome, in the Walter
Gropius Archive, is also unattributed.
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concrete arches at its base. (Fig. 5.38) In the first scheme for the University, the visual contrast
between the concrete vaults of the auditorium and the arcaded pergolas of the mosque took on
additional meaning in the context of the Development Board's modernization efforts, as a display of
the tensions between the universalizing language of modernism and the self-conscious attempt to
identify traditional forms more appropriate to a national Iraqi architecture. 46 (Fig. 5.39)
Monument and Mosque
The legacy of the University of Baghdad has been complicated both by the difficulties of its
realization amid shifting national politics after 1958 and by the problems of authorship that
accompanied its corporate method of production, divided between architects, experts, and
consultants in the U.S., Europe, and Iraq. If its predecessor, Wright's unbuilt Plan for Greater
Baghdad, can be said to have a signature element to embody its appeal to genius as a mode of
authorship, surely it is the statue of Harun al-Rashid that was projected to stand at the terminus of
the Isle of Edena, at once laying claim to the genius of the Iraqi past and conflating this fictionalized
history with the rule of its client, Faisal II, in the present. (Fig. 5.40) In contrast, TAC's university
offers a less obvious monument to the bureaucratic ambition to produce a class of citizens educated
along U.S. lines as a vehicle for national development. A candidate might be the administrative
tower that appeared in the second version of the University scheme, placed on axis with the entry
road as this turns toward the campus center and designed to be seen at a distance, following Qasim's
request for a legible symbol of Iraqi modernization. (Fig. 5.41) For their part, TAC proposed the
arched gateway to the the campus, titled the Open Mind, as an icon of Gropius's lifelong approach
146 TAC's synagogue for Temple Oheb Shalom in Baltimore, Maryland, a design coincident with and likely completed
just before the University of Baghdad commission, featured arches similar to the mosque and its entry courtyard in the
first scheme for the University. The TAC job number for Temple Oheb Shalom is 5726 (the first two numbers refer to
the year of the commission, while the last two appear to designate the order in which the projects came into the office in
a given year), while the University of Baghdad is 5728, indicating that the Baghdad project began just afterwards. The
design for Temple Oheb Shalom appears to have been essentially complete by September 1957, that is, at nearly the same
time that TAC received the commission from the Development Board for the University.
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to pedagogy as well as the Development Board's ambitions for the University as an infrastructure for
national cultural development. Seemingly designed as a free-standing arch as an echo of the
historicist language used for the auditorium and other campus buildings, the gateway is in fact a
composition of two separate, cantilevered concrete forms, framing a thin, linear gap. (Fig. 5.42) TAC
suggested that the form of these symmetrical arcs symbolized the openness of intellectual pursuit that
the university would provide for the nation, evoking the lobes of the human brain or a pair of hands,
sheltering the campus entry between them.
Beyond these bureaucratic and metaphorical totems, a more fitting synecdoche for the
authorial and constructional complexities of the University of Baghdad might be its mosque, among
the elements that underwent the most significant changes between the first and second schemes for
the campus. (Fig. 5.43) Between these two proposals, the conservative design of courtyard and dome
that had originally faced the auditorium was replaced by a self-consciously modernist form, placed in
isolation on a site beyond the ring road that encircled the campus center. This displacement
effectively secularized the main precinct of cultural buildings at the heart of the university, at the
same time that it shifted the meaning of the dome from a marker of regionalist accommodation to a
heroic structural form as a sign of national progress. Like the broadcast towers that stood as technical
images at the center of Wright's plan, this change involved a series of substitutions between spiritual
elements and modern, secular variants. While a clock tower served as the vertical icon in TAC's first
scheme for the university, the second scheme reintroduced a minaret-like structure as a pure
sculpture adjacent to the mosque, separated by a reflecting pool. By these means, TAC argued, an
image of this traditional religious form, "functional in the past," was "kept as a symbol" in the
present. 47
The ambiguous provenance of the mosque among the network of collaborators inside and
outside TAC further contributed to its status as an unwitting embodiment of the bureaucratic
147 TAC, Preliminary Design Report, The University of Baghdad, January 20, 1960: 81.
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complex in which the University was conceived. Indeed, the inability to discern its authorship would
seem to lay bare the gap that Henry-Russell Hitchcock had suggested in his 1947 essay between the
types of commissions that were seen to be appropriate to the authorial modes of genius and
bureaucracy, respectively. While other campus buildings like the administrative tower, classrooms,
and dormitories fell neatly among the building types that Hitchcock regarded as amenable to the
techniques of the bureaucratic office, prosaic in expression and requiring competence and
consistency in execution, the mosque would necessarily be an iconic symbol of the campus, one that,
in Hitchcock's view, would ideally require the synthetic hand of the genius. H. Morse Payne Jr., an
associate at TAC and a member of the design team for the University, later claimed this artistic
mantle, stating that he was the singular author of the mosque that appeared in the second scheme for
the project. 148 Yet Payne specifically denied any knowledge of Kresge Auditorium, the most
immediately proximate precedent for the three-pointed structure of the mosque, despite the fact that
he was an alumnus of MIT, graduating in 1950-the year that Eero Saarinen & Associates began
working on the Kresge dome-and that the building was located just down the street from the TAC
offices in Harvard Square, where he began working in 1952.149
The available evidence suggests that other members of the TAC collaborative played a role in
the design of the mosque. TAC partner Louis A. McMillen, a director of the University of Baghdad
project, credited the first version of the project to the firm's research into traditional building types in
Iraq, such as Al-Kadhimain Mosque, which he and Gropius had visited on their trips to Baghdad.
(Fig. 5.44) Partner Robert S. McMillan, also among the directors of the University project from the
TAC Rome office, later designed a mosque for the University of East Africa at Dar es Salaam,
Tanganyika (c. 1968) after forming his own practice that echoed the Baghdad version in the form of
148 H. Morse Payne Jr. in interview with the author, October 2012.
149 A seminal conference on thin-shell concrete construction took place at MIT in June 1954; Kresge Auditorium was
completed in 1955, two years before the University of Baghdad commission. See J. William Plunkett and Caitlin T.
Mueller, "Thin Concrete Shells at MIT: Kresge Auditorium and the 1954 Conference," paper delivered at Fifth
International Congress on Construction History (June 2015), http://digitalstructures.mit.edu/files/2015-08/plunkett-
mueller.pdf.
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its free-standing dome, reconceived structurally as a composition of mosaic-tiled, pre-cast concrete
units.150 (Fig. 5.45) An even more likely source for the form of the Baghdad dome is Hisham Munir,
whose design thesis at the University of Texas in 1953 had been not only for a mosque, but for one
designed as a concatenation of thin-shell concrete domes, each resting on four, rather than three,
points. While no contemporary images of the design survive, these forms soon reappeared in Munir's
thesis at the University of Southern California in 1956, which included a design for a hospital that
featured an entrance pergola composed of thin-shell concrete forms, each also resting on four points.
(Fig. 5.46-5.47) Yet Munir later claimed that he neither directly advocated for this structural form
within the TAC team nor presented his Texas or USC projects to the office, though he may have
expressed dismay with the conservative, historicist language of the mosque in TAC's first version and
admitted to being pleased with the decision to pursue a more radically modern form in the final
scheme. 151
In its built form, the shifting status of authorial claims over the mosque has been compounded
by the fact that it was never realized as TAC conceived it. The version that was eventually
constructed, by unknown hands at an unknown date sometime after the 1960s, is a hollow echo of
the design that appeared in TAC's second scheme for the campus, illustrated in its January 1960
report with a dramatic rendering by Helmut Jacoby. (Fig. 5.48) The existing building replaces the
pebbled mosaic surface of the original design with a cheap veneer of rectangular panels, and
abandons the structural heroism of its arched, lightly glazed portals for a clunky structure of visible
edge beams framing smaller, more conventional openings. The building has additionally fallen into
150 "Mosque - University of East Africa, Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika," Robert S. McMillan Associates, office portfolio, c.
1968, n.p.
151 Hisham Munir in interviews with the author, June 2013 and August 2015.
270
disrepair, perhaps testifying to its relatively marginal role within the cultural life of the campus.15 1
(Fig. 5.49)
Relegated from the center of the campus to its periphery, radically modified in its form and
signification between TAG's first and second schemes for the university, and ultimately realized
anonymously as a pale echo of the original, the mosque stands as a historiographic cipher for the
cultural stakes of authorship and expertise that marked the development of the University of
Baghdad. Heroic in aspirations yet marginalized within the campus in its realization, the final form
of the mosque condenses the dynamics of its creation into an ambiguous figure, one that oscillates
among the dichotomies between spiritual and secular humanism, regionalism and universality,
historicism and modernism, and genius and bureaucracy. In this sense, it serves as an unlikely
monument to the difficulties of expertise and authorship that have marked the history of the site and
its university.
152 Photographs of the library and other central buildings circa 2008, taken by Pedro Azara, showed the center of the
University campus to be in fairly good repair at the time, unlike the mosque on its isolated site. I am grateful to Azara for
providing me with these photographs. Azara further suggested after his visit that the campus has been protected through
recent conflicts in Baghdad by its relative inaccessibility, surrounded by the river on three sides and entered via a single
gate on the fourth. The disrepair of the mosque thus appears to be a function of neglect or unfinished construction,
rather than of willful destruction.
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Chapter 6
Architecture and Oil in the Gulf States 1973-1983
The projects are immense, and so are the problems. But the builders, many of them Americans, are devising
ingenious solutions.
-Walter McQuade'
TAC must now engage in work overseas and pursue other markets far from our home office for this is
where most of the work is to be found. The international marketplace however, places new pressures,
tensions and dilemmas at TAC's door.
-H. Morse Payne Jr.2
The New Client: U.S. Firms and the "Oil-Rich Mid-East"
Within a few short years after the start of the global spike in crude oil prices after 1973, a raft of
journal articles in the United States had begun to speculate in earnest about the new opportunities
for architects to build in the expanding economies of the Middle Eastern Gulf states. Governmental
complexes, vast military cities, new towns for oil workers, international airports, banking towers,
commercial centers, and luxury hotels were among the vast array of commissions on offer for foreign
firms able to navigate this new market, financed by a spectrum of public and private clients made
wealthy by national oil revenues. Written in the manner of apprehensive but enticing field guides to
the region, such articles sought to outline the opportunities, risks, and intricate protocols that
Western architects would have to negotiate if they hoped to chase the specter of petroleum-fueled
development and the tempting yet often precarious finance economies to which it gave rise. In
Architectural Record, Charles K. Hoyt wrote of the "oil-rich Middle East... the new frontier for
I Walter McQuade, "The Arabian Building Boom is Making Construction History," Fortune (September 1976).
2 H. Morse Payne Jr., "President's Report," in TAC Inc., 1976Annual Meeting ofStockholders, March 25, 1976. MIT
Museum Archives.
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professional services," and asked with both anticipation and unease: "is this the new client?" 3 (Fig.
6.1) In Fortune, Walter McQuade warned that "for the eager American construction men involved,
there are rich rewards to be earned, but there are also immense difficulties." 4 (Fig. 62) National
Geographic offered a guide to Gulf countries that were riding "a magic carpet of petrodollars... to
undreamed-of prosperity and influence," and wondered: "Who are those oil-rich Arabs, and what are
they doing with all that money?" 5
What these articles chronicled above all were the speculative dimensions-potentially lucrative
yet risky-of this desire by Western architects to enter the global market for architectural
commissions in the Gulf. Reaching its peak between the oil embargo that followed the Middle East
war of October 1973 and the series of intertwined political and economic events that marked the
end of the Gulf construction boom after 1982, the heaviest presence of U.S. firms in the Gulf states
paralleled both the spike in crude oil prices and the corresponding recession in the United States and
Europe in this decade. (Fig. 63) Ihis desire thus formed a natural corollary to the desperation of
many Western architects to escape the increasingly precarious conditions of practice in their own
countries, on the opposite side of the revised formulas of oil and capital exchange that had so
enriched the Gulf states. In this way the involvement of U.S. architects in the Gulf acted as a hinge
between the collapsing space of Western building practice and the coveted but also economically
risky territories of the Middle East, where these firms hoped to chase those same sources of wealth
that had been suddenly evacuated from architectural commissions at home.
The notion of speculation provides a useful framework for understanding the cultural and
economic forces that governed both both sides of this equation. The term alludes on the one hand to
the processes of speculating for oil reserves, which had generated the national wealth of the Gulf
3 Charles K. Hoyt, "The Oil-Rich Mideast: The new frontier for professional services?" Architectural Record (June 1975):
101.
4 Walter McQuade, "The Arabian Building Boom is Making Construction History," Fortune (September 1976): 112.
5 John J. Putman, "The Arab World, Inc.," National Geographic (October 1975): 494.
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states so precipitously after World War II. On the other, it refers to the global mechanisms of
financial speculation that were erected on top of this oil revenue, which included the creation of new
state and parastatal institutions in the Gulf from banks and investment companies to international
aid organizations, as well as private companies like the engineering and construction conglomerates
that would prove crucial in mediating the relationship between foreign firms and local projects. In
this exchange, the search by U.S. architects for commissions in the Gulf constituted a related form of
financial speculation, a process that often carried significant levels of professional risk as much as
potential benefits.
Speculation carried additional meaning in the context of Kuwait, among the first and most
extreme examples of large-scale urban transformation in the Gulf states following the master
planning and demolition of much of the existing center of Kuwait City after 1952. Here it resonates
with the idea of spectacle, which historian Farah Al-Nakib has posited as a by-product of Kuwait's
extended modernization by the 1980s. Exploring the ideological construct of al-nadha (the
awakening) as the main driver of the processes of modernization in Kuwait after 1950, Al-Nakib
argues that beyond the government's attempts to plan a functional city center through the
demolition of the existing fabric, development in Kuwait was driven by the desire to create the urban
spectacle of "a cityscape that would serve as the definitive symbol and visual reflection of Kuwait's
newfound modernity."6 (Fig. 64) These ambitions were emblematized early in Kuwait's
modernization by the Fahad Al-Salem Street development after 1957 and later by the iconic Kuwait
Towers (Sune and Joe Lindstr6m of VBB and Malene Bj6rn of Bj6rn & Bjdrn Design, 1965-77). At
the same time, the term resonates with the contemporaneous sense of Kuwait as a speculum, or
mirror, for the changes taking place in architectural practice in the West. Forming the obverse of the
corporate images of an abstract finance economy based on the distant specter of "oil" that circulated
in the U.S. in this period, there lay the parallel conviction among visitors to the Gulf that in its
6 Farah Al-Nakib, "Kuwait's Modern Spectacle: Oil Wealth and the Making of a New Capital City, 1950-90,"
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2013): 9.
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urban spectacle, "Kuwait today is like a mirror of all that is totally modern in the western world." 7
(Fig. 6.5)
Kuwait Funds
Among the Gulf states, Kuwait played an early and outsized role in constructing these new global
processes of exchange. The nation had been among the first Gulf states to fully nationalize its oil
industry, with its rapid takeover of financial control of the Kuwait Oil Company (begun as a joint-
venture between the American-owned Gulf Oil Corporation and the British-owned Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company)-first negotiating 60 percent ownership in 1974 and then full ownership the
following year-providing a model that was quickly exploited in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Qatar, and Abu
Dhabi.8 At the time Kuwait was the third-largest oil producer in the Gulf after Saudi Arabia and Iran
and the sixth-largest in the world, extraordinary figures given its relatively minute size. Moreover,
Kuwait provided a home for the entity directly responsible for the 1973 embargo and the ensuing
price shocks that launched the "second" oil boom after World War II: the Organization of Arab
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), established in 1968 with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and
Libya as its founding members.
Even more crucially for its regional importance, both the state's inability to absorb the enormous
quantities of oil revenue and the desire to ensure its protection among the Arab states (particularly
relative to the territorial claims of Iraq) led the Kuwaiti government to establish an unprecedented
framework for lending international aid for development projects in the Arab world, the Kuwait
Fund for Economic Development (KFAED), immediately after achieving independence in 1961.
7 Gardiner, Kuwait, The Making ofa City: 31. On the late modern mirror-glass buildings through which "the fetishism of
'oil' as pure liquidity, pure circulation" was reified and abstracted in the West in this period, see Reinhold Martin,
"Materiality: Mirrors," in Utopia's Ghost: Architecture and Postmodernism, Again (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press: 2010): 93-122.
8 Robert Stephens, The Arabs'New Frontier (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1976): 38.
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(Fig. 66) Western observers of the Kuwait Fund in the 1970s reflected on the institution's uniquely
"Arab character" and the remarkable success of its lending model in the Arab world as compared to
traditional Western sources of development aid such as the World Bank. Within three years of its
establishment, the list of Arab countries in which large-scale development initiatives backed by the
Kuwait Fund were in progress or soon to be underway included Jordan, Egypt (then part of the
United Arab Republic), Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, with projects ranging from irrigation and
agricultural development to electrical power plants, mining, and tourist infrastructure. 9 (Fig. 67) In
the twelve years prior to the 1973 embargo, Kuwait was the world's largest donor of aid relative to
GDP and the seventh-largest overall after the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, Germany,
Japan, and France, the traditional Cold War sources of international aid. An astonishing 15-20
percent of the country's national budget was given to foreign aid projects in these years. The result of
this framework was that "it was the small Gulf oil state of Kuwait which was the first to make a more
serious effort to use oil money constructively in the Arab world."10 (Fig. 68)
Yet the most immediately visible impacts of Kuwait's newfound wealth were at home. Within a
few years of the discovery of the Burgan oil field in 1938 and its exploitation in earnest after World
War II, the state embarked on an ambitious program of urban clearance and development beginning
in the 1950s that would fundamentally alter the structure of the city center. The key mechanism for
these efforts was a state policy of land acquisition and resettlement that enabled the almost complete
demolition the old town as specified in the first master plan for Kuwait, prepared in 1952 by the
British town planners Minoprio, Spenceley, and Macfarlane." (Fig. 69) The ensuing landscape of
multi-lane streets and vacant urban parcels-many left empty for decades due to the extreme land
9 The Kuwait Fundfor Arab Economic Development, promotional pamphlet (The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic
Development, June 1964).
10 Stephens, The Arabs'New Frontier: 33.
11 See "Town Planning in Kuwait," Architectural Design (October 1953): 272-273. On the Land Acquisition Policy
(LAP) of 1951 and its consequences, see Suhair A. Al-Mosully, Revitalizing Kuwait's Empty City Center (Ph.D.
Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1992) and Asseel Al-Ragam, "The Destruction of Modernist
Heritage: The Myth of Al-Sawaber," Journal ofArchitectural Education, Vol. 67, No. 2 (2013): 243-252.
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values that resulted from their initial purchase at artificially inflated prices-provided the ground for
the construction of a vast array of governmental, institutional, and commercial projects through
which the state sought to reconfigure the spatial and economic bases of a modern Kuwait on the
world stage.
The role of foreign architects in creating this image of modernity was crucial. By the time of the
second boom in oil prices in the 1970s, the city center of Kuwait had become the territory for what
Lukasz Stanek has described as "a global market of architectural resources which, besides labour,
included building materials and technologies, discourses and images... most often combined on the
ground with resources from local and regional networks."12 For many observers of the steady influx
of foreign architects to Kuwait, "the famous names that were appointed to build as a consequence" of
the city's modernization constituted "a veritable Who's Who of the international giants, all
candidates for the front cover of Time magazine. Nothing but the best."13 Such commentary was
typically reserved for the major civic icons of Kuwait's development, a list that included Michel
Ecochard's National Museum of Kuwait (1960-83), Arne Jacobsen's Central Bank of Kuwait (1966-
76), Kenzo Tange's Kuwait International Airport (1967-70), Jorn Utzon's National Parliament
(1972-82), Reima and Reilli Pietilai's Sief Palace Complex (1973-83), and Arthur Erickson's Al-
Sawaber Housing (1976-81, though Erickson's office was only involved until 1977). So too the
roster of foreign luminaries encompassed the largely Team 10-affiliated group of architects invited
after 1968 to submit visionary large-scale proposals for the city center, including the Pietilis, Alison
and Peter Smithson, BBPR, and Candilis-Josic-Woods. 14 Largely in the background of these
discussions were more anonymous, large-scale practices like The Architects Collaborative and
12 Lukasz Stanek, "Mobilities of Architecture in the Global Cold War": 366. Stanek describes this complex as part of
broader processes of "mondialisation," a term taken after Henri Lefebvre to refer to "the emergence of architecture as a
worldwide techno-scientific phenomenon after World War II from within competing visions of global cooperation and
solidarity."
13 Neil Parkyn, "Kuwait Revisited," Middle East Construction (September 1983): 40.
14 See "Proposals For Restructuring Kuwait" and "Kuwait: The Smithsons' Scheme," Architectural Review (September
1974): 179-190.
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Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, as well as the heavy presence of professional architects from socialist
European countries including Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, and
Greece. 15
In assessing the work of these international architects in Kuwait, contemporary Western critics
combined astonishment at the sheer scale of the country's urban transformation with a persistent
misgivings about the ability of such "star" designers to contribute meaningfully to these processes of
modernization. Neil Parkyn, a British architect in Kuwait who returned in 1983 to assess the city's
development after a five-year absence, admitted that "given the firm clues and themes there for the
taking-strong light, privacy and formality, waterfront sites in some cases, abundant resources,
competent contractors-some of the stars turned in their standard home performance, airfreighted
to Kuwait Bay."1 6 ("Not," he was quick to venture, "that this was always inappropriate.") (Fig. 6.10)
Others reflected on the speed and impact of urban change, reflecting on the ways in which "For
good or ill [oil] has brought enormous material and moral changes to Kuwait, transforming it in
little more than a decade from a quiet traditional desert town into a kind of Arab Los Angeles,
spreading its highways and suburbs over the surrounding desert to take in the daily flow of its scores
of thousands of big American cars."1 7 Such statements seemed to confirm the fears of architects like
Parkyn that Kuwait's construction boom had become nothing more than a "showcase for the world's
architectural prima donnas."18
Yet the office that best exemplified the imbrication of U.S. architects with Kuwait's large-scale
urban transformation, The Architects Collaborative (TAC), was in many ways far more anonymous
than the signature architects whose buildings provided a ready image of spectacle for both Western
15 An account of the socialist architects working in Kuwait in this period is Stanek, "Mobilities of Architecture in the
Global Cold War."
16 Neil Parkyn, "Kuwait Revisited": 40.
17 Stephens, The Arabs'New Frontier: 39.
18 Neil Parkyn, "Kuwait Revisited": 39.
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and Kuwaiti critiques. TAC's heavy presence in Kuwait began in 1968 with the commission to
design the headquarters of the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, a project gained after
a diplomatic trip by partner Louis McMillen to seek work in the Gulf states as an extension of the
firm's ongoing involvement with the University of Baghdad in Iraq after 1957.19 The inauguration of
the first Kuwait Fund building in 1974 began a period of thirty years of sustained work in Kuwait
for TAC, so much so that the firm opened a dedicated branch office there in 1976 (the only
international office run by the firm until its bankruptcy in 1995, aside from the one it had begun in
Rome in 1959 to conduct work on the University of Baghdad project). (Fig. 6.11) TAC's dozens of
projects in Kuwait over these decades included a series of commercial developments for the Kuwait
Investment Company combining ground-floor souks with parking, offices, and housing (1973-79),
the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research (1979-83), the Kuwait News Agency (1981-87), the
Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of Science (1982-86), and the Public Authority for Civil
Information (1986-92). This involvement in the Gulf reaped benefits in other countries in the
Middle East as well, including numerous projects in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq,
and Jordan. (Fig. 6.12) While the bulk of the articles directed to U.S. architects in the 1970s
reflected the palpable anxiety for those unfamiliar with the Middle East about how to access this
market and negotiate its risks, the situation was clearly different for firms like TAC that had already
been working in the region for two decades at the time of the oil embargo.
It is no coincidence that TAC's arrival in Kuwait came via an entity whose creation reflected a
sophisticated philosophy of the relationship between Western technologies, local resources, and
modernization efforts in the Arab world. The Director-General of the Kuwait Fund, Abdulatif
Youssef Al Hamad, spoke of the reciprocal relations of dependence among the Arab countries, in
19 Interview with Sabah Al-Rayyes, May 29, 2013. Ironically, one of the initial motives for the Kuwait Fund's aid
program to Arab countries had been to bolster international support for Kuwait in the face of territorial claims by Iraq
under General And al-Karim Qasim, whose rise to power following the coup of July 14, 1958 had spelled the demise of
nearly all of the cultural projects by international architects commissioned under the pro-U.S. Hashemite monarchy of
Faisal II, with the notable exception of the University of Baghdad.
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which Kuwait's need for territorial protection and its lack of natural resources could be remedied
through the lending of developmental aid to foment support within the region: "We are a small
country and rely on our neighbors for almost everything-food, teachers, labor. In turn we share
with them what we have, money." 20 (Fig. 613) Abroad, Al Hamad lectured audiences in the so-
called "first world" about the Arab perspective on the changing equations of trade that had enabled
the creation of institutions like the Kuwait Fund and their role in revising the traditionally
exploitative relationship of the Western powers to the oil-producing Gulf states:
For years our countries lived literally at the periphery of the world, too weak and too poor to
protest against the management of national wealth by foreign private interests, against the low
price of oil, against the rapid exhaustion of our reserves, against the draining away of export
receipts, and the alienation of the whole oil sector from the national economy. History and the
conjunction of several favorable factors began to change all this in the late sixties. We began to
recover sovereignty over our national resources, to analyse the different aspects of the world oil
markets, to accumulate knowledge, and this led finally to what we refer to sometimes as "the oil
revolution." 21
Instead of a unilateral model of resource exploitation, the conception and operation of the Kuwait
Fund "envisaged a triangular cooperation between the technologically advanced oil-consuming
countries, the oil producers with surplus funds, and the developing countries seeking to industrialize
and modernize themselves. Oil money and Western technology would together transform the
economies and societies of the Third World, including the Arab countries."22
The construction of the Kuwait Fund's own headquarters made these triangular relationships
explicit, involving a large U.S. architecture firm, a technologically sophisticated local consultant, and
a client empowered to provide both an expressive and a functional symbol of the new role of oil
20 Putman, "The Arab World, Inc.": 523.
21 "Some Aspects of the Oil Controversy: An Arab Interpretation," lecture given by Al Hamad at the Industrial
Development Bank of Japan in Tokyo, May 8-9, 1975. The lecture was published as Some Aspects ofthe Oil Controversy:
An Arab Interpretation (The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, May 1975).
22 Stephens, The Arabs' New Frontier: 65.
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revenue in reshaping the modern Arab states.23 (Fig. 614) The building consisted of square rings of
offices suspended around an enclosed central courtyard, held by an outer ring of piers under an
overhanging roof. (Fig. 615) This parti had appeared in earlier international civic buildings by TAC,
first at the U.S. Embassy in Athens, Greece (1956) and later in their Library building for the
University of Tunis School of Law (1962), developed for the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID). What was new at the Kuwait Fund was the ziggurat-like stepping of the
office floors and the simplified, monolithic character of its massing, with deep piers of sandblasted
concrete merging into a solid upper floor punctuated by an irregular pattern of vertical slit-windows.
(Fig. 616) Stephen Gardiner, the author of perhaps the sole book-length survey of Kuwait's modern
architecture in these years, praised the stepping back of these platforms "to reveal the entire contents
of the building-its space, contents, structure, materials." (Fig. 617) Contrasting the building's
openness with the introversion of Jacobsen's Bank, which he likened to "the closed, heavily guarded
world of finance," he related the Kuwait Fund building in turn to the international mission of its
client, as a headquarters dedicated to "cultural exchange, education, discussion, ideas." 24 For
Gardiner, its meticulous sand-blasted concrete and stone reflected a sumptuous headquarters in
which "the outstanding excellence of the detail depends largely on the clear expression of materials-
the simplicity with which weighty components like beams and columns are put together, and the
23 In 1985 Al Hamad moved on to become director of Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development, an inter-
governmental aid body created in 1974 as an expansion of the Kuwait Fund's country-specific purview to sponsor
cooperative projects of multinational scope. There he extended his role as a sophisticated architectural patron with the
creation of the exceptionally lavish Arab Organizations Headquarters Building, inaugurated in 1994 with TAC partner
Louis McMillen as architectural consultant. In addition to headquarters of the Arab Fund, the building Inter-Arab
Investment Guarantee Corporation (created with the help of the Kuwait Fund in 1974 to guarantee loans to Arab
corporations against non-commercial risks), the Arab Maritime Petroleum Transport Company, and the global
headquarters of OAPEC, the multinational agency that organized the global oil embargo in response to the Middle East
war in October 1973.
24 Gardiner, Kuwait, The Making ofa City: 137. Robert Stephens, a British visitor studying the Kuwait Fund's
institutional structure a few years after its opening, noted that while some of its employees had apparently held
"misgivings for fear that it might lose something of the compact intimate atmosphere" of its previous offices on the
outskirts of the city, the new headquarters ensured that "through imaginative architectural design and the determination
of the staff, much of this atmosphere has been preserved in the new building while gaining in space, comfort and modern
equipment." Stephens, 7he Arabs'New Frontier: 57.
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candour with which the granite aggregate of the concrete is displayed." 25 Many of these details
became signature elements of TAC and PACE's projects in Kuwait and throughout the Gulf,
particularly its patterning of recessed slit-windows topped with circular arches, set within sheer
concrete surfaces. (Fig. 618)
Local Expertise: Pan-Arab Consulting Engineers
A crucial element in the work of U.S. firms in Kuwait was the presence of consulting firms, large
engineering and construction conglomerates that acted as mediators of foreign technical expertise
and construction details with on-the-ground protocols. This differed from the situation in Saudi
Arabia, for example, where much of the contractual and logistical work of U.S. firms was enabled by
para-statal multinational clients like the Arabian-American Oil Company (Aramco) or more directly
through Western proxies like Bechtel and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 26 Key to TAC's
proficiency in the Gulf was their sustained collaboration with Pan-Arab Consulting Engineers
(PACE), the consultant for nearly all of the firm's projects in Kuwait as well as those of other large
U.S. firms, notably Skidmore, Owings & Merrill (SOM). (Fig. 619) As with TAC and PACE,
foreign and local firms frequently operated together through joint-venture agreements, a way of
25 Gardiner, Kuwait, The Making ofa City: 137-138.
26 On Aramco, see Robert Vitalis, America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2007) and the various area guides for foreign workers published by the company, such as Aramco
Handbook: Oil and the Middle East (Dhahran, Saudi Arabia: Aramco, 1968). On the role of the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers in Saudi Arabia, see Robert P. Grathwol and Donita M. Moorhus, Bricks, Sand, and Marble: U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers Construction in the Mediterranean and the Middle East 1947-1991 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military
History and Corps of Engineers, United States Army, 2009). On Bechtel in the Middle East up to 1958, see Richard
Finnie, Bechtel in Arab Lands, A Fifteenth-Year Review ofEngineering and Construction Projects (San Francisco: Bechtel
Corporation, 1958).
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satisfying the governmental regulation that foreign firms were required to work with Kuwaiti
consultants for all construction projects in the country.27
PACE's close association with TAC also began with the Kuwait Fund headquarters, one of the
earliest projects taken on by the firm after its establishment in 1968.28 Indeed, the growth of this
relationship was crucial for PACE's emergence to become one of the largest consultants in the Gulf,
as its founding members later credited their acquisition of drawing standards and design protocols in
the first years of the office directly to their work with TAC.29 (Fig. 620) Conversely, it was largely
through the close relationship with such consulting firms that TAC grew into one of the largest
architectural practices in the U.S. these decades, sustained by dozens of large-scale projects, both
iconic and anonymous, in Kuwait.
Concrete was the material of choice in nearly all of these buildings. Indeed, precast and poured-
in place concrete became the preferred materials for the vast array of large-scale commissions
designed by U.S. firms in the Gulf States between the 1950s and the 1980s. Perhaps no construction
material better embodied the relationship between large-scale architecture firms in the United States
and the expanding economies of the Middle East. A synthetic material formed by the chemical
interaction of ingredients produced through varying technical means, concrete solidified the complex
exchanges among Western architectural specifications, global material networks, and local
27 For example, the requirement for foreign firms to involve a local consulting office with the design and supervision of
works in Kuwait was specified in a letter from Sabah Al-Rayyes of PACE to Louis A. McMillen of TAC regarding the
contractual agreement for the Area 5 and 9 commercial parking garages (the Souk Al-Manakh and Souk AI-Safat), sent
between June 14 and August 22, 1975. A draft of the joint-venture agreement between TAC and PACE for the Area 5
and 9 garages is dated August 26, 1975. Courtesy PACE Archives. SSH, one of the largest consultants in Kuwait, claims
that the requirement for foreign firms to work with local consultants after 1973 was the result of lobbying by partner
Salem Al-Marzouk, a U.S.-educated civil engineer then in the Ministry of Public Works and a member of the National
Assembly. Rod Sweet, ed., SSH Design: The First 50 Years (http://issuu.com/sshdesign/docs/50-years-book): 47.
28 The project number given to the Kuwait Fund project by PACE was 68006, with the first two digits indicating the
year of the commission, indicating that this was the sixth project ever taken on by the firm in the year of its founding.
29 Interviews with Tarek Shuaib, current head of PACE and son of founding partner Hamid Shuaib (August 1, 2012),
and founding partners Sabah Al-Rayyes (May 29, 2013) and Charles Haddad (May 30, 2013).
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construction firms through which the building economy of the Gulf states took shape in these
decades.
A significant element of these transactions was the changing signification of concrete as a "local"
material, one in which foreign technics and on-the ground matter and labor were synthesized. In
Saudi Arabia, Caudill, Rowlett & Scott (CRS), the architects of the University of Petroleum and
Minerals in Dhahran (196 4 -82)-among the earliest large-scale projects by U.S. architects for Gulf
clients after the University of Baghdad and Minoru Yamasaki's Civic Air Terminal in Dhahran
(1958-61)-had found that "in Saudi Arabia even the sand does not behave the same as sand
elsewhere... wind-blown desert sand loses its sharp, irregular edges and does not bond well."30
Instead sand had to be obtained from the seashore and mixed with local limestone and cement to
produce sufficient hardness. Yet for CRS the resulting composite still constituted "a Saudi product"
despite its reliance on Western protocols of sourcing and assembly, one that was "sand-blasted to
expose aggregate and matrix, color compatible with the jebel site."31 (Fig. 621) Such buildings were
often regarded by local architects as modern as much for their technical proficiency and material
refinement as for any stylistic or architectural expression. In this way, in contrast to purely import
materials like steel, concrete directly materialized the transnational mixture of expertise and matter at
play in these buildings, literally hardening these flows into the image of a "local" architectural
expression.
Cargo Cult: SOM and the Corporate Banking Tower
To the extent that specific architectural types can be identified with Kuwaiti modernization after the
1970s, two stand out as a particular legacy of the U.S. firms that participated in the construction of
30 Jonathan King and Peter Langdon, ed., The CRS Team and the Business ofArchitecture (College Station, TX: Texas
A&M University Press, 2002): 143.
31 Charles E. Lawrence, Saudi Search (Houston: CRSS Research, 1986): 9.
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the city center. One was the office tower, emblematic of both the proliferating array of new financial
institutions that dominated Kuwait's urban landscape and the cargo-cult of technological culture
offered by corporate U.S. firms.32 The Kuwait Fund was among the first of these, adding a concrete
office tower by TAC adjacent to its main headquarters, completed after 1981, that betrayed the
influence of Araldo Cossutta and I.M. Pei & Partners's administrative tower for the Christian Science
Center in Boston, Massachusetts (1964-73).33
Three other new financial entities-the Bank of Kuwait and the Middle East, the Industrial Bank
of Kuwait, and the Kuwait Real Estate Bank-came together to develop the Joint Banking Centre, a
complex of three prismatic towers designed by SOM with PACE (1976-82). Among the U.S. firms
that became major players in the Gulf, SOM's presence in earnest began relatively late with the
design of the Hajj Terminal in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (1975-82), a project that promptly led to
prominent commissions for banking towers in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain. 34 In these towers,
attention to the harsh desert climate and an interest in uninterrupted mass led the firm to develop an
aesthetic of what might be described as "Gulf monoliths," simple geometrical solids whose power
derives from an alternation of sheer blank surfaces in stone or concrete with overscaled, often deeply
recessed openings. This series reached its peak in the hermetic National Commercial Bank (1977-
83) in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, a windowless triangular volume with offices facing onto interior courts
32 On the concept of architectural "cargo-cult" and the emblematic role of SOM office towers in signifying "nearness to
the fountain of technological culture," see Peter Smithson, "The fine and the folk: An essay on McKim, Mead and White
and the American tradition," Architectural Design (August 1965): 394.
33 On the Christian Science Center, see Mark Pasnik, Michael Kubo, and Chris Grimley, ed., Heroic: Concrete
Architecture and the New Boston (New York: Monacelli Press, 2015). The master plan for the Christian Science Center
included TAC's Church Park Apartments (1967-73), directly across from Cossutta and Pei's complex.
34 Among the U.S. firms with the heaviest presence in the Middle East by the 1970s, the earliest arrivals were TAC (the
University of Baghdad, begun 1957), Minoru Yamasaki & Associates (the Civic Air Terminal in Dhahran, begun 1958),
Brown Daltas (the Palace of Princess Fatemah in Tehran, begun around 1962), and CRS (the University of Petroleum
and Minerals in Dhahran, begun 1964). Later arrivals included Leo A Daly (the Saudi Arabian National Guard
Headquarters in Riyadh, begun 1973) and HOK (the King Saud University in Riyadh, begun 1975 in a consortium with
CRS and three other foreign firms). SOM's first commission in the Gulf may have been an office building for ARAMCO
in Dhahran (1962), though little about the project is known. A timeline of these and other projects by U.S. firms in the
Middle East is given in Eva Franch i Gilabert, Michael Kubo, Ana Miljacki, and Ashley Schafer, ed., OfficeUSAtlas
(Zurich: Lars Muller, 2015): 750-753.
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revealed on the exterior by three immense openings on its otherwise blank facades.35 (Fig. 622-
624)
The Joint Banking Centre was won by invited competition in 1976 over entries by TAC, Philip
Johnson, and Kenzo Tange, though the scheme was subsequently redesigned by SOM. Its three
banks are articulated as an offset composition of triangulated slabs, each occupying roughly one half
of a square in plan, with the other half occupied by skylit banking halls at the base of each tower. The
two short sides of each tower exposed to direct sunlight are windowless, with office windows
subsumed into the long face of each tower, bracketed by monolithic stair cores. The result was
regarded by Parkyn as a "striking abstract composition of solids in the sunshine, supported by
immaculate detailing. No attempt at 'Arabic' forms or a false vernacular; a precise, telling statement
to which nothing can be added or taken away." 36 (Fig. 625) Outwardly expressive of the unity of
Kuwait's banking industry, the external uniformity of the three towers gives way to customized
interiors particular to each bank, chosen among a remarkable twelve alternative schemes developed
by SOM for the three banking halls (six options were developed for the executive floors). The result
was a complex "considered the first 'world class' series of office towers in the third generation of
Kuwait's post-World War II building programs," not least for an interior "palette of materials of
enormous richness which this project demonstrates in such superbly sumptuous style." 37 This sense
of luxury was amplified to an extreme at the Al-Ahli Bank (1981-87), where stone-clad semi-circular
cores flank spanning office floors whose decor befits the relatively more ostentatious character of a
privately held, rather than state-affiliated, bank.
35 Aybars Asci, the senior designer for SOM's Al Hamra Firdous Tower in Kuwait (2011), has described the current firm's
awareness of this Gulf aesthetic of monolithic forms and its explicit interest in reviving this lineage in their design for the
Al Hamra tower. See his recent talk at the Export Agendas symposium at Northeastern University, Boston, February 25,
2015.
36 Parkyn, "Kuwait Revisited": 40.
37 Maeve Slavin, "Blue Chip Banking," Interiors (November 1984): 130, 141.
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In devising a language of blank-walled, stone monoliths designed to adapt to the Gulf context,
such buildings constituted an inversion of the fetishism that had accompanied SOM's repertoire of
international bank towers in other countries. As the refined technological products of the epitome of
U.S. corporate practice in these decades, these towers stood as objects of emulation abroad, well
prior to the firm's desire to adapt the language of such banking buildings to the climatic and urban
conditions of the Gulf states. In 1965, Peter Smithson, who with Alison Smithson would begin work
on their urban proposal for the city center of Kuwait three years later, described the other-worldly
impression upon European visitors of "machine-absolute" towers like SOM's Chase Manhattan
Bank in New York.38 Such technologically sophisticated emblems of U.S. practice, Smithson
wrote,"arouse the strongest cargo-cult feelings in foreigners, and are truly hints of une architecture
autre."39 His term referred to the shock of Melanesian islanders at the sight of US warplanes and
their cargo during World War II, and to the elaborate cult ceremonies they invented to copy the
forms of these planes in bamboo and paint, hoping that such mimicry would bring the same
abundance from the gods. Smithson interpreted the "rash of black towers" in the United Kingdom as
signs of just such a cargo-cult mentality, intended to signify a "nearness to the fountain of
technological culture." Henry-Russell Hitchcock linked the fetish character of such products with
the professionalization of the firms, like SOM, that produced them, predicting that in the future it
would be "not only the American skyscraper that has come to be adopted abroad but, up to a point
at least, the methods of its design and production."40
38 Peter Smithson, "The fine and the folk: An essay on McKim, Mead and White and the American tradition,"
Architectural Design (August 1965): 394.
39 Ibid.
40 Henry-Russell Hitchcock, "The Rise to World Prominence of American Architecture," Zodiac 8: America, ed. Bruno
Alfieri (Milan: 1961): 2.
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Anonymity: The TAC Souks
The other building type that marked Kuwait's development in the 1970s was less iconic, yet far more
consequential in its impact on the structure of the city center. These were the modern "souks,"
multistory structures built as infrastructural anchors for the large urban mega-blocks designated as
urban "Areas," each one divided into smaller parcels for development. Referred to as souks on
account of their enclosed shopping areas-and regarded as evolutions of the enclosed linear souks
planned under Saba George Shiber in the 1960s-in reality these were commercial parking garages,
new hybrids of lower-level commercial spaces, multistory parking garages, and upper-level offices
and/or housing. (Fig. 626) As they developed in the 1970s, these new amalgams reflected the
particular real-estate economics that resulted from the rapid demolition of Kuwait's city center in the
1950s and its interrelated products: artificially inflated land values, large empty spaces overrun with
cars, and the urgent need to alleviate traffic congestion.
The Land Acquisition Policy of 1951 had provided the key mechanism by which the state was
able to rapidly clear nearly the entirety of the old town center of its existing fabric of courtyard
houses and narrow streets to make way for an ambitious modernization program of new roads and
public buildings. Under this scheme, land was purchased from property-owning families within the
old town walls (itself demolished to form the green belt that defined the new city center) at
deliberately inflated rates, reputedly up to ten times above market value, as an expedient way both to
distribute oil revenue and to bring development areas rapidly under state control. These families were
then given corresponding plots by lottery and interest-free loans (originally 70,000 Kuwaiti dinars
for the first to move after 1952) to build homes outside of the green belt, generally as single-family
villas rather than traditional urban courtyard houses.41 The consequence of this policy was that land
values in the city center remained permanently raised to such artificial levels that that many parcels
1 Al-Ragam, "The Destruction of Modernist Heritage: The Myth of Al-Sawaber": 245.
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remained undeveloped for decades, as "land speculation became a much more lucrative venture than
construction for the private sector."42 Combined with the extreme congestion that followed the
opening of car traffic through the old center (among the main drivers of the Minoprio, Spencely, and
Macfarlane master plan), the result was an urban landscape of multilane roads and half-empty mega-
blocks, overrun with parked cars. (Fig. 627)
Faced with the urgency of combating these choking conditions of traffic congestion, the state
sought to incentivize private developers to build public infrastructure on land that would otherwise
remain empty for speculation. The solution was a decision to sponsor the construction of forty
commercial parking garages for 1000 cars each within the green belt, a decision Gardiner criticized as
"hardly a recommendation for planners of experience." 43 (Fig. 628) Such structures had already been
predicted in the studies for the city center submitted by BBPR to the Municipality in 1969, which
called for a series of sixty-meter "landmarks" that would provide observation points and recreation
areas, "supplied by large autosilos" below.44 (Fig. 629) The mechanism for inducing private
developers to build parking (on which little profit could be made) was a "build-operate-
transfer" (BOT) arrangement in which sites were bid to developers to build commercial structures on
twenty-five year leases before transferring their operation to the government, with twenty-five
percent of their space allotted to profit-generating uses, i.e., rental offices and ground-floor souks. So
ubiquitous were the garages built over the next decade that for Western visitors like Parkyn, by the
early 1980s they had "come to represent, in a surprisingly short space of time, almost a 'traditional'
Kuwaiti building form-small shopping units for rental grouped around an internal public
concourse, topped by parking levels and office floors."45
42 Farah Al-Nakib, "Kuwait's Modern Spectacle": 13.
43 Gardiner, Kuwait, 7he Making ofa City: 42. The locations of these garages as built are recorded in a map by the State
of Kuwait Ministry of Public Works, Roads Administration, Kuwait City, ca. 1980s. Courtesy MIT Dome.
44 Studio Architetti BBPR, The Future Development ofthe Old City ofKuwait, report submitted to Ministry of Planning,
Kuwait, 1969: 4.3.
45 Parkyn, "Kuwait Revisited": 40.
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Foreign firms played a crucial role in realizing this new infrastructural type. The Kuwait
Investment Company (KIC) and the National Real Estate Company, two of the many new financial
institutions created in the wake of the oil boom, commissioned TAC to design three of these parking
garages-Souk Al-Safat, Souk Al-Manakh, and Souk Al-Wataniya-between 1973 and 1979. Local
consultants SSH designed two others with SOM, Souk Al-Kuwait and Souk Al-Kabeer (1973-76).
Others were completed in conjunction with British firms (Souk Al-Muttaheda and Souk Al-Masseel,
Jack Bonnington Partnership with KEO, 1973-79) or by expatriate Polish architects (Souk
Dawliyah, Ryszard Daczkowski and Edward Lach for Gulf Engineering Office, completed 1978).
These projects occasionally laid bare the intersection of differing demands and technical abilities
between local and foreign firms, as when the concrete frame of the Souk Al-Kuwait collapsed while
under construction (killing laborers who slept on the building's open-air floor slabs at night), a
failure rumored to have been caused by the contractor's overzealous desire to increase the speed of
construction.46 (Fig. 630)
The BBPR study had envisioned an extensive "connecting framework" of elevated passages that
would connect these and other buildings via "moving stairways, conveyor belts, and air-conditioned
spaces" throughout the old city center between the Sief Palace and Safat Square.47 By the early 1970s
this scheme had been translated into a proposed monorail ringing the city center along roughly the
same route, which would have connected Souk Al-Manakh, Souk Al-Kuwait, Souk Al-Safat, and
Souk Al-Wataniya, among other buildings. No such elevated connections, however, were built. The
result was a patchwork of urban interiors surrounded by empty spaces, tenuously connected to the
existing network of souks that had been extended under Shiber.
Visitors seemed ambivalent about the impact of these new structures on the city. Parkyn, for
example, could claim that via "the new multifunction souk superblocks... it is now possible to
46 Interview with Sabah A1-Rayyes, May 29, 2013.
47 Studio Architetti BBPR, The Future Development of the Old City ofKuwait: 4.1, 4.2.
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traverse considerable sections of the downtown area without stepping onto the sunbaked sand or
fragmentary pavements remaining from the First, or was it the Second, Great Surge of urban renewal
in the '60s and '70s," while at the same time warning that "their proliferation and presumed success
raises interesting issues not resolved in a city which still thinks in terms of single site development...
At present they stand in isolation, having no 'back' or 'front,' often no planned linkage to the next
one." 48 Seen as suffering from the same lack of urban cohesion that marked the city's more iconic
"monuments-to-be," Parkyn wrote that as of 1983, most of the souks were still free-standing "among
parked cars, the ruins of what remains of Kuwait's stock of single-storey courtyard family houses and
the dusty walk-ups from the 1950s building boom.... they float like giant and beautifully
constructed space stations in a sea of sand, although this sand is apparently some of the most
expensive real estate in the world, on paper at least."49 The most extreme example of the type was the
Souk Al-Wataniya (1974-79), in which a mat of courtyard housing on the top floor provided a
surreal afterimage of the traditional structure of the city center prior to 1952, now floating above the
infrastructural blocks which had replaced it. (Fig. 631)
Speculative Consequences
It was another souk designed by TAC, the Souk Al-Manakh, that unwittingly became the decisive
site-if not the symbol-of the speculative building economy and its hazards at the end of the boom
in crude oil prices. (Fig. 632) Built across the street from the projected Kuwait Stock Exchange
(John S. Bonnington, 1984), Souk Al-Manakh was organized with five levels of parking and top-
floor offices above a commercial ground floor and mezzanine and two levels of parking below
48 Parkyn, "Kuwait Revisited": 40.
49 Ibid: 42. Among these isolated "monuments-to-be," Parkyn identified Utzon's National Parliament (1972-82),
Mohamed Makiya's Kuwait State Mosque (1977-81), and John S. Bonnington Partnership and KEO's Kuwait Stock
Exchange (1978-86).
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ground. Though less exceptional than Souk Al-Wataniya and its mix of housing with commercial
functions, this organization included an atrium cut through the parking levels to provide light to the
shops on the ground floor, with the parking screened behind interior faqades of concrete alternating
with frosted vertical windows on all four sides of the atrium shaft. As proof of the urban
connectedness envisioned in BBPR's studies for the city center, the southwest portion of Souk Al-
Manakh was originally designed to accommodate a future monorail stop on the first parking level
above the ground floor and mezzanine, a feature indicated in the drawing set as of September
1974.50
The fortunes of both the Kuwaiti economy and TAC's presence within it were tied to a seemingly
innocuous request in 1978, just before Souk Al-Manakh was complete, for TAC to redesign the first
underground parking level of the building to accommodate extra office space for the Kuwait Stock
Exchange. At once, the building's status within the city subtly shifted from commercial parking
garage to the site where the real risks of the Kuwaiti finance economy soon manifested themselves in
force.51 (Fig. 633) Within a year of its opening in 1979, the Souk al Manakh had become the site of
a vast unregulated market for speculating on foreign companies that were prohibited from being
traded on the official stock exchange, open to Kuwaiti citizens only and restricted to government
bonds and securities on entities registered in Kuwait. The vast majority of these "companies" existed
on paper only, fictional entities registered abroad by Kuwaitis in other Gulf states (particularly the
Emirates) solely for the purpose of trading on the eponymous "Souk Al-Manakh exchange." By early
1982, storefront offices on the ground floor of the souk were selling to traders for up to $50 million,
and the government worried about the potential collapse of a black market that operated almost
exclusively on post-dated checks and held more total investment than Kuwait's annual revenue from
50 See drawing sheet A6, "Plan-Level 5 (Showing Future Monorail) 100 Cars," dated September 6, 1974. Courtesy
PACE Archives.
51 Invoice from Moncef Eladhari (TAG) to Hamad Al Bahar (Kuwait Investment Company) for "conversion of level two
parking floor in the Area 5 Commercial and Parking Building to office use for the Kuwait Stock Exchange and Associated
Functions," December 18, 1978. Courtesy PACE Archives.
292
oil. 52 The stock bubble finally burst in August of that year, by which time it had ballooned to absorb
some $94 billion in excess speculation. 53 Newspaper articles chronicled the spectacular rise and fall
of the Souk Al-Manakh exchange, their titles indicating how the country's astonishing "stock souk"
had become subject to an urgent bailout effort to prevent the collapse of the nation's economy at
large.54 (Fig. 634-635)
The sudden bursting of the Souk Al-Manakh bubble was perhaps the most dramatic of the events
that spelled the end of the boom in construction by U.S. architects working in the Gulf after 1983.
The demise of the stock exchange caused a fifty percent decline in construction in Kuwait within the
year, an immediate and heavy blow to foreign firms, particularly TAC, that had overcommitted to
work in the country. The ripple effects of the Souk Al Manakh combined with the economic impacts
of the Iranian Revolution after 1979, the beginning of OPEC price quotas on oil production in
1982, and the deepening of the Iran-Iraq War to reveal the underlying volatility of financial and
architectural speculation that dictated the rise and fall of U.S. firms in the Gulf. In Iraq, the end of
the nation's second postwar building boom under Saddam Hussein coincided with the cancellation
of a planned Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in Baghdad in 1982, marking the end of TAC's
major commissions in both Iraq and Kuwait, its two primary areas of operation in the Gulf, in the
same year.55 Many of the other offices that had grown in size through the 1970s primarily due to
work in the region similarly suffered the negative consequences of this involvement following the
decline in crude oil prices.
52 "Kuwait's Bustling Stock Souk," 7he New York Times, April 5, 1982: D1.
53 Ihsan A. Hijazi, "Kuwait in Bailout Effort After Market Collapses," The New York Times, December 20, 1982: 29, 32;
Paul Lewis, "Kuwait's Market Bailout," The New York Times, February 18, 1983: D1, D7.
54 "Kuwait's Bustling Stock Souk"; Hijazi, "Kuwait in Bailout Effort After Market Collapses."
55 See Sajid Rizvi, "Iraq Concedes Non-Aligned Summit," United Press International, August 11, 1982. https://
www.upi.com/Archives/1 982/08/11 /Iraq-concedes-non-aligned-summit/ 4 53 1397886400/, accessed September 24,
2017.
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For TAC, the compound effect of these rapid political and economic shifts in the Gulf states
precipitated the slow but inevitable end not just for the firm's presence in the region, but for the
survival of the corporation itself. Office memoranda registered the urgency with which the firm laid
off waves of staff immediately after 1982, in tandem with ultimately unsuccessful attempts to shift its
practice back to commissions in the U.S. Occurring at the same time that TAC's directors were
engaged in debates over its future and organization as a large-scale entity with over 300 employees,
discussed in Chapter 2, the demise of the firm's project base in the Gulf exposed the rift between the
collaborative ideals of TAC's beginnings and the corporate imperatives of its global practice by the
1980s. Founding partner John C. Harkness continued to speak the language of collaboration in
seeking a way out of the crisis, writing to "all members of TAC" in September of 1983 that while the
previous eight months had been "troubling for all of us," he indicated his hope that a reduction in
staff could keep the firm afloat through the downturn in Middle Eastern commissions. 56 (Fig. 636)
At the same time, he outlined the firm's attempts to reorient its economy around domestic work,
commending TAC's staff-its "members," in the language of its original partners-for the "energy,
effectiveness, and dedication which so many people have brought to the task of finding new work to
replace our traditional sources of income overseas." 57
Internal correspondence among the partners made evident the tensions between TAC's efforts to
reducing its reliance on projects in the Gulf and its inability to gain re-entry into building markets in
the U.S., like healthcare, which had specialized in the years since these had constituted a substantial
portion of the firm's activity. The firm's President's Report for 1984 acknowledged that "1983 was a
very difficult year for TAC financially," and reaffirmed its need "to collect as much as possible of the
large sums due us from Iraq" in tandem with a decrease in staff and an increase in domestic work.58
(Fig. 637) (The report noted, however, that the reduction in staff had been unequally distributed in
56 Letter from John C. Harkness to All Members of TAC, September 28, 1983. MIT Museum Archives.
57 Ibid.
58 "President's Report." TAC Inc., TACAnnual Report (1984). MIT Museum Archives.
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favor of the partners, "in line with our workload by without cutting into our stockholder group."59 )
Yet some partners still expressed hope that the downturn in Middle Eastern work might prove to be
temporary, despite TAC's urgent attempts to divest itself of commitments in the Gulf states. John F.
Hayes wrote to the Board of Directors in November 1983 that while they could reassure the firm's
creditors "not to be concerned because we did not expect to invest more money in doing work in
Iraq," at the same time, "we also said we expected Iraq to be an important market when their current
financial problems were resolved." 60 (Fig. 638)
Such memoranda made clear that the firm's concerns about foreign work had as much to do with
maintaining its loans from the bank, which were increasingly necessary to keep the firm afloat, as
with the sustainability of its workflow and project income. A summary of "Points Discussed with
Bank of Boston" in July 1983 elaborated these financial issues while offering a defense of the firm's
commitment to working in the Gulf over the previous quarter-decade. (Fig. 639) "TAC has always
had an international outlook," the memo reiterated.61 While its authors detailed the office's
completion of "virtually all" of its Iraqi contracts and its refusal to take on any new projects in the
country after 1981, they insisted that TAC's expansive corporate model was directly tied to the global
nature of its work:
We see our involvement overseas as a positive factor in providing a diversified income base, since
economies overseas tend to be countercyclical to the U.S. economy. This diversification has
allowed us to continue to grow at times when other purely domestic firms were having to
retrench.
Our involvement in Iraq extends over 25 years; we have continued to work there through five
different governments each of which came to power in a violent way. We are known there and
understand the local scene. This gives us an advantage over a firm arriving to Iraq for the first
time. Despite the difficult current situation in Iraq, we see it as an important market for us when
59 Ibid.
60 "Future Commitments in Iraq," TAC office memorandum from John Hayes to Directors, November 28, 1983. MIT
Museum Archives.
61
"Points Discussed With Bank of Boston," TAC office memorandum, July 18, 1983. MIT Museum Archives.
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the situation improves and we are putting great effort into maintaining good relations with our
clients there. 62
Despite such expressions of faith in building abroad as a key component of TAC's practice over
the previous twenty-five years, there was ultimately little that could be done to stem the effects of
overcommitment to work in the Arab and Persian Gulf States by the early 1980s. The firm's woes
stood in contrast to competitors, like CRSS, whose more diversified global portfolios allowed them
to anticipate and absorb the decline in Middle Eastern commissions. 63 Within a year of the collapse
of Souk Al-Manakh and the curtailing of its practice in Iraq, TAC had reduced from 390 employees
to 220. Its staff kept declining, eventually down to fifty and then to a handful by the early 1990s. A
final blow for the office came with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the ensuing
Persian Gulf War, when some $2 million in payments for TAC's ongoing work were frozen in Iraqi
banks. Unable to recoup its assets and suffering the continuing effects of the end of the construction
boom in Iraq, Kuwait, and other Gulf states, the firm ultimately filed for bankruptcy in April 1995.
After suffering through the prolonged decline of its corporate practice over the previous decade,
TAC's demise came just before the next wave of petroleum-fueled development by U.S. architects in
the Gulf after the mid-1 990s, now taking place in the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and
other inheritors of the speculative economy of oil.
62 Ibid.
63 According to the 1978 ranking of firms in Building Design & Construction, sixty percent of TAC's billings in the
previous year came from foreign work, the vast majority in the Arab and Persian Gulf States. With the exception of
Brown Daltas & Associates (whose work was exclusively conducted abroad), all of the other top ten U.S. firms listed
received no more than ten percent of their billings from foreign work. Oliver W. Witte, "Learn from the Public Giants,"
Building Design & Construction (July 1978): 59.
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Conclusion: The Legacy of the Architectural Corporation
If the story of The Architects Collaborative (TAC) offers a telling case study in the broader history of
architectural practice and its incorporation in the United States after World War II, the firm's demise
provides an equally useful benchmark for measuring the rise of multinational conglomerates that
further redefined practice after the 1990s. As TAC went bankrupt in 1995-a victim of legal and
economic shifts within the building industry as a competitive market after the 1970s and an inability
to restructure its practice to take advantage of the renewed building activity of the Reagan era that
followed-the largest design practices were simultaneously experiencing another massive leap in
scope and scale, one that left behind the dedicated architectural corporations of the postwar era.
Following the neoliberal economic boom that extended, with minor interruptions, from the 1980s
to the Great Recession of 2008, a wave of even larger, more diversified entities began to subsume an
increasing proportion of the building industries, with services ranging from architecture,
construction, and infrastructure to economic planning and capital investment at a global scale.
These new multinational architectural conglomerates (which we might call MACs) were among
the extended products of the legal and economic challenges to architectural practice in the 1970s
that compelled large firms to integrate and diversify their services in order to survive, a phenomenon
discussed in Chapter 1. The "merger mania" that accompanied these developments resulted in the
consolidation of fewer, larger practices within the upper economic ranks of the design and
construction fields, a phenomenon coupled with the increasing share of the industry held by such
firms.' According to the chief economist for the American Institute of Architects (AIA), by 1998 the
percentage of AIA member firms in the U.S. with more than 20 employees nearly doubled in a mere
eight years, while firms of 50 or more employees already controlled nearly 40 percent of the building
I See Bradford McKee, "Merger Mania," Architecture (June 1996): 151-155.
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industry.2 As these entities expanded, they were increasingly subject to the globalizing imperatives
that faced the corporate world at large. This reality was summed up by C. Michael Armstrong, the
CEO of AT&T, who declared in these same years that "in the future there will be two kinds of
corporations; those that go global, and those that go bankrupt." 3
The reorganization of architectural practice via the multinational corporation took place just as
firms like TAC, which epitomized the collective ethos of the postwar period and the corporatization
of practice in the decades that followed, found themselves faltering in their attempts to adapt to this
next wave of transformations in the economy of architectural production. In this sense, TAC's
collapse also marked the crisis of the collaborative architectural ideal, based on a generalist
conception of architectural production and reflected in team-based offices with design staffs
consisting primarily, if not exclusively, of architects. The rise of MACs signified a shift from the
creative model of such dedicated architecture practices-classified as "A" firms within the annual
rankings of trade journals like Engineering News-Record and World Architecture-to complex, globally
distributed providers of a vast array of market services related to the building industry. As these
entities have increased in size and obscurity, they have become known less through the production or
reception of specific architectural works than by their market categorization as "AEC" firms, offering
expertise in design as simply one component within this spectrum of services across the domains of
architecture, engineering, and construction.
As the multinational architectural conglomerate took over a dominant portion of the
professional field after the 1990s, the nature of what constituted "architectural" practice thus
changed as well. The rise of such ultra-large firms-often orders of magnitude larger than their team-
based predecessors-entailed even more challenging questions concerning the meaning and impact
of corporate architectural production than those that had accompanied the rise of collective and
2 Philip Langdon, "When Bigger Is Better," Architectural Record (August 1998): 58.
3 C. Michael Armstrong, cited in Medard Gabel and Henry Bruner, Global Inc.: An Atlas ofthe Multinational Corporation
(New York: The New Press, 2003).
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collaborative offices after World War II. Beyond the issues of architectural authorship posed by such
postwar firms, the MACs of the neoliberal era are increasingly no longer architectural practices at all
in conventional disciplinary terms but rather diffuse, abstract corporate entities, with diversified
operations extending across a wide range of services often only tangentially related to the built
environment and its financial underpinnings. As such firms gained an increasingly outsized impact
over the production of the built environment, the relative importance of "architecture" as a market
segment within their own practices thus steadily diminished, often to the point of marginality. At the
same time, the fate of the large-scale, dedicated architectural firm-the model represented by TAC's
collaborative structure-was left in an increasingly precarious position within this radically altered
terrain of competitive practice.
If architectural historians and critics had largely abdicated their responsibility to develop a
framework for theorizing the modes of collectivity that had reshaped practice by the 1980s, a
phenomenon discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, then this lack of critical attention left few tools with
which to take stock of this new class of more globally distributed yet less explicitly architectural
design concerns. Trade magazines were left to repeat arguments made a half-century earlier about the
nature of architectural practice, reminding readers that "American architecture is a business, and an
increasingly collaborative one."4 As journalist Philip Langdon outlined in Architectural Record in
1998, while the scale of such firms extended well beyond that of the postwar corporation, critical
models remained focused on outdated notions of singular architectural creativity. "No matter how
often critics may present the inspired individual as the source of lasting architectural achievement,"
Langdon wrote, "the reality is that American architecture is increasingly the province of very large
firms-those with 200 to more than 2000 employees and billings in the tens or even hundreds of
millions of dollars."5
4 Langdon, "When Bigger Is Better": 58.
5 Ibid.
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The most dramatic example of such mega-scale and scope is AECOM Technology Corp.,
currently the largest design conglomerate in the world. Established in 1990, AECOM has topped the
annual rankings of multinational architectural corporations since at least 2011, with an annual
revenue of nearly $7.5 billion dollars-$1 billion more than that of its nearest competitor-as of
2016.6 The firm's acronym is emblematic of its abstraction as well as its size, referring not to the
initials of partners but supposedly only to the range of services it provides: Architecture, Engineering,
Construction, Operations, and Management. The corporation's name is thus literally anonymous,
evacuated of any message other than its market categorization beyond even the typical scope of the
AEC firm.
The origins of AECOM lay in the decision by Ashland Oil, Inc. to expand its services in 1984 by
acquiring five large architecture and engineering companies, renaming itself Ashland Technology
Corporation in the process. These companies included Daniel, Mann, Johnson & Mendenhall
(DMJM), established in 1946 by Phillip J. Daniel, Arthur E. Mann, and Kenneth S. Johnson, and
joined by 1951 by structural engineer Irvan E Mendenhall. DMJM had already structured its
practice in order to seek large, complex projects at an international scale, offering a full range of
services in architecture, engineering, planning, and consultation and later expanding its work into
highly specialized technical domains including industrial engineering, statistics, and electronics.7 In
its first fifteen years of practice, DMJM's work extended from offices and institutional buildings to
6 "The Top 500 Design Firms," Engineering News-Record, May 1, 2017: 64. By contrast, the largest dedicated
architectural practice in the world as of 2017, Gensler, has an annual fee income of $1-1.5 billion. "WA100 2017: The
World's Largest Architecture Practices," World Architecture (January 2017): 14.
7 On DMJM's organization and international expansion in these years, see "Organization for Efficient Practice 4.
Caudill, Rowlett and Scott, Architects-Planners-Engineers," Architectural Record (November 1960): 179-184; Norris
Leap, "Engineer manages team of five talented architects to success," The Los Angeles Times, October 9, 1960: E2; Tom
Cameron, "Firm creates wide variety of projects," The Los Angeles Times, July 26, 1964: J26; "Names: Daniel, Mann,
Johnson and Mendenhall," Architecture and Engineering News (June 1967): 104-105; "Architecture For Big Business Has
Become Big Business," 7he Los Angeles Times, April 6, 1972: 117; Ruth Ryon, "Los Angeles Companies Create Worldwide
Impact," The Los Angeles Times, June 4, 1978: VI1; "Profile. Daniel, Mann, Johnson and Mendenhall: A Summation of
Parts," Progressive Architecture (June 1972): 72-83; Michael Franklin Ross, "The Development of an Esthetic System at
DMJM," Architectural Record (May 1975): 111-120.
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city planning, transportation, large-scale waterworks, well drilling, and other large-scale urban and
environmental infrastructures. The firm grew large in particular through its expertise in executing
military commissions, designing military housing, airbases, harbors, and communication centers in
Guam, England, and Thailand, as well as domestic projects including missile installations for the
Titan I and II missile silos at the Delta Nine complex near Wall, South Dakota. This extensive scope
of practice was enabled by a managerial structure of coordinated yet autonomous departments with a
partner in charge of each section, a structure that allowed all engineering and technical work to be
done in-house.8 Yet within the architectural field, DMJM's reception after the 1970s was based less
on its diversified array of services than on the development of an "esthetic system" through the firm's
building division, led by designers Cesar Pelli and Anthony J. Lumsden. 9 Contemporary articles on
the practice, and on Lumsden in particular, promoted the image of a conventional architectural
office led by signature designers, in contrast to the extensive range of more anonymous expertise
offered by the firm.10 This discursive status was reflected in Pelli and Lunsden's role with the Los
Angeles circle of architects that became known as the "LA Silvers," in reference to their use of slick,
hermetic mirror-glass curtain wall systems distinguished by their equivalent treatment of thin
horizontal and vertical mullions to produce a homogeneous or "two-way" grid effect."I
8 A theorization of DMJM's practice model within the competitive landscape of U.S. architectural practice in the 1970s
and 1980s is Aaron Cayer, "A Political Ecology of Practice: Daniel, Mann, Johnson, Mendenhall," paper presented at the
Assembling Values: Architecture and Political Economy conference, Columbia Graduate School of Architecture,
Planning, and Preservation, May 7, 2016.
9 Both Pelli and Lumsden left the emerging office of Kevin Roche John Dinkeloo, then completing Eero Saarinen &
Associates's posthumous projects, to head DMJM's design division. Pelli was hired as the first director of design at
DMJM in 1964, with Lumsden soon to follow as principal for design.
10 See for example Esther McCoy, "Post-Mies: Architecture di Anthony J. Lumsden," Domus (November 1975): 1-12;
John Pastier and Michael Franklin Ross, "Anthony Lumsden, DMJM," A&U Vol. 5, No. 3 (1975): 61-160; Ross and
Hayahiko Takase, "Anthony Lumsden, DMJM," Space Design (July 1979): 3, 5-44; Leon Whiteson, Takase, and
Lumsden, "Recent Works of Anthony J. Lumsden/DMJM. Space Design (November 1993): 5-44.
11 See Daniel Paul, "Westward Transitions: The Early Development of the Late- Modern Glass Skin in the Collaborative
Works of Cesar Pelli and Anthony Lumsden," in Tom Marble, ed., Forum Issue 7:- Late Moderns (2010), http://
laforum.ore/article/westward-transitions/.
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When Ashland Technology Corporation decided to refocus on its petroleum refining business in
1990, an employee buyback program led by Richard G. Newman, the president of DMJM prior to
the firm's acquisition, spun off the companies Ashland had acquired six years earlier into a new
entity, christened AECOM Technology Corporation. A sweeping program of acquisitions of over
forty companies since 1998 has allowed AECOM to diversify into an ever-increasing range of global
geographies and markets, from courthouses and civic design to sports facilities, healthcare, aviation,
land surveying, economic research, environmental services, infrastructural engineering, and capital
investment.1 2 The firm became a publicly traded company in 2007, reorganizing two years later to
consolidate all of these entities into a single brand under the name AECOM. While its 2,100
architects alone as of 2015 made the firm the single biggest employer of designers in the world at the
time, with over 45,000 employees by 2010, this number made up less than five percent of the firm's
total staff.1 3 The company nearly doubled its size in 2014 with the acquisition of the engineering
conglomerate URS Corporation, at the time the world's third-largest design firm by annual revenue,
putting AECOM close to the 100,000-employee mark.1 4 As the firm metastasized in scale and scope,
the abstraction of its increasingly diffuse network of corporate activities proved mystifying for
architectural historians and critics who sought to grasp the nature and totality of the multinational
conglomerate. Contemporary articles made evident both the urgency of assessing the meaning of this
new category of practice and the critical difficulties inherent in doing so, offering that "with offices
12 A diagram of AECOM's known acquisitions since its establishment in 1990 is provided in "AECOM Family Tree," in
Eva Franch i Gilabert, Michael Kubo, Ana Miljacki, Ashley Schafer, ed., OfficeUSAtlas (Zurich: Lars Muller, 2015):
954-955.
13 "WA100 2015: The World's Largest Architecture Practices," WorldArchitecture (January 2015): 14; Aaron Seward,
"Making It Big," Architects Newspaper, June 16, 2010: 11.
14 Stuart Pfeifer and Chris Kirkham, "Merger of Aecom and URS to Create Giant L.A. Construction Firm," The Los
Angeles Times, July 13, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-aecom-merger-20140714-story.html; AECOM,
"AECOM completes acquisition of URS Corporation," press release, http://www.aecom.com/press/aecom-announced-
today-that-the-company-has-completed-its-acquisition-of-urs-corporation-with-broad-support-from-stakeholders-
followiniz-arooroval-of-the-merizer-atireement-by-urs-stockholders-and/.
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around the globe and expertise in nearly every feature of the built and natural environment,
AECOM is a giant in the field. But what is it?"1 5
Understanding the transformative impact of the multinational architectural conglomerate over
the last three decades requires a renewed attention to the conceptual and economic roots of
collaborative and corporate architectural practice, born in the years during and after World War II.
Such an endeavor is all the more crucial in a context in which, according to the United Nations,
multinational corporations formed nearly half of the hundred entities with the highest gross national
product (GNP) by the year 2000, greater than the majority of nation-states around the globe.16 As
Alfred D. Chandler Jr. and Bruce Mazlish note, these new "leviathans" have come to play a
predominant role in nearly all aspects of contemporary life, boasting "power and effects [that] are
almost incalculable-not only to the economy but also to politics, society, culture, and values."1 7
Not least among these cultural impacts is the outsized role of the multinational architectural
corporation in reshaping the built and natural environments at a global scale. This status was already
heralded by the rise of large, integrated design firms in the postwar period that sought to merge the
practices of architecture, landscape architecture, and planning into newer, more powerful entities. In
studying the rise and international extension of the architectural corporation after World War II, this
dissertation is thus intended to provide a pre-history of the concepts and practices that both
anticipated and produced the multinational entities of the neoliberal present. So too, it offers a
historiographical framework for assessing the discursive and cultural stakes of incorporation within
architecture's modernity. In examining the history of The Architects Collaborative, among the firms
that most fully embodied the ideals as well as the problematics of the architectural corporation in the
15 Seward, "Making It Big": 11. Italics mine.
16 UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). World Investment Report 2002 (New York:
United Nations. 2002), cited in Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. and Bruce Mazlish, ed., Leviathans: Multinational Corporations
and the New Global History (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 1.
17 Chandler, Jr. and Mazlish, ed., Leviathans: Multinational Corporations and the New Global History: 1. The term is
borrowed from Thomas Hobbes' analysis of the "Matter, Forme and Power" of the commonwealth, or state, in Leviathan,
or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Common Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil (1651).
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second half of the twentieth century, I hope to provide a means for understanding how architects
have negotiated these issues within the structures (and strictures) of architectural practice itself, as a
necessary first step in addressing the challenges of the corporation for historical and architectural
practices in the present.
304
Bibliography
Archives
AKDC Aga Khan Documentation Center, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
BA Bauhaus Archiv
CCA Canadian Centre for Architecture Collections
HUAM Harvard University Art Museums
HHL Harvard University, Houghton Library
FLL Harvard University, Special Collections, Frances Loeb Library, Graduate School of Design
LVC The Louisa Vaughan Conrad Collection, 1913-2003. Special Collections, Frances Loeb
Library, Graduate School of Design, Harvard University
MCRP Mary Caroline Richards Papers, 1898-2007. Getty Research Institute, Los Angeles.
MITM MIT Museum Archives
MITR Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Rotch Library
PACE PACE (Pan Arab Consulting Engineers) Archives, Kuwait City
RIP Reginald R. Isaacs papers, circa 1842-1991, Smithsonian Archives of American Art.
Primary Sources
"Long-Range Planning Meeting-30 October 1970." TAC Inc., Long-Range Planning Meeting-
1970, Re-distributed for Long-Range Planning Meeting offune 25-27, 1981. 1981. MITM.
"Meeting on November 20, 1947." The Architects Collaborative, meeting notes, transcribed by John
C. Harkness, n.p. MITM.
"Personnel Department." TAC Inc., TAC Inc., 1976Annual Meeting of Stockholders, 25 March, 1976.
1976. MITM.
Al-Madfai, Kahtan Hassan Fahmi. Letter to Ellen Jawdat, September 29, 1957. Personal collection
of Ellen Jawdat.
305
Al-Rayyes, Sabah. Letter to Louis A. McMillen, n.d. [between June 14 and August 22, 1975]. PACE.
American Institute of Architects. "Architectural Firm Award Honoring The Architects Collaborative."
1964. CCA.
Argan, Giulio Carlo. "Walter Gropius and the Design of the University of Baghdad, Iraq." Typescript
with manuscript corrections. HHL, MS Ger 208, folder 314.
Cvijanovic, Alex. "Long-Range Planning Meeting-30 October 1970." TAC Inc., Long-Range
Planning Meeting--1970, Re-distributed for Long-Range Planning Meeting offune 25-27, 1981. 1981.
MITM.
Eladhari, Moncef. Invoice to Hamad Al Bahar, Kuwait Investment Company, December 18, 1978.
PACE.
Fletcher, Jean Bodman. "Thesis: Community for Migratory Labor, Central Valley, California." 1943-
1944. FLL, The GSD History Collection, Student Affairs-Student Work, Subseries CA: Graduate
School of Design, Architecture Student Problems, folder CB033.
Fletcher, Jean Bodman, Norman C. Fletcher, letter to Walter Gropius, November 11, 1945. RIP.
Gropius, Ise. Letter to Ellen Jawdat, July 29, 1954. HHL, Houghton f 2013M-29.
Letter
Letter
Letter
Letter
Letter
Letter
Letter
Letter
Letter
Letter
to Ellen
to Ellen
to Ellen
to Ellen
to Ellen
to Ellen
to Ellen
to Ellen
to Ellen
to Nizar
Jawdat, October 3, 1955. HHL, Houghton f 2013M-29.
Jawdat, October 27, 1957. HHL, Houghton f 2013M-29.
Jawdat, October 27, 1963. HHL, Houghton f 2013M-29.
Jawdat, January 11, 1964. HHL, Houghton f 2013M-29.
Jawdat, September 16, 1964. HHL, Houghton f 2013M-29.
and Nizar Ali Jawdat, February 2, 1954. HHL, Houghton f 2013M-29.
and Nizar Ali Jawdat, November 20, 1957. HHL, Houghton f 2013M-29.
and Nizar Ali Jawdat, September 9, 1958. HHL, Houghton f 2013M-29.
and Nizar Ali Jawdat, November 1, 1966. HHL, Houghton f 2013M-29.
Ali Jawdat, May 26, 1954. HHL, Houghton f 2013M-29.
Gropius, Walter. Letter to Benjamin C. Thompson, December 9, 1965. BA, GS 19, No. 690.
. Letter to Ellen and Nizar Ali Jawdat, April 13, 1954. HHL, Houghton f 2013M-29.
306
. Letter to Ellen and Nizar Ali Jawdat, September 9, 1954. HHL, Houghton f 2013M-29.
. Letter to Ellen and Nizar Ali Jawdat, September 20, 1957. HHL, Houghton f 2013M-29.
. Letter to Ellen and Nizar Ali Jawdat, November 21, 1957. HHL, Houghton f 2013M-29.
. Letter to Ellen and Nizar Ali Jawdat, April 3, 1958. HHL, Houghton f 2013M-29.
. Letter to Nizar Ali Jawdat, December 1, 1948. HHL, Houghton f 2013M-29.
. "Speech at Opening of TAC Office, November 1966." Typescript with annotated
manuscript revisions. HHL, MS Ger 208, folder 289.
Harkness, John C. John Cheesman Harkness. Self-published autobiography, n.d. Courtesy of Sarah P
Harkness.
. Letter to All Members of TAC, September 28, 1983. MITM.
. "Policy Board Report." TAC Inc., TACAnnual Report. 1985. MITM.
. "President's Report." TAC Inc., TACAnnual Report. 1981. MITM.
"President's Report." TAC Inc., TACAnnual Report. 1984. MITM.
"Report of the Executive Vice President." TAC Inc., 1976Annual Meeting of Stockholders, 25
March, 1976. 1976. MITM.
Hayes, John E "Long-Range Planning Meeting-30 October 1970." TAC Inc., Long-Range Planning
Meeting--1970, Re-distributed for Long-Range Planning Meeting offune 25-27, 1981. 198 1. MITM.
. "President's Report." TAC Inc., TACAnnual Report. 1985. MITM.
Jawdat, Ellen."Data Concerning Dr. Walter Gropius." Typescript of essay and information sheet, n.d.
HHL, Houghton f 2013M-29.
Letter to Ise Gropius. May 1958. Houghton Library, MS Ger 208, folder 956.
Letter to Ise and Walter Gropius, undated [prior to 1957]. HHL, MS Ger 208, folder 956.
Letter to Walter Gropius, October 3, 1954. HHL, MS Ger 208, folder 956.
Nizar Ali Jawdat. Curriculum vitae, n.d. [after 1986]. Personal collection of Ellen Jawdat.
Jawdat, Nizar Ali. Letter to Walter Gropius, October 4, 1958. HHL, MS Ger 208, folder 956.
307
.
. Letter to Walter Gropius, November 18, 1959. BA, GS 19, 284.
McMillan, Robert S. Letter to Nizar Ali Jawdat, December 12, 1957. HHL, Houghton f 2013M-29.
Munir. Hisham A. "Curriculum Vitae." n.d. [after 1989]. AKDC.
Newsom, David D. Letter to Walter Gropius, June 18, 1954. BA, GN Kiste Nr. 3, Mappe 123.
. Letter to Walter Gropius, September 15, 1954. BA, GN Kiste Nr. 1, Mappe 4.
Office memorandum, "Points Discussed With Bank of Boston." July 18, 1983. MITM.
Office memorandum from Board of Directors to John Patterson, Vice President, "TAC Financial
Management." September 1, 1983. MITM.
Office memorandum from Board of Directors to Stockholders, "Follow-up to Yesterday's Meeting."
August 1, 1986. Courtesy of Richard Brooker.
Office memorandum from Richard Brooker to Board of Directors, "August 1, 1986, Memo from the
Directors." August 8, 1986. Courtesy of Richard Brooker.
Office memorandum from John C. Hayes to Board of Directors, "Future Commitments in Iraq."
November 28, 1983. MITM.
Office memorandum from John F. Hayes to Directors, "Staff Reduction Program." September 22,
1983. MITM.
Office memorandum from John C. Harkness to The Stockholders, August 11, 1986. Courtesy of
Richard Brooker.
Office memorandum from Sarah P. Harkness to Board of Directors, "August 1, 1986, Memo from
the Directors." August 8, 1986. Courtesy of Richard Brooker.
Office memorandum from Norman C. Fletcher to Board of Directors, "August 1, 1986, Memo from
the Directors." August 8, 1986. Courtesy of Richard Brooker.
Olgyay, Victor. "University of Baghdad; climatological evaluations." n.d. MITM.
Olgyay, Victor. "Climatological Evaluation and Recommendation for the Baghdad Area." n.d.
MITM.
Payne Jr., H. Morse. "President's Report." TAC Inc., 1976Annual Meeting ofStockholders, March 25,
1976. MITM.
Robert S. McMillan Associates. Robert S. McMillan Associates. Office portfolio, c. 1968. Avery
Architectural & Fine Arts Library, Columbia University.
308
State of Kuwait Ministry of Public Works, Roads Administration. Map of Kuwait City, n.d. [c.
1980s]. MIT Dome.
Studio Architetti BBPR. The Future Development ofthe Old City ofKuwait. 1969. Kuwait Ministry of
Planning Archives.
The Architects Collaborative. A Civic Centerfor Tallahassee, Florida. August 1, 1956. MITR.
"BMC Site Plan Study." October 22, 1946. HUAM.
Preliminary Design Report, The University of Baghdad. January 20, 1960. MITR.
Presentation slides, University of Baghdad. FLL, Box 1452.
Report on the University of Baghdad Designed by The Architects Collaborative, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, U.S.A. c. January 1959. MITR.
The Architects Collaborative. Office portfolio, c. 1967. CCA.
The Architects Collaborative, 7 vols. Office portfolio, n.d. [after 1970]. BA.
Urban Design Study: Khulafa Street Development Project, Prepared for Amanat Al-Assima,
Baghdad, Iraq. 1982. MITR.
., Giorgio Lombardi, Ove Arup & Partners, Suhair al-Mosully (consultants). Ahmadiya Area
Revitalization, Prepared for Amanat AlAssima, Baghdad, Republic ofIraq (1982). MITR.
Harvard Graduate School of Design. Gropefest, May 8, 1970. May 1970. CCA.
Pan Arab Consulting Engineers. "Plan-Level 5. Showing Future Monorail. 100
Cars" [Drawing sheet A6]. September 6, 1974. PACE.
Thompson, Benjamin C. Correspondence with Ise Gropius and Walter Gropius, 1947-1969. HHL,
MS Ger 208, folder 1623.
Letter to TAC partners, December 7, 1965. BA, GS 19, No. 690.
Letter to Walter Gropius, October 17, 1968. BA, GS 19, folder 690.
Letter to Walter Gropius, December 7, 1965. BA, GS 19, No. 690.
Wines, James. Letter to Walter Gropius, October 4, 1961. BA, GN Kiste Nr. 3, Mappe 113.
309
Interviews Cited
Al-Rayyes, Sabah. Interview conducted by Michael Kubo, May 29, 2013.
Fletcher, Norman C. Interviewed by Perry Neubauer, November 6, 2006. Transcript courtesy of
Perry Neubauer.
Haddad, Charles. Interview conducted by Michael Kubo, May 30, 2013.
Harkness, Sarah P. Interviewed conducted by Perry Neubauer, November 3, 2006. Transcript
courtesy of Perry Neubauer.
Jawdat, Ellen. Interview conducted by Michael Kubo, June 24, 2013.
. Interview conducted by Michael Kubo, June 21, 2017.
Munir, Hisham A. Interview conducted by Michael Kubo, June 25, 2013.
. Interview conducted by Michael Kubo, August 19-21, 2015.
Payne Jr., H. Morse. Interview conducted by Michael Kubo, October 3, 2012 and October 17,
2012.
Shuaib, Tarek. Interview conducted by Michael Kubo, August 1, 2012.
Secondary Sources
"100 Largest Architectural Firms in the U.S." Architectural Forum (April 1963): 110-112.
"100 Largest Architectural Firms in the U.S." ArchitecturalForum (April 1964): 14-16.
"2-Billion Worth of Design by Conference." Business Week, December 4, 1954: 96-104.
"50-Story Office Building: Will Be World's Largest." The Boston Globe, May 8, 1958: 17.
"80-Story Building Planned Atop Grand Central Station." The Washington Post and Times Herald,
September 8, 1954: 23.
"A Competition To Select an Architect for a Proposed Dormitory Group for Smith College."
Progressive Architecture (April 1946): 52-61.
"A Jewel of a University on the Arabian Sands." Fortune (November 1975): 126-133.
"A Journey to Baghdad." Brooks Pfeiffer, ed., Frank Lloyd Wright: His Living Voice. Fresno: Press at
California State University, 1987): 50-52.
310
"A Sixth Sense for Construction." Engineering News-Record, May 28, 1959: 55-57.
"AECOM Family Tree." Eva Franch i Gilabert, Michael Kubo, Ana Miljacki, Ashley Schafer, eds.,
OfficeUS Atlas (Zurich: Lars Muller, 2015): 954-955.
"Americans Abroad: Brown and Daltas in Iran." Architectural Record (October 1962): 126-133.
An Introduction to the Past and Present of the Kingdom ofIraq. Baltimore, MD: Lord of Baltimore
Press, 1946.
"anonymous, adj," OED Online, Oxford University Press, June 2016. http://
www.oed.com.ezproxy.lib.uh.edu/view/Entry/8061?redirectedFrom=anonymous, accessed 25 July
2016.
Aramco Handbook: Oil and the Middle East. Dhahran, Saudi Arabia: Aramco, 1968.
"Architect For Business In a City of Towers." Business Week, September 1, 1962: 54-56.
"Architects for the Developing [World]." Time Magazine, February 12, 1963: 94.
"Architecture For Big Business Has Become Big Business." The Los Angeles Times, April 6, 1972: 117.
"Architecture's Biggest Firms." Architectural Forum (September 1958): 112-114.
"Boston Center." Architectural Forum (November 1953): 104-115.
"Boston's Back Bay Center for Stevens Development Corporation." Architectural Record (October
1953): 143 ff.
"Bright Glass Prism on Brattle Street." Architectural Record (May 1970): 159-164.
"Britain's Energetic Investor." Architectural Record (January 1960): 14-16.
"Builder of Skylines: Erwin S. Wolfson." Time, February 22, 1960: 92.
"Builder Plans 50-Story $100 Million Skyscraper On Grand Central Site." The Wall StreetJournal,
May 8, 1958: 7.
"Building 'a St-Louis. U.S.A." lArchitecture dAujourd'hui (December 1949): 60-63.
"Building Models [All] Business." The Times Record, August 9, 1960: 12.
"Convention Delegates Vote 2-1 to Accept Justice Department Consent Decree." Architectural
Record (June 1972): 47, 49.
311
"Designers For a Busy World: Mood For Working." Newsweek, May 4, 1959: 97-100.
"Editorial." TASKNo. 1 (Summer 1941): 5-9.
"Everybody's Baby." Time Magazine, Vol. 78, No. 2 (July 14, 1961): 66.
"Fabulous New York office boom keeps growing; rental market still firm." Architectural Forum
(January 1956): 12-14.
"Firm Organized to Build Back Bay Civic Center." The Christian Science Monitor, May 22, 1953: 2.
"First Prize: Jean Bodman Fletcher and Norman Fletcher, Birmingham, Mich."' Pencil Points (May
1945): 56-57.
"Genetrix: Personal Contributions to American Architecture." Architectural Review (May 1957):
336-386.
"Grand Central's Outdoor Concourse." Architectural Forum (February 1955): 116-119.
"Gropius and Belluschi Advise On Grand Central Tower Design." Architectural Forum (September
1958): 47.
"Gropius et son ecole." lArchitecture d'Aujourd'hui (February 1950): 4-116.
"Haven of Art and Study: Americans Live and Work at American Academy in Rome." LIFE
Magazine, December 23, 1957: 104-106.
"Homes Design By New York Architects in Prize Competition: Prize Plans in National Contest
Stress 'Livability' of New Homes." The New York Times, May 13, 1945: R1.
"House in Duxbury, Mass: Eleanor Raymond, Architect, Sarah Pillsbury, Associate." Architectural
Forum (December 1941): 402-403.
"Industrial Buildings: Albert Kahn Inc." Architectural Forum (August 1938): 87-96.
"Intellectual Builder: Erwin Service Wolfson." The New York Times, September 8, 1960: 30.
"Intercontinental Hotels: Design for Tourism." Architectural Record (October 1953): 14-15.
"Interview: Pietro Belluschi." Progressive Architecture (June 1990): 122-123.
"Interview with Natalie de Blois by Detlef Mertins." SOMJournal 4. Berlin: Hatje Cantz, 2004.
https://medium.com/@SOM/cracking-the-glass-ceiling-a-look-back-at-the-career-of-trailblazing-
architect-natalie-de-blois-b7efO2b28c2b, accessed November 13, 2013.
312
"John Portman: Atlanta's One-Man Urban Renewal Program." Architectural Record (January 1966):
133-140.
"Kuwait: The Smithsons' Scheme." Architectural Review (September 1974): 183-190.
"Kuwait's Bustling Stock Souk." The New York Times, April 5, 1982: D1.
"Live, Work, Play (Is This Any Way to Run a Business?)." Philip Loheed, William Pressley, Jane
Thompson in conversation with Scott Simpson. ArchitectureBoston: Ben (Spring 2011): 40-45.
MedinaatAl Salaam: Baghdad 1979-1983. PROCESS:Architecture, No. 58 (May 1985).
"Model of Grand Central City Shown." The New York Times, November 3, 1959: 35.
"Motor Traveler's Hotel, By Charles D. Wiley, Norman Fletcher and Jean Bodman Fletcher,
Architects." Architectural Record (July 1945): 75-77.
"Names: Daniel, Mann, Johnson and Mendenhall." Architecture and Engineering News (June 1967):
104-105.
"New Plan for Oldest Boston: Architect's Version of Proposed Government Center." The Christian
Science Monitor, October 15, 1958: 1.
"New Plan Studied on Grand Central." The New York Times, Feb 8, 1955: 20.
"New Lights for Aladdin." Time Magazine, May 19, 1958: 82.
"Nizar Ali Jawdat." The Washington Post, January 29, 2017. http://www.legacy.com/obituaries/
washingtonpost/obituary.aspx?pid= 183773232, accessed June 11, 2017.
"NY boom doubles uptown land prices; key parcels-$250 psf. bid, $300 asked." Architectural
Forum (January 1956): 12-14.
"Organization for Efficient Practice 1. Eggers and Higgins Architects." Architectural Record (April
1960): 207-212.
"Organization for Efficient Practice 2. Daniel, Mann, Johnson, & Mendenhall, Architects &
Engineers." Architectural Record (June 1960): 187-194.
"Organization for Efficient Practice 3. Smith, Hinchman and Grylls Associates, Inc. Architects &
Engineers." Architectural Record (August 1960): 165-170.
"Organization for Efficient Practice 4. Caudill, Rowlett and Scott, Architects-Planners-Engineers."
Architectural Record (November 1960): 179-184.
313
"Organization for Efficient Practice 5. Hellmuth, Obata and Kassabaum, Inc., Architects."
Architectural Record (February 1961): 137-144.
"Organization for Efficient Practice 6. Gruen Associates." Architectural Record (October 1961): 133-
134;
"Organization for Efficient Practice 7. Nolen-Swinburne & Associates." Architectural Record
(February 1963): 155-158.
"Organization for Efficient Practice 8. Eliot Noyes & Associates." Architectural Record (March 1963):
163-170.
"Out of the Heat." Time Magazine, Vol. 70, No. 1 (July 1, 1957): 26.
"Plan 50 Story Office Bldg. in New York." Chicago Daily Tribune, May 8, 1958: D8.
"Planning With You." Architectural Forum (March 1945): 107-111.
Proceedings ofa Conference on Thin Concrete Shells. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 1954.
"Producer of Production Lines." Architectural Record (June 1942): 39-42.
"Profile. Daniel, Mann, Johnson and Mendenhall: A Summation of Parts." Progressive Architecture
(June 1972): 72-83.
"Progress in St. Louis: The American Stove Company Puts Up An Enlightened Administrative
Headquarters and Sales Display Building." Architectural Forum (October 1948): 70-79.
"Proposals For Restructuring Kuwait." Architectural Review (September 1974): 178-182.
"Proposed Back Bay Center Development for Stevens Development Corporation." Progressive
Architecture (January 1954): 73-86.
"Report of the Jury."' Pencil Points (May 1945): 54-55.
"Response: Arthur Drexler on 'Transformations'." Interview with Andrew McNair, Skyline (Summer
1979): 6.
"Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, Architects, U.S.A." Museum ofModern Art Bulletin, Volume XVIII,
No. 1 (Fall 1950).
"Sky-High Deal For a Skyscraper." Fortune (December 1960): 141-143, 266-268, 271.
TAC: 7he Heritage of Walter Gropius. PROCESS: Architecture, No. 19 (October 1980).
314
"TAC Proposes Government Center for Boston." Progressive Architecture (December 1958): 33.
"Talking About a Revolution: Cambridge in the '60s." Roundtable discussion with Norman C.
Fletcher, John C. Harkness, Huson Jackson, Elizabeth Padjen, Terry Rankine, Tad Stahl, Mary Otis
Stevens, ArchitectureBoston (July/August 2003): 8-19.
"Telesis." TASKNo. 2 (1942): 27.
"Tenant Can Pick Building's Name." The New York Times, January 4, 1959: R1.
"The Architects Collaborative." Baukunst und Werkform (December 1957): 681-719.
"The Architects From Skid's Row." Fortune (January 1958): 137-40, 210, 212, 215.
"The Architectural Front." TASKNo. 4 (1943): 1-4.
"The Corporate Clients: What Are Their Attitudes?." Progressive Architecture (June 1966): 158-160.
"The Idea-Giver." Time Magazine, July 18, 1969: 61.
"The Individual House: Practice of The Architects Collaborative." Architectural Record (May 1950):
128-135.
The Kuwait Fundfor Arab Economic Development. Kuwait City: The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic
Development, June 1964.
"The Organization of An Architect's Office No. 1." The Engineering & Building Record, January 11,
1890: 84-85.
"The Skyline Factory." Newsweek, September 18, 1967: 98.
"The Top 500 Design Firms." Engineering News-Record, May 1, 2017: 64-73.
"Those Worrisome Package Builders." Architectural Forum (April 1958): 120-123.
"Town Planning in Kuwait." ArchitecturalDesign (October 1953): 272-273.
"TVA: An Achievement of Democratic Planning." The Architectural Review (June 1943): 138-166.
"Unity for Planning." TASKNo. 5 (Spring 1944): 1-3.
"U.S. Firm Radiates from Rome." Progressive Architecture (October 1964): 239-246.
"WA100 2015: The World's Largest Architecture Practices." World Architecture (January 2015): 14-
15.
315
"WA100 2017: The World's Largest Architecture Practices." World Architecture (January 2017): 14-
15.
Abramson, Daniel. Obsolescence: An Architectural History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2016.
Adams, Nan. "Corporate Identity as a System." Dot Zero, No. 2 (1966): 14-21.
Adams, Nicholas. "Belonging as a Corporate Ideal: Nathaniel A. Owings of Skidmore, Owings &
Merrill Writes The Spaces in Between, 1973." Histories ofPostWar Architecture, No. 0 (2017): 1-14.
. "Gordon Bunshaft: What Convinces is Conviction." SOMJournal9 (Berlin: Hatje Cantz,
2016). http://www.som.com/news/gordon bunshaft what convinces is conviction, accessed
February 22, 2017.
AECOM. "AECOM completes acquisition of URS Corporation." Press release, October 2014.
http://www.aecom.com/press/aecom-announced-today-that-the-company-has-completed-its-
acquisition-of-urs-corporation-with-broad-support-from-stakeholders-following-approval-of-the-
merger-agreement-by-urs-stockholders-and/, accessed September 3, 2017.
Al Hamad, Abdlatif. Some Aspects ofthe Oil Controversy: An Arab Interpretation. Kuwait City: The
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, May 1975.
Al-Mosully, Suhair A. Revitalizing Kuwait's Empty City Center. Ph.D. Dissertation, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, 1992.
Al-Nakib, Farah. "Kuwait's Modern Spectacle: Oil Wealth and the Making of a New Capital City,
1950-90." Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2013): 7-
25.
Al-Ragam, Asseel. "The Destruction of Modernist Heritage: The Myth of Al-Sawaber." Journal of
Architectural Education, Vol. 67, No. 2 (2013): 243-252.
Alsaden, Amin. "Architecture-Art-Architecture: Constructing Baghdad's Modernism." Paper
delivered at Abstraction Unframed: Fourth Annual Conference ofthe Association for Modern and
Contemporary Art ofthe Arab World, Turkey and Iran (AMCA). Abu Dhabi and Sharjah, May 22-24,
2016.
Argan, Giulio Carlo. "A Town For Scholarship" ["La citti-scuola"]. Casabella continuita, No. 242
(August 1960): vii.
Armagnac, Armen P.. "The Most Complicated Building Ever Built." Popular Science (September
1960): 67-72, 216.
Asci, Aybars. Lecture at Export Agendas: The Global Transfer and Translation ofArchitectural Expertise
symposium, Northeastern University, Boston, February 25, 2015.
316
Baldwin, George C. "The Offices of Albert Kahn, Architect, Detroit, Michigan." Architectural Forum
(October 1918): 125-130.
Balmori, Diana. "George B. Post: The Process of Design and the New American Architectural Office.
1868-1913." Journal ofthe Society ofArchitectural Historians, Vol. 46, No. 4 (December 1987): 342-
355.
Banham, Reyner. A Concrete Atlantis: U. S. Industrial Building and European Modern Architecture.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986.
"The Style for the Job." New Statesman, February 14, 1964: 261.
Bannister, Turpin C., ed. The Architect at Mid-Century: Evolution and Achievement, Volume One of the
Report of the Commission for the Survey of Education and Registration of the American Institute of
Architects. New York: Reinhold Publishing Corporation, 1949.
Barber, Daniel A. "The Nature of the Image: Olgyay and Olgyay's Architectural-Climatic Diagrams
in the 1950s." Public Culture, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2016): 129-164.
Barr, Jr., Alfred H. Cubism andAbstract Art. New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1936.
Batatu, Hanna. The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old
Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Ba'thists, and Free Officers. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1978.
Baxandall, Michael. Patterns ofIntention: On the Historical Explanation of Pictures. New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 1985.
Bayer, Herbert, Walter Gropius, Ise Gropius, ed., Bauhaus 1919-1928. New York: Museum of
Modern Art, 1938.
Bayley, John B., Robert Hays Rosenberg, Bruno Zevi, John Taylor Moore, Jr., Warren H. Radford,
Frank C. Treseder, Arthur Koon Hing Cheang, Win. Joseph, Dahong Wang, T. J. Willo. An Opinion
on Architecture. Boston: The Century Press, 1941.
Beall, Lester. "The Trademark: A Graphic Summation of Individuality." TRADEMARKS/USA.
Chicago: Society of Typographic Arts, 1968.
Becker, Howard S. Art Worlds. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.
Belliard, Lauren. "The Design-Build Program at Lake Eden." Molesworth, Helen, Ruth Erickson,
Leap Before You Look: Black Mountain College, 1933-1957 (Boston: Institute of Contemporary Art;
New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2015): 132-141.
317
Belluschi, Pietro. "The Meaning of Regionalism in Architecture." Architectural Record (December
1955): 131-139.
Bentel, Paul Louis. "Modernism and Professionalism in American Architecture, 1919-1933." Ph.D.
Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1993.
Bijker, Wiebe E., Thomas P. Hughes, Trevor J. Pinch, eds., The Social Construction of Technological
Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987.
Blake, Peter. "'Free' Architecture." The New York Times, January 5, 1958: 51.
. No Place Like Utopia: Modern Architecture and the Company We Kept. New York and
London: WW Norton, 1993.
. The Master Builders: Le Corbusier, Mies van der Rohe, Frank Lloyd Wright. New
York: Norton, 1976.
Blau, Judith R., Mark La Gory, John S. Pipkin, ed., Professionals and Urban Form. Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1983.
. Architects and Firms: A Sociological Perspective on Architectural Practice. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1984.
Bloom, Harold. The Anxiety ofInfluence: A Theory ofPoetry. New York and Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1973.
Bogner, Walter F. "The Boston Back Bay Center Project: General Description of Project." Journal of
Architectural Education, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring 1955): 40-43.
Borges, Jorge Luis. "Kafka and His Precursors." Labyrinths: Selected Stories & Other Writings. New
York: New Directions Publishing, 1962: 199-201.
Bourdieu, Pierre. The Field of Cultural Production. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
Boyle, Bernard Michael. "Architectural Practice in America, 1865-1965-Ideal and Reality." Spiro
Kostof, ed., The Architect: Chapters in the History of the Profession (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1977): 309-344.
Bozdogan, Sibel. "Democracy, Development, and the Americanization of Turkish Architectural
Culture in the 1950s." Sandy Isenstadt, Kishwar Rizvi, eds., Modernism in the Middle East:
Architecture and Politics in the Twentieth Century (Seattle and London: University of Washington
Press, 2008): 116-138.
Breckenfeld, Gurney. "The Architects Want a Voice in Redesigning America." Fortune (November
1971): 144-147, 198-199, 203-204, 206.
318
Breuer, Gerda, Annemarie Jaeggi, ed s. Walter Gropius: Amerikareise 1928 = American Journey 1928.
Berlin: Bauhaus Archiv, 2008.
Britton, Karla Cavarra. "Robert Damora and the Mission of American Architecture." 7heJournal of
Architecture, Vol. 21, No. 7 (2016): 995-1011.
Brott, Simone. "Architecture et Revolution: Le Corbusier and the Fascist Revolution." Thresholds 41
(Spring 2013): 146-157.
Bucci, Federico. Albert Kahn: Architect ofFord. New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1993.
Buck, Thomas. "Skyscrapers Planned on Air Rights Site." Chicago Daily Tribune, July 20, 1961: 3.
Burns, Jr., James T. "The Pan Am Building: A Behemoth is Born." Progressive Architecture (April
1963): 61-62.
Cameron, Tom. "Firm Creates Wide Variety Of Projects." The Los Angeles Times, July 26, 1964: J26.
Campbell, Robert. "Architects Collaborative Closes Doors After 50 Years." The Boston Globe, May 5,
1995: 65.
"Reflecting on a Time When Harvard Square Towered With Designers." The Boston Globe,
July 6, 2003.
. "Utopia Revisited." The Boston Globe, April 7, 1994: Al.
Caragonne, Alexander. The Texas Rangers: Notes from the Architectural Underground. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1995.
Cayer, Aaron. "A Political Ecology of Practice: Daniel, Mann, Johnson, Mendenhall." Paper
presented at Assembling Values: Architecture and Political Economy conference, Columbia Graduate
School of Architecture, Planning, and Preservation, May 7, 2016.
Chafee, Richard. "The Teaching of Architecture at the Ecole des Beaux-Arts." Arthur Drexler, ed.,
The Architecture ofthe Rcole des Beaux-Arts (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1975): 61-110.
Chan, Carson. "The Chermayeff Century." 032c, No. 22 (Winter 2011/2012). http://032c.com/
product/issue-22-winter-20112012-the-chermayeff-century/, accessed October 31, 2014.
Chandler Jr., Alfred D. 7he Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business.
Cambridge, MA and London: Belknap Press, 1977.
., Bruce Mazlish, eds. Leviathans: Multinational Corporations and the New Global History.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Chen, Aric. "The Kubla Khan of Hotels." The New York Times, June 25, 2006: 5.
319
Chermayeff, Peter. "Experiential Thinking." Chris Grimley, Michael Kubo, Mark Pasnik, Heroic:
Concrete Architecture and the New Boston (New York: The Monacelli Press, 2015): 283-289.
Chermayeff, Serge. "Architecture and a New World." California Arts andArchitecture (May 1942):
18-19, 38, 40.
. "l'architecture au 'bauhaus' de Chicago / Architecture at the Institute of Design."
lArchitecture d'Aujourd'hui (February 1950): 48-68.
"Telesis: The Birth of a Group." Pencil Points (July 1942): 45-48.
Christopher Alexander. Community and Privacy: Toward a New Architecture of Humanism.
Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1963.
Chicago Architects Oral History Project. Oral History of Natalie de Blois, Interviewed by BettyJ.
Blum. Chicago: The Ernest R. Graham Study Center for Architectural Drawings, Department of
Architecture and The Art Institute of Chicago, 2004.
Clausen, Meredith L. The Pan Am Building and the Shattering of the Modernist Dream. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2005.
. Pietro Belluschi: Modern American Architect. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999.
Cohen, Jean-Louis. Architecture in Uniform: Designing and Buildingfor the Second World War.
Montreal: Canadian Centre for Architecture, 2010.
. Scenes of the World to Come: European Architecture and the American Challenge, 1893-1960.
Paris: Flammarion, 1995.
Cole, Doris. "The Education of Women Architects: A History of the Cambridge School."
Architecture plus (December 1973): 30-35, 78-79.
Constant, Caroline. The Modern Architectural Landscape. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 2012.
Cooper, Louise et al. "The Architect Today." Architectural Forum (October 1955): 116-123.
Crane, David. "The Federal Building in the Making of Boston's Government Center: A Struggle for
Sovereignty in Local Design Review." J. Carter Brown, ed., Federal Buildings in Context: The Role of
Design Review (Washington, D.C.: National Gallery of Art): 21-38.
Cucci, Giorgio, Francesco Dal Co, Mario Manieri-Elia, Manfredo Tafuri. 7he American City: From
the Civil War to the New Deal. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1979.
Cuff, Dana. Architecture: The Story ofPractice. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.
320
Currie, Leonard J., Virginia M. Currie. "TAC: Principles Process & Product." PROCESS:
Architecture, No. 19 (1980): 40-45.
Custer, Lee Ann. "Teaching Complexity and Contradiction: Robert Venturi's Lecture Course
'Theories of Architecture,' 1961-1965." Paper delivered at the Complexity and Contradiction in
Architecture at 50 conference, Museum of Modern Art and Philadelphia Museum of Art, November
11-12, 2016.
Cvijanovic, Alex. "Pan American World Airlines Building, New York City." John C. Harkness, ed.,
Walter Gropius Archive, Vol 4: 1945-1969, 7he Work of The Architects Collaborative (New York and
London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1991): 352-353.
Damora, Robert with Sirkka Damora. "Robert Damora." Nina Rappaport, ed., Robert Damora: 70
Years of TotalArchitecture. New Haven: Yale School of Architecture, 2003.
de Jarcy, Xavier. Le Corbusier, unfascismefranfais. Paris: Editions Albin Michel: 2015.
de Wit, Wim. Design for the Corporate World: Creativity on the Line, 1950-1975. London: Lund
Humphries: 2017.
Deamer, Peggy. "Office Management." Eva Franch i Gilabert, Amanda Lawrence, Ana Miljacki,
Ashley Schafer, eds., OfficeUSAgenda (Zurich: Lars Muller, 2014): 52-64.
DeMars, Vernon Armand. "A Life in Architecture: Indian Dancing, Migrant Housing, Telesis,
Design for Urban Living, Theater, Teaching: An Oral History conducted in 1988-1989 by Suzanne
B. Riess, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley,
1992." http://www.oac.cdlib.org/view?docld=kt938nb53j&brand=oac4&doc.view=entire text,
accessed July 25, 2013.
Dewey, John. Art as Experience. New York: Minton, Balch & Company, 1934.
. Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education. New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1916.
Droste, Magdalena. "The Bauhaus Object between Authorship and Anonymity." Jeffrey Saletnik,
Robin Schuldenfrei, eds., Bauhaus Construct: Fashioning Identity, Discourse and Modernism (London
and New York: Routledge, 2009): 205-225.
Drexler, Arthur. Three New Skyscrapers. New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1983.
. Transformations in Modern Architecture. New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1979.
Drucker, Peter E The Concept ofthe Corporation. New York: The John Day Company, 1946.
Eisenman, Peter. The Formal Basis ofModern Architecture. Basel: Lars Miller: 2008.
321
Elderfield, John, Kirk Varnedoe. Philip Johnson and The Museum ofModern Art. New York: Rizzoli,
1998.
Eliot, T. S. "Tradition and the Individual Talent" [1919]. Selected Essays. New York: Harcourt, Brace
& World, Inc., 1932: 3-11.
Elkus, Howard. "TAC in Asia," "The Beginning of the San Francisco Office." Roland Kiuver, Jim
Paddock, eds., TAC Reminiscences (Cambridge, MA, c. 2005): 14-17.
Filson, Anne. "Net Profits." Eva Franch i Gilabert, Michael Kubo, Ana Miljacki, Ashley Schafer, eds.,
OfficeUS Atlas (Zurich: Lars Mnller, 2015): 700-701.
Finnie, Richard. Bechtel in Arab Lands: A Fifteenth-Year Review of Engineering and Construction
Projects. San Francisco: Bechtel Corporation, 1958.
Fitch, James Marston. Walter Gropius. New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1960.
Fletcher, Jean Bodman. "There Should Be Regional Integration in Central Valley." Arts &Architecture
(May 1945), n.p.
., Sarah Harkness. "Architecture, Family Style: Two Woman Architects Look at Today's
Houses, Tell How They Affect Family Life." House 6- Garden (October 1947): 146-149.
Fletcher, Norman C. "The John E Kennedy Federal Office Building in Boston." J. Carter Brown,
ed., Federal Buildings in Context: The Role ofDesign Review (Washington, D.C.: National Gallery of
Art): 39-43.
Fogarty, Frank. "The Growth of Group Finance." Architectural Forum (September 1958): 118-119.
"The Lender's Influence." Architectural Forum (July 1956): 140-143.
"The Real Estate Operator." Architectural Forum (August 1956): 118-122.
Fowler, Glenn. "Grand Central 'City' Is Planned." The New York Times, May 8, 1958: 1.
Foucault, Michel. "What is an Author?" [1969]. Language, Counter-Memory, Practice. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1977: 113-138.
Frampton, Kenneth. "Towards a Critical Regionalism: Six Points for an Architecture of Resistance."
Hal Foster, ed., The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture (Port Townsend, WA: Bay Press,
1983): 16-30.
Franch i Gilabert, Eva, Amanda Lawrence, Ana Miljaeki, Ashley Schafer, eds. OfficeUSAgenda.
Zurich: Lars Muller, 2014.
322
Franch i Gilabert, Eva, Ana Miljacki, Michael Kubo, Ashley Schafer, eds. OfficeUS Atlas. Zurich:
Lars Muller, 2015.
Friedman, Alice T. "'Through the Network of Wires: Portsmouth Abbey, Richard Lippold, and
Postwar Syncretism." Interiors, Vol. 6, No. 3 (2015): 235-258.
Fulton, Ruth Coan, ed. Coan Genealogy 1697-1982. Portsmouth, NH: Peter E. Randall, Publisher,
1983.
Filssl, Harl-Heinz. "Pestalozzi in Dewey's Realm? Bauhaus Master Josef Albers among the German-
Speaking Emigres' Colony at Black Mountain College. 1933-1949." Paedagogica Historica, Vol. 42,
Nos. 1-2 (February 2006): 77-92.
Gabel, Medard, Henry Bruner. Global Inc.: An Atlas ofthe Multinational Corporation. New York, NY:
The New Press, 2003.
Galbraith, John Kenneth. The New Industrial State. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967.
Gardiner, Stephen C. Kuwait: The Making ofa City. (Essex, UK: Longman Group Limited, 1983).
Gelvin, James L. The Modern Middle East: A History, 4th ed. Oxford and New York: Oxford
University Press, 2015.
Giedion, Sigfried. "Das Experiment S.O.M. / The Experiment of S.O.M." Bauen + Wohnen (April
1957): 109-114.
. Mechanization Takes Command: A Contribution to Anonymous History. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1948.
. "The State of Contemporary Architecture I: The Regional Approach." Architectural Record
(January 1954): 132-137.
. Walter Gropius: Work and Teamwork. London: Architectural Press Ltd., 1954.
Gissen, David. Manhattan Atmospheres: Architecture, the Interior Environment, and Urban Crisis.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014.
Gorby, Christine. "Manuscripts into Manifesto: The Evolution of Robert Venturi's 1966 Complexity
and Contradiction in Architecture." Paper delivered at the Complexity and Contradiction in
Architecture at 50 conference, Museum of Modern Art and Philadelphia Museum of Art, November
11-12, 2016.
Grathwol, Robert P., Donita M. Moorhus. Bricks, Sand, and Marble: U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers
Construction in the Mediterranean and the Middle East 1947-1991. Washington, D.C.: Center of
Military History and Corps of Engineers, United States Army, 2009.
323
Green, Tom. "TAC: May 1959-January 1966." Roland Kluver, Jim Paddock, eds., TAC
Reminiscences (Cambridge, MA, c. 2005): 22-23.
Grimley, Chris, Michael Kubo, Mark Pasnik. Heroic: Concrete Architecture and the New Boston. New
York: The Monacelli Press, 2015.
Gropius, Walter. Apollo in the Democracy: The Cultural Obligation ofthe Architect. New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1968).
"Architectural Details, 5. Walter Gropius." Architectural Record (February 1965): 133.
"Education Should Aim at Combining Individual Independence With the Spirit of
Cooperation." TASKNo. 1 (Summer 1941): 34-35.
. "Gropius Appraises Today's Architect." Architectural Forum (May 1952): 111-112, 166,
170, 174, 178, 182.
Scope of TotalArchitecture. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955.
"TAC's Teamwork." Gropius, Sarah P. Harkness, eds., The Architects Collaborative 1945-
1965 (Teufen: Verlag Arthur Niggli, 1966): 24.
"The Curse of Conformity." The Saturday Evening Post, September 6, 1958: 18-19, 51-52,
54.
The New Architecture and the Bauhaus. London: Faber and Faber, 1935.
"The Pan Am Building in its Urbanistic Context." Real Estate Forum, V. 17, No. 9A
(September 30, 1962): 60-61.
"True Architectural Goals Yet to be Realized." Architectural Record (June 1961): 147-152.
Sarah P. Harkness, eds. The Architects Collaborative 1945-1965. Teufen: Verlag Arthur
Niggli, 1966.
Gruen, Victor. The Heart of Our Cities: 7he Urban Crisis: Diagnosis and Cure. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1964.
Guenther, Robert. "U.S. Developers Sign Contracts To Put Up Projects in China." The Wall Street
Journal, November 12, 1984: ii.
Gutheim, Frederick et al. "The Corporate Client." Architectural Forum (December 1955): 106-113.
Gutman, Robert. Architectural Practice: A Critical View. New York: Princeton Architectural Press,
1988.
324
. "Architecture: The entrepreneurial profession." Progressive Architecture (May 1977): 55-58.
Hahn, Peter. "Bauhaus Architects and Designers Between the Old World and the New." Stephanie
Barron with Sabine Eckmann, Exiles + Emigres: The Flight ofEuropean Artists From Hitler (Los
Angeles and New York: Los Angeles County Museum of Art and Harry N. Abrams, 1997): 211-
224.
Hanks, David A., ed. Partners in Design: Alfred H Barr Jr. and Philip Johnson. New York: The
Monacelli Press, 2015.
Harkness, John C. "Search for a Common Language." Walter Gropius, Sarah P. Harkness, eds., The
Architects Collaborative 1945-1965 (Teufen: Verlag Arthur Niggli, 1966): 27.
., ed. Walter Gropius Archive, Vol 4: 1945-1969, The Work of The Architects Collaborative. New
York and London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1991.
Harkness, John C., Sarah Harkness. "Bank." Architectural Forum (May 1943): 86.
Harkness, Sarah P. "Collaboration." Walter Gropius, Sarah P. Harkness, eds., The Architects
Collaborative 1945-1965 (Teufen: Verlag Arthur Niggli, 1966): 26.
. "The Architects Collaborative." Joseph A. Wilkes, Robert T. Packard, eds., Encyclopedia of
Architecture, Design, Engineering & Construction, Vol. 5 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1987): 45-
52.
Harris, Mary Emma. "TAC Plans." The Black Mountain College Project. http://
blackmountaincollegeproject.org/architecture/campuses/lake%20eden/unrealized%2plans/
%20collaborative%20text.htm, accessed January 11, 2017.
. he Arts at Black Mountain College. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987.
Hartmann, William. "Big Buildings from Big Offices." The Voice ofAmerica: Forum Lectures, Vol. 6,
No. 7. Washington, D.C.: United States Information Agency, 1961.
. "S.O.M. Organization." Bauen + Wohnen (April 1957): 116.
Harvey, W. Clifford. "Hynes Bids Bostonians Aid Civic Center." The Christian Science Monitor,
September 11, 1953: 1.
. "Proposed Boston Center Acclaimed for Design." The Christian Science Monitor, January
29, 1954: 11.
Harwood, John. "Corporate Abstraction." Perspecta 46 Error (2013): 218-243.
. The Interface: IBM and the Transformation of Corporate Design, 1945-1976 Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2011.
325
Hasbrouck, William R. The Chicago Architectural Club: Prelude to the Modern. New York: The
Monacelli Press, 2005.
Haskell, Douglas. "The Lost New York of the Pan American Airways Building." Architectural Forum
(November 1963): 106-111.
Henley, Helen. "Two Girls Share as Equal Partners in Modern Architects' Collaborative." The
Christian Science Monitor, January 13, 1947: 10.
Herdeg, Klaus. The Decorated Diagram: The Decorated Diagram: Harvard Architecture and the Failure
ofthe Bauhaus Legacy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983.
Hijazi, Ihsan A. "Kuwait in Bailout Effort After Market Collapses." The New York Times, December
20, 1982: 29, 32.
Hitchcock, Henry-Russell. In The Nature of Materials: The Buildings of Frank Lloyd Wright
1887-1941. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1942.
. "Introduction." Ernst Danz, Architecture of Skidmore, Owings & Merrill 1950-1962 (New
York: Praeger and London: The Architectural Press, 1962): 7-13.
. "The Architecture of Bureaucracy and the Architecture of Genius." Architectural Review
(January 1947): 3-6.
. "The Rise to World Prominence of American Architecture." Bruno Alfieri, ed., Zodiac 8:
America (Milan: 1961): 1-5.
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Common Wealth Ecclesiasticall and
Civil. London, 1651.
Hooper, Parker Morse. "Office Procedure, I: Office Manual of John Russell Pope, Architect."
Architectural Record (January 1931): 177-182.
. "Office Procedure, 2: Office Manual of John Russell Pope, Architect." Architectural Record
(June 1931): 261-272.
Hoyt, Charles K. "Caudill Rowlett Scott's Ongoing Work For a Saudi Arabian University."
Architectural Record (April 1976): 95-100.
. "The Oil-Rich Mideast: The new frontier for professional services?" Architectural Record
(June 1975): 101-108.
Hudnut, Joseph. "Architecture and the Individual." Architectural Record (October 1958): 165-170.
. "The Architectress, In Two Parts-Part I." Journal ofthe A.LA. (March 1951): 111-116.
326
. "The Architectress, In Two Parts-Part II." Journal ofthe A.L.A. (April 1951): 181-187.
. "The Post-Modern House." Architectural Record (May 1945): 70-75.
Hunt, William Dudley. Comprehensive Architectural Services: General Principles and Practice. New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1962.
. Total Design: Architecture of Welton Becket & Associates. New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 1972.
Huxtable, Ada Louise. "Architecture Stumbles On: Recent Buildings Are Nothing Much to Brag
About." The New York Times, April 14, 1963: 119.
. "Dissenting View: Correspondent Questions Venezuelan Architectural Achievements." The
New York Times, September 8, 1957: X10.
. "Marvel or Monster? Grand Central City is Mass Architecture." The New York Times,
January 24, 1960: X13.
. "The Park Avenue School of Architecture." The New York Times Magazine, December 15,
1957: 30-31, 54-56.
. "Towering Question: The Skyscraper." The New York Times Magazine, June 12, 1960: 16,
69-71.
Huyssen, Andreas. "Mapping the Postmodern." New German Critique, No. 33 (Autumn 1984): 5-
52.
Hyde, Timothy. "Notes on Architectural Persons." The Aggregate website (Transparent Peer
Reviewed), accessed October 15, 2013. http://we-aggregate.org/piece/notes-on-architectural-persons.
"Signature: Or, the Life and Death of Anonymous." Ana Miljacki, ed., Under the Influence
(Cambridge, MA: MIT SA+P Press, 2014): 152-163.
Imbert, Dorothee. "The Art of Social Landscape Design." Imbert, Marc Treib, Garrett Eckbo: Modern
Landscapesfor Living (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1997): 106-
178.
Isaacs, Reginald R. Walter Gropius: An Illustrated Biography of the Creator of the Bauhaus. Boston:
Little, Brown, and Company, 1991.
Isenstadt, Sandy. "'Faith in a Better Future': Josep Lluis Sert's American Embassy in Baghdad,
Journal ofArchitectural Education, Vol. 50, No. 3 (February 1997): 172-188.
., Kishwar Rizvi, eds. Modernism in the Middle East: Architecture and Politics in the Twentieth
Century. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2008.
327
Jacobs, Jane. "New York's Office Boom." Architectural Forum (March 1957): 105-113.
. "The Miniature Boom." Architectural Record (May 1958): 106-111, 196.
James-Chakraborty, Kathleen. "Changing the Agenda: From German Bauhaus Modernism to U.S.
Internationalism." Stephanie Barron with Sabine Eckmann, Exiles + Emigres: The Flight ofEuropean
Artists From Hitler (Los Angeles and New York: Los Angeles County Museum of Art and Harry N.
Abrams, 1997): 235-252.
. "From Isolationism to Internationalism: American Acceptance of the Bauhaus." James-
Chakraborty, ed., Bauhaus Culture From Weimar to the Cold War (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2006): 153-170.
Jameson, Fredric. "The Brick and the Balloon: Architecture, Idealism, and Land Speculation." The
Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the Postmodern, 1983-1998 (London: Verso, 1998): 162-190.
. Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 1991.
. "Theories of the Postmodern." The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the Postmodern, 1983-
1998 (London: Verso, 1998): 22-31.
Jarzombek, Mark. "The Discourses of a Bourgeois Utopia, 1904-1908, and the Founding of the
Werkbund." Franyois Forster-Hahn, ed., Imagining Modern German Culture 1889-1910
(Washington, D.C.: National Gallery of Art, 1996): 127-145.
Jawdat, Ellen. "The New Architecture in Iraq." Architectural Design (March 1957): 79-80.
Jencks, Charles. Architecture 2000: Predictions and Methods. New York, NY: Praeger, 1971.
. Architecture 2000 and Beyond: Success in the Art of Prediction. Chichester, West Sussex:
Wiley-Academy, 2000.
Late-Modern Architecture and Other Essays. New York: Rizzoli, 1980.
. Modern Movements in Architecture. Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1973.
. Modern Movements in Architecture, second edition. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd,
1983.
. "The Evolutionary Tree." Architectural Design (October 1970): 527.
The Language of Post-Modern Architecture. New York: Rizzoli, 1977.
328
. The Language ofPost-Modern Architecture, revised enlarged edition. New York: Rizzoli,
1978.
. The New Moderns: From Late to Neo- Modernism. New York: Rizzoli, 1990.
Jodidio, Philip, Janet Adams Strong, . M Pei, Complete Works. New York: Rizzoli, 2008.
Johnston, David. "Justice Department Files Antitrust Suit Against Architects." The New York Times,
July 6, 1990: Al.
Jones, Caroline. Machine in the Studio: Constructing the Postwar American Artist. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1996.
Jones, Cranston. Architecture Today and Tomorrow. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961.
Jordy, William H. "The Aftermath of the Bauhaus in America: Gropius, Mies, and Breuer." Donald
Fleming, Bernard Bailyn, eds., The Intellectual Migration: Europe and America, 1930-1960
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969): 485-526.
. "The Aftermath of the Bauhaus in America: Gropius, Mies, and Breuer." Mardges Bacon,
ed., "Symbolic Essence" and Other Writings on Modern Architecture and American Culture (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2005): 187-224.
Joselit, David. "The Artist Readymade: Marcel Duchamp and the Societe Anonyme." Jennifer R.
Gross, ed., The SocidttAnonyme: Modernism for America (New Haven and London: Yale University
Press, 2006): 33-44.
. Infinite Regress: Marcel Duchamp 1910-1941. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001.
Kantor, Sybil Gordon. Alfred H. Barr, Jr. and the Intellectual Origins of the Museum of Modern Art.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002.
Kaplan, Louis. Ldszld Moholy-Nagy: Biographical Writings. Durham & London: Duke University
Press, 1995.
Katz, Vincent, ed. Black Mountain College: Experiment in Art. Madrid: Museo Nacional Centro de
Arte Reina Sofia, 2002.
Kay, Jane Holtz. "A Block on Brattle Street." The Boston Sunday Globe, April 30, 1972: A12.
Kentgens-Craig, Margret. The Bauhaus in America: First Contacts 1919-1936. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1999.
King, Jonathan, Peter Langdon, eds. The CRS Team and the Business ofArchitecture. College Station,
TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002.
329
Kliment, Stephen A. "Decay of the Old Ethics." Architectural & Engineering News (December 1968):
3.
Kluver, Roland. "Early Days." Kluver, Jim Paddock, eds., TAC Reminiscences (Cambridge, MA, c.
2005): 33-35.
Knowles, Ruth Sheldon. "Enterprise & Diplomacy: Pan Am Airways' Hotel Unit Helps Itself by
Aiding Nations." The Wall Street Journal, April 14, 1964: 18.
Knox, Paul L., ed. The Design Professions and the Built Environment. London and Sydney: Croom
Helm; New York: Nichols Publishing Company, 1988.
Koehler, Karen. "The Bauhaus Manifesto Postwar to Postwar: From the Street to the Wall to the
Radio to the Memoir." Jeffrey Saletnik and Robin Schuldenfrei, ed., Bauhaus Construct: Fashioning
Identity, Discourse and Modernism (London and New York: Routledge, 2009): 13-36.
Koolhaas, Rem. "Eno/abling Architecture." Robert E. Somol, ed., Autonomy and Ideology: Positoning
an Avant-Garde in America (New York: The Monacelli Press, 1997): 292-299.
Krinsky, Carol Herselle. Gordon Bunshaft ofSkidmore, Owings & Merrill. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1988.
Kubler, George C. The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things. New York and New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1962.
Kubo, Michael. "Brown Daltas." Eva Franch i Gilabert, Kubo, Ana Miljavki, Ashley Schafer, eds.,
OfficeUSAtlas (Zurich: Lars Mdller, 2015): 597.
. "'I Decline To Be A Missionary:' Late-Modern Mirrors and Transformations in Modern
Architecture." Lea-Catherine Szacka, Veronique Patteeuw, eds., Exhibitions, Periodicals and the
Shaping ofPostmodern Architecture-Mediating Messages (London: Bloomsbury, forthcoming 2018).
. "Lincoln House and Studio." Chris Grimley, Kubo, Mark Pasnik, Heroic: Concrete
Architecture and the New Boston (New York: The Monacelli Press, 2015): 194-201.
. "New England Aquarium 1962-69." Chris Grimley, Michael Kubo, Mark Pasnik, Heroic:
Concrete Architecture and the New Boston (New York: The Monacelli Press, 2015): 220-227.
. "Petroleum Power: Architecture and Oil." Eva Franch i Gilabert, Amanda Lawrence, Ana
Miljacki, Ashley Schafer, eds., OfficeUS.Agenda. (Zurich: Lars Muller, 2014): 160-167.
. "The Concept of the Architectural Corporation." Eva Franch i Gilabert, Amanda Lawrence,
Ana Miljaeki, Ashley Schafer, ed., OfficeUS Agenda. (Zurich: Lars Muller, 2014): 37-45.
Lambert, Phyllis. Building Seagram. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2013.
330
Lamoreaux, Naomi R. The Great Merger Movement in American Business, 1895-1904. Cambridge,
UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Langdon, Philip. "When Bigger Is Better." Architectural Record (August 1998): 58-63.
Lange, Alexandra. Tower Typewriter and Trademark: Architects, Designers and the Corporate Utopia,
1956-1964. Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University, 2005.
Langewiesche, Wolfgang. "How to Live Comfortably in the Southwest Desert." House Beautiful
(April 1950).
Larson, Magali Sarfatti. Behind the Postmodern Facade: Architectural Change in Late Twentieth-
Century America. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
Lawrence, Amanda, Ana Miljacki, eds. Terms ofAppropriation: Essays on Architectural Influence.
London: Routledge, 2017.
Lawrence, Charles E. Saudi Search. Houston: CRSS Research, 1986.
Leap, Norris. "Engineer Manages Team of Five Talented Architects to Success." The Los Angeles
Times, October 9, 1960: E2.
Leatherbarrow, David, Richard Wesley. "Performance and Style in the Work of Olgyay and Olgyay."
arq, Vol. 18, No. 2 (2014): 167-176.
Lefaivre, Liane. "Critical Domesticity in the 1960s." Thresholds 19 (2000): 22-25.
Levine, Neil. The Urbanism ofFrank Lloyd Wright. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015.
Levinson, Nancy. "Funds Raised By Preservationists Save Gropius Archives After TAC's Demise."
Architectural Record (September 1995): 19.
Levy, Matthys P. "Matthys P. Levy." The Structural Design of Tall and Special Buildings, No. 14
(2005): 191-204.
Lewis, Michael J. "1860-1920, The Battle between Polytechnic and Beaux-Arts in the American
University." Joan Ockman, Rebecca Williamson, eds., Architecture School: Three Centuries of
Educating Architects in North America (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Washington, D.C.: Association
of Collegiate Schools of Architecture, 2012): 66-89.
Lewis, Paul. "Kuwait's Market Bailout." The New York Times, February 18, 1983: DI, D7.
Lilienthal, David. TIA: Democracy on the March. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944.
Maciuika, John C. Before the Bauhaus: Architecture, Politics, and the German State, 1890-1920.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
331
Mackenzie, Donald. Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993.
Macy, Christine. "The Architect's Office of the Tennessee Valley Authority." Tim Culvahouse, ed.,
The Tennessee Valley Authority: Design and Persuasion. (New York: Princeton Architectural Press,
2007): 26-51.
Marefat, Mina. "1950s Baghdad-Modern and International." TAARI Newsletter, No. 2-2. Fall
2007): 1-7.
. "From Bauhaus to Baghdad: The Politics of Building the Total University." TAARII
Newsletter, No. 3-2. Fall 2008): 2-12.
. "Le Corbusier in Baghdad." Brownbook, No. 55 (January-February 2016), http://
brownbook.me/le-corbusier-in-baghdad/, accessed April 17, 2016.
"Mise au Point for Le Corbusier's Baghdad Stadium." Docomomo, No. 41 (September 2009):
30-40.
. "The Universal University: How Bauhaus Came to Baghdad." Pedro Azara, ed., Ciudad del
espejismo: Bagdad, de Wright a Venturi = City of mirages, Baghdad, from Wright to Venturi
(Barcelona: Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya, 2008): 157-166.
Marquard, Bryan. "Norman Fletcher, 89; Cofounded Influential Architects Group." The Boston
Globe, June 6, 2007. http://archive.boston.com/news/globe/obituaries/articles/2007/06/06/
norman fletcher 89 cofounded influential architects group/, accessed January 22, 2013.
Marr, Phebe. The Modern History ofIraq. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985.
., The Modern History ofIraq, third edition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2012.
Martin, Reinhold. The Organizational Complex: Architecture, Media, Corporate Space. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2003.
Utopia's Ghost: Architecture and Postmodernism, Again. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2010.
Mather, Robert. "A New Program at Baghdad." AlA Journal (December 1965): 57-60.
McAtee, Cammie. "Alien #5044325: Mies's First Trip to America." Phyllis Lambert, ed., Mies in
America (Montreal and New York: Canadian Centre for Architecture and Whitney Museum of
American Art, 2001): 133-185.
McCallum, Ian. Architecture USA. New York: Reinhold Publishing Corporation, 1959.
332
McCoy, Esther. "Post-Mies: Architecture di Anthony J. Lumsden." Domus (November 1975): 1-12.
McGraw, Thomas K. ed. 7he Essential Alfred Chandler: Essays Toward a Historical Theory of Big
Business. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1988.
McKee, Bradford. "Merger Mania." Architecture (June 1996): 151-155.
. "TAC's Demise." Architecture (December 1995): 117-119.
McLeod, Mary. "Architecture or Revolution: Taylorism, Technocracy, and Social Change." Art
Journal, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Summer 1983): 132-147.
. Urbanism and Utopia: Le Corbusier from Regional Syndicalism to Vichy. Ph.D. Dissertation,
Princeton University. 1985.
. "Venturi's Acknowledgements: The Complexities of Influence." Paper delivered at
Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture at 50 conference, Museum of Modern Art and
Philadelphia Museum of Art, November 11-12, 2016.
McMillan, Robert S. "Visual Problems in Town Planning: The 'University Town' at Baghdad." The
New Metropolis in the Arab World. Cairo: Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Egyptian Society of
Engineers, December 17-22, 1960: CAI/15, 3.
McMillen, Louis A. "The Idea of Anonymity." Walter Gropius, Sarah P. Harkness, eds., The Architects
Collaborative 1945-1965 (Teufen: Verlag Arthur Niggli, 1966): 27.
. "The University of Baghdad, Baghdad, Iraq." John C. Harkness ed., Walter Gropius Archive,
Vol. 4: 1945-1969, The Work of the Architects Collaborative (New York and London: Garland
Publishing Inc., 1991): 189-192.
McQuade, Walter. "The Arabian Building Boom is Making Construction History." Fortune
(September 1976): 112-115, 186, 188, 190.
"The New Saarinen Office." Architectural Forum (April 1962): 113-119.
"The Search for Corporate Identity." Fortune (December 1970): 140-141.
Melnikova-Raich, Sonia. "The Soviet Problem with Two 'Unknowns': How an American Architect
and a Soviet Negotiator Jump-Started the Industrialization of Russia." IA, Issue 2 (2010): 57-80.
Miljacki, Ana. "Intercontinental Comfort: Little Americas Abroad." Eva Franch i Gilabert, Milja'ki,
Michael Kubo, Ashley Schafer, eds., OfficeUSAtlas (Zurich: Lars Mler, 2015): 426-427.
., ed. Under the Influence. Cambridge, MA: MIT SA+P Press, 2014.
Mitchell, Timothy. Rule ofExperts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity. Berkeley and London:
University of California Press, 2002.
333
Moholy-Nagy, Sibyl. "Hitler's Revenge." Art in America (September-October 1968): 42-43.
. "T he Diaspora." Journal ofthe Society ofArchitectural Historians (March 1965): 24-26.
Molesworth, Helen, Ruth Erickson. Leap Before You Look: Black Mountain College, 1933-1957.
Boston: Institute of Contemporary Art; New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2015.
Morris, Tony. "American Designers in Arabia." Middle East Construction (August 1985): 37-43.
Moskowitz Daniel P., Peter Hoffmann. "Architects and Engineers Getting Part of What They Want
on Antitrust Laws." Architectural Record (January 1983): 35.
Mozingo, Louise. Pastoral Capitalism: A History of Suburban Corporate Landscapes. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 2011.
Munir, Hisham. "Climate Control and Architecture in Iraq." M.Arch. Thesis, University of Southern
California, August 1956. http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/ref/collection/p15799co137/id/145033,
accessed June 1, 2015.
Murphy, Kevin D. "The Vernacular Moment: Eleanor Raymond, Walter Gropius, and New England
Modernism between the Wars." Journal ofthe Society ofArchitectural Historians, Vol. 70, No. 3
(September 2011): 308-329.
Nerdinger, Winfried. The Architect Walter Gropius. Berlin: Bauhaus-Archiv; Cambridge, MA: Busch-
Reisinger Museum, 1985.
Noble, David. America By Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism. New York:
Knopf, 1977.
O'Gorman, James. "DR US." Architectural Review (January 1972): 28-34.
Ockman, Joan. "The Architecture of Bureaucracy and the Architecture of Genius." Hunch 12:
Bureaucracy (2009): 142-146.
Owings, Nathaniel Alexander. The Spaces in Between: An Architect's Journey. Boston: Houghton
Miffin Company, 1973.
Pacelle, Mitchell. "U.S. Architects in Asia: Only Way to Go Is Up." The Wall StreetJournal, March
21, 1996: Bi.
Parkyn, Neil. "Kuwait Revisited." Middle East Construction (September 1983): 39-42.
Pastier, John, Michael Franklin Ross. "Anthony Lumsden, DMJM." A&U, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1975): 61-
160.
334
Paul, Daniel. "Westward Transitions: The Early Development of the Late- Modern Glass Skin in the
Collaborative Works of Cesar Pelli and Anthony Lumsden." Tom Marble, ed., Forum Issue 7: Late
Moderns (2010). http://laforum.org/article/westward-transitions/, accessed April 12, 2016.
Pearlman, Jill. Inventing American Modernism: Joseph Hudnut, Walter Gropius, and the Bauhaus Legacy
at Harvard. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2007.
Perrow, Charles. Organizing America: Wealth, Power, and the Origins of Corporate Capitalism.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002.
Pevsner, Nikolaus. Pioneers of the Modern Movement from William Morris to Walter Gropius.
London, Faber & Faber, 1936.
Pfeifer, Stuart, Chris Kirkham. "Merger of Aecom and URS to Create Giant L.A. Construction
Firm." The Los Angeles Times, July 13, 2014. http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-aecom-
merger-20140714-story.html, accessed September 3, 2017.
Pieri, Cecelia. "The Le Corbusier Gymnasium in Baghdad: discovery of construction archives. 1974-
1980." May 30, 2012. http://ifpo.hypotheses.org/3560, accessed January 26, 2013.
Plunkett, J. William, Caitlin T. Mueller. "Thin Concrete Shells at MIT: Kresge Auditorium and the
1954 Conference." Paper delivered at Fifth International Congress on Construction History, June
2015. http://digitalstructures.mit.edu/files/2015-08/plunkett-mueller.pdf, accessed June 25, 2017.
Polk, William R. What the Arabs Think. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1952.
Portman, John C. "An Architecture for Contemporary China." Building in China (December 1990):
34-38.
Putman, John J., Winfield Parks. "The Arab World, Inc.: Who Are Those Oil-Rich Arabs, and What
Are They Doing With All That Money?" National Geographic Magazine (October 1975): 494-532.
Rankine, Terry. "Memories of TAC," "The Second Floor of 63 Brattle, circa 1960." Roland Kluver,
Jim Paddock, eds., TAC Reminiscences (Cambridge, MA, c. 2005): 66-71.
. "The Summer of 1962: My Memories of the Start of Cambridge Seven." https://architects.
org/news/summer- 1962-my-memories-start-cambridge-seven, accessed March 19, 2013.
Redensek, Jeannette. "Manufacturing Gemeinschaft: Architecture, Tradition, and the Sociology of
Community in Germany, 1890-1920." Ph.D. Dissertation, The City University of New York, 2007.
Regional Plan Association. Urban Design Manhattan. New York, NY: Regional Plan Association,
April 1969.
Reinhold, Robert. "'Grope Fest' Honors Gropius." The New York Times, May 20, 1970: 43.
335
Rice, Charles. Interior Urbanism: Architecture, John Portman and Downtown America. London:
Bloomsbury, 2016.
Ricoeur, Paul. History and Truth. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1965.
Riley, Terence. The International Style: Exhibition 15 and The Museum ofModern Art. New York:
Rizzoli, 1992.
Rogers, Ernesto N. "Architecture for the Middle East" ["Architettura per il Medio Oriente"].
Casabella continuita 242 (August 1960): vii.
Ross, Michael Franklin. "The Development of an Esthetic System at DMJM." Architectural Record
(May 1975): 111-120.
., Hayahiko Takase. "Anthony Lumsden, DMJM." Space Design (July 1979): 3, 5-44.
Roth, Richard. "High-Rise Down to Earth." Progressive Architecture (June 1957): 196-200.
"The Forces That Shaped Park Avenue." Perspecta, No. 8 (1963): 97-102.
Rowe, Colin. "Introduction." Five Architects (New York: Wittenborn, 1972): 1-5.
Roy, William G. Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation in America.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999.
Rubin, Elihu. Insuring the City: The Prudential Center and the Postwar Urban Landscape. New Haven
and London: Yale University Press, 2012.
Rudofsky, Bernard. Architecture Without Architects. New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1964.
Rugh, William A. Arab Mass Media: Newspapers, Radio, and Television in Arab Politics. Westport, CT:
Praeger Publishers, 2004.
Rupnik. Ivan. "Exporting Space-Time: American Industrial Engineering Tools and European
Modernism." Eva Franch i Gilabert, Amanda Lawrence, Ana Miljacki, Ashley Schafer, eds., OfficeUS
Agenda (Zurich: Lars Miller, 2014): 105-116.
Ryon, Ruth. "Los Angeles Companies Create Worldwide Impact." 7he Los Angeles Times, June 4,
1978: VIi.
Sachs, Avigail. "Marketing Through Research: William Caudill and Caudill, Rowlett, Scott, CRS."
The Journal ofArchitecture, Vol. 13, No. 6 (2008): 737-752.
Saint, Andrew. The Image ofthe Architect. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983.
Hermann Muthesius, ed., Die Werkbundarbeit der Zukunft undAussprache drabber. Berlin: Deutscher
Werkbund, 1914.
336
Saletnik. Jeffrey. "Bauhaus in America." Molesworth, Helen, Ruth Erickson, Leap Before Yu Look:
Black Mountain College, 1933-1957 (Boston: Institute of Contemporary Art; New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 2015): 102-105.
Salter, Lord [Arthur]. The Development ofIraq: A Plan ofAction. Baghdad: Iraq Development Board,
1955.
Sample, Hilary. "Natalie De Blois." Eva Franch i Gilabert, Amanda Lawrence, Miljacki, Schafer, eds.,
OfficeUSAgenda (Zurich: Lars Muller, 2014): 65-81.
Sampson, Anthony. The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World They Shaped. New York:
Bantam Books, 1979.
Schachtman, Tom. Skyscraper Dreams: The Great Real Estate Dynasties of New York. Boston: Little,
Brown, 1991.
Schmertz, Mildred E "A Challenging Collaboration for TAC." Architectural Record (September
1967): 159-164.
"A Life in Architecture." ArchitectureBoston: Ben (Spring 2011): 22-24.
"The Problem of Pan Am." Architectural Record (May 1963): 151-158.
Schwartz, Frederick J. "Commodity Signs: Peter Behrens, the AEG, and the Trademark." Journal of
Design History, Vol. 9, No. 3 (1996): 153-184.
. The Werkbund: Design Theory and Mass Culture Before the First World War. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1996.
Schuldenfrei, Robin. "The Irreproducibility of the Bauhaus Object." Jeffrey Saletnik, Schuldenfrei,
eds., Bauhaus Construct: Fashioning Identity, Discourse and Modernism (London and New York:
Routledge, 2009): 37-60.
Schulze, Franz. "The Bauhaus Architects and the Rise of Modernism in the United States." Stephanie
Barron with Sabine Eckmann, Exiles + Emigres: The Flight ofEuropean Artists From Hitler (Los
Angeles and New York: Los Angeles County Museum of Art and Harry N. Abrams, 1997): 225-
234.
Senkevitch, Anatole. "Albert Kahn's Great Soviet Venture as Architect of the First Five- Year Plan,
1929-1932." Dimensions 10 (1996): 35-49.
Serge Chermayeff Group [Peter Blach, Serge Chermayeff, Abel Sorenson; Collaborators: Norman
Fletcher, Henry Hebbeln]. "Park Apartments." Architectural Forum (May 1943): 138-145.
337
Serraino, Pierluigi. The Creative Architect: Inside the Great Midcentury Personality Study. New York:
The Monacelli Press, 2016.
Seward, Aaron. "Making It Big." Architects Newspaper, June 16, 2010: 11-13.
Shanken, Andrew M. 194X. Architecture, Planning, and Consumer Culture on the American Home
Front. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009.
. "Breaking the Taboo: Architects and Advertising in Depression and War." Journal ofthe
Society ofArchitectural Historians, Vol. 69, No. 3 (September 2010): 406-429.
Sherman, Marjorie. "Gropius Party Postponed." The Boston Globe, May 24, 1970: 12.
Silver, David. "Building Autonomy, Creating Community: The Farm and Work Program at Black
Mountain College." Helen Molesworth, Ruth Erickson, Leap Before You Look: Black Mountain
College, 1933-1957 (Boston: Institute of Contemporary Art; New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 2015): 120-129.
Simon, Reeva S. Iraq Between the Two World Wars: The Creation and Implementation of a Nationalist
Ideology. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.
Siry, Joseph M. "Wright's Baghdad Opera House and Gammage Auditorium: In Search of Regional
Modernity." The Art Bulletin, Vol. 87, No. 2 (June 2005): 265-311.
Slavin, Maeve. "Blue Chip Banking." Interiors (November 1984): 130-141.
. "Portmania." Interiors (October 1984): 118-127.
Smith, Jeffrey Craig. Mega-Project Construction Management: The Corps of Engineers and Bechtel
Group in Saudi Arabia. Ph.D. Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1991.
Smith, T'ai. "The Identity of Design as Intellectual Property." Jeffrey Saletnik, Robin Schuldenfrei,
eds., Bauhaus Construct: Fashioning Identity, Discourse and Modernism (London and New York:
Routledge, 2009): 226-244.
Smithipedia. "Cambridge School of Architecture and Landscape Architecture." http://
sophia.smith.edu/blog/smithipedia/academic-life/cambridge-school-of-architecture-and-landscape-
architecture/, last accessed September 20, 2015.
Smithson, Peter. "The Fine and the Folk: An Essay on McKim, Mead and White and the American
Tradition." Architectural Design (August 1965): 394-397.
Spector, Buzz. Objects and Logotypes: Relationships between Minimalist Art and Corporate Design.
Chicago: Renaissance Society at the University of Chicago, 1980.
Squire, Raglan. "Architecture in the Middle East." Architectural Design (March 1957): 72-108.
338
Stanek, Lukasz. "Mobilities of Architecture in the Global Cold War." International Journal of Islamic
Architecture, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2015): 365-398.
Stanley, Richard L. "Genesis of a Giant." Real Estate Forum, V. 17, No. 9A (September 30, 1962):
12-31.
"Growth of a Giant." Real Estate Forum, V. 17, No. 9A (September 30, 1962): 37-58.
"Scotching a Myth." Real Estate Forum, Vol. 17, No. 9A (September 30, 1962): 3.
Stephens, Robert. The Arabs'New Frontier. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1976.
Stern, Robert A.M., Thomas Mellins, David Fishman. New York 1960: Architecture and Urbanism
Between the Second World War and the Bicentennial. New York: The Monacelli Press, 1995.
Stevens, Sara M. Developing Expertise: Architecture and Real Estate in Metropolitan America. New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2016.
Stubbins Jr., Hugh. "The Process of Design." Journal ofArchitectural Education, Vol. 10, No. 1
(Spring 1955): 43-44.
Sullivan, Louis H. Autobiography ofAn Idea. New York: Press of the American Institute of Architects,
Inc., 1926.
Summerson, John. "Charting the Victorian Building World." 7he Unromantic Castle and Other Essays
(London: Thames and Hudson, 1990): 175-192.
Sweet, Rod, ed. SSH Design: The First 50 Years. http://issuu.com/sshdesign/docs/50 years-book,
accessed August 11, 2015.
Tafuri, Manfredo. "The Disenchanted Mountain: 'The Skyscraper and the City." Giorgio Cucci,
Francesco Dal Co, Mario Manieri-Elia, Tafuri, 7he American City: From the Civil War to the New
Deal (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1979): 405-485.
Francesco Dal Co. Modern Architecture. Milan: Electa, 1976.
Modern Architecture/2. Milan: Electa, 1976.
Tanner, Ogden. "Grand Central's Wolfson." Architectural Forum (November 1958): 132-133, 200.
Taylor, Frederick Winslow. Principles ofScientific Management. New York, London: Harper and
Brothers, 1911.
Taylor, Robert. "Gropefest: A Memorial in Living Metal." The Boston Globe, May 24, 1970: 26.
339
Telesis Environmental Research Group. Spacefor Living. Exhibition catalogue, San Francisco
Museum of Art, July-August 1940.
The Architects Collaborative. "Program for the Proposed Willimantic Public Library on a Theoretical
Site." Arts & Architecture (August 1946): 28-29.
. "Statement of Aims." Arts & Architecture (August 1946): 28.
The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project. David D.
Newsom, Interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, June 17, 1991. http://www.adst.org/OH
%20TOCs/Newsom,%2ODavid%20D.toc.pdf, accessed June 9, 2017.
. Kenton W Keith, USIS Rotation Officer, Baghdad. 1966-1967, interviewed by Charles
Stuart Kennedy, 1998. "Iraq Country Reader." adst.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Iraq.pdf,
accessed June 30, 2013.
Thompson, Benjamin. "Miscellaneous Comments." Walter Gropius, Sarah P. Harkness, eds., 7he
Architects Collaborative 1945-1965 (Teufen: Verlag Arthur Niggli, 1966): 23.
. "Remarks on Anonymous Architecture." Connection (June 1965): 16-18.
Thompson, Jane, Alexandra Lange. Design Research: The Store That Brought Modern Living to
American Homes. San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2010.
Tombesi, Paolo. "Capital Gains and Architectural Losses: The Transformative Journey of Caudill
Rowlett Scott, 1948-1994." Journal ofArchitectural Education, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2006): 145-168.
Torre, Susanna. "Building Utopia: Mary Otis Stevens and the Lincoln, Massachusetts, House." Avital
Bloch, Lauri Umansky, ed., Impossible to Hold: Women and Culture in the 19 6 0's (New York and
London: New York University Press, 2005): 29-42.
Trachtenberg, Alan. The Incorporation ofAmerica: Culture and Society in the GildedAge. New York:
Hill and Wang, 1982.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). World Investment Report 2002.
New York, NY: United Nations, 2002.
Uthman, Fuad A. "Exporting Architectural Education to the Arab World." Journal ofArchitectural
Education, Vol. 31, No. 3 (February 1978): 26-30.
Valentine, Lucia Norton. "First Step Toward New Dormitory." Smith Alumnae Quarterly (May
1946): 126.
Vallye, Anna. Design and the Politics of Knowledge in America, 1937-1967: Walter Gropius, Gyorgy
Kepes. Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 2011.
340
van Zanten, David. "Architectural Composition at the Ecole des Beaux-Arts From Charles Percier to
Charles Garnier." Arthur Drexler, ed., The Architecture ofthe 6cole des Beaux-Arts (New York:
Museum of Modern Art, 1975): 111-324.
Venturi, Robert. Complexity & Contradiction in Architecture. New York: Museum of Modern Art,
1966.
Vitalis, Robert. America' Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2007.
Wagner Jr, Walter F. "The AIA and the Justice Dept: Do you know you're almost slightly pregnant?"
Architectural Record (May 1972): 9.
Warner, Caleb, A. Wendy Warner. Grant Me To Find the Task: The Life Story of Caleb Warner.
Bedford, MA: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2013.
Waid, D. Everett. "How Architects Work I.-Offices of Noted Architects [H. J. Hardenbergh, Cass
Gilbert, La Farge & Morris, Maynicke & Franke, Donn Barber]." The Brickbuilder (December
1911): 249-252.
. "How Architects Work II.-Offices of Noted Architects [York & Sawyer, Charles A. Platt,
Carrere & Hastings, Grosvenor Atterbury]." The Brickbuilder (January 1912): 7-10.
. "How Architects Work III.-Offices of Noted Architects [J. H. Freedlander, H. Van Burn
Magonigle, Delano & Aldrich, Trowbridge & Livingston]." The Brickbuilder (February 1912): 35-
38.
. "The Business Side of an Architect's Office
"The Business Side of
"The Business Side of
an Architect's Office
an Architect's Office
I." The Brickbuilder (April 1902): 69-70.
II." The Brickbuilder (May 1902): 91-93.
III." The Brickbuilder (August 1902): 157-160.
"The Business Side of an Architect's Office IV." The Brickbuilder (September 1902): 191-
195.
. "The Business Side of an Architect's Office V." The Brickbuilder. (Feb 1903): 37-39.
"The Business Side of an Architect's Office VI." The Brickbuilder (November 1903): 232-
"The Business Side of an Architect's Office VII." The Brickbuilder (December 1903): 254-
. "The Business Side of an Architect's Office VIII." The Brickbuilder (January 1904): 13-15.
341
233.
256.
. "The Business Side of an Architect's Office VII." The Brickbuilder (August 1904): 168.
. "The Business Side of an Architect's Office. With A Description of the Architects' Building,
New York." The Brickbuilder (August 1913): 179-181.
. "The Business Side of an Architect's Office. The Office of Mr. Donn Barber." The
Brickbuilder (September 1913): 197-200.
. "The Business Side of an Architect's Office. Description of the Offices of Messrs. Henry
Bacon; Ford, Butler & Oliver; Ludlow & Peabody; H. Van Buren Magonigle and Kenneth
Murchison." The Brickbuilder (November 1913): 251-254.
. "The Business Side of an Architect's Office. The Office of Messrs. McKim, Mead & White."
The Brickbuilder (December 1913): 267-270.
. "The Business Side of an Architect's Office. The Office of George B. Post & Sons." 7he
Brickbuilder (February 1914): 47-49.
. "The Business Side of an Architect's Office. The Offices of Mr. Howard Greenley and
Messrs. Taylor & Levi." The Brickbuilder (March 1914): 62-64.
. "The Business Side of an Architect's Office. The Office of Messrs. Mann & MacNeille." The
Brickbuilder (May 1914): 103-105.
. "The Office of George B. Post & Sons." The Brickbuilder (February 1914): 47-49.
Walker, Barbara Brooks. "No Woman Should Stay Home: Two Cambridge Wives Solve Career
Problem." The Boston Sunday Globe, March 2, 1947: A9.
Walsh, Sharon. "American Institute of Architects Settles U.S. Suit on Pricing Policy." The Washington
Post, July 6, 1990: D1.
Wank, Roland. "Architecture in Rural Areas: A Report on TVA Experience, by Roland A. Wank,
Head Architect." New Pencil Points (December 1942): 47-53.
Ward, Frank Lester. Applied Sociology. Boston, New York, Chicago, London: Ginn & Company,
1906.
. "Collective Telesis: Contributions to Social Philosophy. XII." American Journal ofSociology,
Vol. 2, No. 6 (1897): 801-822.
. "Individual Telesis: Contributions to Social Philosophy. XI." American Journal ofSociology,
Vol. 2, No. 5 (1897): 699-717.
Wehrwein, Austin C. "Air Right Project Slated in Chicago." The New York Times, July 20, 1961: 43.
342
Weidlinger, Paul. "Cooperation Between Architects and Engineers." Progressive Architecture/Pencil
Points (June 1946): 81-86.
Weisman, Winston. "The Commercial Architecture of George B. Post." Journal ofthe Society of
Architectural Historians, Vol. 31, No. 3 (October 1972): 176-203.
Wharton, Annabel Jane. Building the Cold War: Hilton International Hotels and Modern Architecture.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.
Whiteson, Leon, Hayahiko Takase, Anthony J. Lumsden. "Recent Works of Anthony J. Lumsden/
DMJM. Space Design (November 1993): 5-44.
Wickersham, Jay. "From Disinterested Expert to Marketplace Competitor: How Anti-Monopoly
Law Transformed the Ethics and Economics of American Architecture in the 1970s." Architectural
7heory Review, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2015): 138-158.
. "Learning From Burnham: The Origins of Modern Architectural Practice." Harvard Design
Magazine 32 (Spring/Summer 2000): 18-27.
Wiener, Norbert. Cybernetics: or, Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. New
York: J. Wiley, 1948.
Wiens, Henry. "The United States Operations Mission in Iraq." Annals ofthe American Academy of
Political and Social Science, Vol. 323 (May 1959): 140-149.
Williamson, Roxanne Kuter. American Architects and the Mechanics ofFame. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1991.
Witte, Oliver W. "Learn from the Public Giants." Building Design & Construction (July 1978): 48-
80.
Woods, Mary N. From Craft to Profession: The Practice ofArchitecture in Nineteenth-Century America.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.
"The 'American Architect and Building News' 1876-1907." Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia
University, 1983.
Wright, Frank Lloyd. Genius and the Mobocracy. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949.
Wright, Gwendolyn. "Global Ambition and Local Knowledge." Sandy Isenstadt, Kishwar Rizvi, eds.,
Modernism in the Middle East: Architecture and Politics in the Twentieth Century (Seattle and London:
University of Washington Press, 2008): 221-254.
Xue, Charlie Qiuli, Yingchun Li. "Importing American Architecture To China: The Practice of John
Portman & Associates in Shanghai." The Journal ofArchitecture (March 2008): 317-333.
343
Yergin, Daniel. The Prize: The Epic Questfor Oil, Money and Power. New York: Simon & Schuster,
1991.
Zeckendorf, William, Edward McCreary. Zeckendorf The Autobiography Ofthe Man Who Played a
Real-Life Game ofMonopoly and Won the Largest Real Estate Empire in History. New York: Plaza Press,
2014.
Zimmerman, Claire. "Albert Kahn's Territories." Eva Franch i Gilabert, Amanda Lawrence, Ana
Miljacki, Ashley Schafer, eds., OfficeUSAgenda (Zurich: Lars Mdller, 2014): 117-128.
. "'Ihe Labor of Albert Kahn." The Aggregate website (Not Peer Reviewed), accessed
December 14, 2014. http://we-aggregate.org/piece/the-labor-of-albert-kahn.
Zunz, Olivier. Making America Corporate, 1870-1920. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990.
344
AL Air
PLAN OF NEW OFFICE IN THE ARCHITECTS'
BUILDING.
Fig. 1.1 Plan and photograph of
drafting room, McKim, Mead &
White offices, 101 Park Avenue (The
Architects' Building), New York. The
Brickbuilder, December 1913
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Fig. 1.2 Plan of D. H. Burnham &
Company offices, Rookery Building,
Chicago. The Engineering & Building
Record, January 11, 1890
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Fig. 1.3 Plan of Adler & Sullivan
offices, Auditorium Building, Chi-
cago, drawn by Frank Lloyd Wright,
Genius and the Mobocracy (1949)
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by thom anl is owned by them.
Already sae twenty-fve arehi-
tecta and engineers have collected
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theirs, and it will he interesting
to follow the utethod by which thi
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handlesi among so many and in a
city where there is s much com
wetition and tech great activiy isI
buikling. The fad that the tail
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general and sub-critracters, de-
orators, nmaterial men, etc.. wiaild
indicate a greater effeleney i
handling the working forrec I-
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be numbered as tenants. One-
oifice boy, with a tracing. can di-
appear Into an deralue and in tee
minutes tiring back a blueprint
hot and dry fesan an electricall,
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can he most esntvenicnty dse-iwre-
to contractors. and that cntractor.
Called General, can quietly tat' at
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that if F. N. details are not reach
by sch a date, the time of con.
pietion of the building- will have
to be extended. It seems quite
ideal to be able to go nest dour for
a eriticism. or to borrow a draft-
man. or to admire a st of omi-
petitikn drawings.
One hundred ani One Park
Avenue is interesting to the archi-
tectural profession because here
its mentibers can son the offisot of
several distinguihed architetts
designed by themselves and ute-
doubtedly expressive to a irge
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f eaeb. The building is interest-
JJ7/E lotaroto i/iNsat/l in his ser/re Vf
enk"/zk,*cna ds-rnic af aa tcir t /ao/eareCbI&ila flcaa adPketrmanpd c-ill he Pit-
crc/int tend a/5c demni;Iiti of ac/A-al Acea r
of ea*. J lek/itS ere icrde/ &c er/ite to M -.0.l, ~A.. WO i/af/A-c I1ree, Ale' Ied
c-Ac will 4'- ikeesto Icar /cf' ame ct/aE, dt-
:-*ea, Nn/Wat, 1W pcintc/forns ;k14h f/er hae
fcacd c/cad/t i their cjie weauacumat and
/nce afger/intcea/c/iiofeno
--
-0
;j-t 
-iI-i-\il "
a a
L_~ jmEEWLI'OK LAN.
T atea n Ctttclt I xs ma a CfVe
4=u=14 Ac Uh"io -
ing to the building world in gen-
oral, bem-use here thei arebitcsts
were their in clients and tresun.
ably iandled the wliid enterprise
in an ideal way from the aichi-
terts 'iint of vicw- frein the
putrebase of the geurmi to the talc-
tiin of tie oflier building polnem,
-ant inally, in the letting of cn-
trslts and exoution of the work.
The real history of the enterprise
Ie quite as interesting as one's
fancy coali wish. The scheme of
c, operative oftiea for architects
had been suggested by Charles
Eining seven years before. and, at
that titie. with the encouragement
of John I. Carrere and others,
had alnost been realized. Now
all signs seemed pripitious. Mr.
.lead gave strong support to the
Ilea, and, with Ewing & Chappell
and La Parge & Miorris as the
nLtise leaders, it quickly assnued
definiteform. 1ir, Iurt L, Fenner,
as president, headed a stoek com-
pany comcosed of fifteen archi-
tects and seven engineers.
After a cing search fir a site
str was finally selected, excellent
as to its proximity to a great Imas-
portatkin center, the lot chsen
heingwoi the eoreerof ParkAveune
and tirtieth Stset, two tiRA
blorts from the new Grand Central
Terminal. The building Ibtain
a south amd west frontage. This
we toay laltel surprise number one.
In the --uteance, leaver, cwtsid-
ering the nerth court light for
those who wish it, the long, sunny,
breezy *oiuth frint is voted alto-
gether fortunate.
The financing schene haing
been wirked it, several general
contrators tAre ealled upon for
estimates. lIut they oulcln't bring
the cunt down tro ft the finances.
speculative builders have run-
structeit the larger part of Sew
Turk, ad they cate - the receor
in this case - surprise nuether
two,. A firin of buiklers who had
begun with mnodest tenetitnts and
crowned their success as exiert
buyers of ground and lalir and
building materials fur great hotels
Fig. 1.4 D. Everett Waid, "The
Business Side of an Architect's
Office, With A Description of the
Architects' Building, New York,"
The Brickbuilder, August 1913.
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Fig. 1.5 Plan and perspective of l
-2
Frank Lloyd Wright studio, Oak
Park, Chicago (1889). Published in
Ausgeftihrte Bauten und Entwu~rfe von HI-
Frank Lloyd Wright [Wasmuth Port-
folio] (Berlin: Gedruckt und verlegt-
von Ernst Wasmuth A.-G., 1910)
Fig. 1.6 Nameplate, Frank Lloyd
Wright studio, Oak Park. Photo --
graph: Dave Williams
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Fig. 1.7 Richard J. NCutra, Wie Baut
Amerika? (1927)
Fig. 1.8 Richard J. Neutra, Amerika,
Neues Bauen in der Welt, Vol. 2
(1930).
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Fig. 1.9 Walter or Ise Gropius,
photograph of Ford Motor Compa-
ny, River Rouge plant, Dearborn,
MI (Albert Kahn & Associates,
1917-27), 1928.
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Fig. 1.10 Exhibition photograph
and catalogue, "Modern Architec-
ture: International Exhibition," The
Museum of Modern Art, New York,
February 9 to March 23, 1932.
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Fig. 1.11 Walter Gropius, The New
Architecture and the Bauhaus (1935).
Book design by Laszlo Moholy-Nagy.
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Fig. 1.12 Office organization dia-
gram, John Russell Pope, Architect.
Published in Parker Morse Hooper,
"Office Procedure, I: Office Manual
of John Russell Pope, Architect,"
Architectural Record, January 1931.
Fig. 1.13 John Russell Pope, concep-
tual sketch for the National Gallery
of Art (1935-41) Washington, D.C.,
February 1936. National Gallery of
Art, Gallery Archives
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Fig. 1.14 Diagram of Bauhaus
curriculum, published in Staatiches
Bauhaus in Weimar 1919-1923
(1923).
Fig. 1.15 Diagram of Bauhaus
curriculum, published in Bauhaus
1919-1928 (1938).
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Fig. 1.16 Unidentified apprentices,
Gropius Bauatelier, Staatliches Bau-
haus, Dessau, Germany, 1927-28.
Photograph: Edmund Collein
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Fig. 1.17 Exhibition photograph and
catalogue, "Bauhaus 1919-1928,"
The Museum of Modern Art, New
York, December 7, 1938 to January
30, 1939. Exhibition and catalogue
design by Herbert Bayer. _
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Fig. 1.18 "Genetrix: Personal Con-
tributions to American Architecture,"
Architectural Review, May 1957.
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Fig. 1.20 "Wright at 70," photo-
graph of Wright with apprentices at
Taliesin, 1937. Photograph: Kenn
Hedrich, Hedrich Blessing. Front
row left to right: Benjamin Dombar,
Kevin Lynch, Frank Lloyd Wright,
James Thomson, Wesley Peters,
Robert Mosher. Back row, left to
right: Carey Carraway, John Lautner,
John How, Eugene Masselink, Blaine
Drake. Ellis Jacobs, E. Brookins,
Herbert Fritz, Burton Goodrich,
Edgar Tafel. Published in Architectur-
al Forum, January 1938.
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GENIUS AND THE MO CRACY,,,
1, '7
fhe vwrk -4e 64 a grows 1%0~e, U%*s &A~vlft
ord d ""e artJ w% IvO 4e - mV"# t I L~w
Fig. 1.21 Frank Lloyd Wright,
Genius and the Mobocracy (1949).
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ORGANIZATION
Fig. 1.22 "Albert Kahn, Inc.,"
Architectural Forum, August 1938.
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ARCH ITECT
PRODUCER OF PRODUCTION LINES
I I WAS on Thursday. Fcbruary 5. 1939, that Albert Kahn
received a telephone call from the Glenn L. Martin Com-
pany, Baltimore.
"Can you furnish plans quickly enough for us to put up
a 140,000 sq. ft. building by May I ?"
That was quite an order: a mammoth aircraft factory
building to be ready for use in 84 days. But Kahn was
prepared to answer, -Yes." Actually manufacturing began
in that building on April 27, just 81 days after the call.
Mr. Kahn did not realize, then, that this request was to
set the pattern and the pace for a program of war-impelled
plant expansion such as industry had never seen before. Or
that this order, one of dozens to come, was setting a pat-
tern and a pace for building designers, which, though previ-
JUNE 1942
ously unheard of, would come to be accepted as the war-
time obligation of architects and engineers.
Such miracles of speed in design and construction have
not been wrought without greatly expanded planning or-
ganizations, and, more significantly, a highly developed
coordination of planning procedures. They have required
coordination not only within the architectural and engineer-
ing organization, but also among designers. contractors,
manufacturers, and wartime clients.
Take the case of the Glenn Martin expansion. After re-
ceiving the long-distance call from Baltimore, Kahn and
members of his organization left Detroit immediately for
the East. They arrived at the Martin plant Friday morn-
ing. February 6. and set to work immediately, aided by a
39
Fig. 1.23 "Producer of Production
Lines: Albert Kahn, Architect,"
Architectural Record, June 1942.
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THE KAHN ORGANIZATION
UITR
A thoroughly integrated organization of de-
sign specialists, with two divisions and six
major departments and more than 600 em-
ployees, has made it possible for Albert Kahn
to make impressive speed records in the con-
struction of tremendous war production plantsI
M II
MMM
E
Eu
HE
U
U
I
Fig. 1.24 Office organization
diagram, Albert Kahn & Associates.
Published in "Producer of Produc-
tion Lines: Albert Kahn, Architect,"
Architectural Record, June 1942.
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THE CONCEPT
OF THE
CORPORATION
ETER F. DRUCKER
The classc study of the organization and management poli-
c'es of General Motors-the company thiat has become the
model for modern large-scale corporations across the world.
Fig. 1.25 Peter F. Drucker, The
Concept of the Corporation (1946).
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-faURE 6: PERCENTA6E DISTRIBUTION OF ARCHITECTURAL FIRMSW IT H RFE P ET To AlUlMi ER (F P L~OVY E E 0,
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4 o
60-.
- 1
\
REGIONAL DISTRIBU7ION O AI A FIRMS Wir# ONE ORN MOE EMPLOVEES - -
I : .%'I. 
t
AIA 1-4 EMPLOYEES
A IA 5-9
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A1 II
AP A AI-3 40-
1004 "~ 1.
Fig. 1.26 "Percentage Distribution
of Architectural Firms With Respect
to Number of Employees, 1950,"
Turpin C. Bannister, ed., The Archi-
tect at Mid-Century: Evolution and
Achievement (1949).
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FIGURE 10: ORGANIZATION OF A TYPICAL LARGE OFFICE WITH DEPARTMENT6
eneral Dep.Dep
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Fig. 1.27 "Organization of a Typical
Large Office With Departments,"1
Turpin C. Bannister, ed., The Archi-
tect at Mid-Century: Evolution and
Achievement (1949).
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FIGURE FI ORGANIZATION OF A TYPICAL - LARGE OFFICE WITH PROJECT TEAMS
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Fig. 1.28 "Organization of a Typical
Large Office With Project Teams,"
Turpin C. Bannister, ed., The Archi-
tect at Mid-Century: Evolution and
Achievement (1949).
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Fig. 1.29 Office organization dia-
gram, Smith, Hinchman and Grylls,
Associates, Inc. Published in "Orga-
nization for Efficient Practice" series,
Architectural Record, August 1960.
Fig. 1.30 Office organization
diagram, Hellmuth, Obata and Kass-
abaum, Inc., Architects. Published in
"Organization for Efficient Practice"
series, Architectural Record, February
1961.
Fig. 1.31 Office organization dia-
gram, Eggers and Higgins Architects.
Published in "Organization for
Efficient Practice" series, Architectur-
al Record, April 1960.
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Fig. 1.32 Skidmore, Owings & Mer-
rill offices in Inland Steel Building,
Chicago, IL, 1958. Photograph: Ezra
Stoller
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Fig. 1.33 Office organization dia-
gram, Skidmore, Owings & Merrill
(SOM). Published in William
Hartmann, "S.O.M. Organization,"
Bauen + Wohnen, April 1957.
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Fig. 1.34 Meeting to review pro-
posed interior layouts for Connecti-
cut General Life Insurance Company
(SOM, Hartford, Connecticut,
1954-57), Gordon Bunshaft speak-
ing with members of SOM, Turn-
er Construction Company, and
Connecticut General Life Insurance
Company, n.d. Photograph: Victor
Jorgensen
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"Croup Dkoign" As Practim. by S.O.f.
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Fig. 1.35 "'Group Design' As
Practiced by S.O.M." Published in
"The Architects From Skid's Row,"
Fortune, January 1958.
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Fig. 1.36 "2-Billion Worth of De-
sign by Conference," Business Week,
December 4, 1954.
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Fig. 1.37 Exhibition photograph and
bulletin, "Architectural Work by
Skidmore, Owings & Merrill," The
Museum of Modern Art, New York,
September 26 to November 5, 1950.
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WOW. BB Nook iBBe al, FBrB e ABadByin C BlBMBde spGnLB Co. 1 diL RoBiBB a"B-B
.. N lkebrBdel (BSM .-aB In fGMf T.n.B).
Des Egrhon all ae MLgAh.BLB . c -gIrner well .u0 geg0one lk""e VerKMMrse&,&adt sick borafts N de, 0egarMMtiN. Sic
-k egonlw eian 1. San F,."..sc lot
on. .
4 In Cke"BB Ind iL ChlGB
-ndr .1. I  N-Vor, alinchl .0. d-urd
A..ande BMB. . e Yaa 4t
-s Gleden Buekheaf dorm dinl ZhrM fUnndin .11- belae .4.n veloletniws plf
meig, t INoee len Archilaktaar, din ..s
BMQ. Be d. N- K-1 MB t c r aBBB G
ABh.tldk.r aa-aBhiagil and! dBBl A".
MBBLBB .Bd Bel.Bi. b-BBM Bnd GMan BB. "G
.a. Man Man sicka sern, than in de4 .n,
Yw. Un., a.....1vgao a~ne,.c
II-. PlBt. . d.. letil BMB BenBeAG.001.t All iir dit en.0ni'e.' TirmilCompany Riike . dor FAIL A--nu gVseig
-BBB, I N Be BBBBB . 4.0 h Bar chiB
- In bBlBB SB.4..Br d.B. B". Pen
Ha- In d" BBBBBBLn PSoBidMBenB,
d.. V..-MWBB..B GneMarbi .- l.acue,
LB.MB. M6. d. Clh.. - b.. B 1SBiinue
.. a li 0-"LB..B.B .k"Ate. Mir korm ons rch Erishrovn. ,0
.e. r .. . din ScB .B-BB n earn.lidihe -merchilc ."alkat "Igli
-1-sh: nM- han Vercen n, naee
Be., dAB SB B~B HBoB t (11 .B flPork Avenum. Die becinka a" lake $~lr-tern'e L.-ve Breihe lo Indaru = lgangen,arnev, To! des ket rn Tarroint ru avilecaend .n Phol-ien 114, al. Palkliken, In s-
vLBnd.l. 'hi1aar 11M d4MBt-B BB4Ad.A
Fig. 1.38 Sigfried Giedion, "Das Ex-
periment S.O.M.," Bauen + Wohnen,
April 1957.
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Fig. 1.39 SOM, Chase Manhattan
Plaza, New York City (1961). Pub-
lished in Henry-Russell Hitchcock,
introduction to Architecture of Skid-
more, Owings & Merrill 1950-1962
(1962). Photograph: Erich Locker
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Fig. 1.40 The Architects Collabora-
tive (TAC) offices, Cambridge, MA,
1967. Photograph: Ezra Stoller
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Fig. 1.41 Celebration of 80th
birthday of Walter Gropius with
TAC members and invited guests,
Cambridge, MA, 1963. Published in
Gropius and Sarah Pillsbury Hark-
ness, ed., The Architects Collaborative
1945-1965 (1966).
Fig. 1.42 "Gropius's TAC officc,
photograph published in Collabora-
tions (TAC office journal), No. 32, 7j 2 MC.
May 1986.
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GROPIUS APPRAISES TODAY'S ARCHITECT as a 'master builder,"
finds him unmoved by the impact of
industrialization, unrufmed by AIA rules which
prevent him from building
S YOR REACTION ete th cN v.s by aet -s , a ssh
Wuss.d by Pl~ft "N.ll's' esessss a. 06. ss't p'g' W, 55 __
"0ls' 40#01 ft"echr 1,011ds -tme . ss? ef avne' WN .e-
4W, m" .1 &.esal., .s5J.e a . & h 0ldisa " 55 eN S
, , 'w pe s ski, p..,ssns ,,,5. 5 ,sey"r e'1ft".
"" 'eseseS e., ie..s.. . empe.os. I..a .-- es5P0555.
.- rb. 5d5.
** "RAOU MAY 1111
RECOMMENDATIONS:
closer contact with building production,
closer work with engineer and builder*
It the great periods of the past the architect was the
"master of the crafts" or "master buider" who played
a very prominent role within the whole ptoduction proces
of his time. But with the shift from crafts to industry he
is no longer in this governing position.
Today the architect is not the "master of the building
industry." Deserted by the beat craftamen (who have
gone into industry, toolmaking. testing and researchingi.
he has remained sitting all akme on his anachrmistic
hrick pile, pathetically unaware of the colossal impact of
industrialisation. Thr architect is in a very real danger
of losing his grip in competition with the engineer, the
scientist and the builder unless he adjusts his attitude and
aims to moet the new situation.
Complete separation of design and execution of build-
ings. as it is in force today. seems to be altogether art-ti
ficial if we compare it to the process of building in the
great periods of the past. We have withdrawn much too
far from that original and natural approach, when con-
ception and realization of a building were one indiviisible
process and when architect and luilder were one and the
same person. The architect of the future if he want-
to rise to the top again- will be foree by the trend of
evensu to draw closer once more to the building prodw.
hen. If he will build up a closely co-operating team to.
gether with the engineer. the scientist and the builder.
then design, conntruction and ecomrey may again becomne
an entitv---a fusion of art. seicece ande, s.
*e,.a. ns s s.(a .ist-'e I.. .
t~epele~~s'cl 4e-b~.-.Cso. ,e-i'o  oioilc
Fig. 1.43 Walter Gropius, "Gropius
Appraises Today's Architect," Archi-
tectural Forum, May 1952.
380
Fig. 1.44 Walter Gropius, Scope of
Total Architecture (1955).
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Housto's CR6 Design Associstee, led by Waille Scott Jr.. John
Rowlett. Thomas Bullock, William Caudill. and C. Herbert Paseur, has
created a considerable stir among architects by going public.
Why Your Company Should Become
Part of The CRS Group, Inc.
Fig. 1.46 "Houston's CRS Design
Associates, led by Wallie Scott Jr.,
John Rowlett, Thomas Bullock, Wil-
liam Caudill, and C. Herbert Paseur,
has created a considerable stir among
architects by going public." Gurney
Breckenfeld, "The Architects Want
a Voice in Redesigning America,"
Fortune, November 1971.
Fig. 1.47 "Why Your Company
Should Become Part of the CRS
Group, Inc." CRS Group, adver-
tisement in professional journals,
January 1981.
CR5 Group. Inc.
Revenues
S Million
SO- -
& Y
t -
ii, tt.__ __
Growth through
acquisition
Growth through new
start-up companies
Growth through
existing operations
We want to acquire companies we can help; hats one way we grow,
There ae three reasons: Growth, Profit, and Performance.
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CAUDILL ROWLETT SCOTT'S
ONGOING WORK
FOR A SAUDI ARABIAN
UNIVERSITY
Fig. 1.49 "Caudill Rowlett Scott's
Ongoing Work For a Saudi Arabian
University," Architectural Record,
April 1976.
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Fig. 1.50 TAC, Johns-Manville
World Headquarters, Denver, CO
(1973-77). Photograph: Nick
Wheeler
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Fig. 1.51 Johnson/Burgee, Pennzoil
Place, Houston, TX (1973-76).
Photograph: Richard Payne
387
0000
o
o
.
.
JL)
0
0
 
N
-0 u
-
Q
 
x
-9ri
Fig. 2.1 Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA), typical display panel on TVA
comprehensive planning program,
1933-45. Farm Security Adminis-
tration-Office of War Information
Photograph Collection, Library of
Congress
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AN ACHIEVEMENT OF DEMOCRATIC PLANNING
By Julian Huxle,TIF. initi.1, TVA soe 1. gi ni to be Wamibiar
.. the ymd.4 of . umw p. ibility for UKed e..crtie 16timh pa"idlily of
tor Tennessee Vally Authority. and the T-n-se
",Wky Authorty ia the eo ltading tzamupic ofdeorti paning. When it wmi initiated in19U3 it was the firmt IWg-seak, reginnal planning
orgaisti"n which operatedl. .o rar ., pos"ile,
years, it Otill rwin. the munat imuportant exainpltof suelh an orgpinisdiln.
The Izecise dewitation of the reg"o -vrwhich TVA exercises it. futictions was deter-Mninl bV certain osfitut-&-a fscth. 11, the
U.S.A.. ~the pos- permnitted to the Federal
Governit. ms opposed t- the wepamtc -Stc*s,
aft atrictiy limited. Aniong Ihf~ powrm, however,
wre meksines for flonsd-contr.1 and for unprovingthe navigability of river. in the interests of inter.State connmee. rk.od-conto and navipahility
accordingly had to be the pigs on a~wh tZklislation n-essary for regional planning ."shung ; and for itood-control and imnprovrement ofn r' ' t yu uirc an entire river bui.
Tennene = sbt a tribulary of a tributary-it flour. into the Ohio Shortly above the 1.11ce'
coninuence with the Mhalassippi . Yet it is . big
rive by Brtish standards a huge one. For %onw,ditn'b.v it. junction with the Ohio it 6s .
wile "ie n it drains mnost of Tennessee and
purtion, of mix other States. Its total length (not11l under the sme. nare) Ns about 9M0 rudex. -s
mginst Flo muin, (eir the se-ern the IniedrIih river. T7U largest riser basin in lBritain.that or the Thamecs, covers ke- than G.0W square
"films while the sees or the Tennessee Valkey i.Inmt4o00 sqruare mlils. or Isout 1-ur-ifthui thatof FngAW61i n W.1e, but with a population of
only somer two and a half enillion-, about ofte-
eighth conisting of Kegroes. motly very bwek-w.rd.
The Tennessee Valley Authority Act was owe ofthe earliest Neir Deal naesurks having blsnpwdin May 1989---.lesS than three mroatho afterHoooevirlt took oft*e. The presenble states thattepre fthe Act inlue aigbilitywild fodCqr nojf ; treafforeattand Wh prop"r
us fwiin ad;agiutrl"idsra
In the lod% of the AEt. the Boad is utorid .
.nd directed to wake Studies. gperintt. lnd
demnstrulin. " (a elightfully omproensivt
definitionof rsearch!. nt proote the fe of
electri ip-, f- b tlimltural. dotesic andind..riL" purpo-e, .. d is instructed that it way
epexrab.te th 16d p l-t id itt k lt iem y f
other gemiem. froi Sta..t SA.Lil guivernmentsto edne-fin.J and remah iistitutians, an .s to
ensut e the applity ti- of ekeetii Power - to the
l"U"' n etrblncldvlpeto the
rer.e. X of t git. "Th1g tt Is of-reference are kept extresuely browd.
Why a- the Tennessee Valley sigui out as
UK si6e of thi, mseivt experienta ? Ti were
sevend.. otually reinforcing rs. Then was-
the exatence of a graGovernment-bnvilt nitrate
plant in the arma 1%re as the 6"c that propercontrol or the Tennessee Rtiver was crucial for theprereltion, or distrots, linods on the loweriiiipi. There wa- the Further ts.11 that flood
controf could be readily tied up not only with
improved naviffntion, but with the profitable
goveration of electric power: and there Soref- ully the cry'n needs of this hinckward region
which, mih lrey be wet by cheap eletric
we. uh .1 th rural are. of the valley wsmbbtlby =esat farmecs. who. Ittiough
originally of e" ln British muock, had in their
-lunain 6.1latin too oft-n devriop.1 into
poverty-stricken poor-whites. Priwitive in their
reprnductive halitI4 m in their farwine methds.they Multiplied rapily, unfil they presented atypical Malthuslan populatimn psIf h-^1 UP."it. s es of subsistem-e U =derthe sence of
this pressure. the farnera began in wsuiy phie- It,
eacroaeh upon the wooded m-utain- l. A lteep
slope woukd be Isurn off and cleared of its tumber,
ploughed up. wid planted with masise. T71
elnimte I is ot, with spell. of heavy rainfall :
wore then half of all the rain of over 50 ince^
. real that occurs in the U.S.A. fail, in the
T.;.ne Varly. With the iremsvaI of the freSd
cover. and with the riue to apyfertlizerm.the "nI rapidly lost its fertility fuld lage amounnts
-1. t-. IS ".Sl-dL e -6 pra
Z= iand _0& th st l.quesee. and
. t l if. use ist f ntsidy oad es.
-k"ny tanmi0 the aspes- e at pWAm tonab
of it were ,ipl _,hi wy.. Altera febrief, yers help anolne rthth gab ,t, nw abandoned In laeon'o receared ame ery ota in the heOr's -,."h
m-t mo errif otrie o h k nd i-ing
eeniti-Iti.n of the type ;,_Ws _,-eiWed with
primitive Africn tribes.
Th  resullant erosion wsn pladling. 4-. It wam
brought bwme to use when. sur.eyng the furbidtow of the Tmwnsc, River. I .a told that there
were -ne Still Iivg w h. rceceimbered it -
clear blue Ztea. p tinlist moeT bataken the panssxp appearance of So "sill
Arnican rivers for a flict of culture - thw -r-&oht it ws ^ owcunt ma.nde pheomenw
,nd=. Heme under -v Y- , wba kc pd ty !:ig =e fer a vastarma and hurried along to . _atc in the ses.I W.s Saw outeraps of here ruck which thegenerations b-+k had teet cover'd with rch nIi
-ve . ynr  I. depth. For those who like figur,.it may We added thad the ;:.wnt of -it annuallywashed or bk- w ut of 1h feds or the unitedStar.s is cowevativeiy ectiaddat 8.000 iilli-ntons.
.hTh-ghusleot of the regi0n dehifitI"Iiese _i dvaluaria and hookAoMa were cOMS"11.and others caused by ,itawiii deficiences. The etowns awl cit en were still I-aey sufng fewIf. rmines atefs of the Cf~vil War. though
. certain amount of injustrihuition had belatedlygrown !n thff.
The . eeshoahs nitrate work, at the Will-n
,-_u _er built during (be fast .__. At-r 1911variou prope"a . w ash maeconcerning t ftr
_se; It one timer Fordl cvined an inLci nI
The threat thad this great p, set "jtialgh t
private h.mh called for pubc c Tir. iIm2 und tIno. Congress declared in ravoura
Goenet ro of the plnt, but on btoccaiosth '110 .a v-lord bY the the- mn
dent. With the accessa .1 Rome1e1 to power
huoee, the atopeews aitrcd. &oi So it
_Km .6-ut that the need for publi, operan 00h.patclrpathelped on the dee-Wou to wairh
=h-kT nne=I half. the beeficiaryoft Rslar escidet Aire o, plan. Seas nit s th rhere indeaXuk ho1 nain UKame which dictated A Aceiect Cu1i"611y
defenc.oei lpen~b oalshef i-b-almoost
Fig. 2.2 Julian Huxley, "TVA:
An Achievement of Democratic
Planning," The Architectural Review,
June 1943.
Fig. 2.3 David E. Lilienthal, TVA:
Democracy on the March (1944).
TVA
DEMOCRACY
ON THE MARCH
115 IIIl A\\ f lI'. l 111"
DAN ID E. LILIENIIiAL.
. ei I- P & 1 , 1 1 I it ns . P U 9 . g I S :i
-~l ),,,
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Saw-~ _7 1
Fig. 2.4 Black Mountain College,
Summer Art Institute faculty, 1946.
From left to right: Leo Amino, Jacob
Lawrence, Leo Lionni, Theodore
Dreier, Nora Lionni, Beaumont Ne-
whall, Gwendolyn Knight Lawrence,
Ise Gropius, Jean Varda, Nancy
Newhall, Walter Gropius, Molly
Gregory, Josepf Albers, Anni Albers.
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Ft il.
Fig. 2.5 Black Mountain College,
students at farm work program with
Studies Building in background, n.d.
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DEMOCRACY IN ACTION
Iy JOHN EVARTS
O\\ ERTIN thlnpoh ill,, -h tuAl Ial alw, bI- all Amueriian inadition.
It I-, I-, thb, ,leg w h- 'esU'rre on pi ;esi ll fieldi and it It..
ually e .411rllefr h ms sgilita't ricomplishet in art. indvr-rand r-n ill ~duwaiion. 1,om-ho. or other, in .4pi, of li1-tird-high- ter, in spit, of
linancitl Iepi-sion and , ,i- at horn, and abroad. imagination anld deteinvination.
.- treptheitd Ill coopiedtion. I..% I-e abli, it, conweri the impo&-ible into a four
prmre reali; ,
A a in poiv I, Il~Ak M umsi Colltr,, it piotwer in .,od 6n limcrti Nd
nali n, :iue at ik 'forltwin it, flh magnifirent Craigy Motlini of North
Ca aia In.... wnirfrm resil hi, ,nall voriducalionAl inelitution if 75 4.r.
dent- 41.i 211 I~. lo-, , ji, -1 with . -riouj, dilemma la., %,,at. T16% learned that
the building, who I, ilwlha ene 6.1 e lb, veirt, I.-an in 1923 w.uld not 1w
ri-ilable after Imw. Ill 1. ( in, -%u- of .ctirn wa. 'imply lo I-os the coleg .l.
hap. the prait'l atman l-,.d 1.." -0i that it .. , Ilh owtv thint: to do. The, altet-
vali-e iia to relo.t lle ,um building, oil the neirb% ji(1atre lrack of land
whic:h the i lld I hall -- '1, .h goyrd, and Wuild it. ddili,-nal buibilig (or -tudie,
and - l-s ....... lil 11- ..... . ..... fi,,dJ -ailable to Ila~ rbi Jo-'. and will, Ilh
'nr U."n d ..... ol, "t, s Ilw- Own~ of taisip mneu looked rather dark,
A yer. in lia, hrew a geea wigoF Aud-nt, and lelieher. in uu~
prorledwe it, iis osing paolem.. of irewr'Al importlince [o the vollelwl. Tow whol,
matter wa. di-u--J at Iiength and ;I unanimous agwriAl ua.i real-hed: to rai.e -sfficien-t fut-d. A,, iog doiw ....... - I,- o. at le.As -n o( tile walerial", to lind aa, hili
tell I., design all Aww~wsudi-s laildini:, and in Ilh. fall to oiganit, a -irk
program Ilk % whli1ib wth olr, awl itudent,. indr experi t iion. couldl them
Iee .... raI the houiling.
And thi:. itvfi e t , . whill o wallly hapl.wne. (I, almo. olj a smail part if
tile fir" frild %a, raiwd dorinz thle -um1n1wr, -o that [wilt itndenil anti leaen.
.1-1en o-t of th, lonw IChlisltnj holida% it, 1rving to raise moe uort, During th'.
.,it rer, though, th cll,-eg)z IIIeth iolereii of i. L-1,en-r Koheor, the wvll.
kno..t mdr aeia and eon itl.itot of the Arhtrrlkeeord; he deiigned[he bu-ildiing, Old it- Sep[11 roll- a e 1.i - joired tile c-1lege faculty. Groun .. ,
br-kxn ill N.ep1cod. 1n .41rk .- 1- euno the fir~t Unit of dhe building plan. sill.det n ec ei de-pendino I.w hvmv the-Ir arridemni, wduls -,r,, hm
-erdtehsnse fro ..... .... -Fluern I,- a .-ek. A profi-ional buildr lod
.w .....ni Ieeep o inork Nfl-ime and I,, upen i_ do. %w k 1f 16 amia
reut. 1 .. .n ........-. 4, k- lit. , Aditior, to leal-hing; 0.-ve iv rhtetr and
ivd-ostoi W e.in -op, j i-- ilh- -I-h .olndrokinp,
V-wn aftr o I, .,, -wg of 2.1 -1 11 -firdenii -1d 4,;oor,- drove o-r to ilh,prope~t and worketl fr.om I l5t itoib- nd virl, me.,n and ioen I...,dho
lo Wmild man ... di, d:sng 16,h te rut dow'n . hillside- mINdi and
powred eon'lewthe III~ e -.k f"I th" -a11. (ro Ihe ,m...ntain-ide and fcoind,lion I'" , iro I I.,r creeL Ih. pill up 1ont " 1 built ub r i ...: In ihn
ut down ,,,ks ,a- pro, M'. Ill' Ilwhi I" floing Arid the, wrked -w11 nd wifi
enhsamfor . hal fho ,e dom_ In lve .a-. a ,rii- I(onn, C-ii ".I, It
Fig. 2.6 John Evarts, "Democracy in
Action" and image of students build-
irig Studies Building ("Education
in our time is placed upon a truly
democratic and cooperative basis"),
California Arts andArchitecture, July
1941.
EDUCATION IN OUR TIME IS PLACED UPON A TRULY DEMOCRATIC AND COOPERATIVE BASIS
Ik
*1'
I~z'
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I7
&Hes lgw rlsy acrs the valley
IDees ead V6.ife ($scope Lee Nd) aud A&A esw) by seuDAMeSe ad faael, of S U C
Fig. 2.7 Walter Gropius and Marcel
Breuer, rendered aerial perspective
and pilot plan for Black Mountain
College campus buildings, 1939-40.
Marcel Breuer Archive
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telesis: progress intelligently planned
and directed; the attainment of desired
ends by the application of intelligent
human effort to the means. (Webster)
Fig. 2.8 Telesis Environmental Re-
search Group, exhibition catalogue
for Spacefor Living, San Francisco
Museum of Art, July-August 1940.
MIT Rotch Library
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SOCIAL PLANNING FOR WESTERN AGRICULTURE
By I'ERNON DE 4AiS, lNel .treait, PS l. Sa e.,,,,
"Wh doan't you go on Weeo to Chlloerniaf There's
work there, and it nerer gets roll. Why. you can rmah out
anywhere and pick an orange. Why, theries alway some
kind of crop to work i. Why don't you go there"
John Stehinbek, Gripes al Oerth.-
At the foot of the Tehahapix, in Clitoeria'so
rida Son Joaquin Valley ie Armin awl Weedpateh.
You may reavotber the Josd family at the real
of their mirtt weat, at over theme same
amountains And gum with one at the on-bards
and vinrtyara mpread out below them. atac
thaaaawaI ether Jeaads. hafaore awli tn the .uear. tot.
heatrng, have beon ofetad siatahey by thia fiet t
ofra of the grout rattey. Near Woedpatrh sthe
awap of the F'aea tierity Ailueiniateatieo. Thas
tea is the aase CAMp where the JOIade rst fAUd
=mpib, ro_ fear aud hupeksawma in their erm
A good dat has changed i rat the
"a ploae, etly earyon erartedea that the Joads
am not retimly fittional Aharxtera. Reergailoim
of the poblem is the first step towards solution.
But then the "ed-tek hMiligtaoy Isher Camp"has ohaiged too. At trot the camp oonsiated wnlyof tent platforms with a lag one for the Saturday
might dazie. same aetral bukifiap with tit.
and shoeroe ad wash tmya am a ailU buildingfar the oflo and a visthual moe. The problem
asemed to be ely a matter ot providing derency
and sanitation to rampiag-out during the work
MMKn The NWAM over, people pibmaly atback be their haosie. It rame as ah to ocr,
at the end of the At seaint, that met faolies
ctadeot en. blatty had nother hatmes. Also, eanay
made connections ho.wall mw assured on-
snd-aMl work for a good part of the year, with
enough inmhe to dai "following the crapi." was
por eanomy voatateidrag the aost of gastline and
"itiag-eat." tloemer, this ime e was Iaf.
cit t to mat a donAt hoe an folks boarded uptheoaidwaof theirtelts. plantedearnand elgetalea
and Prepared to "&tk it Out" It was in answer
to thi lear-eat need that the FSA (theo the
Resettlemat Admuistration purrhaned twenty
arreo eat eto the compad built the iit toentylahue mie. Their wre a41. too mal
for " eeoem y 0a was proven later, but were a
realistic approsch to the problieoa. The attrtapt
" "ade to synthesit what the aigrantla bum
for then lreo, to their ihadtoano. out of Wraps
of wood, tia, pasteboard and cava.. Taking a
ad e hmm what the tairanta eonaidered ssential
reoalted io a aingle-roosed adobe house, oamplte
however with kitherettr ad hath andt a frair
oleeping poTcb. EAh hot boat a oe-4ee Pnilea
whch eb triibut dl to the fandlta' iagrr itauae
it must ot he asaumed. hai-erm, that tamStarted right in eating quantities of those ge
vertales they had is het 1e without. No.
at ruea eegetables were too feiriga o their
last". Folt woul not came to the Clink at et,
eithe Why bother. when a lith blark poaint on
haay' =aee eooc the roli? Ye. a-m pograms
Ihaeae adeomer then.
There a now our a doen of these conu u-
vitiree e form eorkaa I. California loine. PA
bas bailt nearly fatty of them in the Wat, incl-.
tag Tra for the problen to net roefiazmo oolely te
California. A number of campm have te auilt inMeridsous plainre teingdeveloped in Celorado.Miehiga. Maylaal and Nw Jercey. lo adition
t  the permanent eommunities there ar fifteen
mobile units. eith thoe rn., poWrr mad
tater plant. all mounted on trilem. Eerytaiag
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Fig. 2.9 Vernon De Mars, "Social
Planning for Western Agriculture,"
TASK2, Fall 1941. Harvard Gradu-
ate School of Design
Fig. 2.10 TASK2, cover with draw-
ing by Garrett Eckbo, Fall 1941.
Harvard Graduate School of Design
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1. Power and Land
Will the Central Valley Project be an instrument of public benefit or
private gain? Attention focuses on this California valley as we plan
other similar developments of power audirrigation throughout the nation.
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Fig. 2.11 Walter Packard, "Power
and Land," TASK6 (West Coast
Issue), Winter 1944-45. Harvard
Graduate School of Design
Fig. 2.12 Cover, TSK6 (West
Coast Issue), Winter 1944-45. Har-
vard Graduate School of Design
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CONCLUSION
Dean Hudnut:
Our purpose is to change the mild course of modem fashion
architecture into a struggle for a revolution in the architectural
world. Because of you, Harvard University has one of the best
architectural schools in the world. Students from five continents
testify to this fact.
We ask you to establish a review with DEFINITE PRIN-
CIPLES OF CRITICISM. The commercial reviews based on a
Gallup system of architectural criticism lead nowhere but to the
confusion of public opinion. We want a small review of the "Focus?"
type, of perhaps no more than four issues a year, but with clarity
of leadership. This review should be the center of a movement in
architecture with the purpose of making the people of the United
States aware of modern architecture, which is now known and un-
derstood only by a small group. Together with this review, this
movement, through conferences and propaganda, should state the
principles on which modern design is conceived, and, through a
cold criticism of their work, should stimulate architects in the
United States.
The main aim of this movement and of this review should be
COLLABORATION: its possibility, its experiments.
COLLABORATION iS THE CREDO AND THE FAITH
OF ARCHITECTURE TODAY.
CAMBRIBS- MASS MAY, 18i
John B. Bayley
Robert Hays Rosenberg
Bruno Zevi
John Taylor Moore, Jr.
Warren H. Radford
Frank C. Treseder
Arthur Koon Hing Cheang
Wm. Joseph
Dahong Wang
T. J. Willo
[ z6]
Fig. 2.13 John B. Bayley, Robert
Hays Rosenberg, Bruno Zevi,
John Taylor Moore, Jr., Warren H.
Radford, Frank C. Treseder, Arthur
Koon Hing Cheang, Wrn. Joseph,
Dahong Wang and T. J. Willo, An
Opinion on Architecture, May 1941.
Canadian Centre for Architecture
Collections
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A GROUP OF STUDENTS FIGHTING FASCISM WITH OUT-OF-DATE EQUIPMENT
(Corioon inspired by the publication of An Opinion on Architecture'. Cambridge, Moss., 1941'.
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Fig. 2.14 "A Group of Students
Fighting Fascism With Out-of-Date
Equipment," TASK 1, Summer
1941. Harvard Graduate School of
Design
Fig. 2.15 Cover, TASK 1, Summer
1941. Harvard Graduate School of
Design
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Fig. 2.16 Cambridge School for
Architecture and Landscape Ar-
chitecture, drafting wing addition
(Eleanor Raymond, 1928). Smith
College Archives
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Fig. 2.17 Pillsbury and Vaughan
(Artek in Boston) showroom with
furniture by Alvar and Aino Aalto,
Boston, MA, 1940-43. Frances Loeb
Library Special Collections, Harvard
Graduate School of Design
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PLANNING WITH YOU
Perhaps no one but John Hersey knows whether kindly Major Joppolo in
"A Bell for Adano" lived in fact as well as fiction. But in another small
Italian city a real American, John C. Harkness, has effectively assumed
the role in moments spared from evacuating wounded between Isernia and
Cassino. Ambulance driver by circumstance, architect by trade, young
Harkness has worked with native colleagues in replanning from the rubble
a fine Isernia for tomorrow.
HARKNESS AND PLAN AMID RUBBLE
On September 10, 1943 American
planes dropped their first bombs on
Isernia, a quiet farming village in the
hilly central portion of Italy, then oc-
cupied by the Germans. Ten other
raids followed and the destruction was
continued by German demolition squads
before evacuating the town. When the
British arrived on November 4, rail lines
were hanging loose from crumpled
stone bridges, huge craters pockmarked
the roads, public buildings were a mass
of rubble, approximately one-third of
the homes were leveled. Of the 13,000
inhabitants only 10,000 were still alive.
Like hundreds of other c i t i e s
throughout Europe, Isernia's destruc-
tion followed a definite pattern: Amer-
ican bombers blasted a large area in
the center of tqwn; German explosives
planted on the outskirts put bridges,
roads, power plants and the railroad
station out of commission. As in other
war-gutted towns the civilian popula-
tion. homeless, stunned, suffered most.
Because of the similarity between
Isernia's plight and the situation in
other towns which have become battle-
fields in total war, this small Italian
village is a test case illustrating the
problems of reconstruction which will
be met throughout the war theaters
In Isernia, this destruction is the
latest of many disasters which have
periodically shattered the town since
its beginning around 2,000 B.C To-
day's reconstruction, like that which
followed each new attack, from Roman
times down to the present, started the
day destruction ended. It is not a post-
war job. Civilians lucky enough to
have escaped unhurt start digging for
their dead, or to recover their property.
They need shelter and start rebuilding
their rained homes, stone by stone, at
best following the old pattern, at worst
modifying to fit disorders that cannot
immediately be cured. Much work, of
course, is done by the advancing mili-
tary machine. Bridges and roads must
be rebuilt immediately while utilities
and sewer systems must be put in
working order to maintain sanitary
conditions. This is reconstruction in
its unplanned form which of neces-
sity begins at once. As soon as possi-
ble, however, it should follow some
plan, not merely to restore the town to
its prewar condition, but to take advan-
tage of the opportunity to improve it.
PLANED NE*SUSTgUT10MoN
Unlike many Italian towns sinilarly
blasted by the war, Isernia is fortunate
in having an architectural and engi-
neering firm which has undertaken thii
job almost from the beginning. Their
preliminary solution, the work of Gui-
seppe Tarra, is an example of academic
planning, relying on a formal pattern
of building placement. Of particular
interest, therefore, is a second recon-
struction plan, executed by a young
American architect, John C Harkness,
while he was stationed in Isernia with
the American Field Service. Harkness
worked in the Affice of the local plan-
ners and with their help reached a
fresh solution which may well influence
the final reconstruction of the town. It
coincides with the local plan in many
respects, but differs strongly in certain
basic attitudes. The Tarra plan directs
Isernia's growth eastward, almost com-
pletely separating new construction
from the prewar town. The proposed
dwelling units are thus grouped to-
gether on a flat open space together
with several reconstructed factories.
The Harkness plan provides a more in-
formal multiple grouping of houses on
hilly sections near the demolished town
center, but oriented toward the open
ISERNIA, CENTRAL ITALIAN VILLAGE
Z_ C
0 . . .
MARCH 1946
Fig. 2.18 John Harkness in Amer-
ican Field Service, Isernia, Italy, in
"Planning With You," Architectural
Forum, March 1945.
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39 PREFABRICATED DURATION DORMITORIES VALLEJO, CALIF.
-32
VERNON PeMARS, ARCHITECT
GARRETT ECKSO, LANDSCAPE ARCHITECT
NICHOLAS CIRINO, SITE ENGINEER
Like much previous work of the Farm
Security Administration, these dormitories
for single Navy yard workers combine
distinguished design and economical con-
struction to an unusual degree. Assembled
entirely from prefabricated panels built
on 1 x 3 in. frames, they are among the
few examples of two-story panel con-
struction that have appeared to date.
Based on the familiar "platform" method
of construction, the system employs room-
width panels a story in height, joined at
the line of the second door by an ingenious
double overlap (detail, opposite) which
provides weathering and produces an at-
tractive shadow line around the exterior
at this level. The method results in a con-
siderable saving in material and is com-
pletely demountable. Each of the 39 units
houses 78 men in single and double rooms,
at a cost of $23,311, or $298.86 per man.
Population of the 42 acre plot is 3,042,
or 72 per acre.
334 E5 A C H I Tt C T s a A L F 05 R t
Fig. 2.19 "39 Prefabricated Duration
Dormitories, Vallejo, Calif.," Archi-
tectural Forum, May 1942.
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Fig. 2.21 Jean Bodman Fletcher,
thesis project for Central Valley,
CA, 1944-45, site plan of migrant
workers' community. Loeb Special
Collections, Harvard Graduate
School of Design
Fig. 2.22 Jean Bodman Fletcher,
thesis project for Central Valley, CA,
plan of cotton textile factory. Arts
Architecture, May 1945
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BANK JOHN C. & SARAH HARKNESS, DOSIGNERS. NEN YORK
s Ol
-E ARCHITECT URAL1
t , U. hTMAY 1943
S
page 84
page 86
page 88
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VIEW FERRI PAR KING E a
LOIWIS fIE VAN DES ROME, one of the world-famous founders of modern
architecture and foremost exponent of the "open" plan, is the son of an
Aix-la-Chappele stone mason, never received formal technical training.
Now professor of architecture at the Armour Institute of Technology, Chi-
cago, he first began to practice in Berlin in 1911.
JOHN .&AEKIESS 13 SASAM HARKNESS are recent graduates of the
Harvard Graduate School of Design and Cambridge School of Architecture,
respectively. John Harkness won the Second A.I.A. Medal in 1941, and,
together with his wife Sarah, the Boston Society of Architects Prime in 1940.
Both are now working in New York offices.
CHARLES LAMES was born in St. Louis, Mo. in 1907 and studied archi-
tecture there at Washington University. He has worked for Eliel and Eero
Sasrinen, taught design at Cranbrook Academy of Art. With Eero Saarinen,
he won a first prize in the Organic Design Competition of the Museum
of Modern Art. Now doing experimental work for the Government.
Fig. 2.23 John and Sarah Harkness.
bank design for "New Buildings for
194X," Architectural Forum, May
1943.
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MUSEUM
BANK
CITY HALL
PARK APARTMENTS SERGE CHERMA YEFF GROUP, NEW YORK
PETER BLACH, SERGE CHERMAYEFF, ABEL SORENSEN
COLLABORATORS: NORMAN FLETCHER. HENRY HEBBELN
Fig. 2.24 Serge Chermayeff Group
(Norman Fletcher, collaborator),
park apartments for "New Buildings
for 194X," Architectural Forum, May
1943.
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PROGRESSIVE
ARCHITECTURE
7 -COMPETITION WINNERS
Fig. 2.25 Cover with winning
entry by Jean Bodman Fletcher
and Norman Fletcher for Pencil
Points-Pittsburgh design competition
for "A House for Cheerful Living,"
Progressive Architecture, May 1945.
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MOTOR--
TRAVELER'S HOTEL
By Charles D. Wiley, Norman Fletcher and Jean Bodman Fletcher, Architects
"A HnE," explain the architects, *is the visitor's coon "Thu R(X>M is arranged w he used singk or douhk.
tact with the community and a focal point of local ac- The bulky dresser is gone, the closet is gone, and in their
tivities. It should be part of a community group which in- place is a dressing unit containing a lavatory, drawers, a
cludes shops, offices, local municipal headquarters, theater shelf, and a clothes case that opens widk by means of a
and junior high school. The hotel is physically connected tambourine door.
to the shops, and provided with lounges opening on the "This is not a project for reconversion. ENGINEFRING
green, has advanced be yotid brick on brick and birel on post
"The traveler DRIVES INTO the hotel. Without leav- structures of reconstruction days. The ilywsoti airplane
ing his car he is able to register anti drive to his room. bomber is based on a system of comprte stress transmission
Rooms are on two levels around a covered pirking court over the total outer shell.
where there is PARKING SPACE. "During the war the engineer has solved the needs ol
"From his car the guest crosses the glazed corridor and the tines. But why now must we reconvert: The building
ascends or descends half a kvel to his room. His car is industry cat well take time to employ the engineer as a
where he can use it and need not worry about its care. It man of advatcrtnct and the factory as a machine for
is a CAR-TO-BED plan. producing advanced strctural systems."
ARCHITECTURAL RECORD I JULY, 1945 75
Fig. 2.26 Charles D. Wiley, Norman
Fletcher, and Jean Bodman Fletcher,
"Motor Traveler's Hotel, Architectural
Record, July 1945.
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FIRST PRIZE
NORMAN C. FI.ETCHMES EAN SODMAN FLErCHE. AND SENIAMIN THOMSON
CAMISIDOL MASSACHUSETTS
Ai
tra
SECOND PRIZE
SARAR NARENES AND IOHN C. HARENESS
MILTON. MASSACHUSETTS
b
Fig. 2.27 Norman C. Fletcher, Jean
Bodman Fletcher, and Benjamin
Thompson, first prize, and Sarah
Harkness and John C. Harkness, sec-
ond prize, Smith College Dormitory
competition, Progressive Architecture,
April 1946.
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Fig. 2.28 Publicity photographs of
Norman C. Fletcher, Jean Bodman
Fletcher, and Benjamin 'hompson,
first prize winners, and Sarah Pills-
bury Harkness and John Harkness,
second prize winners of Smith Col-
lege Dormitory competition, released
in connection with the exhibition,
"New Dormitories for Smith Col-
lege," The Museum of Modern Art,
New York, February 5, 1946 through
April 14, 1946. Photographs: Fred
G. Chase. The Museum of Modern
Art Archives
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c roodhue Roal
Eloomfiell Hills,
iidhi an
11 November 1945
Professor Walter Gronius
RobinFon Fall Harvard University
CarbridFe, Massachusetts
Dear Yr. 4ropius:
Jean ani I are taking this onportunity to write
you in order to tell you of our present position
with regard to a coonerative office, which JohnHarnese mentioned to you last week.
r irst of all, we want to emphasize that the chanee
of workInc, toeether not only as a group but par-
taking of your quilance would be a wonderful pros-Pect for us.
Perbais we can sive you some background on the
cooperative idea. Basically, we feel that we canlearn more and give 'rore as proluctive citizensif we achieve more reesonsibility ani indeoendence
than is possible in the traditional office orzan-iation. By working on projects, even very smallones- in which we had a very responsible part, we
- night .gain greater contact with materials, build-ing methods, and people.. This arphitectural work
e would hope to su'plement ani finally-interrate
*- with planning research and execution. Thus ourAlins become, not Lrehitecture foi -architecture'
'ake, but architecture for -the sake of a healthy
eoeiety.
lOely' llied to the architctural aims are the
soc"al aims. We do hope thatyoung people ibvolved
* -1sn Qi. ooperative .an somehow beSin to et to
0ethr takI thinO like a cooperative nursery1084ible Actually we have been talking about
*is fo ew years but only now, that the war
* over ank friende are out of the service is -itbecovig poesible. Ree.dpe myself and J :' and(hip iarknees, Benfamin ompson is a ve-y vital
~sembd . $e # ,a very! tot4 frend of oure'ani very
zup be~hn the ide. I be ieve Uet bad the pla.uWe
of Wa11ca ~witt y0 ssxie~tim. 4ge at LUncoln. He .
11. 0 vat Dt ti s 04of the sOrM;AO.
Fig. 2.29 Letter from Norman
Fletcher and Jean Bodman Fletcher
to Walter Gropius, November 11,
1945. Reginald Isaacs Papers, Ar-
chives of American Art, Smithsonian
Institution
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Fig. 2.30 The Architects Collab-
orative, Black Mountain College,
site plan study, October 22, 1946.
Harvard University Art Museums
413
Fig. 2.31 Group portrait of The
Architects Collaborative partners,
c. 1948. From left to right: John
Harkness, Louis McMillen, Robert
McMillan, Walter Gropius, Jean
Bodman Fletcher, Benjamin Thomp-
son. Historic New England
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No Woman Should Stay Home
Two Cambridge Wives Solve Career Problem
.or a.111 -' so t f tsto
NATURAL Uur s__-
YKK 9LINKY 7 .
SCARSA FS I s - - -
There's nothing like the rich, doep. -
furred heanty of these tatompl. tolzurt-
on's inshy shins to oomspiernet ynnr
spriug unit. At this very-npeeiai-
prdeane prite .they're vsteo- -a
Cther Chaica Scarf Value~r
NATURAL RUSSIAN SAhEi.. ut5' 400'--NATU RAAL 5TONE tARTEN.. i 045-
NATURAL WII.D 14101...35 $18.30*
MA.I ORDERS INVITED
in OX 4 5, -r &skin Wn"t -y.
= sbee tthA likei the- rick deep.., s Ylcs ~ g
Two Girls Share as Equal Partners
in Modern Architects' Collaborative
F Ono sme it se ArIltees' CNSPeIoNnrt bee 'taM. Ih are: rn. Rsh Rafkaens. Rert Vem4ak. NTsain
.rad Whi elo-ebrasd gaIf = =e DV WlerGr. ffeee. V GrarmIles oxid-n Theention. and "irs. Jess 2-dat
0s. Csllelmas i. the Devaraeet =t A =Iter at esr-mrd. 1. Fleiyer. Miise frethn Ibe th a ee use Jonbiarbssaid Lasard
siew mdet it hete designed by Mr. sa" mrs. flitebee. Left "s corI. toe iw e~ two snbes It the C1ltabistine.
13r.he lelleleely.' Cmui0y 1lh0. ' D. UropiusCo-operative Tackles Problems .I - I.L1 .- ed.
- o buy' -4 pr'in n= an Offset to re-Of Home, Community Plann gi - -n - b- 1 - -'- that h  'ee.D ysauhn eti b=ai IOf Lo Many Noe England towns
Ie1h tO biti u a1ill ofer an excellent example
,y *oe .11111153105central lndU1. of hat comm ity life should
ae'tbsfr.ter-eO'Iansoe..e It Was Mr. Harkness who be." But Ie quickly added that
Cunt mes Ma. N sri e ned th. pmiet=d Out what the dsnelop- tradition mean taking f0,-1 aw1
155 1300g w St. chIt5ts coneesili eseneto i thee as- m01 ol such towns might mean faoraf.hers anly these thin
aresbsegseqsstparinith sdsle Am" well beyond the to the woman in the hmenl- wich amM1SIX...... A..ett CO. bstnss. .beae they , .lilo.lthough sI..6d.ltsd ot1h,.T11h - lo resl~l sha. II detsee
ltsebste, I Citdi !r05, 5101u letos med the gir be lse-sosl irn-ect enoti s-ni- 'an InsIen tiegm 1A. ire
.Ventur.wh.. .althoh l .f .0 e me.,,.. ybes .il, 1..n by.n ,,, th. ld. nt I~ rtothe prent wayoflife
yatr 01d,Is r poof enables eXcf to do rl ernment. municipalities, One neI0,i1I5n 1ngaging thethat it's " te'sseto tnr work in the ales as well inwsranct companies, Or 0d- aIr s eser saltaetion at Pree-
unt OWNseS ne to hee duo. .t home. trwlisI. t .. IA'ye5 r pl.n of huildd,.
The monttlse of t*is rto Th= ahnrs n tOll 5 totto sissilne ocossmmnty I_ lln unlsln Cllege m
Jf unli t ;.itsmlsI N lbs ste bu. tAid. ks o pneb ir 'Wheten s somn n 511 , nIth Chrowun. looks after :0:
4:3,h d n tie a Job Or any in0,sling eelvtie. t ly l I
t ,, 1  .ens-r. Sm. .tb.e, .sheti sthe1.utsid her home .. etimn. e deal oemni.., e a. - .l-Thsee btUdIsg Onccens 0.s as- ste. Then she goes in.sIs. penas sn tbw for she he l. prelId.
nly lres t om sisietely co..In the afternoon be eee ler the cornmute.' said Mrs. Harknew in thIs psje-a. ;t- Their Ideal-
esrab e u ie., e wo. ,oun, arknpes;e whie1, "If she mwt. .mmutefo, r t11 ii. Yet P1. ir,,p,.rosl re-
pesin which each memeI, II, mother %wi.t, t ee . quarters ofa hour each -07. 'eas ,are salance 1 exert.
%ies hn an SI1ual basis and Pory and Mrs. 0chr returns home. st may Om he able tn PVe 'he owe. ambiitis' ahuns1sm. ,nddcision Is adne i0,1- - _-- - !s .-oe:tla sl nen- 11.
Ca. If housewitS dm0 a3 0 If the lks It a' only
fTh e guiding en use i the than a frta1 f,30010 hIlill into _w1 01 t _ bla b. I it.i
Fig. 2.32 Barbara Brooks Walter,
"No Woman Should Stay Home:
Two Cambridge Wives Solve Career
Problem," Boston Sunday Globe,
March 2, 1947.
Fig. 2.33 Helen Henley, "Two Girls
Share as Equal Partners in Modern
Architects' Collaborative," Christian
Science Monitor, January 13, 1947.
415
us-
Life is a cycle of houses
no gr&* to tt
4. cvct comoate mani
Yew ewd r .0wr-Jd y-
tamr W, a IrA. compfrtMe wm 0: Zie.
2. TLUMTtso" SOt5a
I %arr a a"0 a me. a uminaf
maet se a &YiaP gEuE ,
A Wowe that nil* taseedw of yoar
fandly. thee spa e e lt sad et
ARCHITECTURE, FAMILY STYLE
Two women architects look at today's houses,
tell how they affect family life
BY JEAN BODMAN FLETCHER AND SARAH HARENE
for the Aftrivtsn Cesebemif, a arep @j Masraseai 'W6
C4"ee104 are Of&erts, clles V ir pasted sdil sa rSea mrre
ave you ever *at down and askd 
yourself serioaliH we doiw...,,..re ,ivigrFight fo,,....-a
your family? As Oe aeft is a series of questions which may
give you a clue to the answer. If you can answer "ye" to
mat of them, you're probably in the right house. the rig
neighorhood-but you're a rare btdiidual If mat it'# up
to yoo-especially if you are a woman-4o do some dcnr.
organied thinking. low should the daily activities of the
family be planned to insure a pleasant and creative life fat
every member? This is a major problett of woaman's lit
today. it's an integral part of the designing and plaetnims
problem.
There is a complicating factor in judgiag wheher
you're living the right way for you: your denands ebeapt
as you life changes. The newly-married couple wil theite
in an apartment. And if it's a tiny space above the ci
roof Lopa, perhaps that is a the more ideal. It is oamplIe
freedom. Until they get a dug. they can walk st ny
tte, locking the door behind theta. The house woo't bs
down. 'hees in so fassae to tend. The pip Nes Vt
frees. llherels no grass to cat. blot *domestic worn.
Fig. 2.34 Jean Bodman Fletcher
and Sarah Harkness, "Architecture,
Family Style: Two women architects
look at today's houses, tell how they
affect family life," House & Garden,
October 1947.
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faM ism plasd 7~ fteawsap
hssar tweam s plmat asl s
[O1 Dme it - prairy .o emam member 01 Ah fay?
Er Am reA , hAMM de sw e - as F-m. -e0?
ED Ame imNd #' ye'"Wij. in sh au46wMharfd
M Am aaw W ad Age mbIs8daeP
Are the gasS6m, me. A te addptW oa as ft shm
C ID e assefe sNA 4a0ee0?
CI d e . ship, .. e?
M Nam '" aW "Ouspmewe so Aisam deeWk 0. d11
trs, eda pfart ame?
In ISr PW s Awa *er e es she as Ams tem kame?
En she 1ama*sy awee 0s61- wsooass ad *ks?
l( ye a m.W -W" t mesesi 1t quasslam., 7" am
paahahty in tht d Se, ihe 1h # sehss 1 d for ya.
Fig. 2.35 TAC, Six Moon Hill,
Lexington, MA, 1948-49, site plan
with house owners. The Architects
Collaborative 1945-1965
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Fig. 2.36 Jean Bodman Fletcher and
Norman Fletcher, Fletcher House,
Six Moon Hill, Lexington, MA,
1950. Photographs: Ezra Stoller
418
Fig. 2.37 John Harkness and Sarah
Pillsbury Harkness, Harkness House,
Six Moon Hill, Lexington, MA,
1950. Photographs: Ezra Stoller
419
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Fig. 2.38 Community meeting,
Howell House, Six Moon Hill,
Lexington, MA, 1950. Photograph:
Ezra Stoller
I
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Fig. 2.39 TAC, Five Fields, Lexing-
ton, MA, 1952. Photograph: Ezra
Stoller
Fig. 2.40 Five Fields, plans and sec-
tion of typical three-level house. The
Architects Collaborative 1945-1965
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st NI)A R eal.) ataV f 19. 195-1.
C- Rom Ecat" .93(a Rodl EAn
FIVE FIELDS
'? IN HISTORIC LEXINGTON
on Cosord Ave., off Route I
dt
.rat
ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN BY
THE ARCHITECTS COLLABORATIYE
Wistervaionally known /or their
conamporry daigu"
JSAN I. RITCHhR IAA KA110451
NORMAN nLIRai ROWl IMi.LhJ
WALIN 4MuS LOUIS A. MeMWRWW
JOHN C HAMNU IMJWIN THO9PM
DICNAW S. M011NOuNs
MEAL FOR CHILDRB'
a Imaginative *ft planning
* Expert engineerIng
* Moderate purchase price
* 1/3 to fullai. lot
* Common land for ommunity use
* 2-6 bedroom houses
* Country living ninutme from town
via Concord Tumrpile
* Houses featured in McCalls
and House and Home
19,950-136,000
Fig. 2.41 "Five Fields in Historic
Lexington," advertisement, Boston
Sunday Herald, July 19, 1953.
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91CLVUlVE A GENTS
THE FIRST IAl4 CO. ef OSTON
7 Pemb~ala Sq. LA 1.7
Fig. 2.42 Five Fields, founding
group on the site, n.d. From left to
right: Benjamin Thompson, Mary
Thompson, Mrs. Martin, Jean
Bodman Fletcher, Professor Martin,
Norman Fletcher. The Architects
Collaborative 1945-1965
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HARVARD UNIVERSMrY
'JUL 0 1 1996
Franc". Loeb Ubrary
Graduate School ot Dmeiq
2,K HLI S -S;
Front to Back, left to right
Front Row
James E. Burlage AIA, RIBA
Sarah P Harkness FAIA
Leonard Notkin AIA
Howard F. Etkus FAIA
Royston T. Daley AIA
Middle Row
Norman C. Fletcher FAIA
Roland Kluver AIA
H Morse Payne FAIA
Peter W Mornon AIA
Richard I Broakei AIA
Alex Cvijanovic AIA
Back Row
John P Sheehy ALA, APA
Perry K. Neubauer AIA
Gregory Downes AIA
Richard A Sabin AIA
John F. Hayes AiA
David G Sheffield AIA, APA
H. Malcolm Tknor AIA
JohnC HakrecFAIA
Walter Rosenfeldk. AIA CS
On The Cover
Composite aerial photo and
rendering of TAC's Copley
Place Development Project
under conatruction in down
town Boron.
Fig. 2.43 "TAC Principals," TAC
Highlights, office portfolio, 1983.
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ANNO DOMINI 1964
THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS
BESTOWS AGAIN ITS
ARCHITECTURAL FIRM AWARD
HONORING
THE ARCHITECTS
COLLABORATIVE
INCORPORATED
JEAN B FLETCHER. AIA
NORMAN C. PLETCHER, AIA
WALTER GROPIUS. FAIA
JOHN C HARKNESS. AlA
SARAH P. HARKNESS
LOIS A. MuMILLIN
BENJAMIN THOMPSON
WALTER QROPIUS HAS LONG HRLD THAT THE PROFUESION OF ARCHITECTURE
HAS LOST SOME OF ITS EPPECTIVENESS IN OWOANIZING ITS PRACTICE ON
THE IOSS-AND-ASSISTANT PRINCIPLE. SOME YEARS OF A NOTASLE EFFORT
IN ESTABLISHING A PURELY DEMOCRATIC ASSOCIATION OF EQIAL PARTNERS
HAVE CARRIED TAC THROUGH THE FORMATIVE YEARS INTO THE MATURITY
OP PRODUCING ARCHITECTURE 01! A HIGH RANK WITHOUT PERSONAL
IDIOSYNCRACIES - EVEN OF THE SELFEFFPACING MASTER,
Fig. 2.44 American Institute of Ar-
chitects, "Architectural Firm Award
Honoring 'Ihe Architects Collabo-
rative," 1964. Canadian Centre of
Architecture Collections
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Fig. 2.45 TAC offices, 63 Brattle St.,
third floor drafting room, n.d. The
Architects Collaborative 1945-1965
426
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Fig. 2.46 Cartoon of TAC main
office, 63 Brattle St., n.d. Archives of
Walter Rosenfeld, reprinted in TAC
Reminiscences
427
Fig. 2.47 Design Research original
store, 57 Brattle Street, Camrbidge,
MA, n.d.
428
A CHALLENGING COLLABORATION
FOR TAC: In the design financing and construction of its new officebuilding in Harvard Square, The Architects Collaborative became its own
client-budget-minded, yet exacting; demanding an organization of
space tailored to its own particular style of working, yet flexible enough
to accommodate unforeseen changes. TAC's architects have proved equal to
the conflicting goals they imposed upon themselves. Their new structure,
adaptable and low cost. is handsome and enduring as well.
Fig. 2.48 Mildred F. Schmertz, "A
Challenging Collaboration for TAC,"
Architectural Record, September
1967.
- 429
- I ______________________________________K:
'7'-
F
Fig. 2.49 TAC offices, 46 Brattle
Street, 1967. Photograph: Ezra
Stoller
430
Fig. 2.50 TAC offices, first floor
and typical floor plans, typical
reflected ceiling plan, sections
and concrete joint details,
Architectural Record, September
1967.
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Fig. 2.51 TAC offices, 46 Brattle
Street, 1967. Photograph: Ezra
Stoller
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Fig. 2.52 TAC partners meeting in
conference room, 46 Brattle Street,
with Design Research in back-
ground, n.d. 7he Architects Collabora-
tive Inc., office portfolio, c. 1975.
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Casabella 318
Fig. 2.53 TAC partners on cover
of Casabela 318, September 1967.
Photograph: Ezra Stoller
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The Boys From Cambridge-Architecture puts no premium on youth; to most
architects under 40, the chance to build one's very own buildings is an en-
viable situation. The four above-Paul Dietrich, 37, Terry Rankine, 36,
Alden B. Christie, 28, and Peter Chermayeff, 27-formed their firm 18 months
ago when they received a commission to design the New England Aquarium.
The Cambridge group (which has its origin in and around the Harvard Grad-
uate School of Design) is also about to build the Shopping Center for the
Washington Park Renewal Area in Boston, another fat commission for which
they received a 1964 Progressive Architecture magazine design award. Their
guiding philosophy: to use each member's special talents in a cooperative way
and to let a building's special problems determine its design.
Fig. 2.54 "The Boys From Cam-
bridge," c. 1964. Photograph: Duane
Michals. Cambridge Seven Associ-
ates
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Robert S. McMillan Associates is an organization of architects and
planners equipped to handle a wide range of projects in the United
States, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. The firm has its head
offices in Lycerne, Switzerland; an affiliated company in Rome, Italy
is responsible for much of the actual production, and operates under
the direct supervision of Mr. McMillan and his associates. In addition
the firm has a branch office in Lagos, Nigeria and other affiliates in
Washington, D.C. and Nairobi, Kenya.
It is a policy of the company to provide the necessary technical staf
convenient to the location of a project. In addition, Mr. McMillan
and his associates travel extensively to maintain optimal commun-
ications with the client. It is in this conceptual and operational
framework, that the unique requirements of each project are examined,
analysed, and given form.
Mr McMillan and his associates have participated as principals or senior
architects on architectural and planning projects in all parts of the
United States, Europe, Africa, and the Middle and Far East, and ate
familiar with the various technical and professional standards, codes,
and operating procedures prevalent in different countries. Their pro-
fessional experience includes universities, schools, large-scale housing
projects, office buildings, hotels, hospitals, shopping centers, industrial
plants, retail stores, civic buildings, military installations, and urban
planning. The diverse backgrounds and varied specialties of the in-
dividuals combine to provide the organization with a wide perspective
and broad insight into all the factors affecting modern architecture.
Prior to the formation of his independent practice in 1963, Robert S.
McMillan was a senior partner of The Architects Collaborative of
Cambridge, Massachusetts, U.S.A. for sixteen years, and, of the many
projects executed during that period, those illustrated herein are
marked with an asterisk.
Each client is served directly by Mr. McMillan and an associate. They
arm fully supported at all levels by the staff of project architects,
designers, job captains, draftsmen, modelmakers, specification writers,
field supervisors, and administrative personnel.
rt s. momXn i11anl aNSooiEates
Fig. 2.55 "Organization," Robert S.
McMillan Associates, office portfolio,
n.d. Avery Architectural & Fine Arts
Library, Columbia University
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Fig. 2.56 Benjamin Thompson and
Associates, Thompson with model of
Baltimore Harborplace, n.d. "BTA
In the 1990s: The Way We Work,"
PROCESS:Architecture, 1990
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Fig. 2.57 Benjamin Thompson &
Asssociates, Design Research Build-
ing (1969) with TAC offices and
TAC office extension under con-
struction at right, 1970. Photograph:
Ezra Stoller
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Fig. 2.58 TAC, exhibition of new
town plan for Jubail, Saudi Arabia in
courtyard of TAC offices, 46 Brattle
Street, c. 1983. Photograph: Sam
Sweezy
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TAC ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
Fig. 2.59 TAC organizational chart,
n.d., after 1977. MIT Museum
Archives
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Fig. 2.60 "Biographies of Principals,"
in "TAC: The Heritage of Walter
Gropius," PROCESS:Architecture No.
19, 1980.
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Fig. 2.61 John Harkness and Nor-
man Fletcher on last day of TAC,
46 Brattle Street, April 7, 1995.
Photograph: Peter Vanderwarker
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TAC's Demise
I be Arehitects Collaborative
closed its doors this spring.
What felled this giant? Wat
are the k'ssons fir other firms?
Aow Gum rs was fout&din
Mn HMth WalerGp.
Harnrs n ,njunin Th.,mpnrn. and
IP
n the eve of its 50th anniversary in April, [he Architects Collaborative
(ITAC) was far from celebrating-the Cambridge, Massachusetts, firm
was on the verge of bankruptcy. Boston's BayBank foreclosed on TAC
on April 7. giving the firm's 55 employees one day to remove their belongings
from 46 Bratile Street-the building TAC designed for its offices in 1964.
The nation's architectural establishment was shocked as word spread that
TAC had closed its doors. After all, TAC was one of the most prestigious firms in
the U.S., founded in 1945 by Modern master Walter Gropius. In 1964, TAC
won the AIA Firm Award; in 1973, it designed the national AIA headquarters in
Washington. By 1980, TAC was among the nation's largest practices, employing
380 people and spawning some of Boston's best firms. Why did it fail?
The simple answer is: Too much foreign work and too much debt. In recent
years, more than half of TAC's work was overseas; the firm focused heavily on
projects in Iraq and Kuwait, where direct losses from the Persian Gulf War of
1990-1991 ran to about $2 million. At the same time, TAt's U.S. developer
clients collapsed, incurring losses of nearly $500,000. (TAC's total billings for
this period were in excess of $20 million.) With offices in San Francisco and
Rome, the firm had built up tremendous overhead, yet was reluctant to let staff
go. Moreover, TAC lost fees for work already performed and thus owed engi-
neers, consultants, and vendors thousands of dollars it couldn't remit. "We
weren't generating enough work in the last two years to feed this very large
machine," admits 78-year-old TAC principal and cofounder Norman Fletcher.
Once upon a time, TAC's thoroughly Modern outlook set the pace for the
postwar era. But the Cambridge firm never made the transition to Postmodern
realities-namely, the profession's increasing fragmentation, rampant liability,
and breakneck competitiveness. "TAC went out of business because they held
4I till) It- R 111, D EMI R 1- 117
Fig. 2.62 Bradford McKee, "TAC's
Demise," Architecture, December
1995.
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Fig. 3.1 "Career Connections of Ma-
jor American Architects." Roxanne
Williamson, American Architects and
the Mechanics of Fame ( 19 83).
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Chart 8. Groplus and Mies and their descendants.
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Fig. 3.3 "Gropius and Mies and
their descendants." Roxanne Wil-
liamson, American Architects and the
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Fig. 3.4 Walter Gropius and Sarah P.
Harkness, ed., The Architects Collab-
orative 1945-1965 (Teufen: Verlag
Arthur Niggli, 1966).
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Fig. 3.5 TAC offices, 46 Brattle
Street, 1967. Photograph: Ezra
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Chance zu geben, wird sich durch grtisere
Leistungstfhigkoit und breiteren Einfluss auf
die Offentliche Meinung belohnt t"hen. Ein
Entwerferteam. des die perso8nliche Freiheit
wirklich achtet, wird zurn Ansporn fr des
Individuum, man bleibi oeastisch und beweg-
lich, Personlichkift und Leistung entwickeln
sich im Kreuzfeuer der Diskussion. Gruppen.
die sich zu diester Arbeitsweiso erzogen haben,
khnnten zues Ferment einer Entwicklung zu
kultureller Einhelt werden.
Collaboration
by Sarah P. Harkness
There are two ways to go - towards competition
or towards collaboration. A contest can be
stimulating, but as a way of tile competition is
wasteful. Time and energy are dissipated in
overlapping efforts. The efficiency of
collaboration lies in interaction directed
towards the solution of a problem.
A world that believes only In survival through
competition must always be at war. And if the
winner is preoccupied with winning, he may find
himself on amountain he never would have
chosec to climb. In architecture, rivalry may
lead to irrational design; it may put aside a
direct solution in favor of a more sensationalOne.
To fight for conviction ie another matter, and
this fits in with collaboration. The essence of
collaboration is the strength of the individual.
When collaboration is operating as it should. a
good Idea will be carried by conviction,
recognized by others without loses of their own
prestige.
The spirit of exploration and invention, led by
philosophy, can be present In an office. Ideas
are welcomed from wherever they come.
Architectural music is orchestral rather than
solo. Every member is involved.
Zusemnanarbeit
Sarah P. Harkness
Man kann zwischen zwei Wegen wehlen - dem
des Wettbowerbs und dem der Zusammen-
arbeit. Ein Weatkampf kann anregend sein: alo
Lebensauffassung abet ist der Wettbewerb
eine Zeit- und Kraftvrschwendung, da Zeit und
Kraft vergeudet warden for Anstrengungen, die
sich Oberschneiden. Die Leistungsahigkeit in
der Zusammonarboit hingegan beuht sauf siner
gegenseitigen Beeinflussung, die einzig und
allein die Losung aines Problems zues Ziele hat.
Eine Welt, die nur noch Uebarlegenheit durch
Wettbewerb gotten laset, moslte in eines
stendigen Kriegszustand lben. Und der
Sieger, der voes Gewinnen voll In Anspruch
ganommen ist, worde sich schliesslich wieder
finden auf einem oinsamen Gipfel, don or gar
nit erklimmen wollis. In der Architektur kann
Rivalitat zu irrationelen Entwlrfen flhren, weil
man zu lelcht die direkto LOsung augunston
aoesoerensationelleren beiseito schiebt.
Kampfen fOr sine Ueberzeugung ist sine
andere Sachs und last sich absolut mit gute
Zusammenarbeit vereinbaren. Des Wasen der
Zusammenerbeit beruht auf der Kraft des
Individuums. Wenn Zusammenarbeit richtig
funktioniert, dann ist aine gute Idea Yon Utber-
zougung getragen und kann von den anaern
ohne Prestigeverlust anorkannt werden.
Dar Geist der Forschung und Erfindung,
goleitet von philouophischen Ueberlegungen -
des kann sine durchaus lebendige Realitit in
inem Bauatalier soin; gute Ideen werden
immer begrast, von we sis auch kommen
megan. Architekturmusik wird sher von sines
Ensemble alt von Solisten gespielt; jedes
Mitglied ist daran beteiligt.
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Seareh for a Ceeoseen Language
by John C. Harkness
The foremost objective of TAC Is to find
common denominators which will allow
individual expression to produce a unified
whole. This search is at the basis of the TAC
organization. The interrelation of the principals
in the firm should not weaken or reduce their
individuality, but should make the work handled
by each, singly or in groups, part of a common
language. At a time when architectural thought
and espression appear to be flying in all
directions at once. this effort seems particularly
important.
It is obvious that such an approach is more
difficult than establishing a rigid formula and
requiring that everyone follow it. It is also more
difficult than establishing no direction and
permitting each individual to go his own way
without regard for the whole. But if the physical
expression of our society is to regain some
sense of order and freedom within certain
common denominators, it must begin some-
where. If groups such at TAC can demonstrate
the possibilities, they will have achieved a
worthwhile objective.
Die Sech nach der geesetsamen Sprache
John C. Harkness
Eines der wichtigsten Ziele von TAC besteht
darin, einon gemeinsamen Nenner zu finden,
auf dessen Grundlage individuellor Ausdruck
zu aines ainheitlichen Ganzen gestaltet
werden kann. Diese Suche nach dem gemein-
samen Nerner ist des fundamental Anliegen
von TAC. Die gsgenseltigen Baziehungan
unter den Partnern sollen nicht die Individualitat
des Einzoelnen schwachen, aie sollen vielmehr
die Arbeiten, ob sie durch Einzlne oder durch
esine Gruppe entwickelt werden, alt vrschle-
dene Asusserungen oiner gemeinsemen
Sprache eracheinen leasson. Solche Beim-
hungen sind besonders wichtig in inoer Zeit, in
der Idea und Ausdruck in der Architoktur nach
verschledenen Rlchtungen auseinandergehen.
Einen Obereinstimmenden Ausdruck diaser Art
zu errtichen iet bestimmt schwierigesr, ale sine
strange Formel zu statuieren und zu fordern,
dass jeder aie befolge. Schwiariger auch, als
gar keine Richtung festzulogen und jeden seine
Woge gehen zua sen, ohne RGcksicht auf ds
Ganze. Wenn aber unssre physische Erechel-
nungswelt winder in Gsflhl der Ordnang und
der Freiheit innerhalb der Grenzen einer
gewiosen Ueboereinkunft vermitteln soll, dann
muss is irgendwo begonen warden. Und wenn
Teams wie TAC sine solche Mfiglichkeit
demonstnleren konten, dann wAre ein wert-
volles ZIel erreicht.
The Idea of Anonysity
by Louis A. McMillen
When we called our firm -The Architects
Collaborative" instead of Fletcher, Fletcher,
Gropius, Harkness, Harkness, McMillan,
McMillen and Thompson, we were conforming
to our ideal of anonymity. This attitude helped
to bind the office together.
We fell that if the group was to have real
strength, it must work as a unit and not as
separate individuals. It was essential that the
partners have a congenial outlook on life, have
similar aims and ambitions. and artistic integrity
with which to assist each other in the attainment
of their joint goal. The partners were dedicated
to the firm and its collaborative ideals and did
not simply join the office for the sake of hanging
on for the next fow years until the seal thing
come along, but know that they had found their
medium for architectural expression and that
this was, in fact, 'it".
We realized that we had to recognize the
virtues and tolerate the weaknesses In each
other and acknowledge our own shortcomings.
With the group firmly established on this base,
we were able to achieve the most important
apect of collaboration - effective inter-group
criticism - which has played an essential part in
the successful development of the firm.
By being inexorably linked within the larger
destiny of the firm, established on the concept
of anonymity and internal cooparation, selfish
consideration and desire for personal advance-
ment has been minimized, each member
working for the whole and incorporating in his
individual work the best ideas from all sources.
Moreover, because each member is accepted
by the group his security Is not jeopardized, and
he can than devote his entire energy to the
production of good work rather than use it in
pointless competition with other members
within the group. In fact, because of the nature
and spirit of the organization meetings are held
frequently, each member taking part in the
development of each project. The impact of
every individual on a project throughout its
progress is Important, but it is difficult to
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Fig. 3.6 Sarah P. Harkness, "Collab-
oration" John C. Harkness, "Search
for a Common Language," and Louis
A. McMillen, "The Idea of Anonym-
ity," in The Architects Collaborative
1945-1965.
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Remarks on Anonymous Architecture
by BENJAMIN TIIOMPSON
(from a speech given at the Progressive Architecture Awards dinner, 1965)
We were given this award fir design of a regiotal public high school in a semi-rural
sector of Vermont. The building was to be built on an extremely low budget. We
worked with an inexperienced ten-men, one girl school board of vastly ranging in-
terests, from farmers to physicians. The six rivaling school districts had never
done anything collectively. not even sit down to decide the common boundaries be-
tveen them. They had a very non-urban, non-suburban attitude towards education
because about 50% of the students could not even conceive of schooling after high
school. We were given a wonderful site (you have to work hard to find an "unwon-
derful" site in Vermont). The energetic and hard-listening board wanted to look
ahead in education, but still had that deep-down traditional Vermont distrust for
"ARCH-ITEKW' because they "don't know nothing about CMIIMLEYS "
Before we started to design, we were presented with a thick book of educational
speciflcations 200 pages long, about the size of the Boston phone book, so detailed
and so demanding in content that the only possible building that might have accom-
plished the wished-for relationships (everything connected to everything else) might
have been a giant geodesic dome.
I have greater than normal interest in remarks by the Progressive 
Architecture
jurors describing their search for "simplicity and directness." The jury 
noted,
"Architects seem to think complications will make their designs 
more beautiful "
I was happy that the jury would take such a definitive stand against the present-day
fashion of architectural monumentality. expressionistic spinning, structural 
leaps.
and sculpturesque gyrations.
When Paul Kirk told the jury, "To hell with architecture--let's start just 
building
buildings." he made a statement that's been made before, but that 
desperately needs
repetition today. Wasn't he suggesting a return to something close 
to anonymous
architecture, closer than we've seen in the last few years? Caution--it 
looks sim-
ple, but it isn't. Can we create in our own way the 
harmony of the lovely New Eng-
land Greens of our forefathers?
No really anonymous architecture exists today. unless it's the 
hamburg stands and
filling stations along our highways. We don't dare to be anonymous 
because we think
of anonymity as coformity, and thus follows loss of identity. But isn't a 
higher
level of arohitecture possible. achieving the repose, tranquility, civility, 
that are
the marks of a true community architecture? Certainly 
it could coma Only after
egotism and upstege-itis have been overcome. leaving the confident 
self-assurance
to design for other humans than ourselves
Fig. 3.7 Benjamin Thompson, "Re-
marks on Anonymous Architecture,"
Connection, June 1965.
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Fig. 3.8 Walter Gropius, Apollo in
the Democracy: The Cultural Obli-
gation ofthe Architect (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1968).
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Fig. 3.9 The Architects Collabora-
tive, partners meeting circa 1950.
From right to left: Louis A. McMil-
len, Walter Gropius, Norman C.
Fletcher, Jean Bodman Fletcher, John
C. Harkness. Collection of Perry
Neubauer
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Fig. 3.10 The Architects Collaborative,
partners c. 1951. From left to right: Sarah
Pillsbury Harkness, Jean Bodman Fletcher,
Robert McMillan, Norman C. Fletcher,
Walter Gropius, John C. Harkness, Benja-
min Thompson, Louis A. McMillen.
Photograph: Walter R. Fleischer
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Fig. 3.11 The Architects Collab-
orative, partners c. 1951. Bottom
row from left to right: Jean Bodman
Fletcher, Walter Gropius, Sarah Pills-
bury Harkness. Top row from left to
right: Benjamin Thompson, Norman
C. Fletcher, Robert McMillan, Louis
A. McMillen, John C. Harkness.
Photograph: Walter R. Fleischer
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Fig. 3.12 "Gropius et son Ec6le,"
special issue of lArchitecture d'
Aujourd'hui edited by Paul Rudolph,
February 1950.
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Fig. 3.13 Sigfried Giedion, Walter
Gropius: Work and Teamwork (Lon-
don: Architectural Press Ltd., 1954).
Cover design by Herbert Bayer.
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Fig. 3.14 Meredith L. Clausen, The
Pan Am Building and the Shattering
of the Modernist Dream (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2005).
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TAC Projects in which
Gropius Had a Major Part
Co-Princpais or Oth"
senor staff who wwrks* with
yefp lb GApW on each j* TAC job #
1946 Kapan House Haknes 4601
1946 Ryan Howe Curle 4602
1946 Poppton House Thompson 4603-5605
1946 Black Mountais Originally Gropus and 4604
Cokrge, Buar (1939), Groplus
1lack Mountain, and hetcher, consultants
North Carolina for donnitory design
Mater Mlanning
1946 Tanguy Homssuuds, Harkness and N. Fletcher 4605
Glen M9s
Pmsytvanla
1947 Competition for Harkness, MdM1ies
Eafentary Schoot,
Attlebsro, Massacthsetts
1948 Howlett Residence Thompson 4809
Bleinont, Mashusetts
1948 Hua Tug Univenity, N. Fetcher and l.M. Pei 4816
Shanghai, China
(hood)
1949 Harvard Graduate McMilen, N. Fetcher, 4903
nnter, MMillan, Thompson
CabtddWe Masachushs Assodated archlects:
Brown, lawford, and Forbes, N.Y.
1949 Junior High School, Harknens, McMilen 4901
Atteboro, Massachubefs
1950 Festival Theater, Thompson 5017
New Rocheke, New York
(prlect)
Fig. 3.15 "TAC Projects in which
Gropius Had a Major Part," index
to the fourth volume of 7he Walter
Gropius Archive: The Works of the
Architects Collaborative 1945-1969
(New York and London: Garland
Publishing, Inc., 1990-1991).
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1:CTHE HERITAGE OF WALTER GROPIUS
Fig. 3.16 "TAC: The Heritage of
Walter Gropius," PROCESS:Architec-
ture No. 19, 1980, Part I, "Works of
Walter Gropius in America."
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Fig. 3.17 Harvard Graduate Center,
in "TAC: The Heritage of Walter
Gropius," PROCESS:Architecture No.
19, 1980.
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Fig. 3.18 "TAC: The Heritage of
Walter Gropius," PROCESS:Architec-
ture No. 19 (1980), Part II, "Recent
Works of TAC."
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1940 1950 1969 1910
Fig. 3.19 Evolutionary tree of mod-
ern architecture, in Charles Jencks,
Modern Movements in Architecture,
second edition (Harmondsworth:
Penguin Books Ltd, 1983).
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Clearly with such an opportunistic approach, that con-
tradicts its intentions to suit the Zeitgeist, the outcome in
terms of building will tend to be compromised architec-
ture and it only remains to show that this was in fact the
result. There are many projects of this nature, varying
from the large-scale Rudow-Buckow Housing to the
small-scale Playboy Club, but I will mention only three
which are representative.
First, the Pan Am Building [651, which was a large
volume broken up into an octagonal shape to decrease the
apparent size, was like Le Corbusier's Algiers Scheme of
1938 except that it lacked the all important articulation of
social content within. Gropius justified this inarticulate
mass by appealing to the social pressures on New York
building which, he said, it was impossible to avoid without
6.. Walter Gropius % ith
TAC: Pan Am Building.
New York, 1959. lit -
nine storev tower with pre
cast mullions, false oilumm
and flattened ociagomal
shape.
66 (opposite). Walier
Gropius with TA(
Temple Oheb Sha ssn,
Baltimore, Maryland
1957. While somewhil
restrained, the archit tUr,
is not dissimilar to h f
the prima dsa ars.ssssi
whom Gropius attasi's" sr1
his later years.
retreating into an ivory tower escapism. In short, his
defence against the various criticisms 7 consisted in the
old argument that it is more honest and difficult to com-
promise with the real, tough world than to opt out as an
armchair critic and safely chide others for failure - a tacit
ao
acknowledgement that he had in fact both compromised
and failed.
The second building, which was again coupled with an
inadvertent self-criticism, was the Temple of Oheb
Shalom [66] which appeared with the following rebuke:
We, however, have become top heavy with personal contribu-
tions of a more-or-less glamorous nature which then fail to find
their necessary foil in a dignified, restrained background archi-
tecture of a rather impersonal, collective character ... In our
time, architects have left these 'grey' areas largely to the com-
mercial builder to fill up, or they have introduced such a
confusing variety of shapes and techniques in one and the same
building area that their different structures never attained a
common rhythm and close relationship. The modern urge for
personal glorification has warped and confused our goals.
-
ow a awl 111101.thhfk 4-m.775h*,
in his later years, Gropius often attacked the 'egocen-
tric prima donna architect who forces his personal fancy
on an intimidated client',
5 
without ever specifying exactly
who he meant. If one looks around for the objects of these
frequent outbursts, they turn out to be none other than
121
Fig. 3.20 Captions listing "Walter
Gropius with TAC," in Charles
Jencks, Modern Movements in Archi-
tecture, second edition (Harmond-
sworth: Penguin Books Ltd, 1983).
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Fig. 4.1 Left: Park Avenue, 19 4 0s.
Right: Park Avenue, 1963. Photo-
graph: Joseph W. Molitor. Avery
Architectural & Fine Arts Library,
Columbia University.
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Fig. 4.2 Special issue of Real Estate
Forum on the Pan Am Building,
September 30, 1962. Avery Architec-
tural & Fine Arts Library, Columbia
University.
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It has a logic of its own in which business
at lunch, the poor spelling of secretaries,
and the efficiency of a brisk stroll account
for 116 new buildings on a congested island
New York's office boom
In hiago Philaddphia, Houstan,
Cleveland or Atieffl, a new cataso
tower is news. But I Nea York,
with 64 postwar offm biaildiags al-
mady up, DD under construction and
the whita X's of impending doom on
the windows of ons middls-aged
landmark sftr another, so ordi-
.ar 80-1bary tomor makes about as
much stIr as any routine birth an-
ntrtment
What is hoppning In N. York
is has ." expansion than an xplo-
mion of offie space. lhe 40 million
sq. ft. added or abot to be added
i asknig Pa At-. W-0c -o pt.-ga
-L-t L- Xith at i. 9csilr
.fft 1 ee at 6 .. . 1
repOsenta mor. than a 40% in-
cresm of the c 'a ofie space at
the wsr's and. The incresse alone
represents more otaen space than the
total It any other US city. Or. put
another way, it equals all the new
ofile building in all the rest of the
country put together and then half
at much again. And every rentable
.pare toot of it in air conditioned.
for this it expesttive spas rentstg
mostly for $5 to $6.60 per sq. ft.(with a little at low as $4. cotnsider-
able at $7 and a little at U or mom).
It is in,cding to think of this
fantastic absorption of expensivc
spare as a "Ne. Yrk" boor. fo"
slllmo4h the boas it grographicis5y
localiesd in Manhatta. this is really
the 'US" atlas building boom. or
most of it It can be understood only
in those ters. In sae caso the
nsational-or imtsrnattonal-oce
of demad forer space is instantly
obvhiai: thm rgipesstaatav ex-
ampies within a fea biom an Park
A.. woe the Arabian-Aterican Oil
C. building. whose chief tant
.m.vd in from the Wet Coat;
Inver Houia, -hmoccueepant moviad
hiadquarers In frot N. Englacd:
the Colt. - PaOlive building,
w-hose nasabske ferried actust the
ritvr from Jersey City. at vn
ahan the nw p* it =aapsd op
by Old inhabitants of the city-at it
i. in m-a cas-ah demand di-
rsstly releut 5ai0onal fro-th in
mahin. toolt instaled. aakinp
sold. on win tapped. nonay- hlt,
pillt -allowed.
not if ths aim af th afi- hm
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Fig. 4.3 Jane Jacobs, "New York's
office boom," Architectural Forum,
March 1957.
Maps show distribution of new and
planned buildings which cluster In already
intensively used midtown and financial
areas. Based on data from New York Real
Estate Board and James Felt & Co.
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we are in the midst of a building boom
which is crowding our cities with tedious uniformities . . .
r~7~ 7
4!
/
7
Corporative client and "corporative" architect
Fig. 4.4 "...we are in the midst of a
building boom which is crowding
our cities with tedious uniformi-
ties..." and "Corporative client and
'corporative architect," illustrations
in Joseph Hudnut, "Architecture and
the Individual," Architectural Record,
October 1958.
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wat they eaasoned that the troops
could well move to the saburba. A
real estate broker with everal such
alient, relat.e the typiel toueame.
"Whei ithy Set offla. ttheaay and
down to caes. they find they need
the comptroller arovd and he can't
get along without his head account.
ants and supar erors, and ther bead
the aaaatala doing a.e ta-ta-d
wea ana ta. people need tha.
So It goes wat departmet after
department. Wut you have left
over is a few odd operation. that
wouldn't he missed. Lnkagis op-
@rat acraea company Unes and In
the coepany all the ay through
h-duarte-
A low With rate is nat nrmall
considr'd e-y baa to aetructin.
but in the case of this offne boom,
the da.ada of depression births has
been a poweirful spur to iew build-
ing. expensive bailding and. aboe
al. to eoaeastrated baidIng. New
blood-arreatly aged 17 to 10-a
in acut short supply, a staa that
became uncomfortably noticeable to
,,rsonnel deaatata in 1M aad
Ia apactd to contiaae antil 1960.
and of new worters avallahto,
mighty few can pell, which mak
:.e W%&i
the actual shortap .ven more aa...
than the apparet shorage. The
r cruiting rivalries aaoag compa.-
nice on June campusea now. ha,
their coua terpa all year in the
employment agencies and personnel
dapaartmente of Manhattan. Air con.
diloning. 'glamor." adjiaent hopm
and Iota of tha, ad location In tht
.thaag .. irae of thinga bave
ploymaat agen.es domant ae.
anor CA" of succ.efully rIcana g
c mpaewia-th new ollso in tem-
tral locations, a"d simultaxwous in.
ability to malm a dtat in the vacaanty
backlog of catrpartaopanies in
aod space a. a-a-ay -pc.
This has actually been the dedsive
factor in many dachIIons on when to
,oos ad, abel. alon ,be. ailn
to t-v- it ha. b-en the clincher
agtinat the s&art.is aed ... ina th
edges of the Winad "We might a"
well .bat down this departmenit if
we move out of midtown." says a
personnel tead, and he mans It.
"Whim wi pet iathe fit anapaay in
an industry. we son get the rat."
reports a glaifa real "taw van.
.rTab the metals.,PO.,. If one o
thee move. into the right .pot it
"etaaerybody who.anspil molyb-
denum; the rest have to follow
Fig. 4.5 Emery Roth & Sons
buildings in Jane Jacobs, "New York's
office boom," Architectural Forum,
March 1957.
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COMPANIES
Architect for business
in a city of towers
Emery Roth & Sons has been setting the pace in Manhattan's
postwar building boom by designing structures
tailored to the dollars-and-cents outlook of modern builders
Fig. 4.6 "Architect for business in a
city of towers," Business Week,
September 1, 1962.
Eight Roth buildings crowd Park Avenue photo, including Pan Am (left). Excep-
tions are Lever House (fourth from right) and Union Carbide (right of Pan Am).
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Fig. 4.7 Armen P. Armagnac, "The
Most Complicated Building Ever
Built," Popular Science, September
1960. Illustration by Ray Pioch.
Fig. 4.8 "Sky-High Deal for a Sky-
scraper," Fortune, December 1960.
Illustration by Max Gschwind.
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EXISTING PHYSICAL FORM: MIDTOWN MANHATTAN
Fig. 4.9 "Existing Physical Form:
Midtown Manhattan," Regional Plan
Association, Urban Design Manhat-
tan (April 1969).
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Fig. 4.10 Robert Schwartz, tempera
rendering of Emery Roth & Sons,
Grand Central City, first scheme,
1954.
472
Fig. 4.111. M. Pei for William
Zeckendorf (Webb & Knapp), mod-
el of proposal for tower on site of
Grand Central Terminal, 1954-55.
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Fig. 4.12 Robert Schwartz, tempera
rendering of Emery Roth & Sons,
Grand Central City, revised scheme,
1955.
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Noted Architects to Plan Center
Walter Groplus PIntro Uenusohl
-Two noted architectf, who
have had widespread influence
on contemporary architecture
here and abroad, will collabo-
rate with a local firm in the=
design of a fifty-story sky-
scraper to be built at the rear
of Grand Central Terminal.
Walter Gropius and Pietro
Belluschi will serve with Rich-
ard Roth of Emery Roth &
Sons as architects of the new
building, which will replace
the six - story Grand Central
Terminal Office Building. The
structure, which will have3,000,000 square feet of space,
Is planned by a group headed
by Erwin S. Wolfson.
Dr. Gropius was head of the
Department of Architecture in
the Graduate School of Design
at Harvard University from
19a8 to 1952. He is now senior
partner of Architects Collabo-
rative of Cambridge, Mass.
Dr. Belluschi is dean of the
School of Architecture at the
Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
4 J-
Fig. 4.13 "Noted Architects to Plan
Center," The New York Times, August
24, 1958.
Fig. 4.14 Carl Mayden, photograph
of Walter Gropius and Pietro Bellus-
chi, August 1958. (Time/LIFE)
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The Skyscraper-
IContinued from Page 16)
tical and physiological "proof"
that they no longer need it.
Man can no longer relate to
theme giants with dignity, as
he has been able to with the
smaller-scaled architecture of
the past. Perhaps the most
appalling characteristic of the
skyscraper is its inhumanity.
I N ANSWER to the charges
of overcrowding and dehuman-
isation, investors, builders and
architects reply that the sky-
scraper is an economic inevi-
tability, and that their job is
only to build buildings, not to
run the city or its people.
They are not guilty, they say,
if these structures place
overwhelming pressures upon
urban patterns of transporta-
tion. The commercial builder
concentrates on filling the
available space for the great-
est possible financial return.
His architects have become
technical specialists in real
estate by the square foot, for-
getting what they ever knew
about design and urban plan-
ning. All are quick to stress
the economic' facts of New
York life: on expensive Man-
hattan land anything but
a big building is a losing
proposition-
It is a fact that the big
building is a necessary and
desirable instrument of big
business. The more concen-
trated the quarters of a cor-
poration, the more efficient its
operation will be.
Moreover, the massing of
these buildings makes it pos-
sible for related industries and
services to group together;-for
easy and profitable communi-
cation. to provide the kind of
valuable personal and corpo-
rate interchange that is called
"confrontation" in the jargon
of the business world. Some
of the companies that moved
WEDDING CAKE-The prolle of
a typical New Yor bi building.
out of New York after the
war, following the popular
theory of decentralization,
which promises Ideal corporate
existence in idyllic country
surroundings, have since
moved be*es, in spite of big-
city pressures and problems.
As for the 'charge of ugli-
hess. the developers and their
architects reply that the city's
present zoning requirements
make it difficult to build a
profitable building that is also
good-looking. These regula-
tions state that any building
'that fills its lot may rise
straight only to a certain
height, then it must be set
* back before it can rise again
-to guarantee light and air
to its neighbors. In effect, the
law specifies a shape-an
empty "wedding cake" mold-
into which the builder may
push his structure until the
mold is filled. By filling the
mold completely, he makes the
greatest profit.
Unfortunately, the "wedding
cake!' mold is extremely home-
ly, but the law that dictates it
is the real architect of the
city's buildings. A straight
tower or a soaring ahaft, like
the Seagram Building, slices
off the profitable sides of the
cake, leaving only the center
piece. Neo dlesa to say, this
kind of esthetic altruism does
not appeal to the speculative
builder.
'THESE conditions are clear-
ly demonstrated in Lever
House and Its neighbor. 400
Park Avenue. Lever gave up
many square feet of floor space
that would have fitted into the
legal cake mold in favor of a
smaller building with a sim-
ple, handsome slfipe: a slim
vertical tower set on a low,
horizontal base, open at the
ground floor for a landscaped
plaza.-
The building at 400 Park
bears a superficial resem-
blance to Lever House in the
green glass panels of Its walls,
but the simiarity ends right
there. A standard product of
SLCED CAKE-A tower above an
open plaza cut off rentable space.
the present law, it hiccups its
way upward, tight against ad-jacent buildings, squat and
pquare below, zigzagging un-
easily above. . Its undistin-
guished commercial profile is
a striking contrast to Lev-
er's slender architectural dis-
tinction.
At present, better design
can be achieved only through
this kind of financial sacrifice.
Lever House, the Seagram
Building, the Pepsi-Cola Build-
ing and the new Union Car-
bide headquarters 
- all pres-
tige structures on Park Ave-
nie-are exceptional exam-
pies In which rentable space
has been given up voluntarily
by building less than the law
allows. More( distinguished
architectural forms, sun-filled
plazas and spacious settings
are some of the desirable ef-
fects achieved by this deliber-
ate floutink of urban econom-
ics. However, the ordinary
builder or investor has no de-
sire to sacrifice rentablespace.
THE face of these prob-
lems, is there any solution,
any hope for New York ? It
is self-evident that no city
can build so much, so fast,
with such splendid selfish in-
dividualism, without distress-
ing results. It is also obvious
that something must be done
if New Yorkers are to exist in
any comfort or serenity with
the new massive construction.
The ideal solution-the total-
ly Planned city-is an obvious
impossibility for a metropolis
that is already vastly over-
built. Visions of sensibly lo-
cated industrial, commercial
and residential areas with ade-
quately calculated services,
balanced . neighborhoods and
city-wide projects of coordi-
nated architectural excellence
must remain the dream of the
planner who starts from
scratch, presumably in a wil-
derness.
Fortunately, there are some
(Continued on oilouing Page)
Fig. 4.15 "Wedding cake" and
"sliced cake" tower profiles, in Ada
Louise Huxtable, "Towering Ques-
tion: 'he Skyscraper," The New York
Times, June 12, 1960.
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Fig. 4.16 Ludwig Mies van der Rohe
and Philip Johnson Seagram Build-
ing, New York City (1952-1958).
Photograph: Ezra Stoller.
Fig. 4.17 Skidmore, Owings &
Merrill Lever House, New York City
(1948-1952). Photograph: Ezra
Stoller.
Fig. 4.18 Lever House, section dia-
gram showing maximum permissible
building envelope on Park Avenue
site.
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Fig. 4.19 Richard Roth, "High-Rise
Down to Earth," Progressive Architec-
ture, June 1957.
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Fig. 4.20 The Architects Collabora-
tive (TAC), model of revised scheme
for Grand Central City, c. 1955.
Reprinted in The Architects Collabo-
rative 1945-1965.
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Fig. 4.21 TAC, elevation sketches of
relationship between Grand Central
City tower and base, after meeting
with Gropius and Belluschi, August
1959. Walter Gropius Archive,
5819.5-5819.7.
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Fig. 4.22 TAC, perspective of Grand
Central City scheme with plaza on
site of New York Central Building,
c. 1958-59. Walter Gropius Archive,
5819.1.
Fig. 4.23 TAC, sketch of Grand
Central City scheme with plaza on
site of New York Central Building,
c. 1958-59. Reprinted in Mildred
F. Schmertz, "The Problem of Pan
Am," Architectural Record, May
1963.
Above: how Pan Am would look if the New York General
tower were removed and its site became a park. Although
Gropius knows that this eventuality is unlikely, he also con-
siders it the optimum solution. View from the north (top
right) shows the New York General tower and from the
south (bottom) the Grand Central Terminal. Pan Am closes
the Park Avenue vista from the north and south. On the
opposite page (top) is the view from the east on 44th. From
the west on 44th (bottom) Pan Am is positioned on the axis
of the street
481
Fig. 4.24 Robert Schwartz, tempera
rendering of Emery Roth & Sons
with TAC and Pietro Belluschi,
Grand Central City, 1958.
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Fig. 4.25 Heliport and Pam Am
signage, Pan American Airways
Building, n.d. Photograph:
Corbis-Bettmann.
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Fig. 4.26 Pan American Airways
Building, large-scale cutaway model
by Norman S. Briskman, 1959-60.
Photograph from "Sky-High Deal for a
Skyscraper," Fortune, December 1960.
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Fig. 4.27 Andreas Feininger,
photographs of Erwin S. Wolfson,
Walter Gropius, and Richard Roth,
February1959. (Time/LIFE)
485
FFig. 4.28 Pan American Airways
Building, north elevation. Drawing
by TAC office (?). Walter Gropius
Archive, 5819.9.
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Fig. 4.29 Le Corbusier, model of
proposed office tower, Algiers, c.
1936-1938.
Fig. 4.30 Le Corbusier, model of
town plan and civic center, St. Die,
c. 1945.
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Fig. 4.31 Boston Center Architects
(TAC, Pietro Belluschi, Walter F.
Bogner, Carl Koch & Associates, and
Hugh Stubbins Jr.) for Stevens De-
velopment Company, photomontage
of Back Bay Center, 1953.
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Fig. 4.32 TAC, model of proposed
headquarters for the American Acad-
emy of Arts and Sciences, Washing-
ton, D.C., 1952. Walter Gropius
Archive, 5212.3-9.
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Fig. 4.33 TAC for First Realty
Company of Boston, perspective of
proposed Government Center, Bos-
ton, 1958. Walter Gropius Archive,
6104.2.
490
Fig. 4.34 Gio Ponti with Pier Luigi
Nervi and Arturo Danusso, Torre
Pirelli, Milan, 1950-58. Photograph:
Gabriele Basilico.
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Fig. 4.35 Comparison of typical
floor plans for Torre Pirelli (left), Pan
American Airways Building (mid-
dle), and tower for Algiers (right).
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The Pan Am Building in
its Urbanistic Context
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Fig. 4.36 Walter Gropius, "The Pan
Am Building in its Urbanistic Con-
text," Real Estate Forum, September
30, 1962.
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Fig. 4.37 Walter Gropius and Adolf
Meyer, Chicago Tribune Tower com-
petition entry, perspective, 1922.
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Fig.0 4.38 Photograph ofPaAmr
icanPIM Aiwy Buldng 1.193 (J
Alexo Lagly photogapher?,fro
Theolis Arhtet Colbrtv 1945-1
1965.ls 1110111
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Fig. 5.1 "Muslim Member Nations
of the Baghdad Pact," Inter-Services
Public Relations (ISPR) Directorate,
Pakistan Armed Forces, c. 1955.
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Fig. 5.2 The Architects Collaborative
(TAC), University of Baghdad, site
plan, January 20, 1960.
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Fig. 5.3 Frank Lloyd Wright, Plan
for Greater Baghdad (1957), aerial
perspective from north, June 20,
1957. The Frank Lloyd Wright
Foundation Archives, The Museum
of Modern Art |Avery Architectur-
al & Fine Arts Library, Columbia
University (FLWFA)
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Fig. 5.4 Plan for Greater Bagh-
dad, Preliminary sketch plan over
conjoined 1951 Hunting Aerosurvey
aerial photographs. FLWFA
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Fig. 5.5 Cover, Iraq Development
Board (IDB), Second Development
Week brochure, October 1957 and
map of irrigation projects, IDB, First
Development Week brochure, 1956.
Harvard University
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Fig. 5.6 Frank Lloyd Wright,
Plan for Greater Baghdad, site
plan, June 20, 1957. FLWFA
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Fig. 5.8 Ellen Jawdat, Walter
Gropius, and Nizar Ali Jawdat, U.S.
Embassy, Baghdad, August 1954.
Bauhaus Archiv
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Fig. 5.9 Ellen Jawdat and Nizar
Ali Jawdat, Women's Head-
quarters of the Red Crescent,
Baghdad, Iraq (1948-50) and
Jawdat House, Baghdad, Iraq
(1948/1955). Photographs from
Raglan Squire, "Architecture in
the Middle East," Architectural
Design, March 1957.
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Fig. 5.10 National Bank of Iraq (at
left), William Dunkel, Baghdad,
Iraq (1954-56), adjacent to Rafidain
Bank, Philip Hirst (c. 1956) and new
construction. Photograph: Latif al-
Ani, n.d. Arab Image Foundation
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Fig. 5.11 Walter Gropius, lecture
and exhibition on modern architec-
ture, U.S. Embassy, Baghdad, August
1954. Bauhaus Archiv
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Data Conoerning Dr. Walter Gropius
(Dates are approximate)
192T-1933
193.3-1936
19 6-1952
1938-i47T
& Founder and Director of Bauhaus Bohool of DeOhUS I
Dessau, Weimar Republio
Developed rovolutionay aproaoh not only to arohit
tUawl design, but to industrial do**=u building t
niques, eto, which influenaedtk the entire trend QI
architectural thought of the firqt halt of the
century. Grepius recognised as one of the Founder o
the International Sohool of Arohitecture.
: Private YractIee in England in Partnersklip with
Maxwell Fry
i Chairman of Dep artment of Architecture, Harvard
Graduate sohool of Design, Cambridge, Mass, U.S.A.(Now recognised se finest arohidotural sobsol in Stat
Became U.S. Oltisen
i Private Pree tSe in partnership with Marcel Breuer
1948-present: Practioe in partnership with Lrohiteots Collaborative
(group of siX young arohiteots under 35 yr..)
Design Chariman of Coutaizqr Ourporat4on of Amnrica
Developed and Manufaoturod Frefabriqatod Strio4tural System
Town and Regional Planningobe.es with Marcel Wagner
U.S. Government Advisor on Housintg during war. (Willow Run)
Past President (1). and at preseAt Vice-Fresident in charge of
Education of CIAN (Cengres International dArahitooture Rodeza
Pursonal qualificationas
Adaptability: Has worked under many different conditions, and
in many oountriqa, and is primarily interes ted in fiaiug
builduig eetbes and styles suitable to special oonAtiOXL
the society, oltmateeto, In question.
AdmizstratAve Abilitys ability to delegate authority
Extremex Xodout
postases great vision, and ,nthusiam
Personal interest iA Arab Countries and in the ways they are
utilising and doveloping their resources
Fig. 5.12 Ellen Jawdat, "Data Con-
cerning Dr. Walter Gropius," n.d.
Personal collection, Ellen Jawdat
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Fig. 5.13 TAC, The University of
Baghdad: Preliminary Drawings and
Specifications, c. January 1960. MIT
Rotch Library
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SCHEMATIC CONCEPT FOR BUILDINGS IN
A UNIVERSITY OF 12, 000 STUDENTS
(By type of activity)*k
Fig. 5.14 "Schematic Concept for
Buildings in a University of 12,000
Students" and "The Pattern of
Adminstration," in TAC, Report on
the University of Baghdad, c. January
1959. MIT Rotch Library
plan might involve an organization which has two major functions.
instruction and operations. Each of these would be administered
by a Vice-President under whom would be the Deans of the schools
and the directors of plant, maintenance, procurement, and the
like. Organizationally, this would look as follows:
Ministry of Education
Vice President Vice President
for Instruction for Operations
Director Director
tScience Deans - Professional Plant Procurem ;dSchools
Director IDirector
Business n-Professional
issistant Dean Assistant Dean Affairs Personnel
Peral Studiesi Sec:I Studies
It is our feeling that the central administration, consisting
of the president, the vice president in charge of instruction and the
vice president in charge of operations, with appropriate assistants
510
SstructioalBuildingsL6, 000 
.. . I
dministraionL LibrDarmes 12,0003,,000
and AvancedL
Research, 3,000
Medical Agricultural Demonstration
Hospital School Elementary and
Farm* Secondary Schools
It will be observed that in this approach there is not a Law
School as such with its separate buildings, lecture halls ... nor is
there a Medical School with rooms for didactic instruction, clinical
or laboratory work or research in the biological sciences. The
*Numbers of students are used merely to illustrate a possible
distribution in each type of activity. Later sections detail this aspect
for Baghdad University.
Fig. 5.15 University of Baghdad,
first scheme, roof plan. In TAC,
Report on the University of Baghdad,
c. January 1959. MIT Rotch Library
tii 933933339j Sr SASEUPB
tas mistsr t ass s egVII 
USIITY OfiiS~t'
511
I
A-
*7
A cow We
J- "Mma\ - G M WM
Ewa WA
tee eueavseSe ee~ssmemese
Fig. 5.16 Universiy of Baghdad,
first scheme, pilot plan. In TAC,
Report on the University of Baghdad,
c. January 1959. MIT Rotch Library
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Fig. 5.17 Walter Gropius and TAC
partners with Director General of
Baghdad, Cambridge, c. 1965(?).
Left to right: Richard Morton, H.
Morse Payne Jr., Walter Gropius,
Louis A. McMillen. Reginald Isaacs
Papers, Smithsonian Archives of
American Art
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Fig. 5.18 "U.S. Firm Radiates from
Rome," Progressive Architecture,
October 1964.
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Fig. 5.19 University of Baghdad,
construction site, n.d. (c. 1966?)
Right to left: Hisham Munir, Walter
Gropius, Umberto Vannini, Louis A.
McMillen. Walter Gropius Archive
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HISHAM MUNIR & ASSOC. BAGNDAD-IRlq
Fig. 5.20 Hisham Munir and Asso-
ciates, Government Guest House,
Baghdad, (1964-67). Hisham Munir
&Assoc., office portfolio, n.d. Aga
Khan Documentation Center
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Fig. 5.21 "Abbreviated Climatic
Evaluation of Baghdad" and "Bio-
climatic Chart, Baghdad, Iraq," in
TAC, The University of Baghdad: Pre-
liminary Drawings and Specifcations,
January 1960. MIT Rotch Library
aii Aw
S---
or; jaor; 2Op; Yr.
FA
- --- 
-- 
-
I1'
-AI .W;
517
- - A
__4
MM WAN MEAN MEAN MISAWST LOW&ST MEAN R.. IN TOTAL A 9 NONTH MAX. MIN. MAX. MON. 0/o INClEas HouRs DAILY MPH PSRI.CTION
p 4 58 59.7 39.1 77 1 51 0.91 20B 6.7 6.6 MW
JANUARY 9 52.0 65.0 39.o 84 16 52 1.76 238 7.6 5.2. E
52.7 64.4 41.9 86 23 42 1.04 203 7.2 6.7 W
FEBRUARY c 56.0 64.o 43.o 92 24 49 1.69 240 8.5 2.7 E W
59.3 71.3 48 1 90 27 36 1.12 253 8.1 7.8 N NW
MARCH 61.0 75.o 47.o 95 30 42 1.31 303 9.8 6.2 E w
7'-1 85.2 575 o4 37 34 0.41 262 9.4 7.8 N NW
AFRIL % 6.0 82.0 53.0 103 35 35 1.66 34o 11.2 6.4 E w
1 62.9 56.5 67.5 112 51 19 0.14 344 11.1 8.3 N NW
MAY 76.0 91.0 60.0 114 39 28 1.12 397 13.2 6.4 E W
90.5 105.1 73.2 119 56 13 TRACE 375 12.5 10.4 N NW
A JUNE 85.0 101.0 69.0 116 49 27 0.48 M 12.9 6.3 E w
94.0 109.8 76.4 121 62 12 TRACE 394 12.7 11.9 NW
JULY 22 90.o 104.0 77.0 118 63 36 4.98 363 11.8 6.3 E w
15 53.9 309 76.0 120 65 13 TRAcE 382 12.3 10.5 NW
AuGusT 89.o 101.0 76.0 115 58 42 2.17 343 11.4 5.8 SE W
86.9 103.7 69.6 116 51 Is 0.04 340 11.3 8.G N NW
SEPTEMBER 82.0 97.0 69.0 113 49 42 3.06 327 10.5 5,G SE W
& 774 91.7 61.3 107 39 22 1.12 282 9.1 7.5 N NW
OCTOBER Y 71.0 86.0 56.0 105 36 42 1.45 311 10.3 5.4 5E W
63.3 76.7 50.8 94 29 39 0.73 225 7.5 5.8 NW
NOVEMBER 60.0 75.0 45.o 96 27 45 2.40 262 8.4 5.1 E W
51.8 63.8 41.8 79 20 52 1.0+ 202 6.5 6.1 NW
DECEMBER 53.0 G-0 40.0 84 22 54 1.92 235 7.6 5.0 5 W
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Fig. 5.22 Cover and "Method of
climate interpretation in housing," in
Victor Olgyay, Design With Climate:
Bioclimatic Approach to Architectural
Regionalism, 1963.
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Fig. 5.23 Perspective view of library,
University of Baghdad. Render-
ing: Helmut Jacoby, c. 1959. Loeb
Library Special Collections, Harvard
Graduate School of Design
Fig. 5.24 Vertical facade types, in
Victor Olgyay, Design With Climate:
Bioclimatic Approach to Architectural
Regionalism, 1963.
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Fig. 5.25 "Hot-arid zone housing
layout," in Victor Olgyay, Destgn
With Climate: Bioclimatic Approach
to Architectural Regionalism, 1963.
Fig. 5.26 Pilot plan, University of
Baghdad, first scheme. In TAG, Re- tsetmse rana
port on the University of Baghdad, c...,. ..
January 1959. MIT Rotch Library
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Fig. 5.27 Model photograph of cam-
pus center, University of Baghdad,
first scheme. In TAC, Report on the
University of Baghdad, c. January
1959. MIT Rotch Library
521
-77-
Fig. 5.28 Paul Rudolph, U.S.
Embassy (unbuilt), Amman, Jordan
(1954), perspective rendering.
Library of Congress
Fig. 5.29 Richard Neutra and
Robert Alexander, U.S. Embassy,
Karachi, Pakistan (1955-61). Photo-
graph: Rondal Partridge
Fig. 5.30 Raymond & Rado,
U.S. Embassy, Jakarta, Indonesia EM*
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Fig. 5.31 TAC, Tallahassee Civic
Center (unbuilt), Tallahassee, FL
(1955-56). In TAC, A Civic Center
for Tallahassee, Florida, August 1,
1956. MIT Rotch Library
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Fig. 5.32 Le Corbusier, Palace of the
Soviets, Moscow, U.S.S.R (c. 1931),
photograph of competition model.
Le Corbusier, Oeuvre Complete
Fig. 5.33 Walter Gropius, Total
Theater for Erwin Piscator, Berlin
(1927), isometric drawing. Harvard
University Art Museums
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iFig. 5.34 Perspective view of audi-
torium, University of Baghdad, in
TAC, The University of Baghdad: Pre-
liminary Drawings and Specifications,
January 1960. Rendering: Helmut
Jacoby, c. 1959. MIT Rotch Library
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Fig. 5.35 Diagrams of arena seating,
Tallahassee Civic Center, Tallahassee.
In TAC, A Civic Centerfor Tallahas-
see, Florida, August 1, 1956.
MIT Rotch Library
Fig. 5.36 Plans of auditorium, Uni-
versity of Baghdad, second scheme.
Casabella continuite, August 1960.
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Fig. 5.37 Sketches for campus
center, University of Baghdad,
n.d. Loeb Library Special
Collections, Harvard Graduate
School of Design
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Fig. 5.38 Eero Saarinen and Associ-
ates, Kresge Auditorium and Chapel,
Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy, Cambridge, MA (1950-55).
Image from The Perceptual Form of
the City, Gyorgy Kepes and Kevin
Lynch, researchers, MIT, 1954-59.
Photographer: Nishan Bichajian.
MIT Rotch Visual Collections
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Fig. 5.39 Perspective view of campus
center with mosque and auditorium,
University of Baghdad, first scheme,
in TAC, Report on the University of
Baghdad, c. January 1959. Render-
ing: George Connelly. MIT Rotch
Library
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Fig. 5.40 Frank Lloyd Wright, Plan
for Greater Baghdad, aerial perspec-
tive (detail) and Harun al-Rashid z0
monument, east elevation. FLWFA V v N D
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Fig. 5.41 Walter Gropius with
University of Baghdad administra-
tive tower in background, n.d. (c.
1966?). Walter Gropius Archive
531
Fig. 5.42 Perspective view of "Open
Mind" entry gate, University of
Baghdad, second scheme. Render-
ing: Helmut Jacoby, c. 1959. Loeb
Library Special Collections, Harvard
Graduate School of Design
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Fig. 5.43 Plans, sections, and
elevation of mosque, University of
Baghdad, second scheme, January
20, 1960. Loeb Library Special Col-
lections, Harvard Graduate School
of Design
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Fig. 5.44 Walter Gropius and
Louis A. McMillen at Al-Kadhimain
mosque, Baghdad, n.d. (c. 1966?).
Walter Gropius Archive
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Fig. 5.45 Robert S. McMillen,
mosque for University of East
Africa, Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika (c.
1968), model photograph. Robert S.
McMillan Associates, office portfolio,
n.d. Avery Architectural & Fine Arts
Library, Columbia University
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Fig. 5.46 Hisham Munir, perspective
of hospital designed for graduate
thesis, University of Southern Cali-
fornia, 1956. USC Library
Fig. 5.47 Hisham Munir, sketch
reconstruction (2015) of mosque
designed for UT Austin thesis, 1953.
Aga Khan Documenatation Center
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Fig. 5.48 Perspective view of
mosque, University of Baghdad,
second scheme. Rendering: Helmut
Jacoby, c. 1959. Loeb Library Special
Collections, Harvard Graduate
School of Design
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Fig. 5.49 University of Baghdad,
mosque as built, c. 2013. Photogra-
pher unknown. "Gropius Mosque,"
Watad Magazine, Jul 7, 2013.
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Fig. 6.1 "The Oil-Rich Mideast."
Architectural Record, July 1975.
S"Ili I ng the oien-present -Aal I between architwt and the ps rmid, of
bu'eauccv "in Mideast o'nent"'s. Saudi A'abian" o"Wn th e,'tN''' P''t'"um
and Minerals designed bn an hdnel1 Caudill. Rawleit and 5A ot,
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THE ARABIAN BUILDING
BOOM IS MAKING
CONSTRUCTION HISTORY
The projects are immense. and so are the
problems. But the builders. many of them Americans,
are devising ingenious solutions.
by Waller1MQuadr
Fig. 6.2 "A Mecca for Builders in
Arabia." Fortune, September 1976.
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Fig. 6.3 Projects by U.S. architects
in the Gulf states, 1945-1991, plot-
ted against price of crude oil (yellow)
and location of major oil pipelines
(red). OfficeUS Atas.
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Fig. 6.5 "Partners in Growth: The
Gulf." Aramco World, January-Feb-
ruary 1977.
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THE KUWAIT Fd
FOR ARAB ECONO
DEVELOPMENT
Fig. 6.6 The Kuwait Fund f or Arab
Economic Development. Kuwait Fund
for Arab Economic Development,
1964.
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Fig. 6.7 The Kuwait Fund for Arab
Economic Development, development
projects. Kuwait Fund for Arab
Economic Development, 1964.
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KUWAIT FUND FOR ARAB ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
THE ARAB WORLD
KEY InDICATORS
APRIL 1975
Fig. 6.8 The Arab World: Key Indica-
tors. Kuwait Fund for Arab Econom-
ic Development, 1975.
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Fig. 6.9 Development plan for
Kuwait and old town, Minoprio,
Spenceley & Macfarlane, 1952.
KA A
C.I.E. nUAJAJ -
A DEVELOPOANT PLA-
FDA HIS HIGHNESS -
%AIHH ABOULLA AS SALO AS SUMAH CIE ---
TH ALE O KUWAIT ----
1951
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KUWAIT
REVISITED
s0wpft lool, I uking oulwards to Kuwail Bay leploomtses the emirates trad,,onal embrace
of the am ...pear fishing, triadig).
traditional patterns of solid and void,
enclosure and openness, pattern and plain
surface in his design for the Foreign
Ministry alongside the Sief Palace. Many
local observers are puzzled by the out-
coue; the building's partial symmetry.
strong, almost schoolroom colours, flat
roofscape and somewhat secretive face to
the world have proved hard to digest, yet
the architectural audience wanted him to
succeed.
More palatable, if modish. remains
Jacobsen's National Bank a few hundred
Yards away. This tiny building will never
Vow old. Its horizontal sunscreen
louvers, bound by what seem almost
'Classical' vertical column bays, rise calm-
ly from a canted tooled granite podium. A
controlled essay in proportion, taste and
naterial, a true Arab thoroughbred.
Goings on at the palace
Three recent additions to the Kuwait Col-
kction of world-class buildings merit
closer study. As it happens two are within
APetnjcan throw of each other, lone tothe Sief Palace. which is itself the subject
of an invited architectural competition for
an estension to provide spacious new ac-
COstodation for the Emir, the Crown
Prince and their Council of Ministers.
Moving up from the Palace on Mubarak
A-Kabtr Street you pass the near-
Complete State Mosque (a: Makiya
Associates. c: United Building Co) which
will undoubtedly prove the outstanding
item in the City's 'collection', apart from
ts religious and cultural significance. It
can impress as statistics - the largest
liwque to be built this century, larger
than the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem,
able to contain 7,000 worshippers, totalbuilt area of 12,500 m and so on - but
its most salient quality in not sheer size,
alhough it staads four-square on its rising
AorO,,d,,," Kuwait. A 'casstc' buildi"Je.he Natinal iBonk of An~t. ea, the Sirt
Palace, is Vsi one of the MGMt elagmt structureS s the Gu~f - but W'eY si-e/ - a ee/lk
b/inB/ow. the 01e, Kuwait. 771e legendafry Mrs Seudder' s hous fthe w4o of the 
A meerran
b'moeoa doctr who set up rhefeS -- W -ke V~in Kuwif oehe rwod Emirw MubeurskT sinryothi oek O nod h~ef'~K
Th-rai h -u~ ll rteOl 'Pfl fmxu~.,f tew roycnr- i~i
MIDDLE EAST CONSTRUCTION 41
Fig. 6.10 Neil Parkyn, "Kuwait Re-
visited." Middle East Construction,
September 1983.
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The Architects
Collaborative
TAC aL
Middl. E"st
Architecture
Urban Design
Master Planning
Campus Planninrg
Land Use Planning
Landscape Architecture
Interior Architecture
Graphic Design
Programming
Space Planning
CADD
Feasibility Studies
Cost Analysis and Control
Construction Administration
TAC was founded in 1945 in
Cambridge, Massachusetts by
eight architects who established a
firm based on collaborative
professional practice The
founders included Walter Gropius.
the celebrated modern architect
and former director of the Bauhaus
in Germany, who was also
chairman of architecture at
Harvard. The young firm was soon
well known for its innovative work
in 1964 TAC received the
American Institute of Architects
Architectural Firm Award and in
1966 built its own headquarters
building in Harvard Square A
Middle East office was established
in Kuwait City in 1974, and an
office was opened in San
Francisco in 1984 in response to
the growth of TAC's national and
international clientele.
Fig. 6.11 TAC Middle East, office
brochures. Courtesy MIT Museum.
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Recent Work
I Hi r-Centiltal
barjah. UnitedAibEmratesFourten-story luxury hotel over-
0clukg theAbtan Gulf Facilitv
combinos33f tesftroomswsth
a wode rege 0cotctctat,
rcrceatbo.asercte fcb
ties. plus sheltered parking A
lush garden atium is the focal
point Of t1e design
2 Ku.itInestment Companv$Sok l .Mantakh
Kuwaft Cy, Kuwait
Urban compilex fn downtown
Kuwast combines offce. shop-
ping. nd kng inan eight-Ipt. 2 q goss)
structure Spacioss skyhtcourt-
yoads with fountains provide
focal points for both office and
shop areas Provision for future
monorail stahirn building
3 KawaltFunltdrArabEmonawia
Kawaikit.Kuwi
Five-storyheadquaftersbuilditg.
includinglbaftandparking To
offset severe clmatic condinton.
all office spaces face inward
toward an enclosed. at-coth-
tioned garden court. An adjacent
18-story office lower now under
construction will provide an adt
ttonal 25.000 sq to of space
4 WilrsYoftag8dadSaghaq~a
Prtog a, mastet plan. asff
deg Of no 00t, -stedenttc-
_i tZ?~ildingsrnnini
to idividual facty houses.
Work itiatd in mW's. Proitct
ongoing Faculty Tower afow
S$dctaEsiLai,**sS*ad.Wad$pdwd #dmm~OOOA~nFallifell fteane Ctp
Unissrsity afltsa
Developed with funding from
U.Sgncy for Intetmatonal
Deselapott. this catmpft co-
sists af f" academic buldings
clusteredaoundacentialcourt
inctudes 250.000-volume lhbray.
twosauditoriums. and two class
room buildings with tecture and
semnar room
* 11iaaaIon aatb1tatE COanpiySouhAVillateni"11%
Kuwait cty, Kuwait
A muhti-function building of$9.200sq, ts =ssiocateden
the caeter of KuwaCity;
oidelesitftsidential courtard
,partimnas, pakinglf for 1.00
cars. and 6.200 sq. - Inet Of
shl space cot shops. Shops aelocated at street mnd mazzans
evcels and hout On te tr%
sylit courtyards containing lowa-
tais accentham shopping area
7 Abua ODaatmisnal abary
Abu Dabi
United Arb Enmlaesm
A throkstory building with tand.
scapedcourtyardssurroundedSattadec sainteacithba fort
.0vumsreadsyatao.,
a dhedtaiba. teahtacal sat-
Vces, shdftion spaces. admin-
istfative offices. a f.OO0-seat
auciftorum. lecture andconfer-
anceha, anda meetng rooms
with complete fanslating facci-
es. Exatensraantdacaping
rlat snew buildng to theoatd
palace which shares the sie
t11111p __?:_
17 17
S N afthawabaa
Poect for the Nazonal Rousing
Authority cohsist5 of368 units o
luuty spetmtrents on an 8-hec-
fiae site. Includes 736 parking
SOacs. s ~pa, kidatarten. and
support faciltes. Ceentral pedes-trian plaa contains pergolas.
fiuntains, and landscaping
Completion 1983
IN 11 1
3 S
Fig. 6.12 TAC Middle East, office
brochure. Courtesy MIT Museum.
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Fig. 6.13 Abdulatif Youssef Al-Ha-
mad at Kuwait Fund headquarters.
National Geographic, October 1975.
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Fig. 6.14 Kuwait Fund for Arab
Economic Development, construc-
tion. Courtesy Pan Arab Consulting
Engineers.
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Fig. 6.15 Kuwait Fund for Arab
Economic Development, model.
Courtesy Pan Arab Consulting
Engineers.
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Fig. 6.16 Kuwait Fund for Arab
Economic Development, construc-
tion. Courtesy Pan Arab Consulting
Engineers.
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Fig. 6.17 Kuwait Fund, plans and
sections. Stephen Gardiner, Kuwait:
The Making ofa City (1983).
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Fig. 6.18 Kuwait Fund for Arab Eco-
nomic Development. Courtesy Pan Arab
Consulting Engineers. Photograph: Nick
Merrick @ Hedrich Blessing.
556
7" ....
*T'4: V *
Fig. 6.19 Pan-Arab Consulting
Engineers (PACE), offices. Courtesy
Pan Arab Consulting Engineers.
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Fig. 6.20 Kuwait Fund for Arab
Economic Development, building
sections. The Architects Colaborative
with Pan Arab Consulting Engineers,
1965-1972. Courtesy PACE.
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CAUDILL ROWLETT SCOTT'S
ONGOING WORK
FOR A SAUDI ARABIAN
UNIVERSITY
Fig. 6.21 "Caudill Rowlett Scott's
Ongoing Work for a Saudi Arabian
University," Architectural Record,
April 1976.
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Fig. 6.22 Joint Banking Centre, Ku-
wait. Skidmore, Owings & Merrill,
1975-82.
Fig. 6.23 Al-Ahli Bank, Kuwait.
Skidmore, Owings & Merrill,
1975-82.
Fig. 6.24 National Commercial
Bank, Jeddah. Skidmore, Owings &
Merrill, 1977-83.
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Fig. 6.25 Joint Banking Centre,
Kuwait. Skidmore, Owings & Mer-
rill, 1975-82. Courtesy Pan Arab
Consulting Engineers.
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KUWAIT PARKING GARAGE1~
Fig. 6.26 Drawing set for Souk
Al-Manakh, The Architects Collab-
orative with Pan Arab Consulting
Engineers, c. 1974. Courtesy Kuwait
Municipal Archive.
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KU WA 1T 5 K' UOMPAN2
NE mARCEECTS COLLABORAmVE Pl. SOLZA AlO jC. SHOOSHAMAN ENGEEE ASO~ TES46 .VArTLE STRET B w STRET 129 IALEN STREET
CAoaRVE, WtiASHJSET TS '02138 CAIRDGE, MASSen1JSET1S O21$S BOSTON, MASSEACHUSET TS 02115
INY
Fig. 6.27 Kuwait City, old town
center showing surface parking lots,
c. 1983. From Stephen Gardiner,
Kuwait, The Making of a City (19 83).
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STATE OF KUWArT
MNISTRY OF PSUC WOACS
Pl-af Ad"*b
am mom
. * s~uw~uannZ
Fig. 6.28 Ministry of Public Works,
State of Kuwait, map showing com-
mercial parking garages (dark grey),
c. 1980s.
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THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE O CITY OF KUWAIT SBPR MILANO
yMUL VIEW
TM UE DIUMIOrWR OF TE OW CITY oF wmwU
/* . - DU NS
Fig. 6.29 BBPR, The Future Develop-
ment of the Old City of Kuwait, 1969.
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Fig. 6.30 Souk al Manakh, model
photograph. Courtesy Pan Arab
Consulting Engineers.
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Fig. 6.31 Souk Al-Wataniyah. The
Architects Collaborative with Pan
Arab Consulting Engineers, 1973-
79. Courtesy MIT Dome.
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Fig. 6.32 Souk Al-Wataniyah. The
Architects Collaborative with Pan
Arab Consulting Engineers, 1973-
79. Courtesy MIT Dome. Photo-
graph: Wayne Soverns, Jr.
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KUWAIT PARK04Q GARAGES
PLM-LEV 2
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A2W
Fig. 6.33 Souk Al-Manakh, plan,
level 2, September 1974. Courtesy
Pan Arab Consulting Engineers.
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A street to Kuwait. 'lloeeuk"al nakh Is ametlficialslbak market haMt Is weryf tbeGovernmOnt.
Kuwait's Bustling Stock Souk
"aveetTMewymenato
KUWAIT - It's called Soulk al-Ma.
naih. but It haa very little In common
Ith th. A.A A -h -b.U. I
There In also an official Kuwait stock "It in a cancer. and It may be too
mariket, which deals in shares of do. late to heal it." he went on. "Thee
mesetoea hem peole are buyhin phonY cOepaneSouk aI44az a hbad a delirious on credit and payt 106eroet intar.
Fig. 6.34 "Kuwait's Bustling Stock
Souk." The New York Times, April
5, 1982.
Fig. 6.35 "Kuwait in Bailout Effort
After Market Collapses." The New
York Times, December 25, 1982.
(tM AIT SOUK
~ ___7_
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Oaxnma-La-e
Kuwait's unofficial market, the Souk al-Manakh, is an over-the-counter cen-
ter where the securities of 45 companies registered In Persian Gulf countries
outside Kuwait are traded. It was founded In 1977.
Kuwait in Bailout Effort
After Market Collapses
n.,IrIUCA A WnA71 The official stock market handles
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PT H E A-R C H I-T E C TS !CiO L'L A B O'R AT I V E
September 28, 1983
To All Members of TAC:
The last eight months have been troubling for all of us as we have
seen very talented people, whom we have known well, leaving TAC as
we have reduced our staff.
For that reason, I thought it was important to tell you, now, that
we have completed the staff reduction program which was presented
at the Annual Meeting last April. By the time you read this, the
last people to leave will have met with Walter Rosenfeld and dates
for the completion of their work will have been agreed. This will
bring TAC to a size of 220 people, and we expect to hold steady at
that size at least until the end of the year.
I have been impressed by the energy, effectiveness, and dedication
which so many people have brought to the task of finding new work
to replace our traditional sources of income overseas. While we
expect the overseas market to become important again in the future,
it is clear that the most important task for all of us right now
must be to acquire new projects which will provide a stable work-
load for a firm of 220 people initially, but which will also permit
us to grow as quickly as possible to a size at which we can provide
opportunities for professional growth and financial security for
all of us here.
Having completed our planned staff reductions, I propose that we
now shift our attention single-mindedly to the issues of growth
and the acquisition of new work. The Directors are working with
the Marketing Department and outside consultants to develop pro-
posals which will be discussed with the Policy Board. I would
welcome your participation in this process by giving me your
thoughts or suggestions on ways of achieving that growth.
All best regards,
THE ARCHI ECTS COLLABORATIVE, INC.
John C. H r ness, President
JCH:MGC
4 6 B R A T T L E S T R E ET . C A M B R I D G E , M A S S A C H U S E T T S 0 2 1 3 8. U. S A.
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Fig. 6.36 Letter from John C. Harkness
to All Members of TAC, September 28,
1983. MIT Museum Archives.
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PRESIDENT'S REPORT
As we all know, 1983 was a very difficult year for TAC financially.
Looking back at last year's Annual Report,, we had established three
major goals in order to balance the shtp and head us back in a
positive direction. These were:
1. To collect as much as possible of the large sums due us
from Iraq. While this is still a long way from being
completely accomplished, we did receive since the last
Annual Meeting approximately $4 million, and, as of the
moment, we are continuing to receive payments according to
schedule. To put it another way, we have received from
Iraq a great deal more than we spent there since the last
Annual Meeting.
2. To reduce the size of the office in line with our workload
but without cutting into our stockholder group. Painful
though this was, it had to be done and was accomplished
pretty much on schedule.
3. To increase our new work so as to have work for the future,
even if things do not get better in Iraq and the Middle
East. Our results in this area have been particularly
gratifying. We have signed up $12 million of new work in
1983 and, so far, $6 million in 1984. Although we substan-
tially exceeded our budget to achieve this, it was essen-
tial and we must continue to drive in that direction.
I want to express nw appreciation to each of the Directors who
played key roles in these areas: John Hayes in predicting our
financial situation with great accuracy in spite of all those
variables, and in keeping the confidence of the bank in our
ability to deal with them; Walter Rosenfeld in handling two years
ago the great increase in staff, and in 1983 an even greater
reduction, carried out this difficult task with patience and in
the most hunane way possible; and Roland Kluver for his constant
drive and enthusiasm for getting new work and stimulating us all
to help.
But more even than the Directors, I believe it has been the very
positive response of the office as a whole, particularly the
stockholders, which has made it possible for us to turn things
around. You have accepted with good grace the reduction in salary
and freeze on promotions, although I know it has brought great
stress, particularly in some cases. You have undertaken assignments
-3-
Fig. 6.37 "President's Report," TAC
Inc., TACAnnual Report, 1984. MIT
Museum Archives.
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OFFICE MEMORANDUM
TO Directors DATE _28 Nov. 83
FROM John Hayes
SUBJECT: Future Camtitments in Iraq W0V ia
There have been several recent discussions of possible new work in Iraq.
I think it is important that we look at all of these possibilities at one
time and decide upon the level of our cxmitment to new work in the
country. In total, our existing work and potential new work amounts to:
Existing_ Work Client TAC Contact
University Technical Assistance SOOB P. Morton
2000'Housing Units Site Supervision AAA P. Morton
Council of Ministers Building Design Coord. High Cmrn. J. Hayes
Potential Work
State Mosque Design Coordination AAA J. Hayes
Khulafa St. Apartment Building Energop. P. Neubauer
-NeV-T0M:-_ ? R. Kluver
Housing for Iraq Prefab. Building Co. Makers P. Morton
University Expansion - resume work SOOB P. Morton
3( ceit [eqec-(
There are four issues that limit our ability to take on new work in Iraq:
1. Our Bank At the end of the Surmer, when Bank of Boston expressed -
hesitation about lending us more money, we told them not to be con-
cerned because we did not expect to invest more money in doing work
in Iraq - that we were just going to collect our receivables for the
work we had already done, without taking on new work in the country.
Obviously, this was not a lifetime omitment and we also said we expec-
ted Iraq to be an imortant market when their current financial prob-
lems were resolved. Our financial statements will show a very large
loss for 1983 (unless unless more money than expected cames in between
now and the end of the year). This will mean that we are going to have
to have very careful discussion with the bank, and their willingness to
continue to loan us money will depend very much on their evaluation
of our potential exposure overseas. While they will continue to be
concerned about work in Iraq, they are more apt to go along with us if
we are able to show that our past bills have been paid up to date, and
that money has been appropriated by the government to pay our new bills.
It has been suggested that this risk could be minimized on the Makers'
and Energoprojekt projects by arranging to have those firms pay us frcn
overseas accounts rather than through Iraq. We should really get the
answer to whether this can be done before we allow our name to be submitted
for these projects, since once an Iraqi client has been told that TAC will
be involved, it will be politically very difficult to withdraw with the
explanation that we cannot do the work if we are to be paid from Iraq.
A-2
Fig. 6.38 "Future Commitments
in Iraq," TAC office memorandum
from John Hayes to Directors,
November 28, 1983. MIT Museum
Archives.
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Points Discussed with Bank of Boston
July 18, 1983
1. TAC has always had an international outlook. We see our involvement
overseas as a positive factor in providing a diversified income base,
since economies overseas tend to be countercyclical to the U.S. economy.This diversification has allowed us to continue to grow at times when
other purely domestic firms were having to retrench.
2. Our involvement in Iraq extends over 25 years; we have continued to work
there through five different governments each of which came to power in a
violent way. We are known there and understand the local scene. This gives
us advantages over a firm arriving to Iraq for the first time. Despite thedifficult current situation in Iraq, we see it as an important market for
us when the situation improves and we are putting great effort into
maintaining good relations with our clients there.
3. TAC has a Long Range Planning Committee. At its 1981 meeting in Woodstock
the committee noted that, in addition to earlier work, we had just signed
a contract for the Khulafa Street Project ($13.5 million) and negotiations
were proceeding for the expansion of the University of Baghdad ($16.5
million) other projects such as the Mosul Hotel ($4.0 million). The
Committee's decision was that while such work could be profitable, it was
not in the long term interest of the firm to have such a high proportion
of our total income concentrated overseas. The goal set was to generate atleast half of our income from the domesdtic U.S. market.
4. Since the Fall of 1981, we have not taken on any new projects in Iraq(other than special and limited situations such as the landscape and
interior work for the Council of Ministers Building). We have turned downinvitations to make proposals on projects such as the State Mosque and the
Raschd University).
5. We have now completed virtually all our contracts in Iraq. Our current
work on the University Expansion will be completed this month and will not
be resumed until the situation becomes clearerfhe Mosul Hotel will be
completed in iy if,0$ October and after that our only continuing work
in Iraq will be the site supervision work at the University and responding
to questions on other projects. The total amount of money we will spend on
projects in Iraq during the last six months of this year will be only$350,000 to $400,000, so there will be no major increase in our risk
there. While we would lose anticipated profits if payments from Iraq were
cut off, we have recovered all our costs on the work done there and have,
so far this year, received about $2 million more from Iraq than we have
spent on doing work there. All expenses of the Iraqi projects have been
paid and we have no outstanding liabilities on the Iraqi work.
Fig. 6.39 "Points Discussed With
Bank of Boston," TAC office
memorandum, July 18, 1983. MIT
Museum Archives.
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